Active (dis)engagement: the gendered production of political apathy in Israel by Natanel, Katherine Louise
 
 
 
Natanel, Katherine Louise (2013) Active (dis)engagement: the gendered production of 
political apathy in Israel. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18067 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners.  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge.  
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Active (Dis)engagement: 
The Gendered Production of Political 
Apathy in Israel 
 
 
Katherine Louise Natanel 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Gender Studies 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Gender Studies 
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences 
SOAS, University of London 
 2 
Declaration 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from 
the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in 
the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed:  Date:  28 January 2014 
 
 
  
  
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For David Snelling, Gary Johnson and Ann Glogau Bibi, 
who taught me the importance of listening and laughter.  
  
 4 
Thesis Abstract 
Ma la’asot?  ‘What can we do?’  
Spoken with a sigh and a shrug of the shoulders, this sentiment often brings to a close 
the tense pause which follows discussions of ha sichsuch, ‘the quarrel,’ in Israel-
Palestine.  As expressed by Leftist Jewish Israelis, the phrase ma la’asot becomes a 
way of conveying political emotions of despair, helplessness and disappointment at 
the same time as it presents a practical question of power.  Faced with the seeming 
intractability of conflict, the interminability of a stalled peace process and increasing 
social and political conservatism, those Jewish Israelis opposed to Israel’s occupation 
of the Palestinian Territories find themselves at loose ends: what to do indeed? 
While an extensive body of research critically engages with ‘the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict’ through lenses including history, political economy and activism, this thesis 
shifts focus to the production of stasis.  In considering how things stay the same, we 
might better understand the roots and routes of how they may become different.  
Drawing upon one year of ethnographic research with Jewish Israelis living in Tel 
Aviv and West Jerusalem, this thesis explores the processes, practices and beliefs 
which sustain normalcy in conditions of conflict.  Central to this investigation is 
gender – as an aspect of subjectivity, relation of power and ordering principle of state 
and society, gender is integral to the conduct of everyday life and the maintenance of 
political realities.  Thus, this thesis asks what a gender analysis of Jewish Israeli 
society might tell us about the trajectory of ‘Israel-Palestine,’ what the textures of 
normalcy, apathy and stasis mean for our visions of the future.   
Moving through degrees of division and entanglement, modes of avoidance and 
activism, sites of investment and withdrawal, and instantiations of normalcy and 
rupture, this thesis foregrounds the gendered subjectivities and sociality central to the 
production and maintenance of power in Israel-Palestine.  By attempting to unpick to 
relationship between gender and political stasis, this thesis ultimately looks to 
domination in hopes of finding new paths to transformation. 
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Introduction 
Bruchim Ha'Baim [Welcome] 
 
“Now you are free,” he says with a smile. 
The workshop has come to a close and slowly I make my way west, home to Tel Aviv 
from Birzeit University in the Occupied West Bank.  The last two days have marked 
my first independent trip to the West Bank and Occupied Territories – not part of an 
activist tour or solidarity initiative as a matter of research, this time I travelled to 
Ramallah and Birzeit to attend a workshop hosted by the Institute for Women’s 
Studies at Birzeit University in partnership with Warwick University, United 
Kingdom.  Remarkable for the political commitment and academic rigour 
demonstrated by those present at the workshop, the kindness extended by shopkeepers 
and strangers in the city, and the intense beauty of the surrounding hills burned pink 
and orange at sunrise and sunset, my time in the West Bank feels cathartic.  Upon 
leaving the university campus at the close of the session I was apprehensive at the 
thought of passing through Qalandia checkpoint on the way to East Jerusalem – this 
would not be the first time I experienced the protocols and practices of Israel’s border 
policies, but it felt a ‘first’ as someone who had transgressed the occupation in a 
manner aligned with my politics and potential.  As I nervously readied to travel the 
distance from Birzeit to Qalandia, other workshop participants recounted stories of 
mobility restricted and denied as Palestinian residents of the West Bank.  Confined to 
the areas surrounding home and university, limited to travel within the West Bank, 
allowed entry solely into East Jerusalem – each woman spelled out different terms of 
her seeming incarceration.  In contrast, my trepidation at border crossing was a 
privilege. 
On the bus I am the only non-Palestinian passenger, staring out the window with wide 
eyes as iconic images come into focus upon the looming grey Wall: a young Yassir 
Arafat, a girl holding balloons drawn by Banksy – a creature beside her offers another 
floating globe to add to the clutch which might lift her over the wall, “Do you need 
more, little girl?” – graffiti in English intended for an international audience and their 
cameras.  The bus stops.  The passengers exit and I try to stay on board.  “See if they 
are nice today,” the driver suggests with a shrug when I tell him that I had heard 
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international travellers are occasionally allowed to remain on the bus with the ill and 
elderly rather than queuing for the turnstiles and document check.  Two soldiers 
board: a man and woman who look as if they are barely out of high school.  The 
woman checks IDs of those still on the bus, while the man stands behind her with a 
hulking weapon.  They arrive to my seat.  I smile.  She checks my passport and orders 
me off the bus to the queue behind the fence. 
In the growing heat we stand clumped together behind the wire fence, not pushing, not 
shouting, but not pleased – the wait is long and irritating.  Many around me are 
students, with books and backpacks, and I am struck by the difference to my commute 
in London where travelling to university on the Tube at times felt trying.  Held like 
cattle behind the fence, some chat while others, like me, look out at lanes of traffic 
and auto bays where soldiers and private security agents inspect cars with guns at the 
ready.  They largely seem bored, these agents of the Israeli state, laughing, joking and 
scuffling between vehicles, inspecting languidly and shouting derisively when needed.  
We wait for the turnstiles, slowly drawing nearer.  These gates – similar to those 
permitting entrance to Tel Aviv University and the touristic Dead Sea beaches – allow 
approximately five people to pass between each ‘click’ and ‘beep,’ sometimes more 
and sometimes less.  They seem to start and stop randomly, jarring and embarrassing 
whomever attempts to pass when the gate jams.  Click!  Thunk.  The woman ahead of 
me gets jammed, looks back at her friends and carries on chatting from within the 
cage of metal bars.  Around me others talk, text and wait – I feel there is some kind of 
solidarity in this waiting and slamming, that there is something subversively routine 
about it, that the laughter and conversation of those around me should embarrass the 
young Israeli soldiers, though they think nothing of it.   
Green light.  Click! Beep!  Go.  I am sandwiched between two young men in black t-
shirts as my turn in the stiles arrives.  Click!  Thunk.  The man ahead of me is jammed.  
My eyes are wide, my heart is racing.  He leans against the wall between the bars, 
waiting.  Green light.  Click!  Beep!  Go.  I am through the turnstile and follow what I 
have seen others do: place bags on the x-ray conveyor belt, walk to the large window 
with more soldiers at the ready.  I press my passport to the window as those before me 
have done, only to be directed to use the scanner – as an American citizen my 
documents are more ‘advanced’ than the various paper permits issued to different 
categories of Palestinians.  Waved through, I grab my bags and wait again for another 
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turnstile and green light – the inner sanctum is protected on both ends.  Green light.  
Click! Beep!  Go.  I step out into the exit chute with one more turnstile to pass before 
reaching the line of empty buses.  I sigh in relief and turn to thank the young man 
behind me, whose subtle guidance – through nods and gestures – made my border 
crossing less confusing, humiliating, frustrating and frightening than it might have 
been otherwise. 
“Now you are free,” he says with a smile.1 
 
Occupation Unravelled 
Emerging through the account above is an image of occupation, colonisation and 
domination in the context of Israel-Palestine, as experienced and understood by a 
white, middle-class American feminist researcher who possesses the social and 
economic capital – the privilege – to cross a boundary which divides relative freedom 
from daily experiences of oppression.  Clear within this narrative are relations of 
power, modes of regulation, technologies of control and even sites of contestation as a 
bus is emptied of its human cargo at the behest of security, demarcating zones of ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ along with categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ within the material terrain of a 
military checkpoint.  Here identities are suspected and confirmed, threat is assessed 
and dispelled, and belonging is differentially produced and denied as individuals 
traverse the threshold ostensibly separating Israel from Palestine.  Whether citizen-
soldiers, occupied subjects or doctoral researchers, the movement of bodies across and 
within a constructed border paints a familiar picture to those who would see it: guns, 
walls and fences; youth, aggression and barely checked power; humiliation, 
frustration, fatigue and steadfastness.  Yet remaining hidden in relation to this image 
of domination is the other side of the checkpoint, what lies beyond the turnstiles once 
the final green light is granted.  Certainly, the Israeli state commands a robust tourism 
industry replete with campaigns and advertisements ushering visitors into the dusty 
antiquity of Jerusalem’s Old City lanes and the European modernity of Tel Aviv’s 
cafes and beaches.  So too scholarship and analyses critical of Israel’s 46-year 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories and annexation of East Jerusalem and the 
                                                
1 Field notes, 13 April 2011. 
 
  
 13 
Golan Heights makes visible the political economy which continues to connect Israel 
with Palestine, despite ostensible separation.  Through the circulation of these 
discourses, images and critiques we indeed see Israel – sometimes modern, liberal and 
democratic, other times repressive, colonialist and despotic.  However, rarely do we 
travel the road from Qalandia through Jerusalem to Tel Aviv in order to ask how its 
end might produce and maintain its beginning, how lives made possible and liveable 
on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea might depend upon lives constrained and even 
cut short in the hills of Birzeit and Ramallah.   
Green light.  Click!  Beep!  Go. 
In a journey beyond the checkpoint, this thesis attempts to make visible the micro-
political logics which produce and maintain the material realities, practices and 
experiences conveyed through the account above.  Beyond the turnstiles and soldiers 
of Qalandia, a coach travels to the East Jerusalem bus station and a researcher walks 
toward the city’s west in order to board a monit sherut, or mini-bus, bound for Tel 
Aviv.  This vehicle passes Jewish Orthodox neighbourhoods before reaching the 
highway which winds westward toward the White City, where restaurants bustle and 
hum as the sun sets blazing orange in blue waters behind the beachfront boardwalk.  
At the road’s end lies a kind of normalcy which appears entirely disparate from 
everyday life in the West Bank, where even in relatively affluent Ramallah an elderly 
man turns earth with a donkey and plough in a tiny plot, if one walks far enough into 
the Tahta neighbourhood at sunrise.  Yet despite its seeming polarity, normalcy at the 
(Jewish Israeli) end of the road relies upon and arises through the relations of power 
which necessitate agricultural subsistence within cityscapes, lock academics at Birzeit 
University within metaphorical and material prison cells, and fashion understandings 
of ‘freedom’ through experiences of oppression at the border.  Read thus, continuity 
replaces disparity as occupation, colonisation and domination trace a thread binding 
Israel with Palestine and Jewish Israelis with Palestinians. 
In an attempt to provide texture and complexity to this continuity, through gender 
analysis this thesis shifts focus to consider the production and maintenance of stasis.  
Contributing to a growing body of critical research which engages with Israel-
Palestine through lenses including history (Shlaim 2000, 2010; Abu El-Haj 2001; 
Masalha 2003; Khalidi 2006; Pappe 2006; Pappe and Hilal 2010), sociology (Lentin 
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2000; Shafir and Peled 2002; Ron 2003), political economy (Gordon 2008; Hever 
2010; Abdo 2011) critical geography (Yiftachel 2006; Weizman 2007) and activism 
(De Jong 2011; Richter-Devroe 2011, 2012; Weizman 2013), this thesis appraises the 
attitudes and actions of Jewish Israelis with regard to the occupied Palestinian 
Territories and annexed East Jerusalem in the hopes that by understanding how things 
stay the same, we might better understand the roots and routes of how they may 
become different.  Here political inaction and disengagement emerge as underwritten 
by so much knowing, caring, seeing, feeling and doing, as gender analysis reveals 
degrees of division and entanglement, modes of avoidance and activism, sites of 
investment and withdrawal, and instantiations of normalcy and rupture in a context of 
domination.  Through centralising the relations which bind subjectivities with 
sociality and wider political realities, this thesis draws Israel together with Palestine 
and in doing so asks what the textures of normalcy, apathy and stasis might mean for 
our visions of the future. 
The Trouble with Normalcy 
Within the context of a widely perceived two-sided conflict between categories of 
‘(Jewish) Israelis’ and ‘Palestinians’ (Hilal and Pappe 2010: 6), the desire for and 
construction of normality constitutes a growing, if marginal, area of study.  In shifting 
focus from rupturing events to  “the monotony of an unresolved conflict,” the 
mundane is appraised as a site wherein “aborted events and frustrated expectations” 
might accumulate with significant implications for both stasis and transformation 
(Allen 2013: 27).  Primarily undertaken by anthropologists working with Palestinian 
communities in the West Bank, studies of normalcy depict “getting by” Israel’s 
occupation, adapting to its disruption of daily life, violence visited upon bodies and 
dislocation from homes and histories.  Lori Allen’s (2005, 2008) work in the West 
Bank highlights the particular kind of agency which accompanies “getting used to it,” 
or Taw’wwudna [Arabic], in practices of managing and adapting to the dynamism of 
occupation during the second intifada, as individuals and communities “tame violence” 
and reincorporate the extreme into the ordinary.  Tobias Kelly’s (2008) scholarship 
unfolds during the same period in the West Bank and looks to the ways in which the 
desire for “ordinary life” in a context of sustained political violence may take on 
political and ethical charges, as aspiration critically reflects the gap between what “is” 
and what “ought to be.”  Penny Johnson, Lamis Abu Nahleh and Annelies Moors 
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(2009) present comparative scholarship focusing on marriage practises during the first 
and second intifadas, again drawing attention to how the routinisation of violence in 
the latter uprising extended to practices of everyday life, as “political marriages” were 
supplanted by the material displays which characterised a more quiescent pre-intifada 
period.  In her post-intifadas work with Palestinian women in the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and Israel, Sophie Richter-Devroe (2011) foregrounds how the pursuit of 
normalcy and joy might constitute acts of resistance not only to the Israeli occupation, 
but also to internal Palestinian power structures rooted in patriarchal and social forms 
of control.   
Collectively, this scholarship reveals critical aspects of conflict previously elided by a 
focus on violent events and macro-level politics, insisting that survival, sumud 
[Arabic: steadfastness] and normalcy can tell us something new about power in Israel-
Palestine.  Then what is fundamentally different about these practices, processes, 
ideals and aspirations among Jewish Israelis who share this frame of conflict with 
Palestinians?  While methods of “getting by” practiced by Palestinian populations – 
from travel patterns (Allen 2008; Richter-Devroe 2011) to modes of commemoration 
(Khalili 2007; Allen 2008), narration (Sayigh 1998; Allen 2008; Kassem 2011), 
marriage (Johnson, Abu Nahleh and Moors 2009; Jad 2009) and desire (Kelly 2008) – 
might be mirrored in mechanisms developed by Jewish Israelis, these latter practices 
unfold in relation to domination not as ‘subject to,’ but rather ‘productive of.’  With 
power at play within and among structures of practice (de Certeau 1984; Mitchell 
1990), longing for a normal life then assumes a function and value apart from the 
normalisation of uncertainty, fear, violence and despair among Palestinians, while 
remaining subject to these very forces.   
The trouble with normalcy among Jewish Israelis is precisely what it produces, elides 
and maintains in Israel-Palestine.  Emerging in tandem with conflict and occupation, 
among Jewish Israelis normalcy operates in part through its capacity to gloss, 
streamline and consolidate, promising a sense of stability and certainty within the 
precarity of everyday life.  Yet paradoxically, here normalcy depends upon that which 
it purports to overcome or erase, becoming a way of life and state of mind among 
those whose relative power and privilege require maintenance of the status quo.  In 
this, a state of flourishing appears to exist despite conflict while taking root in its very 
perpetuation, an apparent contradiction which makes possible “the good life” (see 
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Mendel 2009, 2013; Vick 2010; Ochs 2011; Simon 2012; Deger 2012; Natanel 2013).  
At risk of becoming a euphemism in the context of Israel-Palestine, ‘conflict’ remains 
central to normality even as the term effectively renders invisible multiple lines of 
division and sites of contestation, including those internal to a society which seeks to 
maintain its primacy.  So too ‘occupation’ becomes stitched into the fabric of 
everyday life while adherence to this term potentially masks how Israel’s control of 
Palestinian lands and population depends not only upon ostensibly temporary military 
force, but also upon the development of social and political infrastructure, systems of 
economic and judicial regulation, and practices of territorial sequestration and 
confiscation consistent with settler colonialism (see Khalidi 1992; Kimmerling 1983; 
Shafir 1989, 1999; Abu El-Haj 2001; Masalha 2003; Hajjar 2005; Khalidi 2006; 
Massad 2006; Pappe 2006; Yiftachel 2006; Weizman 2007; Gordon 2008; Lentin 
2008; Weizman 2013).  While normalcy in differential contexts does not remain free 
from relations of power, its pursuit among Jewish Israelis serves to produce, elide and 
maintain colonisation, annexation, segregation, blockade, de-development, 
displacement and dispossession – key aspects of ‘conflict’ and ‘occupation’ in Israel-
Palestine.  Thus underwritten by structures of privilege and power, at stake in Jewish 
Israeli normalcy is the perpetuation of domination.   
Ma La’asot? 
While the above discussion sheds light upon the ties binding normality with conflict 
and domination in Israel-Palestine, this is not to suggest that all Jewish Israelis 
actively consent to participation.  Rather, hegemony makes visible the ways in which 
domination may be secured through both active and passive assent, creating the 
possibility that even those who resist or oppose may become implicated in the 
maintenance of power.  As advanced by Antonio Gramsci (1971), ‘hegemony’ has 
been widely translated into popular discourse as ‘common sense,’ a given order which 
seems natural, inevitable and enduring.  In this parlance, hegemony provides the 
stability and values from which individual decisions are made, beliefs shaped and 
courses of action pursued, firmly embedding the individual within a wider collectivity.  
Yet as developed by Gramsci (1971), at its inception hegemony speaks directly to 
domination, or the securing of control through leadership.  For Gramsci (1971: 52-53), 
hegemony provides the means by which a dominant group maintains its position of 
leadership through passive or active sanction by subordinate or subaltern social groups.  
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Dependent only partially upon material force or coercion, domination relies upon 
processes of “continuous absorption” made possible through mechanisms and 
apparatuses of political, moral and intellectual influence and attraction (Gramsci 1971: 
58-60).  Collectively, these structures and relations generate the conditions of 
normality, the ‘common sense’ of everyday life in a given context.  
Thus through hegemony, the possibility arises that those who articulate and even 
practice resistance might become ‘absorbed’ into domination.  Importantly, within the 
context of Israel-Palestine hegemony provides a means through which to appraise how 
the political despair articulated by many Jewish Israelis opposed to occupation and 
annexation bolsters the very practices and policies in question.  Indeed, at its inception 
this research project sought to unpick the sense of disillusionment and inefficacy 
reflected in the phrase “Ma la’asot?” [What can we do?], which trails open-ended at 
the close of conversations with self-described political Leftists.2  More than purely 
rhetorical, this query relays a sense of shared fatalism, hopelessness and 
disenchantment with action, accompanied by an admission that action indeed should 
be taken.   
This very tension – when knowledge of what occurs is met with inaction or 
effacement3 – points toward apathy, a socio-political phenomenon examined to a 
limited extent in other contexts.4  Framed primarily in terms of detachment and 
declining political participation (Rosenberg 1954; Sevy 1983; Boyer 1984; Eliasoph 
1997, 1998; Dolan and Holbrook 2001; Hay 2007), explicit studies of apathy 
undertaken by political scientists and sociologists are complimented by psychological 
and anthropological approaches which connect these practices to interpersonal and 
intimate dimensions.  Here “alienation” in Argentina and Libya (Auyero 2007; al-
Werfalli 2011) meets with cynicism and “getting by” among Palestinians (Allen 2005, 
2008, 2013; Kelly 2008; Johnson, Abu Nahleh and Moors 2009; Richter-Devroe 
                                                
2 This Left-to-Right political spectrum is specific to Jewish Israeli society and Israel-Palestine; as 
detailed in the following chapters, here categories of political Left and Right are defined largely in 
relation to matters of conflict and security.  
 
3 Thanks to Laleh Khalili for this concise working definition; email communication 5 April 2011. 
 
4 Studies focusing on ‘political apathy’ have been primarily conducted in the United States and United 
Kingdom, though Hay’s (2007) work extends to include a wider spectrum of member states in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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2011) and “denial” in studies of political violence and the Holocaust (Cohen 2001).  
Though remaining largely undefined in this collective body of work, apathy emerges 
enmeshed with wider global trends, a relational and social process, bound to attitude 
and perception, and rooted in subjective aspects of emotion and desire.  Yet in its 
conceptual thickness how can ‘apathy’ account for the participation of 66.6 per cent of 
the voting public in the January 2013 elections in Israel (Ha’aretz 2013)?  Is this 
apathy at all? 
Political disenchantment and inaction among Jewish Israelis presents a complex and 
contradictory puzzle, at times active and engaged yet deeply and intimately 
dispassionate.  When coupled with conditions of sustained conflict, here appraisals of 
what we should do break against the limitations of what we can do given the seeming 
enormity and impossibility of the wider context.  In adhering to the frame of apathy to 
explain the ways in which the construction of normalcy secures domination even 
through resistance, this thesis asks us to rethink our assumptions around the term: can 
apathy involve action and care?  What are its textures, mechanisms and logics?  How 
does it shape selves, communities and realities?  Here apathy is not solely a matter of 
political practice or participation, but emerges from the tensions between conflict and 
normalcy, politics and intimacy, as these assumed dualisms collapse to produce and 
maintain domination.  In this thesis apathy is conceptualised as active disengagement, 
a tension captured by the following query:  
When a desire to change the status quo is simultaneously accompanied by 
recognition of implication in its production and maintenance, what does this 
do? 
Expressed in the knowing admission, “I am a part of it, whether I like it or not,” for 
many research participants this tension results in a seeming paralysis underwritten by 
knowing, caring, seeing, feeling and doing.  Apathy then presents a complex relation 
which draws together subjects and interpersonal relations with institutions, society and 
state.  Importantly, as this thesis will illustrate, active disengagement among Jewish 
Israelis is critically structured and made possible through hegemonic patterns of 
gender emerging at the level of everyday life. 
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The Politics of Everyday Life 
From scholarship by James C. Scott (1985) to Diane Singerman (1995) and Asef 
Bayat (1997, 2010), the everyday has increasingly become a site of investigation into 
the complex relationships framing politics, power and social relations.  Whether 
“everyday forms of resistance” in Malaysia (Scott 1985), “the quiet encroachment of 
the ordinary” in Iran (Bayat 1997) or “popular political expression” in Egypt 
(Singerman 1995), studies of the mundane reveal structures of practice (de Certeau 
1984: xv-xvi) shaping subjectivities and lived realities across diverse contexts.  
Collectively, this scholarship demonstrates how “[…] a relation (always social) 
determines its terms, and not the reverse, and … each individual is a locus in which an 
incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational determinations 
interact” (de Certeau 1984: xi).  In using this prism of the everyday or ordinary, 
scholars of Israel-Palestine have produced critical ethnographies linking subjects and 
social relations with Israel’s continuing occupation of the Palestinian Territories.  
Whether centring on (Jewish) Israeli or Palestinian narratives, experiences or practices, 
these accounts provide glimpses into the textures and machinations of daily life while 
revealing individual strategies and structural frameworks for negotiating sustained 
political violence.  From Julie Peteet’s (1994) first intifada account of beatings and 
imprisonment turned masculine rites of passage among Palestinian men in the West 
Bank to Juliana Ochs’ (2011) second intifada ethnography of security and suspicion 
as embodied practices linking Jewish Israeli subjects with the state, these insights into 
daily actions and perceptions shed significant light upon long-term trends and 
processes. 
Echoing sentiments that power may circulate and operate most effectively where it is 
least obvious (Gramsci 1971; Foucault 1998 [1978]; Mitchell 1990), the move to 
foreground the ordinary in contexts characterised by conflict highlights processes of 
repair and maintenance in conjunction with interruption.  As scholars of violence 
convincingly demonstrate, conflict may be sewn into the constitutive fabric of the 
everyday in ways less obvious and more pervasive than determined through a sole 
focus on violent events (Scheper-Hughes 1992; Das 2007).  In the context of Israel-
Palestine, this shift to the mundane additionally facilitates the meeting of scholarship 
located on either ‘side’ of the presumed divide between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians.  Through the everyday, narratives of suspicion and politics of security 
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practices among Jewish Israelis (Konopinski 2009; Ochs 2011) might indeed share a 
frame with accounts of sumud, or steadfastness, practiced by Palestinian residents of 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (Allen 2008; Kelly 2008; Johnson, Abu 
Nahleh and Moors 2009; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2009; Richter-Devroe 2011).  Through 
this lens, we might ultimately “sense the political” (Navaro-Yashin 2003) beneath the 
guise of stasis and normality which makes domination possible.   
Reading Power 
Yet in order to appraise the presence of politics and the circulation of power within 
these everyday structures of practice – to insist that a shared frame of analysis does 
not imply parity – there must be a shift to “defamiliarise” the everyday, to “make 
strange” the ordinary for purposes of drawing attention to the inconspicuous 
(Highmore 2002: 22).5  Framed by a historical legacy and continuing commitment to 
“telling stories differently” (Hemmings 2011), feminist gender analysis presents one 
such “interruptive strategy” (Brecht 1964 cited in Highmore 2002: 23).  As an aspect 
of subjectivity, relation of power and structure of states and societies, gender remains 
integral to the practices of everyday life; though often elided, gender itself exists as a 
structure of practice.  To foreground gender as a political and analytical category, then, 
is potentially to estrange the ordinary, particularly in studies of conflict and 
domination whose histories of gender-blindness limit the scope of both understanding 
and transformation.  Applying feminist gender analysis in search of power in the 
everyday is to ask critical questions of norms and normality, of divisions assumed 
static, of valuated space, place and politics.  Indeed, as illustrated by feminist scholars 
such as Cynthia Enloe (1989, 2010) and Diane Singerman (1995), the ostensibly 
depoliticised or apolitical spaces of the everyday domestic act as significant sites and 
forums for political thought, expression and action.  Maligned as “low politics” vis-à-
vis the “high politics” of states and elites, the too-neat division of private realms – 
associated with family and women – from those deemed ‘public’ exists an already 
political act (Singerman 1995: 5-9; Yuval-Davis 1997: 80).  In contexts of war, 
conflict and violence, often characterised as particularly masculinised enterprises 
(Cohn 1987; Enloe 1989; Cockburn 2007; Segal 2008), this imposed separation 
impacts access to political voice and available registers for action just as it influences 
                                                
5 Highmore’s imperative follows on Bertolt Brecht’s theory of estrangement, as delineated in work by 
Frederick Jameson (1991 cited in Highmore 2002: 22-24). 
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academic analyses (Enloe 2010: 22), shaping and reflecting prevailing roles, norms, 
codes and relations. 
However, a feminist gender analysis of everyday life among Jewish Israelis cannot 
unfold solely on the plane of those relations, codes and roles established between 
categories of women and men.  Rather, in order to fulfil its interruptive potential this 
analysis must account for contradiction, complexity and interrelation, and in doing so 
problematise and extend beyond those more obvious divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
to reveal what lies at stake in the production and maintenance of power.  Thus the lens 
adopted must be intersectional, attentive to “the complex, irreducible, varied, and 
variable effects which ensue when multiple axes of differentiation – economic, 
political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential – intersect in historically 
specific contexts” (Brah and Phoenix 2004: 76).  In this it must be postcolonial, 
concerned with the histories, legacies and continuing processes of empire and 
colonialism, as well as the ways in which these projects impact not only those 
subjected to domination, but also who participate in subjection (Fanon 1963; Said 
1978; Mohanty 1988; Spivak 1994).  So too a power-sensitive feminist gender 
analysis of the everyday must be transnational in scope, insistent upon the links 
binding local contexts, nations and states with global trends and processes, along with 
the embeddedness of practices within wider frames of neoliberal capitalism, 
globalisation, militarisation and geopolitics (Grewal and Kaplan 2000; Mohanty 2003; 
Shohat 2006; Riley, Mohanty and Pratt 2008; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Khalili 2011).  
With this critical means of estranging the ordinary and defamiliarising the everyday, 
the structures, practices, processes and beliefs which produce and sustain power begin 
to come into focus, along with the costs of their maintenance. 
Boundaries Of and In the Field 
In looking to everyday Jewish Israeli life to reveal the textures of apathy as it 
produces and maintains domination in Israel-Palestine, boundaries must be drawn 
around territory, population and locality for the purposes of analysis.  Importantly, in 
a feminist attempt to “tell stories differently” (Hemmings 2011) this thesis does not 
include an extended methodology section which appraises the strengths and 
weaknesses of diverse techniques and disciplinary frames, detailing the route through 
which the conduct of research was ultimately decided.  Rather, throughout the 
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subsequent chapters of the thesis I practice the chosen methodology, from the 
inclusion of auto-ethnographic material to in-depth readings of key interview 
narratives.  As such, the reader does not gain a sense of methods and methodological 
approaches opted against, nor is she privy to what remains unseen through these 
choices in research design.  However, through this manner of story telling the reader 
is woven seamlessly into the fabric of everyday life in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, 
allowing her to understand its complexity and contradictions more fully. 
Academically and politically, I practice and advocate engagement with the totality of 
‘Israel-Palestine,’ emphasising interrelation and connection rather than adhering to the 
principle of separation (Weizman 2007: 161-184; Gordon 2008: 197-222) which 
maintains physical, intellectual and ideological divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ 
‘here’ and ‘there.’  As this thesis will demonstrate, Israel exists inextricably bound 
with Palestine as Jewish Israeli society remains entangled with Palestinian citizens 
and subjects – to offer an analysis of ‘Israel’ without reference to ‘Palestine’ would be 
politically dubious and empirically misrepresentative.  Ultimately, I support the 
establishment of a single secular multi-national democratic state, with substantive 
reparations extended to those who have suffered displacement and loss at the hands of 
the colonial project.6  Yet in order to reach this horizon, we must first understand the 
operation of power as it maintains the status quo.  Thus, in thinking toward how we 
might conceive of ‘Israel-Palestine’ as a political reality rather than solely a pre-
figurative state of mind, I chose to study the political community of Jewish Israelis – 
those actors who dominate within the broader context – as enmeshed with ‘other’ 
collectivities.  Here, I find foundation in Hannah Arendt’s (1998 [1958]: 63-64) 
discussion of the polis: enclosed and divided by a series of walls and wall-like laws 
which separated public from private and interior from exterior, the Greek city yielded 
a political community explicitly through structures of inclusion and exclusion.  As 
these walls shelter, protect and separate, so too they create the communities whose 
interests drive collective politics and shape the contours of wider political realities.  
Within Israel-Palestine my concern lies with those who have historically possessed the 
                                                
6 This state must be established through consensus and redress the erasure of peoples, homes and 
histories – this is not the single Israeli Apartheid state which is increasingly becoming ‘fact on the 
ground.’ 
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political, legal, economic and discursive ability to construct and destroy these walls at 
will: Jewish Israelis. 
Yet numerous lines of differentiation cleave the category ‘Jewish Israeli,’ even while 
constructed to consolidate national identity and political community.  Experienced 
through intersecting vectors of gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, generation, 
religion and geopolitical location, ‘Jewish Israeliness’ cannot be understood as 
monolithic.  Rather relations of power and privilege circulate within the ranks of those 
who dominate; indeed, membership in a group does not guarantee uniform privilege, 
enfranchisement or belonging.  In keeping with the contours of hegemony among 
Jewish Israelis, this research focuses primarily upon the experiences, attitudes, beliefs, 
practices and aspirations of secular middle-class heterosexual Ashkenazi7 Jewish 
Israelis in relation to ‘conflict.’  Even as the face of Israel’s elected government 
changes over time – differentially including Mizrahi,8 Russian, Ethiopian, Druze and 
Palestinian representatives – Ashkenazi citizens continue to enjoy privilege and shape 
norms within Jewish Israeli society as a result of a history of ideological, political, 
economic and social dominance (Shafir and Peled 2002: 88; Sasson-Levy 2013: 28, 
33).  Intersecting with normative narratives, images and ideals of ‘Israeliness’ 
constructed through race, class, gender, religiosity and sexuality (Boyarin 1997; 
Lentin 2000; Kimmerling 2001; Shafir and Peled 2002), ethnic identity remains 
central to domination and its study in Israel-Palestine.  Thus while Mizrahi Jews now 
comprise the majority of Israel’s Jewish population rather than Ashkenazim (Lavie 
2011: 57; Abdo 2011: 89; Sasson-Levy 2013: 32) – and this latter category’s secular 
and middle-class proportions are admittedly in decline – an analytical focus on the 
minority constitutes a political decision.  Following Orna Sasson-Levy (2013: 33), 
despite changing demographics in Israel “[…] Ashkenaziness can be viewed as a 
resource, a form of symbolic capital that in turn grants access to additional resources.”  
As Israel’s Ashkenazi citizens continue to define the contours of hegemony among 
Jewish Israelis through current claims to power and the historical exercise of 
                                                
7 Though specific to Jews of Eastern European origin, the term ‘Ashkenazi’ has been extended within 
Jewish Israeli society to include those Jews immigrating to Israel from Europe and America; this thesis 
employs the inclusive understanding unless otherwise stated.  Recent critical scholarship by Orna 
Sasson-Levy (2013) details how this ethnic group has been constructed as Israel’s ‘white’ Jews, 
enjoying relative privilege and possessing features in common with whiteness in the United States. 
 
8 ‘Mizrahi’ describes Jews of North African or Middle Eastern origin. 
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dominance (Gramsci 1977: 333), this research project is concerned with their 
(in)action and influence. 
With these boundaries established, in October 2010 I departed London for Tel Aviv 
and twelve months of field research in Israel-Palestine.  Chosen for their differing 
proximities to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and histories of political violence, 
active research centred on Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, Israel’s two main population 
centres.  In addition to sharing the relative political, economic, social and historical 
privilege enjoyed by residents of urban locales vis-à-vis rural towns, villages, 
kibbutzim and moshavim (Yiftachel 2006: 223),9 these cities provided both contrast 
and continuity within Israel’s internationally recognised 1949 Armistice Agreements 
borders (Shlaim 2000: 41-47; Shlaim 2010: 31).10  Indeed, riven by the ‘seam zone’ 
separating (Jewish) West Jerusalem from (Palestinian) East, everyday life in 
Jerusalem is commonly juxtaposed with Tel Aviv, where a cosmopolitan city meets 
the waters of the Mediterranean Sea; yet within both sites Jewish Israelis desire, 
pursue and practice normalcy within a shared national frame.   
During the course of research, I conducted 29 in-depth semi-structured interviews in 
each location, contacting participants through ‘snowball sampling’ largely made 
possible by the support and social networks of my Jewish Israeli family and friends.11  
In the interest of exploring gender as an explicitly relational structure, these 58 
interviews were evenly split between Jewish Israeli women and men who defined 
themselves as politically ‘Leftist’ and were above the age of conscription;12 the 
project’s generational range thus extends from early 20s to mid-80s, even as its 
                                                
9 Kibbutzim and moshavim are two forms of rural collective organisation in Israel; while both 
emphasise community labour and agriculture, kibbutzim often demonstrate an ideological (socialist) 
subscription to shared wealth among members, whereas moshavim permit individual ownership and are 
rooted in “the ideology of the family” (Nevo 1991: 276). 
 
10 Negotiations in 1949 resulted in agreed borders between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, 
successively; according to these agreements, the bounded area of the Israeli state does not include the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula or entirety of Jerusalem. 
 
11 As a non-Jewish, non-Israeli researcher married to an Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli with family in Tel 
Aviv, I experienced an inside-outside social location throughout the time of fieldwork.  While family 
ties brought me ‘inside’ Jewish Israeli society and opened social networks, the ethno-national aspects of 
my positionality continued to maintain my location ‘outside.’  
 
12 Both Jewish Israeli women and men are subject to mandatory conscription, beginning upon 
completion of high school.     
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demographic profile remains distinctly Ashkenazi and middle-class.  The interplay of 
ethnicity, race and social class gained complexity through the inclusion of a small 
number of participants who identify as Mizrahi or ‘Arab Jew,’ as these individuals 
often recounted racialised experiences of economic and social marginalisation.  
Among participants in both locations, sexuality and martial status constituted 
important variables as a spectrum of experiences and attractions necessarily shapes 
individual beliefs and practices.  So too a self-professed degree of political 
engagement became critical to narratives and subsequent analyses; while I expected to 
interview two categories of Jewish Israeli ‘activists’ and ‘non-activists,’ research 
participants presented a rich continuum ranging from “former activists” to “should be 
activists,” “passive activists,” “couch activists,” “sometimes activists,” “radical 
activists” and “recovering activists.”  Importantly, this diverse participant group is 
bound together through their specific relationship to politics in Israel-Palestine, a kind 
of melancholic attachment of despair, disillusionment and fatigue which seemingly 
precludes action. 
During the interview exchanges, discussion centred on five primary topic areas, 
determined through a process of refinement in response to early interviews: 1) 
personal background, including military service; 2) relationship to and experiences of 
political activism; 3) understanding of Israel’s occupation and experiences of conflict; 
4) politics and family relations; and 5) perception of ability to influence or transform 
wider realities.  After securing verbal consent, the interviews took place in public 
cafes or private homes and lasted between 60 and 120 minutes, during which time I 
recorded accounts and responses in the form of hand-written notes.13  While these 
notes may not convey the subtleties of hesitation and intonation in the same manner as 
recorded audio data, this mode of recording set participants at ease and granted 
silences the space in which to become intimate reflections.  After each session, the 
interview notes were supplemented with descriptions of the surrounding environment, 
the atmosphere of exchange and any additional observations relevant to the data.  At 
this time, note of pauses, silences and changes in bodily comportment or vocal 
                                                
13 Throughout the course of field study I developed a system of codes and shorthand, which allowed me 
to take notes quickly and accurately while bypassing the effects of introducing digital recording 
equipment to the interview environment.  Many interview participants commented positively on this 
practice, conveying a preference for written rather than audio records.  As reproduced here, all 
transcriptions have been anonymised for purposes of confidentiality.  
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intonation were inserted into the written record, which was transcribed within two 
days of the interview session.   
However, in order to understand and capture the textures and nuances of everyday life 
in relation to conflict and domination, interviews would not suffice.  Throughout the 
duration of research, I additionally undertook over 300 days of ethnographic 
participant-observation in everyday life, recording varying experiences of the 
mundane from informal conversations and personal travels to participation in large-
scale political demonstrations and solidarity actions.  Beginning with three months of 
ulpan – a state-sponsored Hebrew language programme – I became immersed in 
everyday Jewish Israeli life even as I remained an outsider; importantly, this non-
belonging allowed me to freshly experience the discourses, processes and practices 
which generate community, from language school lessons to holiday gatherings and 
discussions of politics.  The thesis gains its auto-ethnographic lens from these 
experiences and encounters, drawing my personal story into contact with wider 
political and social meanings in Jewish Israeli society. 
As I sought experiences available to the Jewish Israelis from whom I expected 
engagement, recorded observations of the everyday increasingly spilled into sites of 
political action.  Beginning with an October 2010 olive harvesting trip in the West 
Bank with Rabbis for Human Rights, I pursued available avenues of political action 
and engagement while noting their prevailing dynamics and narratives.  Slowly, I 
came to understand my role as a catalyst, as trips to visit friends and colleagues in 
(Palestinian) Wadi Ara, Ramallah and Nablus provoked reactions among Jewish 
Israeli family and friends; these tensions provided a clear sense of the intimate social 
dynamics which would become central to my research.  Ultimately, political action 
would come to roost at ‘home’ in Tel Aviv during the 2011 summer of social protests 
against the cost of living in Israel.  Spurred by frustration among young middle-class 
Jewish Israelis, tent encampments, demonstrations and protest rallies would re-ignite 
hope among many of the politically disillusioned, that body of actors central to my 
research.  Thus with the summer of potential came renewed participant-observation, 
as I reconnected with interview participants in order to learn what now compelled 
them to action. 
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In these ways, my research moved beyond ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine,’ conflict and 
occupation, action and inaction, to become a nuanced study of what tethers 
individuals and communities to the comfort of the everyday, even as a sustaining 
sense of normalcy exacts great physical, moral, personal and political costs.  
Contradiction, complexity and tension then frame the voices emerging within the 
pages of this thesis, yet the resulting analysis maintains focus on power, driven by the 
certainty that as prevailing structures, narratives, practices, beliefs and aspirations 
produce political effects, so too do our analyses (Mohanty 1988: 69). 
 
A Tapestry of the Ordinary 
In creating a portrait of everyday life and domination among Jewish Israelis, this 
thesis draws together multiple threads to weave a tapestry of the ordinary suffused 
with power.  While I rejected sewing, weaving and knitting during my early teenage 
years in an act of burgeoning feminist resistance, these crafts now provide 
metaphorical tools particularly suited to the transmission of my analysis.  Cross-stitch, 
weft and warp, knit and purl – each technique speaks to the ways in which threads of 
varying shape, size and composition combine to create a whole, a coherent material 
structure.  Yet so too the resulting fabric may be pulled, unwoven and unravelled to 
reveal its threads once more.  No less robust for the undoing, elemental strands might 
again be sewn together, yielding a new pattern borne of the original fibres.  This thesis, 
then, stands in part a reclamation of a feminine, feminist craft. 
Within the fabric of this thesis, three layers of narrative weave together the elemental 
threads of political apathy in Israel-Palestine.  At the level of theory, the central 
filament of gender emerges as constituted through and productive of hegemonic 
patterns, as manifest in prevailing norms, codes, roles and relations.  Understood as 
both dynamic and structural, within this thesis gender is interwoven with the threads 
of space, normalcy, resistance and politics as together these theoretical frames create 
the fabric of domination.  Importantly, in the interest of “telling stories differently” 
(Hemmings 2011) these theoretical threads are laced throughout the subsequent 
chapters; rather than appearing within a single chapter or comprehensive ‘theoretical 
framework,’ this thesis explicitly interweaves theory as an experiment with form.  At 
the level of experience, twelve months of fieldwork in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem 
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provide the loom upon which this thesis is woven.  Structurally, chapters unfold in a 
form which mirrors my period of research in Israel-Palestine, moving from 
familiarisation with context into a growing understanding of division and 
entanglement, on to normality produced and maintained, then to political action 
pursued and resisted, and finally to stasis secured.  At the level of metaphor, weaving 
provides a means of visualising the textures and patterns through which domination is 
generated, recognised, resisted, entrenched and perhaps undone.  From the guise of 
tightly woven normality threads begin to appear and unravel, becoming disentangled 
and re-stitched within the fabric of each chapter and the thesis as a coherent material; 
ultimately, these threads are rewoven into a pattern of radical possibility.  
Unfolding in five core chapters, this gendered analysis of political apathy among 
Jewish Israelis thus assumes an intentional form produced through feminist acts of un-
stitching and re-weaving.  This approach is not only in keeping with the assertion that 
stories fundamentally matter (Hemmings 2011), but also draws attention to how we 
tell these stories, as selves and social formations emerge in part through the 
construction of narratives (Lentin 2000: 3; Hemmings 2011: 5, 26).  Chapter One 
presents the already-woven tapestry of normality, exploring the ways in which a 
single thread – gender – structures and normalises hegemonic narratives, institutions 
and politics within Jewish Israeli society.  Chapter Two begins the process of un-
stitching through examining how principles of separation – ‘us here’ and ‘them there’ 
– exist underwritten by entanglement, as points of contact with and dependency upon 
‘others’ emerge critical to the maintenance of Jewish Israeli normalcy.  Chapter Three 
subsequently appraises the mechanisms through which normality is actively repaired 
and maintained after rupture, as politics intrude upon intimate realms through the 
enmeshment of conflict with the everyday.  Chapter Four investigates resistance to 
this normalisation, focusing on avenues for oppositional political action available to 
Jewish Israelis and the ways in which they might become re-woven with power.  
Chapter Five engages with the 2011 summer of social protests in Israel and follows 
the trajectory of these events as, through subscribing to an explicitly ‘apolitical 
politics,’ political action ultimately secured the status quo.  Weaving the personal with 
the political throughout, this thesis presents a tapestry of domination in Israel-
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Palestine with the hopes of offering a critical point of intervention through which it 
might be transformed.14
                                                
14 This guiding impetus and turn of phrase is inspired by Clare Hemmings’ (2011: 20) recent work, 
which maps the political grammar of feminist theory and in doing so “[…] offer[s] a rigorous point of 
intervention through which Western feminist stories might be transformed.” 
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Chapter One     
The Everyday of Occupation – HaYom-Yom [Routine] 
 
“Now are you ready for this?  I don’t think you are ready.  Every woman, when she 
sees this she’s jealous.  Are you ready?  Take a look at this…  Can you believe the 
size of this closet?!”  My mother and I stood in the doorway of what was admittedly 
an enormous walk-in clothes closet, surveying shelves of shoes beside racks of dresses 
and trousers, everything organised and indeed impressively expansive.  We had just 
climbed the stairs to the new apartment’s second storey after a tour of the kitchen and 
children’s rooms on the lower level – now our tour guide waited expectantly for a sign 
of appreciation.   
After seven months of fieldwork, in May 2011 I received a visit from my mother, a 
mid-Western American, on her first trip to the Middle East.  Residing in a small town 
in northern Wisconsin, for my mother Tel Aviv and Jerusalem had remained largely 
imagined sites, though photographs and stories from my previous travels to the region 
introduced European cafes, white sand beaches and haute cuisine to fantasies of 
camels, deserts and danger.  Happily we passed ten days together, journeying from 
Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem, Jaffa to Bethlehem, traversing and binding together the 
multiple landscapes and narratives which constitute the breadth of Israel-Palestine.  
With months of research behind me and more ahead, my eyes had grown tired despite 
my best efforts to retain freshness, as with each passing day I lived an increasingly 
routine life in Tel Aviv.  Events and people which appeared extraordinary, out of 
place or in specific places only – the Palestinian workers at a neighbouring 
construction site, the Eritrean grocery stockers at corner shops, the invasive routine of 
bag inspection and metal detection at shopping malls – had somehow become my 
everyday.  No less surprising or angering, but somehow seemingly normal.  To my 
mother’s eyes, however, nothing was taken for granted; every curiosity and 
incongruity loomed large, becoming the subject of inquiry and explanation.   
This clarity still intact, the holiday concluded with a family gathering in a small city 
north of Tel Aviv, where my partner Guy’s relatives arrived to meet my mother and 
bid her farewell.  The day was magnificent, warm and sunny under the bluest of skies, 
as we consumed delicious dishes on a top-story balcony – a uniquely ‘Israeli’ mix, the 
cuisine reflected the extended family’s Polish and Iraqi origins combined with a 
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platter of Palestinian sweets purchased by my mother in Nazareth the day before.  
Emotions ran high as new-ness, reflection and gratitude met the impending rupture of 
departure, inflecting upon each introduction and conversation both weight and height.  
Our tour of the family’s new flat thus became an amplified register of observation, as 
my mother was guided through intimate spaces and private lives with the 
thoroughness of description reserved for foreign visitors.  Moments before entering 
the closet we had been standing in the youngest daughter’s bedroom, where my 
mother took in the concrete walls, small window and heavy door, with troubled 
uncertainty appearing in her eyes.  “This is the mamad, the safe room,” our guide 
explained, drawing her attention to the reinforcement of the walls and window, the 
thickness of the metal door and the air vent now sealed tight yet ready to be opened in 
the event of an attack.  My mother was stunned.  “This is a child’s room,” she 
whispered forcefully as we stepped through the doorway on our way to the stairs and 
waiting closet.  She was right.1   
What failed to shock me – shock us who resided in Israel-Palestine, whether 
permanently or temporarily – was not only this preparation for the intrusion of 
violence into a home, but also the extent to which psychological and material 
readiness had become normalised.  Not necessarily ‘normal,’ but normalised, as the 
confessed ideal would be a situation in which safe rooms were unnecessary; instead 
we settled for a way of living ‘as if,’ an approximation of normalcy as close as we 
could manage.  Here normality emerges a product of aspiration, concession and 
compromise, a process of negotiation unfolding within the intimate space of a Jewish 
Israeli family.  Against the ideal of a home ‘safe’ in its totality rises the reality of 
newly-built apartments with single rooms equipped to meet violence, small sites of 
security nestled within wider frames of insecurity, a sanctuary-in-waiting where the 
family’s youngest, most vulnerable child sleeps each night.  Normalcy becomes that 
space in-between, where the desire for pervasive safety is knowingly exchanged for 
the assurance that those precious to us should remain shielded from harm.  Enacted 
and constructed in material terms – the mamad with its walls, window, vents and door 
– these concessions ostensibly protect against the intrusion of violence and conflict 
into the private realms of everyday life, preventing forcible entry.  Yet so too these 
                                                
1 Field notes, 28 May 2011. 
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seeming guards and guarantees hold violence close, ensuring its passage and 
circulation within intimate domains, enmeshing conflict with normality in basic units 
of presumed security. 
While this mutuality between violence and normalcy will be explored at length in 
Chapter Three, the task of this chapter is to investigate the textures and patterns of 
Jewish Israeli ‘everyday life’ in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, or what makes 
particular lives liveable therein.  Here a tapestry of the mundane emerges, at once 
weaving together “is” and “ought” (Kelly 2008), material reality and collective 
aspiration, in an expression of daily life unique to the processes and narratives shaping 
Israel-Palestine.  Significantly, gender constitutes a principal structural thread lacing 
together dominant values, institutions, meanings and practices.  Here, gender analysis 
allows us to “sense the political” (Navaro-Yashin 2003) beneath the surface of 
ostensible normality, revealing the social, political and economic baseline which 
underwrites Jewish Israeli society.  Through enmeshment and mutual constitution, 
fraternity, security and modernity emerge as central social pillars actively bolstered by 
military, family, education and media institutions.  Together, these constructs and 
relations reveal the centrality of gender to the assumed stability of everyday life 
among Jewish Israelis, providing constancy and dependability through hegemonic 
roles, relations, codes and norms.  Yet this stability ultimately remains framed within 
the normative precarity of Zionism, whose narrative of threat, persecution and 
transcendence bears critical implications for subjects’ understandings of and 
investment in politics.   
 
The Relative Constitution of Normalcy  
Two cities, two tales. 
Tel Aviv – at once “the bubble” and the crown jewel; each summer day as hot and 
humid as the next, every morning a sun burning bright against a clear blue sky.  On an 
ordinary Friday morning the wooden deck of the affluent seaside port in the city’s 
northern district is positively heaving with the weight of relaxation: café patrons 
reclining with the financial paper, cyclists and joggers weaving their way through 
crowds and restaurant tables, families strolling languidly with toddlers and 
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fashionable prams, photography clubs capturing images of fishermen testing their luck 
along the breakwater, and beaches filling with colourful umbrellas, tanned bodies and 
the day’s first swimmers.  Guy and I make our way past the balloon seller with his 
enormous cluster of brightly coloured Mylar floating overhead in shapes of unicorns 
and fighter jets, avoiding the growing audience awaiting the variety act about to begin 
at the port’s widest section.  En route to our favourite brunch restaurant, ‘Gilly’s,’ I 
think back on our first late morning breakfast at the start of my fieldwork in October, 
when the nearby daily farmers’ market was a weekend-only affair and hosted actual 
farmers rather than boutique vendors.   
On that October day we had descended upon an afternoon brunch with appetites borne 
of a morning spent with Guy’s sister at IKEA, finding an empty table near to the sea.  
I made note of the peculiar surroundings, which like the mamad would eventually 
become ‘normal’: nearby Reading power station with its towering smokestack; the 
low-flying planes passing overhead to land at Sde Dov airport; the occasional military 
helicopter taking off from the same location, flying invariably southward.  Amidst this 
mix of luxury, industry and military we settled in for mimosas, brioches, olives, 
omelettes, salads and cappuccinos, seeking respite from the exhaustion of shopping.  
Mid-way through my omelette, however, something relatively extraordinary appeared 
on the sea’s horizon: a small gunship stationed just off the coast, near enough to see 
the gun turret mounted on the front deck in silhouette.  Yet neither Guy nor his sister 
seemed to notice; as I sat watching, the boat moved south and finally curved back 
northward out to sea.  “Oddly normal, I guess,” I wrote in my field notes that night, 
curious as to why this type of ship should appear on that day and not others during 
visits in years past, why I should find it strange while my companions did not.2  Later 
that night, I would learn that the Israel Air Force (IAF) had bombed a car carrying 
three suspected militants in the Gaza Strip while I was eating my omelette and 
pondering the gunship (Ha’aretz 2010b). This felt like my first real experience of 
Jewish Israeli normalcy: an act of violence miles away unfolding unknown, unseen 
and unheard as I contented myself with a lunch of chives, goat cheese and tomatoes 
beside the sea. 
                                                
2 Field notes, 7 October 2010. 
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Jerusalem – the holy city and a sectarian labyrinth; a complex network of enclaves 
bisected by a charged and shifting seam.  I arrive early for my interview in Baka, a 
neighbourhood in Jerusalem’s southeast identified as one of the city’s remaining 
secular Jewish areas along with the German Colony and Beit HaKerem.  My usual 
walk takes me from Jaffa Street – near to the de facto seam between (Palestinian) 
‘East’ and (Jewish Israeli) ‘West’ – skirting the Old City’s Christian Quarter, down 
through the gardens and studios of Gan Shmu’el, and finally up to Bloomfield Garden 
with its windmill and panorama of the ancient city and the Wall beyond.  By this date 
in June the journey and view have become routine.  The dry heat and dust of 
Jerusalem offer a welcome reprieve from the humidity of Tel Aviv as I make my way 
along Jaffa Street where Café Hillel sits facing The Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, 
walking by shuttered shops ready to sell religious memorabilia to the throngs of 
tourists congregating at Jaffa Gate.  Upon arrival to the Old City I note the regular 
presence of Magav [Border Police] at the New Gate, my preferred entrance to the 
city’s winding streets and Christian Quarter, and pass along the exterior walls toward 
the valley below.  Quickly I descend and then ascend, climbing limestone steps past 
planters and window boxes lush with the pinks, purples, yellows and oranges of 
flowers bidding entrance to the artist studios nearby.   
Now across the valley I proceed past the windmill and overlook, arriving to the 
junction of the affluent German Colony and its humble neighbour Baka.  A glance 
down Emek Refayim and I know what awaits: cafes and restaurants, shops and 
boutiques, an energy similar to Tel Aviv, but a street where English is as common as 
Hebrew and modern religious dress mingles with European fashion.  Instead, for the 
first time I continue straight down Derech Beit Lechem [Bethlehem Road] and turn 
into a small park where I plan to await the appointed hour of my interview.  I am 
unusually tired this day, feeling the strain of field study along with a particular 
heaviness – today is Naksa Day, the anniversary of the 1967 War.3  Bored, I call Guy 
in Tel Aviv to chat and pass the time, yet his news comes as a shock: accounts are 
emerging from Israel’s northern borders with Lebanon and Syria, with footage of 
Palestinians attempting – and succeeding – to break through the border fences into 
                                                
3 The Arabic term ‘Naksa’ [setback] is used by Palestinians to mark the 1967 or ‘Six Day’ War in 
which the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula were captured by 
the Israeli military, resulting in ongoing occupation and annexation.  
 
  
 35 
Israel.  Majdal Shams, a Druze village in the northern Golan Heights, is a site of 
intense violence and Guy tells me of the live ammunition being shot into crowds of 
protestors by the Israel Defense Force (IDF); crowds and violence are also growing 
near Qalandia checkpoint outside Jerusalem, but somehow I am certain that the 
violence there cannot touch me.  I sit in the empty playground, again experiencing the 
acute absent presence of violence, but an interview awaits – life must go on.  I climb 
the steps of the nondescript apartment building, passing identical doors with their 
personalized nameplates and arrive to collection of potted plants which marks the 
participant’s home.  Though I hear the news broadcast blaring through the door as I 
wait, our exchange would unfold without mention of the day’s violence, a pleasant 
conversation between an elderly former-Londoner and an American researcher in the 
space of a home.4  
Through this tale of two cities, urban sites make visible the ways in which Jewish 
Israeli normalcy emerges through a tension between materiality and desire, absence 
and presence, violence and calm.  Rather than a ‘split’ between worlds or ways of 
being, normalcy and its cityscapes rely on the continued presence of the seemingly 
obverse or inverse, a delicate balance between conditions lived daily and dreams of (a 
better) tomorrow.  Normalcy then exists not a matter of substitution or replacement, 
but an in-between and ‘becoming’ which locks ostensible polarities in sync.  Yet it is 
not enough to merely observe these degrees of accord and contradiction made visible 
in physicality, discourse and everyday interactions, noting their easy co-existence.  
Rather, the material conditions of Jewish Israeli normalcy remain underwritten by 
particular ideological and structural formations, as normative networks of belief, 
meaning and investment bind together members of a society and make life liveable. 
Fraternity, Security, Modernity 
Central to visions and practices of Jewish Israeli normalcy are three core social 
values: fraternity, security and modernity.  Simultaneously distinct and relational, 
each construct takes shape through the others, melding together within the 
overarching frame of modern day Zionism.  While often narrowly cast as the 
dominant form of Jewish nationalism centred on the primacy of collectivity and 
statehood, contemporary Zionism extends beyond popular frames to encompass 
                                                
4 Field notes, 5 June 2011. 
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economic policies, social practices and political agendas, suffusing and binding 
together interests once regarded as disparate.  Indeed, as depicted in the snapshots 
above, each central pillar of society continues to rely on the presence of its ostensible 
opposite or ‘other’ even as all combine to form the prevailing ethos of state and 
society.  Following Ferdinand de Saussure’s assertion that “meaning is made through 
implicit or explicit contrast” (Scott 1988: 36-37), fraternity requires division and 
exclusion, security necessitates threat and instability, and modernity rests upon the 
persistence of tradition.  Importantly, these cohering values intersect on subjective, 
interpersonal and state levels through hegemonic patterns of gender, producing accord 
among seeming contradictions and creating the foundation for a stable social structure. 
Within Jewish Israeli society, military service perhaps provides the clearest 
illustration of the ways in which fraternity, security and modernity become bound 
together in the ethos of modern day Zionism; here gender norms, roles, codes and 
relations lace through and weave together realms ideological and material.  As 
demonstrated by Ronit Lentin (2000: 188, 217), Jewish Israeli society and normality 
are constructed in explicitly gendered terms, resulting in a “military-masculine 
hegemony” which privileges ‘national security,’ generates discourses of “no choice” 
engagement in conflict, and produces specific categories of ‘others’ which affirm the 
contours of ‘self.’  In this, the construction of ‘normal’ Jewish Israeli subjectivities 
becomes bound with the framing of Israel as overtly masculine, as perceived 
weakness and emasculation in diaspora were historically repudiated through the 
Israeli-born ‘tsabar’ or ‘Sabra’ figure, who effectively redeemed Jewish manhood 
through his health and courage (Lentin 2000: 198-199).  Significantly, though 
explicitly depicted as a male – “[…] the Sabra was born into a vacuum in which the 
ideal figure was not the father, but the son. . . . portrayed in ‘Aryan’ terms as healthy, 
tanned, often with blond hair and blue eyes, confident, proud and brave, presumably 
cleansed of all ‘Jewish’ inferiority complexes” (Lentin 2000: 198) – the pairing of 
masculinity with pervasive militarisation in Israel spells the extension of Sabra ideals 
throughout society. Required of both men and women upon completion of high school, 
service to nation in the form of conscription constitutes a mandatory duty for all 
Jewish Israelis, for periods of three and two years respectively (Shafir and Peled 2002: 
143).  Though there exist various forms of conscientious objection and limited terms 
of legal exemption (see Kidron 2004; Lentin 2004; Rimalt 2007; Lerner 2010; Natanel 
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2012), in its normative quality military service shapes individual subjectivities, social 
relations and political realities regardless of active participation in fulfilment of ‘duty.’  
At the most basic and pervasive level, military service connotes belonging by ushering 
Jews – citizens and non-citizens5 – into a specific constellation of fraternity, one 
constructed around narratives of threat and protection.  As related by Shoshana, a 68 
year-old Jerusalemite born in the United States, this relationship between service and 
belonging dominates perceptions among Jewish immigrants to Israel: “[…] I didn’t do 
military service.  I wanted to – the army builds and protects.  We all wanted to do that.  
From a social point of view, to be in the army is to be Israeli, to be a ‘real Israeli,’ to 
be ‘in.’” An eager volunteer who arrived to Israel two weeks after the end of the 1967 
War, Shoshana had hoped to contribute to the war effort and expressed regret that 
“They started the war without me!”  Unable to enlist in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) 
due to her advanced age – 25 years old at the time – Shoshana participated in post-war 
fraternity by cleaning the Mt. Scopus university campus; “I was sent to clean up,” she 
recounted, “but I read Israeli newspapers so I knew that the volunteers were there to 
take over the jobs of the men in the army.”  Although in this instance a gendered 
division of labour appears to collapse after the cessation of conflict, Shoshana later 
described the ways in which militarised gender norms and hierarchies continue to 
structure roles and relations: “My husband was a non-combatant, so he wasn’t called 
up [in the 1973 War] – he was in a way ‘like a woman.’  There’s a difference between 
who has to stay at home and who gets to go out and be part of it.”6  Indeed, Oded, a 33 
year-old filmmaker now living in Tel Aviv, corroborated this valuation as he reflected 
upon his military service after immigrating alone to Israel from Latvia at age 16: “I 
came to stay [in Israel] and it was important to me to ‘be Israeli.’  First I learned that 
to be Israeli you have to go to the army – and do full combat.  Otherwise you won’t be 
considered a man. It was important to me to be a ‘real Israeli man,’ to play the tough 
guy.”7 
                                                
5 In addition to requiring mandatory conscription from Jewish Israeli women and men living in Israel, 
the IDF offers opportunities for non-Israeli Jews and Jewish Israelis living abroad to volunteer for 
service in the Israeli military; see http://www.mahal-idf-volunteers.org, accessed 8 December 2012.  
 
6 Interview in Jerusalem, 27 June 2011; handwritten notes 
 
7 Interview in Tel Aviv, 11 April 2011, handwritten notes. 
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Thus mandatory military service creates fraternity through participation in security, 
instituting a ‘brotherhood’ of (Israeli) Jews as fulfilment of national duty produces 
“real men” and women.  At a superficial level, here ‘men’ take on the attributes of 
machismo commonly associated with militarised masculinities in diverse contexts; in 
speaking of the perceived conflict between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, Oded 
related the hegemonic construction of masculinity thus: “The cultures in both societies 
– Palestinians, Middle Eastern societies, Israeli society – are very macho.  It’s about 
power.  Here [in Israel] it’s all mixed up with an insane military thing… the army is 
seen as producing the best characteristics of society.”8  Once instilled in and adopted 
by individuals, this brand of masculinity circulates at the level of society as social 
actors both mirror and produce the prevailing norm.  Significantly, the pervasive 
normativity of militarised masculinity in Israel creates a mode of belonging which 
seemingly cuts across hierarchies of race, class and sexuality.  Yoni, a 28 year-old 
Jerusalemite activist of Yemeni origin, spoke at length about the overlaps and tensions 
framing masculinity, sexuality and race in the context of militarisation: 
I embarrass people not really to embarrass them, but as a tool to make them 
think about what they said a few seconds ago.  Like at a Shabbat [Sabbath] 
dinner, there was a guy there who I didn’t know and some straight guy asked 
me, ‘Do you think he’s hot?’  I said, ‘Sure, he’s hot.’  Then the guy said, ‘So, 
do you want to suck his dick?’  I turned to him and said, “Baby, if anyone is 
going to be sucking someone’s dick it’s you!’   
I don’t want to be violent like this, but you have to.  It’s this macho thing that 
comes through the military and society.  You can’t be polite.  If you don’t 
know how to argue here…  It’s very violent, but this is how you establish your 
presence.  You have to say ‘Fuck you!  I’m going to show you.’  I’m softer 
with my Sephardic identity because I’m still trying to figure it out – I’m 
stronger in being gay.9 
In his non-normative sexuality, Yoni’s ability to speak the language and enact the 
violence of hegemonic ‘macho’ masculinity grant him belonging; learned through 
military service, the performance of security begets membership in fraternity.  
However, even as non-normative sexuality and normative gender co-exist within a 
frame of militarism, the racialised otherness of Yoni’s body and identity remain sites 
                                                
8 Interview in Tel Aviv, 11 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
9 Interview in Jerusalem, 3 July 2011; handwritten notes. 
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of unease – self-identified as an “Arab Jew,” Yoni’s ‘Arabness’ potentially remains a 
threat to the security of brotherhood and just at it poses a danger to the brotherhood of 
security. 
This apparent co-existence of tension and accord made visible within the framework 
of security and fraternity additionally unfolds in relation to a third social pillar: 
modernity.  Enmeshed with the two former categories through narratives of (Western) 
‘progress,’ ‘civilisation’ and ‘liberalism,’ modernity remains central to Israel’s 
militarised nationalism and its gendered roles, norms and relations.  In correspondence 
with other patriarchal nationalisms, the category (Jewish Israeli) ‘woman’ has been 
constructed at the nexus of tense polarities, at once inside and outside the nation, in 
need of protection and posing threat, a symbol of both progress and custom (Yuval-
Davis 1997; Kandiyoti 1991; Lentin 2004; Jacoby 2005).  Within Jewish Israeli 
society, this contradictory symbolism and social location has increasingly spelled the 
inclusion of women in combat, those positions tasked with providing security in 
conditions deemed most dangerous (Lentin 2004; Jacoby 2005; Sasson-Levy, Levy 
and Lomsky-Feder 2011: 743; Hopkins 2012).  Importantly, the participation of 
women in military service – including combat – serves not to ‘soften’ or ‘feminise’ 
military structures, policies or practices, but often entangles women in pursuit of 
masculinised attributes of strength, aggression and power (Sasson-Levy 2005 [2001]), 
qualities associated with both fraternity and security.10  During military service, 30 
year-old feminist activist Meital worked as an artillery guide stationed on-base, tasked 
with (re)training reservists for service in combat.  As we spoke together in Tel Aviv, 
she described the position and experience thus: “When people in the miluim [reserves] 
come back for service they need to refresh their memory about the process and 
practice in the field for a week, so I did that with them.  It was fun!  I really enjoyed 
this.”  Yet toward the end of our exchange, Meital reflected upon how this pleasurable 
experience of military service impacted her attitude and behaviour later in life, as 
                                                
10 Similarly, Laleh Khalili (2011) points to the ways in which the participation of women in the 
formulation of counterinsurgency strategies and policies in the United States constructs new modes of 
“colonial feminism,” aligned with American military interests.  Again mirroring the tense and at times 
seemingly contradictory position of women in Israel – simultaneously combat fighters and mothers of 
the nation – Khalili (2011: 1489) writes of the American context, “The images of the counterinsurgent 
women shows them as feminine, dressed in ball gowns, kissing their counterinsurgent officers, all the 
while flaunting their warrior credentials (one counterinsurgent woman has been a former air force pilot, 
the other a professor at the US Marine Corps University). Others work in the Pentagon in various – and 
often influential – positions.”  
 
  
 40 
masculinised norms absorbed and adopted generated increasing tension with her 
feminist ideals: 
Two years ago I came to a psychology treatment and I came with a strong 
feminism.  It took me time to realise that although I was feminist, I was 
militant about it – I was telling women what they should do, what they should 
think.  I was practically doing what I was trying to stop!  It took me a long 
time to see what I was doing through feminist mishkafaim [glasses] – a 
feminist lens.  Now I try to bring this to my friends and myself, but I judge 
myself cruelly.  The psychologist helped me to see that there are more options 
than just ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’11  
 
While a striking proportion of the women interviewed in Tel Aviv and West 
Jerusalem recounted military deployment in educational capacities – reflecting the 
codes which associate women with private, homefront and reproduction (Sharoni 
1995, 2005 [1994]; Herzog 2005 [1998]; Jacoby 2005) – the terms of Meital’s service 
correspond to the rise of a new ‘modern’ woman defined by her willingness to 
actively fight and sacrifice for security and fraternity.  Underwritten by a shift to 
neoliberalism in Israel beginning in the mid-1980s, new constructions of femininity 
reflect the ‘equal to if not better than’ mantra of liberal feminism in the United States, 
a major proponent of neoliberal economic policies (Mohanty 2003; Mohanty, Pratt 
and Riley 2008; Hemmings 2011).  Indeed, 25 year-old Meirav – another self-defined 
feminist activist – gave voice to this imbrication of modernity, fraternity and security 
as evident in the figure of the female combat soldier.  “Israel is a militaristic society – 
either you’re in combat or you have babies for them,” she said early in our Jerusalem 
interview.  She later followed this assertion with a story about her younger sister:  
My sister did the most combat thing you can do and she changed some 
procedures – she’s actually Leftist.  She was on the border with Gaza, in the 
lookouts in charge of the war room.  She’s also an animal rights activist and 
she refused to shoot at herds of sheep to deter the herds and Palestinians from 
going next to the wall.  She directed the forces and saved a lot of lives on both 
sides.  She’s very hands-on.  Three times she was next to suicide bombings.  I 
asked her once “How are they [the bombings]?”  She said that they aren’t as 
                                                
11 Interview in Tel Aviv, 16 February 2011; handwritten notes. 
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frightening as seeing rockets flying above.  She’s my baby sister, so I’m 
protective, but she’s tough.  She’s going to Africa to volunteer.12   
Coupled with future heroism on the final ‘frontier’ of Africa, Meirav’s younger sister 
embodies the contradictory symbolism of the female combat soldier and the ways in 
which modernity, fraternity and security operate in tandem through military service 
among Jewish Israelis.  Here “combat” spells not only hand-to-hand fighting, but also 
saving and caring, moral practices ostensibly particularly suited to women according 
to the logic of gendered roles and binaries.  Thus while this young woman’s 
participation in combat clearly bolsters security, it simultaneously reinforces multiple 
constellations of fraternity; here, militarism and Leftist politics sit together.  
Significantly, this very ease of accord depicted in Meirav’s account further aligns 
Jewish Israeli society and the Israeli state with those deemed ‘modern’ and ‘liberal,’ 
as ultimately a young woman’s courage on the battlefield translates into humanitarian 
bravery and benevolence. 
The ‘Usual Life’ of Zionism 
Within the prevailing security paradigm, militarism binds together a nation in 
fraternity while simultaneously laying the foundation for claims to belonging within a 
larger collective of ‘liberal’ Western states, as performances and narratives attest to 
modernity.13  Yet the pursuit and construction of these core ideals relies upon the 
continued presence of ostensible opposites – fraternity needs division, modernity 
requires tradition, and security arises through conditions of instability and threat.  In 
this way, new norms remain bound with old, moving ‘forward’ while bearing with 
them the roles, codes and relations of the past.  Again gender is instructive, as 
‘modern’ women remain subject to the pressures of reproduction, though now able as 
feminists to participate in combat as pilots and infantry troops.  So too emergent 
constructions of masculinity – the new ‘high-tech’ man working in the latest start-up 
company – remain bound with ‘traditional’ roles of protection, as deployment in 
                                                
12 Interview in Jerusalem, 3 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
13 A recent ad campaign by BlueStar – a San Francisco-based “organization dedicated to empowering 
the next generation of Israel advocates and leaders” – makes visible this critical relationship in its 
tagline: “Where in the Middle East can gay officers serve their country?  Only in Israel.  In a 
democracy positions of leadership and political office are open to all citizens, no matter their race, 
religion, or sexual orientation.  Support democracy.  Support Israel.” See 
http://www.bluestarpr.com/military-gay-rights-israel.html, accessed 26 October 2012. 
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intelligence units tasked with fighting increasing cyber attacks ensures collective 
safety in ways perhaps more expedient than hand-to-hand combat.  While the 
individualism wrought from neoliberal ideologies and economic policies might appear 
poised to shatter the collective base of nationalism and early Israeli socialist ideals 
(Shafir and Peled 2000; Ram 2008), these very relations of fragmentation and 
stratification enable the constant desire for and reproduction of fraternity.  Indeed as 
Yonathan, a Tel Aviv filmmaker in his mid-30s, claimed, “With capitalism came this 
idea of the individual, self-survival, and also trauma.  New developments are fuelling 
old ideas.”14  This description of a simultaneous shift and (re-)“fuelling” speaks to the 
continued normativity of previous aspirations and ideals, as a return to the wholeness 
of trauma is made possible through splintering borne of capitalism, (re)setting the 
stage for the performance of security. 
In these ways, the mutually inscribed ideals of security, fraternity, and modernity 
entrench and resuscitate Zionism as ideology and practice, from the cafes and 
boutiques of Tel Aviv to the dusty streets and markets of Jerusalem.  This updated 
vision of Zionism, a belief draped in drones and rainbow flags, aims not at the goals 
of its origin – a sovereign state and guaranteed safety for the Jewish people (Herzl 
1988 [1896]; Goldberg 1996; Lentin 2000; Ram 2003; Piterberg 2008) – but rather 
becomes an endless iteration of its founding narrative: persecution, trauma, 
perseverance and triumph.  Taking root in the negation of historical exile (Piterberg 
2008: 93-96), the narrative of Zionism situates victimhood and powerlessness at the 
core of the Jewish nation-building project.  As historian Idith Zertal (1998, 2005) and 
sociologist Ronit Lentin (2000) convincingly argue, this narrative has been 
transformed into a myth which promises transcendence and triumph, completing the 
cycle proposed above.  Following Martin Jaffee, Zertal demonstrates how this myth of 
victimisation permits the victim to simultaneously understand himself as victor, “‘[…] 
always destroyed but always reborn in a form that overcomes the victimizer’ [sic]” 
(Jaffee cited in Zertal 2005: 2).  For both Zertal and Jaffee, “The chief beneficiary of 
that empowerment… is the community, which perceives itself as the historical witness 
to the degradation of the victim and his subsequent transcendence, as the historical 
body whose very existence preserves and relives the moment of degradation and 
                                                
14 Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 January 2011, handwritten notes. 
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transfiguration” (Zertal 2005: 2).  Presently, this preservation and reliving – always 
destroyed but always reborn – are made possible through active memorialisation of 
the Holocaust and a popular understanding of the Israeli state as existing within “a 
world defined repeatedly as anti-Semitic and forever hostile” (Zertal 2005: 4).  Indeed, 
the lyrics of Israel’s national anthem – ‘HaTikva’ or ‘The Hope’ – attest to this ethos 
of constant struggle and striving: 
As long as deep in the heart, 
The soul of a Jew yearns, 
And forward to the East  
To Zion, an eye looks 
Our hope will not be lost, 
The hope of two thousand years,  
To be a free nation in our land, 
The land of Zion and Jerusalem.  
 
Through repetition, ideology and practice – narrative and materiality – thus become 
entwined, producing and maintaining a particular world (Butler 1993: 9; Ahmed 2004: 
12); importantly, this iteration structures and potentially incorporates the terms of its 
own resistance.  Matan, a 35 year-old Jerusalemite artist on the verge of leaving Israel 
for the first time in ten years at the time of our interview, spoke candidly of this 
tension: 
The rebellion I told you about in my 20s, with not knowing against what but 
something strong came up.  Probably you don’t know about Holocaust 
families, that you can find common issues.  You see many times that the 
Holocaust generation doesn’t talk with the second [generation], but they talk to 
the third [generation].15  That’s what happened exactly in my family.  My 
grandfather talked to me. . . .  All my childhood, every Saturday almost, I 
listened to my grandfather.  My grandmother didn’t talk, she never did.  He 
would talk every time, this loop of Holocaust stories – it was six years, the 
                                                
15 ‘The Holocaust generation’ is popularly understood as those Jewish Israelis who directly experienced 
World War II in Europe and immigrated to Israel.  As Ronit Lentin (2000: 4-5) writes, “Equally 
complex is the definition of Israeli ‘children of Shoah survivors’, termed both in the literature and 
popularly ‘the second-generation’.  This is a contested term, since some … believe either that children 
of survivors have no characteristics distinguishing them from other Israelis, or that they do not have the 
same entitlements as do their survivor-parents...”  Importantly, Lentin (2000: 163-164) corroborates 
Matan’s claim to ease of dialogue between the third generation and survivors of the Holocaust or Shoah, 
in contrast to the tension which often characterises the relationship between parents and their second-
generation children. 
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Holocaust, so there were a lot of stories!  And before [the Holocaust]: the 
Communist party, the Soviet Union – it was ten years of life.  It was very 
important, it was injected into me from my early childhood to when my 
grandfather died.  I was in the army [when he died].  Then was my rebellion.  
It was very unconscious.  I’m not sure that I’m right about it now either, but 
now I have a bit more maturity.  My inside structure is like this: animals, 
Sheikh Jarrah, the occupation comes in – whatever makes you cry comes in.16 
Though ‘third generation,’ Matan identifies as a “survivor of the Holocaust” despite 
his clear recognition of the work done by this narrative brought from past into present 
and future.  Even as Matan would later describe himself as “post-Zionist,” pervading 
his vegan and anti-occupation activism is the trauma of his grandfather’s generation 
and the narrative of vulnerability, persecution and striving in which Zionism takes 
root.  Again, apparent contradiction sits easily within this frame as the presence of 
polarities helps Matan to make sense of the surrounding world, a place where 
“whatever makes you cry comes in.”  Thus resistance enacted by Jewish Israelis in 
Palestinian Sheikh Jarrah – a site geographically distant from the Poland of Matan’s 
grandfather – becomes integrated with the wider narrative of Zionism, fuelling the 
cycle of repetition and trauma.17  As Zertal (2005: 2) writes of Israel’s relationship to 
the Holocaust: 
Through the constitution of a martyrology specific to that community, namely, 
the community becoming a remembering collective that recollects and 
recounts itself through the unifying memory of catastrophes, suffering, and 
victimization [sic], binding its members together by instilling in them a sense 
of common mission and destiny, a shared sense of nationhood is created and 
the nation crystallized.  These ordeals can yield an embracing sense of 
redemption and transcendence, when the shared moments of destruction are 
recounted and replicated through rituals of testimony and identification until 
                                                
16 Interview in Jerusalem, 21 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
17 Sheikh Jarrah is a Palestinian neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, which has become a prominent site 
of solidarity activism in Israel-Palestine.  Once populated by a small Jewish community which left 
before 1948, the neighbourhood has been home to Palestinian families made refugees by the war and 
resettled in 1956.  Recently, Jewish Israeli settlers acting on legal claims made by Jewish organisations 
are increasingly displacing these families.  Since 2009, Jewish Israeli, Palestinian and international 
activists have staged weekly joint protests against these evictions; see http://972mag.com/sheikh-jarrah 
and http://www.en.justjlm.org, accessed 28 October 2012.  Throughout the course of my research, 
Sheikh Jarrah emerged as the single most popular protest site and initiative among Jewish Israeli 
women and men who consider themselves in some way ‘activist,’ whether mainstream or radical.  
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those moments lose their historical substance, are enshrouded in sanctity, and 
become a model of heroic endeavor [sic], a myth of rebirth.18 
Clearly not restricted to the historical past, remembrance and (re)narration are actively 
renewed at contemporary sites of trauma which give rise to fraternity, security and 
modernity on scales at once micro and macro.  Indeed, as Lentin (2000: 178) writes, 
“Zionism is ‘nationalism as narrative’, in that it claims a privileged narrative of the 
nation and thus justifies its own capacity to narrate its story and construct its history in 
an assertion of legitimacy and precedent for present as well as future.” 
Thus the narrative of Zionism transcends its originary intentions, creating a self-
sustaining contemporary world characterised by the repetition of instability, a society 
based on trauma and processes of redemption and healing which can be only be 
partially complete.  Yet what gives this world solid grounding?  As depicted above in 
the tale of two cities, everyday life often unfolds in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem 
seemingly in the (material) absence of violence and conflict – in these sites ‘normal’ 
assumes a distinct hue.  Gil, a 35 year-old Jerusalemite musician, artist, and social 
worker, described normalcy thus:  
[The occupation is] an ambient thing.  It’s like, you know you can live [as if] 
not noticing it, but it is an ambience here.  I just talked with a friend who a few 
months ago returned from Spain.  We talked about Israel, the different feeling 
here.  It starts with the feeling of security.  In so many places, if you go to 
sleep outside you don’t feel safe – either because you’re afraid of Arab… 
terror attacks or you’re afraid of the army, the police. . . .  We hear about [the 
occupation] all the time: there’s an attack, a fight, a conflict… we absorb the 
feeling.  You think that to live like this is a usual life, but it is different from 
life in other places.19 
 
What makes this life liveable? 
Beyond the material conditions of a prospering economy, this “usual life” is made 
possible through the ways in which hegemonic gender norms, codes, roles and 
relations provide the sense of constancy assumed to underwrite ‘normal life’ in model 
contexts, primarily American and European.  Indeed, in her analysis of the 
                                                
18 Emphasis added. 
 
19 Interview in Jerusalem, 13 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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masculinisation of Israeli society vis-à-vis the active feminisation of the Holocaust, its 
survivors and Jewish diaspora, Ronit Lentin (2000: 200) writes, “The Israeli aspiration 
to an elusive ‘normality’, to being just like all other (preferably Western) nations, 
required adhering to strong social norms, which define that ‘normality.’”  Here, 
gender provides the glue of everyday life, shaping subjectivities and interpersonal 
relations, demarcating realms of public and private, structuring political and domestic 
spheres, and providing a sense of belonging to a wider (patriarchal) world.  In this, 
gender enables the co-existence of polarities, permitting old and new, traditional and 
modern, collective and individual, security and instability to remain both in tension 
and constitutive relation.  Itself a relation of power (Connell 1987), gender does not 
make even or equal all members of society, but may rather ensure the perpetuation of 
hierarchies, intersecting with race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, generation and 
geopolitical location at the levels of subjectivity, society and material reality.  
Developed in contemporary feminist theory as ‘intersectionality,’ this approach to 
gender highlights its constitution through and articulation with the multiple axes of 
domination shaping and shaped by everyday life.  As Avtar Brah and Anne Phoenix 
(2004: 76) argue, this intersectional quality of gender points to “[…] the complex, 
irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axes of 
differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential – 
intersect in historically specific contexts.”   
Intersectionality then makes visible the ways in which social relations and material 
conditions may be variably constructed and experienced depending upon multiple 
aspects of subjectivity, each bound up with power.  With regard to the query posed 
above, an intersectional approach to gender reveals how within the context of Jewish 
Israeli society, particular lives are made liveable.  As demonstrated earlier, the 
category ‘Jewish Israeli’ can be divided into sub-categories depending on social 
hierarchies; in this, ‘normalcy’ remains differentially understood and experienced.  
Indeed, as a middle-class Jewish Israeli living in West Jerusalem Gil may have space, 
time and resources to consider the occupation ambient as related above, an aspect of 
the normality which enables his career and artwork.  Despite membership in the 
category of Israeli Jews descendent from Middle Eastern and North African 
communities, Gil’s physical appearance is strikingly Ashkenazi; thus he is able to 
traverse the space of the city without eliciting the routine questioning and suspicion 
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experienced by other Mizrahi Jews living in the Jerusalem area.  For a Jewish Israeli 
man who appears ‘Arab,’ Israel’s occupation may be experienced in a somatic and 
violent manner rather than as “ambient,” subject to requests for identification by 
soldiers and searches by security agents at the bus station.  Here, race intersects with 
aspects of subjectivity in the space of West Jerusalem to produce distinctly different 
understandings of and access to imagined, perceived and constructed normalcy.  Thus 
an intersectional approach not only makes clear the ways in which multiple factors 
and axes intersect within a given context, but also it draws attention to how categories 
of Jewish Israeli ‘man’ and ‘woman’ cannot be approached as monolithic or static, 
even as gender lends constancy to everyday life. 
As Brah and Phoenix (2004) impel scholars to consider the effects revealed through an 
intersectional understanding of gender, in the context of Israel-Palestine a particular 
kind of stability emerges, one bound tightly with domination.  In its complexity and 
multiple embeddedness, gender possesses the capacity to both regularise and 
normalise as hegemonic roles, norms, codes and relations produce a hegemonic 
‘gender order’ specific to context (Connell 1987: 134-139; Connell 2002: 3).  Despite 
often appearing unchangeable, these gender patterns remain in process (Connell 1987: 
140-141; Connell 2002: 10) and their adaptation and variability become central to 
stabilising those precarious worlds which both promise and threaten the ‘good life’ 
desired by their inhabitants.  A given gender order then creates a seemingly 
predictable and dependable foundation upon which everyday life might unfold, while 
at the same time remaining critically dependant upon the evolution of norms, codes, 
roles and relations.  Reflecting those historical norms which instate divisions between 
homefront/battlefield, feminine/masculine, private/public, and domestic/political 
(Sharoni 1995, 2005 [1994]; Herzog 2005 [1998]; Jacoby 2005) while relying on the 
very collapse of these binaries, the contemporary Jewish Israeli gender order emerges 
a site of accord and contradiction.  Yet this apparent tension ultimately lends stability 
and constancy as, to borrow once more from Yonathan, new developments indeed fuel 
old ideas.  While not ‘more important’ to everyday life than relations of race, class, 
religion or ethnicity, gender remains unique in its ability to provide coherence to 
norms, values and practices at once liberal and collective, modern and traditional, 
novel and entrenched.  
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Institutional Imbrications 
In its very everyday quality, the normative narrative of threat, persecution and 
transcendence becomes a collective emotion, a sensibility and a manner of engaging 
with a larger world.  Here, Lauren Berlant’s work on American culture is instructive, 
as she argues that political meaning may become attached to the sensations of 
particular groups, describing how specific emotions come to be experienced as ‘the 
national’ (1993: 556, 560).  So too Berlant posits that the hegemonic affective regimes 
of nation-states – those institutionally supported emotions deemed politically 
meaningful and ‘national’ – might justify domination (1998b: 640).  This overlap of 
sensation with institution importantly resonates within Jewish Israeli society.  Less a 
matter of which individuals are excluded from the production of national emotion and 
whose sensations remain beyond the boundaries of political meaning, here the 
question becomes exactly how a particular narrative becomes hegemonic through 
patterns of gender. 
Military, Family, Education 
As R.W. Connell (1987: 120) writes, “We cannot understand the place of gender in 
social process by drawing a line around a set of ‘gender institutions.’  Gender relations 
are present in all types of institutions.  They may not be the most important structure 
in a particular case, but they are certainly a major structure of most.”  With these 
guiding and cautionary words in mind, an investigation into the role of gender regimes 
– “the state of play in gender relations in a given institution” (Connell 1987: 120) – 
reveals the extent to which gender reinforces normative narratives through the 
blurring of boundaries among three key institutions: the military, family and education.  
In a manner similar to the imbrication of security, fraternity and modernity and an 
intersectional understanding of gender, within Jewish Israeli society institutions of 
military, family and education cannot be separated into “discrete and pure strands” 
(Brah and Phoenix 2004: 76).  Indeed, each institution becomes a critical site of 
production and reflection of the others, as indicated in extensive research conducted 
by feminist researchers in Israel (Sharoni 1995; Lentin 2000; Abdo and Lentin 2002; 
Jacoby 2005; Gor 2007; Gor and Mazali 2007; Abdo 2011; Peled-Elhanan 2012).  
Binding together the institutions of military, family and education are patterns of 
gender manifest within and produced through distinct yet enmeshed regimes.  Ana, a 
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university lecturer in her mid-30s now living in Tel Aviv, recounted the complex 
relationship thus:  
Related to the occupation is the big role of the army – it’s in everyone’s lives.  
In order for an 18 year-old to go to the army he must be brainwashed from the 
day he is born.  And part is the gendered military discourse.  I remember in 
high school the girls with the soldier boyfriends were ‘so cool.’  The discourse 
is very gendered.  Now women can be fighting [combat] soldiers and the 
position is very high status because it’s a male position.20   
Ana’s narrative is not unique in its highlighting of “brainwashing” as the reason for 
their participation in mandatory military service; indeed, many interview participants 
cited indoctrination as the conduit through which they took part in national duty.  Yet 
Ana importantly extends the period of ‘convincing’ and ‘learning’ – here 
‘brainwashing’ occurs from the time of birth, signalling a site of instruction beyond 
the formal national education system: the family.  Interestingly, Ana remembers the 
education system less for nationalistic or militarised lessons and fieldtrips than for 
popularity contests won by those girls with (older) soldier-boyfriends, revealing a 
novel type of militarised hierarchy present within Jewish Israeli (secular) schools.21  
So too this narrative points to the centrality of heterosexuality to Jewish Israeli society 
as manifest in military, education and social relations.  As contemporary Zionism 
exists a nation-building project rooted in patriarchal nationalism, biological 
reproduction remains a top social imperative, in part propelled by the construction of a 
‘demographic race’ imagined between Jewish and Palestinian residents of Israel-
Palestine (Yuval-Davis 1989; Kanaaneh 2002; Halperin-Kaddari 2004; Steinfeld 
2012).  Underwritten by the founding narrative of threat, persecution and 
transcendence and bolstered by corresponding historical experiences of European 
Jews, heterosexuality retains primacy in Jewish Israeli society, framing hierarchies, 
norms and relations. 
Thus Ana’s brief account demonstrates the ways in which gender binds together the 
Israeli military with the national education system, alluding to the role of the 
heterosexual nuclear family therein.  Yet her further remarks during our conversation 
                                                
20 Interview in Tel Aviv, 6 February 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
21 With many students able to claim exemption from mandatory military service, Jewish Israeli 
Orthodox religious schools would present a different mode of hierarchical organisation. 
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speak directly to role of family, demonstrating the significance of an intersectional 
approach to the institutional production of normalcy: 
I have a son, he’s half black and half white – he’s four years old now.  In the 
summer we moved to Tel Aviv and he started a new gan [kindergarten], which 
isn’t easy.  I was reading a big ad in the paper about ‘supporting Arabic gas’ – 
this was when there was a huge fight about gas over the summer.  For now 
most of our gas is from Egypt and it’s referred to in the paper as ‘gaz Aravi’ 
[Arabic gas].  Anyway, I was talking about it with my husband and my son 
asked me, “Is that my gas?”  I asked him what he means and kids in the new 
gan say that he is an Arab…  They’re three and-a-half – how do they know 
what an Arab is?!  I answered him and said, a) no, you are not an Arab and b) 
it’s not a bad thing to be an Arab.  Later I had an argument with my husband – 
he told me that by telling our son that he wasn’t an Arab I already gave him 
the feeling that it was a bad thing.  I don’t know…  At three and a half how 
does the conflict influence their lives when they learn this?22 
In a sense, Ana answers her first question – “How do they know what an Arab is?” – 
moments later when she links the occupation with the “big role of the army in 
everyone’s lives.”  Here, values of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are eventually translated from the 
language used in familiar and formal education systems to the terms of national 
security, only to recirculate within families and schools once more.  As Ana reassures 
her son that, no, he is not an Arab, her husband intimates that her insistence on 
distinction bestows meaning and value upon the category – Arab becomes a ‘bad thing’ 
despite her belief to the contrary.  Aware of conflict at three and-a-half years old, 
Ana’s son bears militarism home in his kindergarten backpack, setting upon the 
family table those harsh lessons of otherness learned in school. 
As the thread binding regimes of military, family and education within a given order, 
gender appears conspicuously absent save what might be read inter-textually between 
Ana’s account and existing scholarship.  However, the role of women as biological 
and cultural reproducers of the nation as outlined by academics (see Yuval-Davis and 
Anthias 1989; Kandiyoti 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997) seems only partially applicable 
here, as clearly Ana takes issue with the prevailing narratives and values to which her 
son is exposed.  Immediately following her earlier memory of high school social 
hierarchies, Ana changed tack to speak once more of her son: 
                                                
22 Interview in Tel Aviv, 6 February 2011; handwritten notes. 
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You know, on Holocaust Day they tell my son at two and a half, three and a 
half, about the Holocaust.  It’s this intense string of holidays: Passover, 
Holocaust Remembrance Day, then Memorial Day.  So first it’s ‘The 
Egyptians are trying to kill us,’ then it’s ‘The Germans are trying to kill us’…  
My son heard me say the word ‘German’ and he said, ‘These are bad people.’  
What?!  And it wasn’t even near Holocaust Day.  Next Holocaust Day I won’t 
send him there.  But what if I have to work?  I’m seeing my son being 
brainwashed.23 
Returning to the normative narrative of Zionism, in combination with the previous 
account Ana’s quandary over Holocaust Remembrance Day reveals a division of 
labour based upon and productive of the hegemonic gender order.  Despite her work 
as a university lecturer and the presence of a male partner engaged in parenting, Ana 
asks what will happen the following year if she is unable to look after her son; she 
answers the question of whether or not ‘Arabic gas’ belongs to him.  Though 
philosophically subscribing to the tenets and critiques of feminism, Ana retains 
primary responsibility for her son’s care and development.  With this provision of care 
comes the desire to safeguard, ostensibly challenging those norms which link men 
with defence and protection; yet her husband’s non-Jewishness and non-whiteness 
shift the duty of protection within the remit of motherhood, as ethnicity and race 
intersect with gender roles, relations and norms.   
As gender constitutes a thread linking institutions and their regimes, it indeed remains 
in process, a site of contestation and accord which importantly provides a material 
sense of normalcy – as mothers care for and look after children, they answer difficult 
questions and engage with lessons learned at the nexus of military, family and 
education.  Home becomes a site of stability within a sea of uncertainty, a place where 
repeated norms, values and narratives might be laid to rest at the same time as they 
gain new purchase.  Clearly, cyclical practices remain in play, yet Ana’s investment in 
repetition is uncertain – despite complex relations of race, ethnicity, gender and class 
binding her to the majority, Ana tries her best to disentangle herself and her family 
from dominant narratives and values.  Then how does she become part of the 
hegemonic system, expressing a sense of “depression” at her own political inaction 
and an inability to transcend the subsequent feelings of guilt?  Arising not solely at the 
gendered confluence of military, family and education to which her son remains 
                                                
23 Interview in Tel Aviv, 6 February 2011; handwritten notes. 
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subject, Ana’s enmeshment points to differential sites of norm production central to a 
sense of collectivity. 
The News-Holiday Cycle 
Appearing in Ana’s account of her son’s early exposure to Holocaust narratives, the 
annual holiday cycle in Israel not only (re)produces prevailing norms, but also 
fashions national subjects, both willing and unwilling.  Building upon and 
complicating the foundational work of Michel Foucault and Marxian post-structuralist 
scholars, queer theorists such as Lauren Berlant and Judith Butler regard the 
production of norms and subjects closely, discerning potential sites of interruption and 
transformation even as their scholarship details the pervasive and constitutive qualities 
of normativity.  Indeed, Butler (1993: 1-3) describes the ways in which matter gains 
“boundary, fixity, and surface” through processes of (re)materialisation, cycles of 
repetition which remain continually unfinished.  Here Butler (1993: 3) posits, 
“That . . . reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialisation is never quite complete, 
that bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialisation is 
impelled.”  While raising the possibility that “threat and disruption” might constitute a 
critical resource in efforts to transform the prevailing valuations of “legitimacy and 
intelligibility” which frame and constrain subjects (Butler 1993: 3), in the context of 
Jewish Israeli society these very ruptures and interruptions coalesce with the precarity 
of Zionist narratives.  Thus even as iteration yields “abject beings” (Butler 1993: 3) 
whose non-conformity and agitation might promise transformation, cycles of 
repetition and their unruly subjects remain central to the production of hegemony, 
reinforcing normative narratives, values, practices and relations. 
It is no coincidence that the holiday period foregrounded by Ana above – as she 
expressed trepidation at her son’s ‘hailing’ into the national fold – reappeared as a key 
timeframe in numerous interviews.  Preceded by Pesach [Passover], a week-long 
holiday whose narrative centres on persecution and escape,24 Yom HaShoah 
[Holocaust Remembrance Day] prepares the ground for Yom HaZikaron [Memorial 
Day], which the next day yields to Yom Ha’Atzmaut [Independence Day] all within 
                                                
24 Pesach or Passover is an annual Jewish holiday commemorating the emancipation of the Israelites 
from slavery after exodus from Egypt; see 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/holidaya.html, accessed 1 November 2012. 
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the time of one month.25  While a time of ‘high nationalism’ similar to American 
Independence Day with its flags, parades and expressions of patriotism, during this 
period the narrative of persecution and redemption particular to Zionism suffuses 
everyday life to an extreme.  Compounded by media coverage in the form of films 
portraying personal stories of loss, television broadcasts of official commemorations 
attended by government officials, and dedicated radio playlists of songs whose lyrics 
evoke those emotions considered ‘national,’ the cycle of holidays produces specific 
selves, subjects and collectivities. 
Sitting on the airy balcony of a Jerusalem café tucked within the winding narrow 
streets behind Kikar Zion [Zion Square], Matan touched upon the holiday-media cycle 
as he related his process of coming to political action: 
In the 90s, I was 20 [years old] after the army.  After [the army] I didn’t know 
what it was against, but it [an energy] was coming up.  It didn’t have specific 
content, it was through art, music, raves – rethinking, rebuilding community.  I 
was 20 or 21.  It wasn’t conscious, it happened through nature.  Art, music, 
freedom – this is what we were building community through.  We had some 
very serious people there, a lot of fantasies of what we could do.  We were 
very young.  I don’t know the cause and effect, but then the terror attacks 
started in Jerusalem.  The ideal community – art, music, freedom, etc. – broke 
apart during the bomb attacks.  It was very hurtful, every two to three days 
there was an attack in Jerusalem.  I would cry every night.  I would hear a 
bomb – I was living in the centre – and turn on the TV to see how many were 
killed.  I would cry every night, every other.  I had a period of three to four 
years of emotional breakdown, again and again and again and again and again.  
This is a very special culture in Israel.   
KN: That the culture is so emotional?   
M: We are born, raised, educated with holidays – not as Jewish but as Israeli 
culture, new Israeli culture.  There are some big holidays like Holocaust 
Memorial Day and Memorial Day for soldiers and from [age] 4, 5, 6, 7, every 
year we are crying, feeling ecstatic feelings.  You are born and raised that way, 
it’s a feeling of being picked up as a child.  It’s in the music.  I would become 
addicted to the music after a bomb attack, the music played on the radio.  The 
                                                
25 While these Jewish Israeli holidays follow the Hebrew calendar, Palestinians annually observe 15 
May as Nakba Day, the day of ‘catastrophe’ on which the Israeli state gained international recognition 
one day after Ben-Gurion’s proclamation of the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.’  
This proximity means that Memorial Day, Independence Day and Nakba Day commonly fall within the 
same week. 
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music is so sad.  It’s special, with an artistic touch and talent, not kitsch.  After 
every attack there were days of songs.  In a way it was like a party.26   
The same man who earlier recounted his grandfather’s “loop of Holocaust stories” and 
their impact on his political identity and activism, during our interview Matan 
explicitly invoked the cycles of holidays, violence and media discourse, relating their 
repetition to the production of “new Israeli culture” as separate from Jewish culture.  
In keeping with Butler’s (1993) optimism that space for transformation exists within 
repetition, this wider national cycle indeed produces its own resistance, as Matan 
sought the formation of an “ideal” community as an alternative to the mainstream 
against which he rebelled after military service.  Described in terms of “art, music and 
freedom” – for Matan what the mainstream community could not offer – this 
collective engendered a space of action, for “rethinking, rebuilding” even if now 
associated with fantasy.  Importantly, Matan’s account draws attention to the very 
pervasiveness of national narratives and emotions, a quality which lures him back to 
the fold even in his non-compliance.  Catalysed by violent events, Matan’s ideal 
community dissolves as media images and discourses (re)produce the culture unique 
to Israeli society; here tears induced by bombings meld with the tears of holidays past.  
His micro-community disintegrates and Matan feels himself rejoin wider society as 
experiences of violence mirror childhood memories, producing a sense of 
identification through emotional extremes and even breakdown.  This relation of new-
old trauma then points to the ways in which feelings of sadness and ecstasy can “pick 
up” an adult as if a child once more.  Through the intimacy of trauma, Matan is 
effectively re-interpellated or ‘hailed’ (Althusser 1971: 48-50; Brah 2012 [1999]: 12) 
back into the national community, as his escape from narrative and collectivity was 
never quite complete.  
Structures of Fear and Fatigue 
Significantly, though Matan’s narrative concludes in his seeming reintegration with 
Jewish Israeli society, as we spoke in the café near the ‘seam’ with East Jerusalem our 
exchange remained framed by his impending departure from Israel.  “Now I’m 
starting a political immigration,” Matan told me when we began our interview.  “It’s 
something inside and outside – I’m not that famous that it will be a real ‘political 
                                                
26 Interview in Jerusalem, 21 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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immigration,’ but inside, yes.  I’m searching for a place.  I’m going to Amsterdam for 
options.”27  Producing not only resistance which might later be reabsorbed within 
national narratives, overlapping holiday and media cycles create “structures of feeling” 
(Williams 1977), those socially constructed patterns of intimacy which bind together a 
collectivity.28  By entrenching the precarious extremes of experience and emotion so 
central to Zionism, the repetition of holidays and media discourses fuels differential 
cycles which result in disengagement and stasis, illustrating how discourse yields 
subjects, social structures and material consequences (Foucault 1988; Butler 1993, 
1997a, 1997b; Lentin 2000; Berlant 2011; Hemmings 2011).   
For Dalia, a filmmaker and journalist in her mid-30s living in Tel Aviv, the discursive 
repetition of trauma is mediated not only through television and radio, but also 
through her partner and young daughter.  As the only interview conducted with a 
couple, my exchange with Dalia and Avi emphasised the extent to which connectivity 
and intimacy become bound up in institutional frameworks and cycles.  Indeed, in 
response to my query about the contours of their individual activisms, Dalia and Avi 
not only negotiated their relationship to hegemonic discourse, but also to each other as 
partners within a collective: 
Dalia: […] There is so much to suppress here – if you don’t you go crazy.  If 
you read all the news, be an activist on all the things, there is no time to 
breathe between demonstrations and legal actions.  There is so much wrong 
you must suppress in order to live.  But when something is broken in the 
suppression it’s overwhelming because you recognize how much you have to 
suppress to live your little life.  It makes me think what is the collective cost?  
If you just live your life the big circle gets smaller – there are less people who 
think like you.  And when less people care, there is more corruption. 
Avi: Dalia was reading the paper three hours a day at one point, she would get 
really angry.  We both work at home – we fold our bed up and it becomes our 
office.  I couldn’t take it so I cancelled our subscription to the newspaper, the 
newspaper she writes for!  If you read all the headlines in the morning… 
maybe it’s better to read them at night.   
                                                
27 Interview in Jerusalem, 21 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
28 In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams (1977: 132) describes “structures of feeling” as 
“thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-
relating continuity . . . a social experience still in process, often indeed not yet recognized as social but 
taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in analysis (through rarely otherwise) 
has its emergent, connecting, and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies.” 
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Dalia: But through Twitter I know the news before it reaches the paper.  I go 
through cycles or waves of rage and suppression - now I’m on a wave of 
suppression.  I can’t even read all the blogs.  I think the last straw in the last 
cycle was a document about the military trial of two Palestinian minors.  It was 
so awful, I felt helpless about it.  People 100 times more activist than me were 
crying about it.  But if they’re crying about it what can I do?  Join them and 
cry?  And in the meantime neglect my own kid?  I just can’t take it anymore – 
let this place blow up.  I don’t care.29   
A self-professed “couch activist,” Dalia’s narrative makes visible the ways in which 
the extremes produced through national holiday and media discourses produce 
particular modes of political disengagement, bolstering the status quo and existing 
material realities.  Bound to Matan’s account through acts of crying, feelings of 
helplessness and expressions of antipathy – yet connection – to “this place,” the 
exchange between Dalia and Avi reveals how normative national cycles compound 
those more personal, here a cycle of “rage and suppression.”  As Avi resists the 
intrusion of discourse and politics to the extent of cancelling a subscription to the 
newspaper which employs his partner, both he and Dalia adhere to a broader public, 
one characterised by the pursuit of “little lives” amidst necessary uncertainty.  Thus 
while both Dalia and Avi characterise themselves as ‘Leftists,’ their actions meld with 
those of the mainstream and Right-wing factions relative to the Jewish Israeli political 
spectrum, positions which reaffirm stasis through both actions taken and withheld. 
While appearing in nearly every interview, ‘fear’ is not the sole product of the 
national narratives which circulate through cycles of holidays and media discourses.  
Whether described as an experienced emotion or used to characterise Jewish Israeli 
society, subscription to fear masks the extent to which investment in trauma engenders 
fatigue and political disengagement.  Indeed, Meirav, a 25 year-old activist from 
Jerusalem, made this link between fear, fatigue and disengagement explicit: 
People are tired, fear is wired so deeply.  For years I can’t watch more than ten 
minutes of the news without getting mad… just the way they tell it. . . .  The 
way the story is told becomes myth.  Once you understand that life isn’t a story, 
that myth is and can be something else, you are setting for yourself your own 
goals.  I’m frustrated… I care so much.  One month ago I was given the option 
to go to Montreal for next year – it was fun and depressing because I realised 
                                                
29 Interview in Tel Aviv, 7 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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how much I feel tired, I want to escape.  I want to gain perspective from a 
place where I don’t have to put so much effort into living.30 
While constitutive of collectivities through the ways in which movement away from a 
feared object implies movement toward or attachment to a loved object (Ahmed 2004: 
68), within Jewish Israeli society fear differentially coalesces community through the 
production of hegemony.  Here, fraternity emerges through security and modernity in 
new ways, as the cyclical perception of threat creates a community caught up in 
(post)modern paralysis –  indeed ‘apathy’ is not a condition unique to Jewish Israelis.  
As described earlier, most existing academic studies of political apathy, 
disenchantment or disengagement take place in the United States, United Kingdom or 
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
states (see Rosenberg 1954; Sevy 1983; Boyer 1984; Eliasoph 1997, 1998; Dolan and 
Holbrook 2001; Hay 2007).  So too apathy has been popularly ascribed to publics in 
Egypt and Libya prior to the 2011 uprisings, which mobilised massive numbers of 
formerly quiescent citizen-subjects (Diab 2009; al-Werfalli 2012).  Yet within Jewish 
Israeli society, education, military, family, media and commemoration converge to 
produce a pervasive Zionist ethos inclusive of its own opposition, and awareness of 
this entanglement – “I am part of it, whether I like it or not” – severs the ties which 
make transformation seem a tangible possibility rather than a momentary fantasy.  
Thus trauma emerges as a cyclical combination of fear, aspiration and fatigue; the 
admission of our implication within its repetition wears us down to the extent that 
Amsterdam, Montreal and “little lives” seem to promise a new object of desire: 
effortless living. 
 
Collective Politics 
As institutional imbrications result in disenchantment and divestment, pervasive 
institutionalisation further enmeshes the normative Zionist narrative with Israel’s 
hegemonic gender order.  Indeed, as political fatigue and disengagement emerge 
through the repetition of trauma, prevailing gender norms, codes, roles and relations 
are reinforced, bearing implications for broader meanings and practices of politics.  
                                                
30 Interview in Jerusalem, 5 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Here, cyclical repetition compounds further relations beyond those emotive and 
discursive; as R.W. Connell (1987: 141) writes, “[…] gender is institutionalised to the 
extent that the network of links to the reproduction system is formed by cyclical 
practices.  It is stabilised to the extent that the groups constituted in the network have 
interests in the conditions for cyclical rather than divergent practice.”  As cycles of 
trauma are performed, repeated and stabilised – interpellating those who might 
diverge – so too patterns of gender gain constancy, providing structure for both 
‘politics’ and material realities.  
Alienation and Cynicism 
Within Jewish Israeli society, ‘politics’ has been constructed as an interest and 
practice tied to the privileging of men and masculinity, which accompanies Zionist 
narratives of persecution, defence and redemption.  Popularly associated with conflict 
and violence, politics emerges as a bastion of security and defence, interests with 
which most Jewish Israeli women were deemed to have little ‘formal’ familiarity until 
the recent inclusion of female conscripts in combat positions (Lentin 2004; Jacoby 
2005; Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011).  With scant experience of combat, 
Jewish Israeli ‘women’ as a category were effectively granted little political voice and 
few positions of governance, despite the Israeli state’s passage of a ‘Women’s Equal 
Rights Law’ in 1951 and its revision in 2000 (Raday 1991: 18-20; Yuval-Davis 2005 
[1980]: 122; Yishai 2005 [1997]: 203; Halperin-Kaddari 2004: 17, 20).  While recent 
intersectional analyses undertaken by feminist scholars such as Nahla Abdo (2011) 
complicate any claims made around ‘women’ as a homogenous category in Israel-
Palestine, the prevailing valuations and arbiters of national politics remain masculine.  
Importantly, an intersectional approach again makes visible how access to political 
voice and leadership are informed not only by gender, but also through intersecting 
hierarchies of ethnicity, race, class and religion.  From the state’s naissance and the 
dominance of Labour Zionism through the rise of Likud in the 1970s and the 
exclusive nationalist political parties currently gaining influence, primarily white, 
middle- and upper-class heterosexual Jewish men have populated successive 
governments and exercised audible political speech (Shafir and Peled 2002: 88-94; 
Sasson-Levy 2013: 28; see also Swirski and Safir 1991 and Yishai 2005 [1997]).  
Thus even as recent reorganisation and demographic shifts within the military have 
opened roles formerly closed to women and reflect a rise in rates of religious 
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conscription, for many citizens political practice and interests remain exclusive.  
Though ‘politics’ might be theorised as conduct and exchange in the public “realm of 
human affairs” open to all citizen-subjects (Arendt 1998 [1958]), lived experiences 
and popular understandings in Israel-Palestine yield a complex image of alienation. 
Importantly, even as the figures of Jewish Israeli politicians remain relatively stable, 
the content of their politics has shifted from the liberal Labour platforms dominant 
until the 1977 elections to agendas and policies increasingly centred around ethno-
nationalist concerns (see Shafir and Peled 2002: 213-230).  Along with the waning 
influence of historically strong Left-of-centre parties in Israel, the recent power 
sharing agreement between the centre-Right Likud party and Right-wing Israel 
Beiteinu [‘Israel Our Home’] attests to the recent intensification of these trends and 
processes (Lis 2012).  As the influence and appeal of the political Right grows, so too 
the specific contours of alienation shift, spreading to encompass a spectrum of 
subjectivities inclusive of those who once enjoyed considerable political power.  Here, 
corruption becomes a way of talking about estrangement from politics and the 
political elite – not only are we ‘not like them,’ but also their policies and practices are 
seen to benefit the select few gathered in the upper echelons of political office.  “I see 
Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] on the television and it’s embarrassing to 
see his body language – he’s sitting on a chair and there is a row of gangsters behind 
him,” Yael, an Israeli citizen originally from Australia, recounted as we spoke in her 
home in Jerusalem’s German Colony.  She continued, “It’s about money and religion 
– they hide behind the cloak of religion, religion which is so full of righteousness. 
What can I do with all of that?  Except for run away if it gets too bad.”31  Likewise, 
Dalia linked politicians with corruption during our exchange in Tel Aviv: “I’m 
pessimistic about Israeli politics, it’s corrupted in a neglecting manner.  It’s not evil or 
fat-cats, but detached.  They can’t think of creative things.  Everyone is old and they 
look to the way things used to work.”32  So too Dana, a self-professed “politically 
avoidant” interview participant in Tel Aviv, spoke of the political elite in terms which 
conveyed estrangement as we conversed in a Tel Aviv café: “There is no one to go 
                                                
31 Interview in Jerusalem, 12 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
32 Interview in Tel Aviv, 7 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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to. . . .  Now that all the generals have died, like [Ariel] Sharon33 and [Yitzhak] Rabin, 
the new generation is all white-collar crooks.  It’s a cynical notion, but these pictures 
of the ministers now look like the pre-Holocaust caricatures of Jews: hooked noses, 
fat bodies, beady eyes.”34  With politicians characterised as gangsters or crooks, 
righteous, detached and archaic, feelings of alienation circulate among citizen-subjects 
as they increasingly fail to see not only their interests reflected in state policies, but 
also their values mirrored by those who lead the country.   
Yet even as Yael, Dalia and Dana differentiate themselves from Jewish Israeli 
politicians and politics through declarations of alienation, these actions and sensations 
remain enmeshed within wider frames of reference.  Yael conveys a willingness to 
flee as she feels herself increasingly powerless against the money and religion of 
politicians; Dalia invests in her child and professes scant concern if Israel “blows up” 
as related above; Dana stopped reading newspapers at age 20 and now at 32 years old 
sees no one whom she can vote for rather than against – through conveying forcible 
estrangement, these practices of and claims to detachment seek to institute division.  
However, the phrasing of alienation-as-corruption points to a relation of attachment, 
an inescapable entanglement which implicates dissent, resistance and ‘bad subjects’ in 
power.  Indeed Yonathan, Dana’s former partner and the Tel Aviv filmmaker who 
earlier related how “new developments fuel old ideas,” outlined his perception of this 
connection in response to a question of politics: 
I see [politics] as the expression of the currents in societies.  You can collect 
political influence when you have a central movement to collect it in.  Now all 
the corruption in movements is an expression of what is happening in society, 
it is a mirror.  They are corrupt because we are.  We are corrupted and people 
don’t see that.  Corruption is everywhere: in relationships, in work, in renting 
an apartment – it is expressed everywhere.  Many times people aim their 
energy to change politics without looking at how society is taking part in it.35 
Implicating himself and his society in the corruption which produces sensations and 
practices of alienation, Yonathan challenges the distinction imposed between ‘them’ 
                                                
33 Subsequent to a stroke in 2006 former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has been in a permanent coma, 
while showing brain activity in early 2013; in this passage the speaker – Dana – misidentifies his 
condition as “dead.”  
 
34 Interview in Tel Aviv, 17 January 2012; handwritten notes. 
 
35 Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
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and ‘us,’ the political realm and its subjects.  Importantly, the discussion of alienation 
articulated by the women above affirms the findings of much feminist scholarship, 
describing the normative relations positioning Jewish Israeli men as political 
knowers/actors and women outside the political sphere; yet a shift to the language of 
cynicism both complicates and clarifies hegemonic gender patterns.  Invoked by Dana 
in her identification of contemporary politicians’ images with pre-Holocaust anti-
Semitic propaganda, cynicism conveys a tense relationship to politics professed by 
both women and men, stressing connectivity, overlap and enmeshment.   
In contrast to alienation, yet bound within a shared frame, cynicism signifies 
entanglement with the object from which one feels distanced, divided or excluded.  As 
Lori Allen (2013: 16, 27) observes among Palestinians living in the Occupied 
Territories, cynicism constitutes “a stance, attitude, mode of expression, and value 
judgement” which “[…] can be not only a way that power is reproduced and political 
stasis maintained, but also part of how people continue to critique and search, or at 
least hope, for something better.”  While cynicism may indeed reflect a situation in 
which “[…] the possibilities of thinking and freedom open up precisely when one 
cynically gives up on such values of ideals” (Asberg 2008: 2), during interviews in 
Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem this sentiment conveyed knowledge of implication 
coupled with a felt inability to institute change.  Oded, the Tel Aviv filmmaker who 
earlier related the construction of “real men” via military service, spoke directly of the 
links between corruption, cynicism and (in)action: 
[…] Politics here is a great way to shift attention away from real issues.  Like 
how we’re being robbed by people who squeeze money from the country, who 
own it, who have their way with the country.  Now we have the highest fuel 
prices in the world!  In the world!  And no one knows why.  There is no 
substantial public transport here.  In France everyone would go on strike and 
paralyze everything, they would bring the country down.  Here it won’t 
happen because it’s a ‘social issue’ – “How can you compare this to the 
suffering of people in Sderot with missiles every day?”  And when something 
happens politically, people stay home… because they have such cynicism.  
“What can we do?  People are corrupt, and if we get rid of them more corrupt 
people will come!  What can we do?  I’m going to watch Big Brother…”36 
 
                                                
36 Interview in Tel Aviv, 11 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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A self-professed “former cynic,” Oded locates the helplessness of ‘Ma la’asot?’ 
[What can we do?] within a wider frame of politics and alienation, demonstrating the 
ways in which the absence of reflected interests and values still manages to bind 
individuals with the collective.  Unable to locate “social issues” – community matters 
in need of attention and transformation, such as the cost of fuel or dearth of public 
transportation – within the discourses and policies of ‘corrupt’ government officials, 
concerned citizens remain in their homes along with those unconcerned or supportive 
of the status quo, despite clearly feeling the situation in need of redress.  Then beneath 
cynicism lies a sense of responsibility, piqued by acknowledgement of implication yet 
dulled by the conviction that action is futile.   
Political Emotions 
As cynicism defies restriction to a single category of ‘men’ or ‘women,’ this relation 
complicates those prevailing gender norms which largely locate Jewish Israeli men 
within the political and women without; here the realm of politics encompasses those 
whose interests and values it reflects regardless of gender, while implying a 
preference for stasis.  Excluded – yet implicated – are men as well as women, 
Ashkenazi as well as Mizrahi, Jewish as well as non-Jewish, each upon bases which 
coalesce around hegemonic national narratives and ideals.  Shaul, a 20 year-old 
student of religion and philosophy active among the leadership of Jerusalem-based 
Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity,37 described new terms of political division thus:  
Politics has changed drastically in the last 20 years – the ‘two states versus 
larger Israel’ debate is gone, although Parliament still speaks in this language.  
But if you look at the political platforms, they are quite similar – Kadima, 
Likud, [Ehud] Barak’s Atzmaut, and even [Avigdor] Lieberman too!  We have 
one large Right-wing narrowly interpreting Zionism and then smaller 
ideological parties on both sides of it.  The political discussion has shifted to 
an ethno-nationalistic majority versus a civil society-democratic minority – 
these are the new fault lines.38      
                                                
37 Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity is a Jewish Israeli activist initiative supporting those Palestinian families 
forcibly expelled from East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood by settlers; for historical context 
see page 43 of this thesis, footnote 17. 
 
38 Interview in Jerusalem, 28 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Pragmatic in delineation, in addition to its resonance what struck me in Shaul’s 
account was the intensity with which he spoke, the way he almost spat words, 
expressed irritation and anger, and at times answered with obvious derision.  In 
contrast to the frustration and despair which characterised many interviews, those who 
still felt themselves able to act politically came alive in their seats before me.  “It took 
me a while and a lot of anger,” Jerusalemite activist Meirav admitted as she recounted 
her path to feminism, now the basis of her political action.  “I credit my anger. . . .   I 
can be angry for ten minutes and say what I want, ok, but people won’t let me do that 
– I’m not cute and harmless.  So I got cynical. . . .  People get cynical, they get tired.”  
When I asked how she manages to avoid the cynicism of which she once felt herself a 
part, Meirav answered, “I don’t!  I go to the places that allow anger.”39   As she feels 
herself actively silenced, Meirav remains subject to the feelings of relative inefficacy 
which frame both cynicism and alienation, yet she works through her relationship to 
politics by means of anger and continued action.   
Like Shaul’s disposition, Meirav’s account casts as exceptional the attributes of anger 
and action, a seeming paradox within a society whose militarisation pervades 
everyday life and interpersonal relations.  Yet within the course of fieldwork 
interviews, the primary political emotions expressed by Jewish Israelis emerged as 
despair, disillusionment, shame and guilt – sentiments which reflect and reproduce 
aspects of the normative Zionist narrative.  Importantly, these interviews did not 
situate sentiments of political depression opposite anger, but rather drew connections 
between extremes, completing and reaffirming the cycle of trauma.40  Similar to 
Meirav who does not escape cynicism in her action, contradictions suffuse 
subjectivities and experiences, again complicating prevailing gender patterns.  
Shoshana, who arrived “late” from the United States to Mt. Scopus on the heels of the 
1967 War, personified these tensions as we sat together in the cafeteria of Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem: 
                                                
39 Interview in Jerusalem, 5 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
40 This accord between seeming contradictions in political emotion bears striking similarity to 
Palestinian contexts; as Lori Allen (2013: 26) writes, “[…] in Palestine cynicism is an emotion tied to 
political stasis, apathy, and hope, all uncomfortably combined and anchored in a political phase of 
perceived limbo.”  
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[After the Oslo years] I grew more and more disillusioned.  I probably became 
extremely pessimistic, extremely.  I think probably the attacks from Aza 
[Gaza] after we pulled out… the attacks from Lebanon…  From Aza it was 
pretty bad, but the thing from Lebanon – I know people from Beirut and my 
first reaction was “Flatten that country!”  It took 20 years to get the army out, 
starting with the Four Mothers [Arba Emahot].  Then I said, “Wait, it’s Zaher 
and Salim, [friends] in Beirut...”  It gives you an idea of how angry I was. A 
lot of it is what happened to the Israeli Left. . . .  But my son is much worse: he 
went from being an activist.  It’s true, he was a student at the time, there’s 
some life-cycle influence.  But he was at a meeting every week, then a meeting 
in Tel Aviv, every Saturday he’d go out.  “To Hebron?!  You’ll get arrested!” 
– you don’t know whether to be proud or worried!  Now he’s disillusioned.  
He’s worse than me.  He feels they’re all liars!  The Left, the Palestinians – 
everyone is liars.   
It’s very interesting.  I went through a period of tremendous, tremendous 
pessimism.  I began to think that there was no way of stopping [the 
occupation] – this is not why I settled in Israel, to have a bi-national state.  
Now I say that I am saving my strength for ‘right to vote’ demonstrations.  
After the Right-wing grew stronger, there are more things to make a two-state 
solution impossible – then there will be one state and we need to fight for the 
rights of Palestinians to vote.  “What can we do?  Isn’t this ridiculous?” I said 
to a woman at the store.  “You do!” she told me.  “Why don’t you come to 
Sheikh Jarrah?  There are a lot of people from the university there.”  But I 
don’t like that – it’s like a performative social club…  Whoever plans the 
demonstrations on Friday’s doesn’t have to make Shabbat dinner, that’s for 
sure!41  
Appearing within a single narrative, alienation, anger and disillusionment clearly co-
exist, compounding one another as they culminate in a cynicism which legitimises 
inaction.  Pervading the political subjectivities of both Shoshana and her adult son, 
disillusionment transcends categories of gender as Jewish Israeli society is again 
divided, this time along lines of ‘liars’ and actors, though the moral boundary between 
the politically dominant Right-wing and that minority of “performative” Leftists 
appears uncertain.  Vacillating between the solemnity of depression and the agitation 
of anger, Shoshana and her son settle somewhere between in the moral safe space of 
an ideological, if inactive, Left. 
                                                
41 Interview in Jerusalem, 27 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Thus disillusionment, despair, shame and guilt complicate the streamlined image of a 
gender order which associates ‘active’ emotions with militarised masculinity and 
ostensibly ‘passive’ positions and sensations with femininity.  Expressed by women 
and men alike, political depression pervades and seemingly gives shape to that group 
situated by Shaul opposite “the ethno-nationalistic majority.”  While the following 
chapters largely complicate such an easy distinction, this collective relationship to 
politics – one of alienation, cynicism and disengagement – indeed entrenches and 
reproduces particular norms and relations on levels more macro.  In gendered terms, 
even as political depression transcends categories of ‘men’ and ‘women,’ the 
embeddedness of this position within existing relations of power ultimately reaffirms 
‘politics’ as masculine.  Unable to affect change in the realm of those “crooks” and 
“gangsters” of formal politics who appear almost invariably male, white and upper 
class, those subscribing to and expressing political depression collectively assume the 
attributes of femininity seemingly complicated by the very production of prevailing 
political emotions.  That is, as both women and men experience despair, 
disillusionment, shame and guilt, the ways in which these emotions cross category 
boundaries serve not to revalue political sensations, but rather to devalue those who 
express them.   
The Politics of Living 
As prevailing gender patterns are both complicated and clarified through relationships 
to politics and political emotions, modes of everyday living become bound up with the 
desire for stasis and stability.  As illustrated above, the complexity and contradictions 
of sensation, experience and belief overwhelmingly produce in women and men 
disenchantment, disengagement and investment in realms more immediate and 
intimate.  As Lauren Berlant (2011: 259) writes: 
The depressive position, in [Melanie] Klein and [Eve] Sedgwick, is taken up 
by a subject who acknowledges the broken circuit of reciprocity between 
herself and her world but who, refusing to see that cleavage as an end as such, 
takes it as an opportunity to repair both herself and the world.  But . . . such an 
arc and rhythm can also amount to attempts to sustain optimism for irreparable 
objects.  The compulsion to repeat a toxic optimism can suture someone or a 
world to a cramped and unimaginative space of committed replication, just in 
case it will be different. 
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While in the narratives recounted above the realm of ‘politics’ often does not become 
the object of reparative action – rather small worlds emerge as a locus of action, as 
explored in Chapter Three – the breakdown of reciprocity indeed catalyses a form of 
suturing.  Here the combination of relations, emotions and actions reflects a new mode 
of politics embedded within wider realities: the politics of living.  Dependent upon 
replication and repetition oriented toward perceived normalcy and wholeness, the 
worlds created through political depression take shape through structures of gender, 
(re)suturing ‘bad subjects’ to the normative national fold. 
Bound tightly with Holocaust narratives, survival characterises accounts of everyday 
life in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem and constitutes the practice against which visions 
of normalcy are desired and constructed.  Yael, the 56 year-old Jerusalemite who 
earlier characterised politicians as “gangsters,” detailed the extent to which survival 
pervades daily life: 
I do think it’s amazing accomplishment, this state – it’s a miracle, a miracle.  I 
heard a sentence recently from a friend, an actress, who made a wonderful play 
about the Holocaust: “The truth is more important than the facts.”  Here what 
is the fight over?  Land and entitlement to it. “It’s mine.  No it’s mine!  No it’s 
mine!”  I don’t know how it’s ever going to…  
It’s quite amazing that life goes on, on so many levels here.  It’s like a frog in 
water and more gets added so he swims up to keep his head above water.  
Then more is added, and more…  Life is going on!  I think that the ultimate act 
of optimism is to continue having children, creating families.  There are a lot 
of people in the West who don’t have the urge [to have families], they think 
“What’s it worth?”  But here we are, in a more complex situation, more 
disheartening, and we continue on.  You know, demographics are a very 
important issue here.  Who is having babies – the religious and the Arabs.  
This will be important!42 
In this short statement, the Holocaust becomes a sub-textual frame through which to 
appraise successes of the state, contemporary practices of living, gendered imperatives 
for reproduction, and visions of a better tomorrow just beyond reach.  Survival, then, 
becomes past, present and future, a practice and ethos which must be continually – 
and incompletely – transcended through acts of repetition as it renders the world 
                                                
42 Interview in Jerusalem, 12 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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intelligible.43  This mode of living produces values of security, fraternity and 
modernity, as here a “fight” creates families and categories of ‘us’ within an economic 
frame shared with the West.  Cyclically repeated as water is added again and again to 
nearly cover the swimming frog’s head, survival melds with those narratives of 
trauma instilled through institutions of military, family, education, media and 
commemoration.  So too survival draws upon and activates relations of political 
alienation, if not cynicism, as Yael leaves unfinished her thoughts about a resolution 
to the (political) argument over land and entitlement.  Culminating in an expression of 
“optimism,” this account of everyday survival momentarily resists dominant political 
emotions and in doing so implies those very “disheartening” sensations. 
Thus Yael’s account emerges as instructive in the ways that it gathers together the 
many threads of Jewish Israeli everyday life, enmeshing dominant values with 
overlapping institutions and popular appraisals of politics.  Yet the precise content of 
her optimism is striking as here Yael foregrounds reproduction, pointing to ability of 
complexity to engender simplification and entrench those norms which render life 
most stable.  As the (collective) act of “having children, creating families” constitutes 
an ultimate expression of optimism, for Yael the contradictions, subversions and 
potential transformations previously detailed in this chapter become streamlined and 
reduced, again melding with the normative narratives which position Jewish Israeli 
women as reproducers and men as protectors.  Providing constancy amidst political, 
demographic and moral uncertainty, hegemonic gender norms emerge as the backbone 
of new normalcy and constitute that which makes immediate survival liveable.  Again, 
this structure links directly to narratives, experiences and values derived from the 
Holocaust: “You have to make life in the hard places,” Matan told me as he crushed 
another cigarette in the dish between us.  “This life is going and building a community 
– other actions can be built on it because it’s fun.  Fun is part of life.  Even in the 
Holocaust I’m sure they had fun.  My grandparents made my mother inside the 
Holocaust so they had some fun!”44  Extending beyond metaphor or discourse and into 
the physicality of everyday life, survival-borne drives to “make life,” “build 
                                                
43 Importantly, however, Ronit Lentin (2000: 219) points to tensions around the simultaneous embrace 
of a triumphal Holocaust narrative and the social rejection of its survivors in Israel: “By nationalizing 
the memory of the Shoah, deemed necessary in the process of establishing the state of Israel, and by 
centring its commemoration machinery around the un-written principle of an Israeli ‘victory over the 
Shoah’, Israel erased the very memory of the Shoah itself.” 
 
44 Interview in Jerusalem, 21 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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community” and even “have fun” possess material and normative dimensions – at its 
most triumphal, survival implies the biological continuation of life.  Bound with 
cycles of trauma, narratives of survival and visions of normalcy, the hegemonic 
heteronormative gender order and its roles, relations, codes and norms become the 
basis of a community stable in its precarity, with new generations invested in its 
reproduction. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the entanglement of individual subjects with the relations of 
power, institutional structures and normative narratives which together crystallise 
forms of political disengagement, shaping new visions of normalcy and wider material 
realities.  Yet this is not to say that diverse Jewish Israeli women and men exist 
passive sites for the inscription of power (see McNay 1992: 12), victims to the 
“brainwashing” detailed and feared by Ana as she observes her young son’s education.  
Rather, this account of Jewish Israeli everyday life – the everyday of occupation – has 
begun to unpick a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, threading 
through the analysis an awareness of responsibility.  While reflective of Michel 
Foucault’s (1997) biopower in the sense that “massifying” relations of power and 
domination indeed function on the level of population, engendering control through 
normalisation and regularisation, the actions and perceptions of Jewish Israelis 
redirect attention to the role of the agential subject.  As Timothy Mitchell (1991: 90) 
writes, “The power to regulate and control is not simply a capacity stored within the 
state, from where it extends out into society. The apparent boundary of the state does 
not mark the limit of the processes of regulation. It is itself a product of those 
processes.”  These mass-oriented modes of power then produce normalisation and 
regularisation of a population through its own design. 
Thus as subjects good and bad are hailed and subjectified by ideology, discourse and 
even material practices, an eye must be kept to Louis Althusser’s original claim: 
“ […] the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept 
his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his 
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subjection ‘all by himself.’”45  According to Althusser (1971: 55), for this free subject 
hailed through structure, practice and values there remains choice, as ‘good’ subjects 
regulate themselves while ‘bad’ subjects incur the weight of the repressive state 
apparatus – one chooses one’s subject position.  Thus the individual retains the 
capacity to act; she may be constituted and constrained by power, but she remains 
agential.  Indeed, as Judith Butler (1995 cited in Davies 2006: 426) asserts, “[T]o 
claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the 
contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency.”   
Then to insist upon agency in the everyday of occupation is to call into question the 
effects of normalcy envisioned, desired and pursued, to tease apart the threads which 
together create a tapestry of belonging and constancy however precarious.  To unpick 
values, cycles and meanings – those threads which colour, grant texture and render 
intelligible and liveable everyday lives in a context of violent conflict – is to begin to 
disentangle by insisting upon entanglement.  This is not to simplify what is 
complicated nor to complicate what is simple (Roy 1998), but to draw upon a single 
structural thread – gender – which renders visible active participation in and 
dependency upon hegemony, along with investment in its preservation. 
 
    
 
  
                                                
45 Emphasis in original text.  
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Chapter Two 
Bordered Communities – Gderot Hafrada [Separation Fences] 
An early start on a clear weekend day.  We drive gloriously north on Kvish HaHof, the 
coastal road, away from Tel Aviv into the warm light of morning and the promise of 
open space.  I have been in Israel-Palestine for just over five months and I feel tense 
as a guitar string, ready to release at a touch.  But this morning I am freed by the 
promise of escape.  Guy and I arrive to the parking lot at Nachal Taninim, or 
‘Crocodile Stream,’ a nature preserve and bird sanctuary whose trails are popular 
among both twitchers – bird enthusiasts like ourselves – and families seeking fresh air 
and adventure.  Told that the preserve is located “near to Caesaria,” one of the 
wealthiest towns in Israel, I am surprised when in truth we enter the site via a gravel 
road beneath Jisr az-Zarka, an ‘Arab town’ so impoverished that it substituted for the 
Gaza Strip in the filming of a recent British television serial.1  We turn into the 
preserve, passing a van parked alongside the dirt path as its driver languidly sets his 
lawn chair for the day’s work.  Clad in the electric yellow of a security vest, he 
glances quickly at our car and does ostensibly nothing to securitise, save perhaps to 
‘profile’ our car – in a shiny silver Volkswagen, we pull into the lot without question 
or inspection.   
Binoculars and bird guide in hand, Guy and I take to the trail, exchanging smiles with 
a Palestinian woman and her three children seated in the empty picnic area.  I am 
buoyed by the thought of new avian and human encounters.  We set about finding 
birds and flowers in the cultivated ‘wilderness’ before us, shuttering our ears against 
the soundscape of excited children arriving and emptying into the parking lot by the 
carload.  It strikes me that tiny Nachal Taninim exists as a presumably safe space for 
experiencing nature – someone has gone before, investigated the area, built trails and 
infrastructure, opened the recreation site, stationed a guard and requested payment.  
Unlike in the deserts, mountains, canyons and forests of Israel, here families and 
twitchers alike can experience wilderness with the promise of security.   
As Guy and I debate this point, we attempt to avoid the increasing stream of fellow 
recreationists whose presence strips our surroundings of their wild façade.  Faced with 
the sudden influx of humanity, we bound off into the tall grasses and short trees 
                                                
1 The Promise, aired by Channel Four in 2011. 
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seeking immersion in bird habitat, imagining ourselves alone.  Upon emerging from 
the bush we immediately meet a group identifying a pashosh, the diminutive graceful 
Prinia, and arrive at the stream where Pied Kingfishers dive and dance.  Now alone, 
we continue on the path toward Jisr az-Zarka, feeling relative solitude return once 
more as it seems that the others have turned back.  Increasingly, the human-scape 
becomes Palestinian: we meet a man and his children fishing “for fun, no luck”; we 
pass a woman and child grilling meat nearby, presumably the fisherman’s family; we 
come upon another group seated around a picnic table, their sheep and goats grazing 
on the grass; yet another family picnics in the tall grasses around a bend and the 
young children wave excitedly, calling “Shalom!” over and over.  Eventually, Guy 
and I reach a clearing and Jisr az-Zarka stands before us – we see the school and hear 
children playing, we see the waste dump on the town’s outskirts, we see homes and 
hear life.   
The call to prayer sounds from the mosque’s minarets as we walk past horses, 
crossing what I assume to be the preserve’s official border where the open field stops 
at a berm and the manicured paths resume.  Inside the preserve once more, the arches 
of ancient ruins loom large, their round stone forms rising against the grasses and blue 
sky.  We stop and face only this direction.  From this vantage point our view covers 
the ruins and Israel’s ancient history, with Jewish Israeli families exploring between 
and amidst the layers.  Here visitors consider ‘other inhabitants’ of Israel – Romans – 
former residents now devoid of connection to everyday life.  However, current ‘others’ 
are alive and embodied, Palestinians who reside in the town behind us and fish the 
stream, grill meat and graze livestock, living on the preserve’s margins should we 
choose to see. 
Guy and I continue walking toward the parking lot, passing through a small creaky 
gate, likely an entrance for local Palestinians who will remain on the preserve’s 
periphery.  Beyond the gate we arrive at the security van and to the right of the parked 
vehicle an impromptu Palestinian parking lot has taken shape, marked by families 
with women wearing hijab and cars of an older, less shiny calibre.  There are clearly 
different points of access and relationships to the land we ‘share’ on that warm March 
day – we pay and tour, with official guides and marked paths; they enter through 
secondary gates free of charge and use the land, yet remain suspect on its margins.  
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We join the road and meet a Palestinian family walking toward the preserve, as the 
woman covers her hair with a scarf while pushing a baby carriage.  I smile and give 
my best “Ahlan!” [Arabic: hello] and she returns my greeting.  This feeling of 
connection, no matter how minute, is gratifying.  The woman continues to the parking 
area behind us, collecting her family as she goes, and we return to our car in the 
separate lot.  I see then how strange this place looks, Israeli flag draped over the 
entrance to the information centre, parking lot full of grey, white and silver cars 
parked in rows, visitors with their families speaking Hebrew and looking touristic 
with backpacks, camelbacks, cameras, strollers, sunglasses and sunscreen.  Though 
this scene unfolds directly beside the small Palestinian parking lot under the town of 
Jisr az-Zarka there is no deliberate mixing, not even a ‘hello’ offered to the woman 
with her carriage.  Palestinians remain largely to the south, while Jewish Israelis keep 
to the north – it exists a different world, or rather two very different worlds within a 
single small space.2   
That morning in Nachal Taninim, the divisions and unease pervading wider Israeli 
society became newly visible and palpable, suddenly somehow more alive in their 
concentration.  Accordingly, through narratives of separation and entanglement, this 
chapter considers the ways in which Jewish Israeli and Palestinian lives remain 
actively woven together despite the conditions of protracted conflict which seemingly 
divide ‘us’ from ‘them’ and ‘here’ from ‘there.’  In looking to critical theories of 
space proposed by Juval Portugali (1993) and Doreen Massey (1994), social relations 
emerge as key to the understandings and experiences which shape division, exchange 
and belonging in Israel-Palestine.  While ostensibly subscribing to a principle of 
separation advanced by the Israeli state as seen in walls, barriers and segregated 
communities (Weizman 2007: 161-184; Gordon 2008: 197-222), Jewish Israeli 
society remains dependent upon Palestinian ‘others’ for the material production of 
normalcy.  In this, normalcy again arises not against or despite conditions of political 
violence and conflict, but rather through their very continuation.  After first outlining 
multiple processes and practices of ‘othering’ through which ‘strangeness’ is socially 
marked and identified, this chapter challenges the claim that Jewish Israelis have 
become increasingly separated from Palestinians in their everyday lives.  Instead, 
historical and contemporary accounts of enmeshment demonstrate the continued 
                                                
2 Field notes, 19 March 2011. 
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reliance of Jewish Israelis upon relations of exchange with ‘others,’ whether through 
labour, maintenance or nourishment.  Here, gender analysis makes visible how 
sustained modes of social interaction underwrite and structure seeming partition, 
ultimately rendering particular lives liveable. 
 
The Social Relations of Space 
In work on topographic space in the context of Israel-Palestine, Juval Portugali (1993) 
centralises “implicate relations” as a means through which co-existent separation and 
relation become possible.  Here sociality and inter-subjectivity emerge as central to 
meanings, understandings and experiences of physical space, binding together 
collectivities while at the same time generating degrees of separation.  Following 
David Bohm (1980 cited in Portugali 1993: 57), Portugali posits that the “explicate” 
realm of separate things – those “[…] entities and parts, independent of, and external 
to, each other…” – exists through the “unfolding” of the “implicate” order, where  
“‘[…] everything is enfolded into everything.’”  As Portugali (1993: xiii) writes:  
Implicate relations as a conceptual notion implies that space and society are  
indeed independent entities, but only within the limits of the explicate domain.  
At a subtler level they enfold each other, exist inside each other, and in this 
respect coexist in implicate relations.  From this point of view space is not a 
passive entity, but an active actor in the theatre of social reality. 
This active dimension of space importantly arises through its very sociality, as 
divisions unfold and totality enfolds, neither process remaining fixed nor finished.   
Significantly, this emphasis on process, relationality and mutual inscription overlaps 
with critical scholarship by Doreen Massey (1994), a feminist geographer whose work 
emphasises the ways in which the sociality of space is in part structured by gender.  
While Portugali (1993: 57) asserts that unfolding, distinction or separation at the 
explicate level occurs through the articulation of hierarchically arranged “generative 
social orders” – “[…] code(s) according to which people socio-spatially order their 
lives” – Massey clarifies the contours and contents of these codes and orders.  Here, 
space becomes infused with and shaped by specifically gendered and classed relations 
of power, while at the same time producing these very constitutive social hierarchies.  
In her work, Massey (1994) offers a critical intervention in hegemonic 
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conceptualisations which separate space from time, valuate time more highly than 
space and strip space of political potential.  Like Portugali (1993), Massey (1994: 2) 
claims that space and society exist in reciprocal relation, drawing the social and 
spatial together in her conceptualisation of the spatial as social relations “stretched 
out.”  For Massey, the relationship between social relations and space is not 
unidirectional or linear, wherein social relations produce or constitute space; rather 
she points to the ways in which space “[…] is integral to the production of the social, 
and not merely its result” (Massey 1994: 4) – here space and social relations are 
mutually constitutive.  Importantly, within this thick, fluid, three-dimensional space 
Massey locates both politics and gender.  In this, Massey considers how a series of 
dualisms in classical thought have fused the realm of time with politics and action – 
through ideas of History with a capital H and ‘progress’ – leaving space behind as a 
realm of stasis, absence and passivity (Massey 1994: 6).  Subsequently, Massey 
argues convincingly that according to a further set of dichotomies, space has been 
coded as feminine – and time as masculine – in hegemonic Western thought.  Yet 
following on her earlier line of argument Massey posits, “[…] if spatial organisation 
makes a difference to how society works and how it changes, then, far from being the 
realm of stasis, space and the spatial are also implicated… in the production of history 
– and thus, potentially, in politics” (Massey 1994: 254).   
Following this reading of space, how might gendered relations both unfold and enfold 
in the context of Israel-Palestine?  As Massey (1994: 179) argues, “From the symbolic 
meaning of spaces/places and the clearly gendered messages which they transmit… 
spaces and places are not only themselves gendered but, in their being so, they reflect 
and affect the ways in which gender is constructed and understood.”  How does the 
gendering of space and place institute separation while depending upon entanglement, 
and with what implications for meanings, understandings and experiences of gender? 
 
Degrees of Separation 
In first looking to the explicate domain, various mechanisms of separation and 
distinction indeed arise from and circulate within Jewish Israeli society, concealing 
yet alluding to deeper relations of entanglement.  Here, gender emerges as central to 
processes of spatial mapping, identification of ‘others,’ practices of racialisation and 
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valuations of culture or custom which ostensibly divide ‘us’ from ‘them,’ constructing 
a reality in which “[a]n average Jewish Israeli can live an entire life without 
personally knowing, let alone befriending, a single Palestinian citizen of the same 
country” (Mendel 2009: 29). 
Mapping 
As Portugali (1993: 156) argues, in order to make sense of the environments in which 
ordinary life unfolds, individuals create “cognitive maps” which facilitate interaction 
among particular constellations of community.  Mutually inscribing the social and 
spatial, meaning and materiality, in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem these maps take 
shape explicitly through gendered and racialised valuations of safety, revealing 
specific terms of exclusion and belonging. 
Sitting at a popular café in Jerusalem’s Machane Yehuda market, 25 year-old Meirav 
recounted her experience of the city’s ‘zones’ or internal boundaries, the seams along 
which its topography and social fabric become enfolded and unfolded.  A blogger and 
online activist who created a popular campaign against street harassment, Meirav 
understands and navigates her adopted city according to a sense of security: 
Personally, there are three neighbourhoods that I feel safe on a good day to 
walk in.  For the average Palestinian man there are five. . . .  
You feel the neighbourhood boundaries when you crash into them – I can’t 
walk on the East side alone.  People know who is Palestinian or Jewish, it’s 
more than history.  Palestinian guys stare at your eyes directly and Mizrahi 
Israelis won’t.  I feel more threatened by the Palestinian guys.  Someone from 
the university, an activist, came to the AI [Alternative Information Centre]3 
café in the East of the city.  This guy suggested that two girls walk to the café 
in the East!  I didn’t go.  He probably thinks I’m racist, but he doesn’t realize.  
I used to live in French Hill for three years – I’ve been called ‘Jewish whore’ 
enough.  I was stalked, the group made my life hell.  But I can’t tell because 
what would people say?  Even the police….  The police won’t help French 
Hill students and also on the lines between.  They won’t help on the border 
line.  So the liberal Leftist male activist won’t believe me, the police I can’t 
                                                
3 The Alternative Information Centre is a Jerusalem-based Palestinian-Israeli joint activist organisation 
“engaged in dissemination of information, political advocacy, grassroots activism and critical analysis 
of the Palestinian and Israeli societies as well as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”; see 
http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/about-the-aic, accessed 7 June 2013. 
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tell – I was forced into silence because it’s not okay to say what Arabs do to 
me.  
For Meirav, encountering Palestinians in the spaces of annexed East Jerusalem 
activates experiences and memories of gendered and sexualised subjectivity, which 
now inform her understanding and navigation of the cityscape.  Having lived on the 
‘border line’ in the French Hill [Giv’at Shapira] neighbourhood, technically built over 
the Green Line in occupied territory, Meirav’s subjection to gendered harassment 
translates to an appraisal of personal safety clearly rooted in social relations.  
Significantly, this precarity is distinctly racialised – Meirav relates feeling “more 
threatened by the Palestinian guys” as an Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli woman.  Yet so too 
felt insecurity emerges as the product of multiple social relations as she expresses 
subsequent feelings of abandonment, misunderstood by the Jewish Israeli Leftists with 
whom she shares common politics and the police charged with her physical protection.  
Together, these patterns and dynamics intersect within the shared space of the city to 
compound Meirav’s sense of vulnerability, producing a particularly gendered mode of 
insecurity.  Later in our exchange, Meirav recounted a recent initiative on the Mount 
Scopus campus which explicitly spatialised these experiences of social relations: 
The campus safety discussion is zero in Israel.  I was angry about campus  
safety at French Hill and the college suggested that Im Tirtzu4 was organizing 
to escort women back to their rooms.  That’s how bad it was.  I wasn’t 
frightened enough to ask them for help, but I was close.  Campus safety is 
known all over the world, but not in Israel.  There was a ‘[prevention of] 
violence against women day’ and the Left shut our mouths when we tried to do 
the most vanilla activist thing: we wanted to draw a map with areas that 
women shouldn’t walk in.  In the organisation we’re all Left if not radical Left 
– we won’t draw something racist, just what to expect [in the neighbourhoods].  
There are different types of harassment in different places.  But the Left on 
campus shut our mouth about it because they were afraid that it might hurt the 
Palestinians on campus – they weren’t worried about [offending] the religious 
[students].  It was just a photocopied map!5  
                                                
4 Deemed fascist and McCarthyist by Ha’aretz journalist Gideon Levy (2010), Im Tirtzu is a Right-
wing extra-parliamentary organization which “[…] works to strengthen and advance the values of 
Zionism in Israel” (see http://en.imti.org.il, accessed 2 January 2011); it does so in part through 
targeting academics, institutions and organizations deemed ‘anti-Zionist’ by its own valuation.  
Translated from Hebrew ‘Im Tirtzu’ means ‘If you will it’, derived from Theodore Herzl’s dictum 
regarding the creation of the state of Israel: Im tirtzu, ein zo agada – ‘If you will it, it is no dream.’ 
 
5 Interview in Jerusalem, 3 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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This second narrative is immediately notable for the extent to which the extreme 
political Right presents itself as the protector of women while the Left sits paralysed 
by propriety, seemingly resulting in the preservation of the status quo and existing 
social relations.  Importantly, the proposed physical manifestation of cognitive maps 
catalyses and clarifies seemingly latent tensions between race, gender, politics and 
security.  While declaring herself and her colleagues “not racist,” Meirav alludes to 
the ways in which these maps align with the city’s many racialised zones as they 
purport to ensure (Jewish Israeli) women’s safety – “Palestinians on campus” are the 
group ostensibly protected by Leftists at the cost of female students’ security.  In a 
move to perhaps illustrate her own sensitivity to prejudice, Meirav importantly notes 
the absence of concern expressed by Leftists vis-à-vis the impact of the safety map 
upon the university’s religious students; political ‘correctness’ in this instance 
highlights further lines of division predicated upon social relations.  However, 
ultimately the young women who Meirav sees targeted by street harassment remain 
vulnerable without safety maps to guide them through the city, entrenching the 
prevailing gender norms which deem women in need of protection.  Mapped plainly 
here, the sociality of space indeed affects experiences and understandings of gender. 
Yet those men deemed ‘threatening’ through Meirav’s account also experience the 
gendered construction of city spaces, though differentially so.  For Yoni, a 28 year-old 
Mizrahi Jewish Israeli gay activist, Jerusalem possesses a surprising degree of security 
despite the frequency with which he is mistakenly identified as Palestinian: 
My Ashkenazi friends have been harassed or beaten, but I’m a big, Sephardic 
man.  When I go down the street I feel very safe.  These Ashkenazi friends are 
white, a bit scrawny… it goes through the whole macho, manly thing….  I 
have an advantage that way – if you’re a dark man and big, you feel safe in the 
city.   
KN: But what about when they check your ID? 
I feel safe then because I know it will be okay.  The inspection operates 
through the idea that the person blowing up is an Arab – and he looks like me.  
I understand the holistic experience of going through it all the time.  When 
they realize I’m a Jew it’s alright, but for Palestinians there’s more…6  
                                                
6 Interview in Jerusalem, 3 July 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Safety in Jerusalem appears forgone conclusion for Yoni, even as his bodily 
appearance superficially identifies him as ‘threatening’ and ‘other’ to Meirav’s white 
female body and clear Jewish Israeliness.  Yet paradoxically, Yoni’s very security 
rests in his physiognomy, as physical size and racialised perceptions of violence 
converge to insulate him from the homophobic attacks experienced by friends.  Thus, 
while appraised against and within safety maps as dangerous, Yoni’s brown male 
Arab body ultimately ensures his security, as upon inspection he is able to provide 
proof of national belonging.  Here social relations again emerge in terms of 
contradiction and complexity, as layers of subjectivity shape individual experiences of 
shared space.  Ultimately, the social relations of space as experienced by Yoni and his 
friends serve to entrench prevailing valuations of masculinity, as the “macho, many 
thing” retains primacy. 
Through these two accounts, the explicate and implicate unfold and enfold through 
social relations embedded in space, place and time.  While testifying to the drive for 
separation, Meirav’s narrative makes visible the ways in which individuals and 
communities necessarily come into contact despite neighbourhood boundaries.  So too 
Yoni’s account highlights degrees of simultaneous enmeshment and distinction, this 
time locating encounter within the subjectivity of one person, a self-identified “Arab-
Jew” often outwardly recognised as Palestinian.  Here, space is understood in terms of 
(in)security, juxtaposing gendered and racialised understandings of safety within a 
shared cityscape.  Seemingly left vulnerable is the (white) Jewish Israeli woman; left 
intact is the hyper-masculinised (ostensibly heterosexual) Jewish Israeli man.  Thus 
social relations and space might indeed be understood as reciprocal, as gender 
constitutes a code through which individuals “socio-spatially order their lives” 
(Portugali 1993: 57).  
Telling 
As the spatial separation or distinction of ‘us’ from ‘them’ and ‘here’ from ‘there’ 
remains incomplete in narratives of safety, individuals and communities adopt 
strategies of identification on scales more micro, ways of identifying belonging in 
moments of encounter.  Indeed, these mechanisms are highlighted by Meirav above as 
she claims that Mizrahi men act qualitatively differently from Palestinian men in 
shared streets and alleyways – eye contact becomes the telling sign of threat.  Here 
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gendered bodies are read and decoded for sameness and ‘strangeness’ within space 
(Yuval-Davis 1997: 47-48; Ahmed 2000: 7-9, 21-37; Lentin 2000: 182-183) in the 
interest of preserving individual security and maintaining community cohesion, while 
at the time requiring the continued presence of that ‘other’ being.  Again separation is 
problematised by entanglement; as Sara Ahmed (2000: 7) writes: 
Identity itself is constituted in the ‘more than one’ of the encounter: the 
designation of an “I” or “we” requires and encounter with other.  These others 
cannot be simply relegated to the outside: given that the subject comes into 
existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject’s 
existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered.  
 
In his study of the relationship between bodies and violence in Northern Ireland, Allen 
Feldman (1991) explores a practice of corporeal identification first theorised by Frank 
Burton (1979) in the same context.  For Feldman and Burton in their particular site of 
conflict, the human body is subject to “telling” or “the sensory identification of the 
ethnic Other through the reception of the body as an ideological text” (Feldman 1991: 
56).  Rather than solely serving to identify and compartmentalise the ‘other,’ acts of 
decoding actually encode the self, as belonging and cohesion arise through and against 
the presence of ‘strange’ bodies in a manner similar to Ahmed’s assertion above.  
Reminiscent of the ways in which social relations take shape within space (Portugali 
1993; Massey 1994), here physical bodies are read within particular places, a match or 
mismatch constituting the key criterion of valuation.  As Feldman (1991: 58) writes of 
Northern Ireland, “The proper reading of the various signs of embodiment, including 
dress, insignia, and speech, creates a circuit that indicates the residential affiliation of 
the subject and thus his precise relationship or nonrelationship to the social space in 
which the subject is encountered.”  In this, bodies are either “in-place” or “out-of-
place,” with those not belonging potentially subject to violent encounter as the result 
of somatic and symbolic reading.   
Within the incompletely segregated spaces of Israel-Palestine, ‘telling’ becomes an 
explicit practice indeed often bound with violence, as related by Yoni in his narrative 
above – “The inspection operates through the idea that the person blowing up is an 
Arab – and he looks like me.”  Here, clothing, posture and language are read 
alongside gender and race within highly charged spaces, as valuations of belonging 
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and strangeness carry palpable implications.  Yet so too telling orders and regulates 
the everyday irrespective of bodily threat and harm, generating boundaries of 
geographic space and the moral codes of communities therein.  Through the valuation 
of explicitly gendered and racialised human bodies in topographic space, Palestinians 
emerge as separate from Israeli Arabs, religious Jews are detached from their secular 
counterparts, and Yerushalmim [Jerusalemites] are judged against Tel Avivim [Tel 
Avivians].  Yet on the most basic level, in the context of Israel-Palestine telling 
attempts to differentiate the broader categories of ‘us’ from ‘them,’ ‘Jewish Israelis’ 
from their many ‘others.’  In the Jerusalem suburb of Mevasseret Zion, Ronit, a 57 
year-old Ashkenazi scientist at a nearby university, made clear the difficulties and 
tensions which accompany practices of telling in her everyday life: 
I can’t tell the difference between an Arab and a Jew from Morocco.  My 
hairdresser is Arab – he has fifteen kids and six brothers who are all working 
together.  They are very nice!  Every day they go to work.  They pass the 
checkpoint and come to work – their shop is completely full with Jewish 
women and Arab women.  I go every two months to dye my hair….  I always 
take my work with me, some readings, but I don’t work because I like to watch 
people.  On the promenade, in the coffee shop, I watch people – I like to figure 
out the relationships between them.  When I sit there are many Arab women 
who come to the shop, but they are very modern.  80% of them I can’t say they 
are Arab, I can’t distinguish.  It’s only when they start talking and I hear the 
accent that I know.  I don’t want to think like this!7  
In the gendered homosocial space of her (Palestinian) hairdresser, Ronit is unable to 
distinguish national belonging based on the ‘modern’ bodies of the women entering 
into the shop.  These women presumably share her relative social class and appear 
recognisably Jewish in phenotype, dress and comportment; here language and accent 
ultimately become the markers of strangeness in what appears to be a shared 
secularised semi-private space.  Though concluding here with a declared desire to 
cease in the practice of telling, during our exchange Ronit prefaced her account of the 
beauty shop with the statement “They [Arabs] are everywhere!” and followed with the 
admission, “I don’t pity them – we all have hatred.”  Though seemingly contradictory, 
this cluster of sentiments possesses internal logic for Ronit as fear drives her to 
identify strangeness and threat in the bodies and language of these ‘brown’ bodies 
around her.  As she decodes her fellow customers in the space of the salon, Ronit 
                                                
7 Interview in Mevasseret-Zion, 20 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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determines the meaning of their skin colour – Arab or Jewish – against their modern, 
secular dress, with curiosity disguising anxiety. 
Importantly, this ambiguity is key to the work done by telling, as through repetition 
identities and communities of commonality are continually reaffirmed.  Indeed as 
Ahmed (2000: 7) writes, “[…] in daily meetings with others, subjects are perpetually 
reconstituted: the work of identity formation is never over, but can be understood as 
the sliding across of subjects in their meetings with others.”  Thus, just as ‘we’ depend 
on the presence of ‘them,’ clarity requires a degree of murkiness and telling 
necessitates moments of misidentification.  While Ronit’s narrative above makes clear 
the prevalence of ambiguity, my own experience of learning to ‘tell’ is additionally 
instructive.  In early May 2011, I was beginning the West Jerusalem interview 
sessions, shifting from the familiarity of Tel Aviv to the unknown of Israel’s capital 
city.  As night fell, I sat on a bus from travelling from the Jerusalem central bus 
station to Tel Aviv, exhausted and ready to be home.  Our vehicle began to slow and 
pulled to a halt at the highway bus stop just east of Abu Gosh, a Palestinian town near 
to Jerusalem. The driver opened the doors, allowing two passengers to board the bus 
as was customary on this route; both young men sat down in empty seats and we 
entered the main road, resuming our travel.  While I had been nearly asleep when we 
stopped to collect the passengers, now I was wide awake.  One young man, no older 
than his early 20s, had chosen the seat in front of me, searching through his pockets as 
he settled in for the ride in the darkened bus.  I had not scrutinised this man as he 
boarded the bus, but now my heart raced, my eyes widened and my palms began to 
sweat – what was he looking for?  I made a snap judgement upon seeing the back of 
his head, recognising his darker skin and hair as ethnically and racially ‘other’ to the 
majority of passengers on the bus; that he boarded near a Palestinian village increased 
the likelihood that he was Palestinian.  Had he been dressed in the dull greens of an 
IDF uniform I would have quickly judged him Mizrahi Jewish Israeli, but this young 
man wore a thin grey coat and fashionable jeans, common attire for Palestinian men of 
his age.  I regarded him as best I could from behind, attempting to determine whether 
he was Jewish Israeli or Palestinian, valuating his body in the space of the Israeli bus 
as he extracted a smart phone from his pocket and began listening to music.   
Feeling terrible guilt, I berated myself for my own clear racism, for the extent to 
which I had absorbed prevailing fears and the techniques of their reproduction. 
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Disturbed by my prejudice and calmed by the seeming misplacement of my suspicion, 
I settled back in my seat.  “Anyhow, if he was going to blow up the bus, he would 
have done it by now,” I told myself.  It was the location of his aged, gendered and 
racialised body within layered space that both frightened and reassured me – a young 
Palestinian man on a bus became less threatening as that vehicle passed locales 
imagined to be strategically or symbolically significant.   
I sat in self-disgust, sinking into something close to sleep when suddenly the young 
man in front of me stood – my heart plummeted instantly.  Had I been right in my 
earlier suspicion?  What was he doing?  Looking only at the floor, the young man 
removed his coat and sat down, more comfortable now wearing a t-shirt in the warmth 
of the bus.  I felt ashamed.  I realised that for me, ‘how I experience the occupation’ – 
a question posed to interview participants – was in part through guessing ethnicity, 
learning to care about national belonging and religious affiliation, starting to fear 
otherness and ambiguity, reading “political transcription[s] of the human body” 
(Feldman 1991: 57).  In Tel Aviv, we disembarked at the Arlozorov bus station and I 
descended the steps behind the ‘suspicious’ young man; he dialled a friend and spoke 
in perfect Hebrew, far better than my own, walking into the night seemingly sure of 
the city and his belonging within it.8 
Blackness and Racialisation 
As clearly illustrated in the above accounts of mapping and telling, race is central to 
the identification of ‘others’ or ‘strangeness’ in relation to and importantly within the 
Jewish Israeli community.  Complicating Oren Yiftachel’s claim that ethnicity 
structures rights and governance in Israel-Palestine, David Theo Goldberg (2008: 42) 
argues, “Palestinians are treated not as if a racial group, not simply in the manner of a 
racial group, but as a despised and demonic racial group.”  In developing and 
substantiating this argument, Goldberg makes visible how prevailing theories 
predicated upon ethnicity and nationality offer explanatory frameworks which elide 
the explicit status of Palestinians as a “subjugated race” (2008: 43).  From 
“Palestinianising the racial” to “racialising the Palestinian,” Goldberg convincingly 
argues that race, rather than ethnicity, underwrites the production and maintenance of 
                                                
8 Field notes, 5 May 2011. 
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power relations in Israel-Palestine.  As in my account of the bus ride to Tel Aviv, 
gender remains inextricable from racialised practices of differentiation: “… the figure 
of the Palestinian, of the threatening suicide bomber, of a refugee rabble reducible to 
rubble, is overwhelmingly male, supported by women considered, unlike their 
military-serving Israeli counterparts, too weak and too late to do anything about it” 
(Goldberg 2008: 31).  As seen in the above narratives, it is the colour of skin – the 
ostensibly phenotypical race – which sets processes of mapping and telling into 
motion.  Here, categories of Mizrahi Jewish Israelis, Palestinians and indeed ‘Israeli 
Arabs’ collapse into each other, leaving ‘tellers’ to grasp for further readable signs 
and symbols of belonging.   
Again, Yoni’s experiences as a self-defined “Arab Jew”9 shed important light on the 
tensions and complexities, this time with respect to active processes of racialisation: 
KN: So I’m curious about something.  As someone who identifies as  
an Arab Jew, do you get stopped or mistaken for a Palestinian ever? 
Yoni: All the time.  I’m stopped all the time for my ID, all the time.  At the 
Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv they stop me and I’ve finally asked them to 
stop it, but I understand why they’re doing this.  And it’s one one-thousandth 
of what… [Palestinians experience].  During the time when I was a soldier, on 
leave I’d wear my uniform really sloppy and of course that looks suspicious, 
an Arab dressed this way, so they’d stop me.  Once in Tel Aviv two guys 
jumped me, they said, ‘Mamatsav, achi? Ma shlomcha?’ [What’s up, brother? 
How are you?].  ‘Achi…’ [Brother]  But they said it harshly – they didn’t want 
to know how I was, they wanted to hear my accent to see if I was Arab.  
Sometimes I’m tempted to do the accent – but it’s not worth sitting fifteen 
hours in jail…  One time at the Rishon LeZion train station there were two 
guards – one was really hot so I was checking him out.  But it looked to them 
like something else, they were afraid that I would blow up!  How do I explain 
this to them?  “It’s not what you think!  I’m not going to explode that way, but 
maybe another way!”  What would they rather? 
Here Yoni recounts the experience of telling from the position of one ‘told,’ 
importantly highlighting his relative privilege while conveying the sensations which 
accompany being read as Palestinian.  For Yoni, racial and national (mis)identification 
                                                
9 The adoption of this label is uncommon among Jewish Israelis of Middle Eastern origin, as 
‘Jewishness’ and ‘Arabness’ have been popularly constructed in antithetical terms (see Shohat 1988, 
Massad 1996 and Pappe 2010: 160); as such, Yoni’s self-identification as an “Arab Jew” may be read 
as overtly political. 
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are read through his gendered male body, a suspicious form presumed to be 
heterosexual in its threat to Jewish Israeli lives.  As we spoke in his Jerusalem 
apartment, Yoni continued to reflect upon perceptions of his racial identity:  
If I sit on a bus of Palestinians here, you can’t tell and I like this.  This is who I 
am.  At the university, everyone is white… or maybe I should say that I’m one 
of the only ‘coloured’ people there.  And I can feel this.  People say to me, 
“But Yoni, you’re just dark,” as if this means I’m not Arab.10 
Drawing distinctions between ‘darkness’ and ‘Arabness,’ Yoni’s (white) university 
colleagues make clear how popular conceptions of race underwrite valuations of threat 
and belonging, as his specifically coloured male body undergoes differentiation.     At 
his university, Yoni founded an organisation of Mizrahi Jews which openly uses the 
term ‘Arab Jew,’ rather than ostensibly less political labels.  Though those who know 
him more intimately assure him of his Jewish ‘darkness’ rather than Palestinian 
“Arabness,” Yoni actually embraces the latter label, understanding precisely the work 
done by his Palestinianised ‘blackness,’ the ways in which it might offer an alternative 
space of belonging and site of resistance.  
Similarly to mapping and telling, racialisation and qualities of blackness serve not 
only to divide the broader categories of ‘us’ from ‘them,’ but also to distinguish 
degrees of inclusion within the Jewish Israeli community.  As Ronit Lentin (2000) 
demonstrates through her gendered analysis of Israeli society and the Holocaust, or 
Shoah,11 stigma operates within a given society “[…] as a way of categorising and 
socially grading individuals and groups. . . .  Society establishes the means of 
categorising, and grading is measured by ideal standards completely beyond 
attainment for almost every member of society” (Goffman 1968 cited in Lentin 2000: 
170-180).  Importantly, Lentin (2000: 181) argues that “[…] stigmas . . . tell normals 
not only about their normality, but also about their own weaknesses.”  While for Yoni, 
Jewish ‘darkness’ rescues him from Palestinian abjection, this lighter reading of race 
must be understood in conjunction with other criteria of social belonging – Yoni is 
young, fit, handsome and confident, describes himself as macho when needed, 
                                                
10 Interview in Jerusalem, 3 July 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
11 Lentin (2000: 3) intentionally uses the term ‘Shoah’ rather than Holocaust, stating, “‘Holocaust’ 
derives from the Green holocauston, meaning ‘whole burnt’, referring in Septuagint to sacrifice by fire 
as distinct from the Hebrew term for sacrificial offering, olah.  Many Jews, aware of the Christian 
notion of a Jewish cavalry and sacrifice, reject the term (Young 1990: 87).” 
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completed mandatory military service and was soon to begin studies at Masters-level 
studies in Paris.  In this, Yoni may be marked as ‘normal.’  Even Yoni’s non-
normative sexuality – potentially read as a sign of “weakness” within a context 
characterised by “military-masculine hegemony” (Lentin 2000: 178) – might be seen 
as a reason for social inclusion, as “homonationalism” increasingly binds particular 
gay and queer subjects to Israeli state and society.12  Yet for other Jewish Israelis, 
there are far fewer opportunities for rescue from blackness and racialisation.   
Often referred to as ‘black hats’ in popular (secular) Israeli discourse, Orthodox Jews 
face a similar contempt to the aggregate category of ‘Arabs’ with whom they share the 
spaces and places of Israel-Palestine.  Both communities are denounced for living off 
of the ‘welfare state,’ contributing little labour or taxes and ‘exemption’ from 
mandatory military service (Shafir and Peled 2002: 126-127, 143-145, 324-248).13  
Indeed, as Ha’aretz journalist Gideon Levy (2011b) wrote of the uproar at 
increasingly public practices of gender segregation among the Israeli Haredi 
community: “This struggle is also characterized by generalizations about Haredim, 
every one of whom is a parasite and an exploiter, a black and benighted community, 
without any shadings of color [sic] – just like the Palestinians, who are all bloodthirsty 
people who want only to destroy Israel.  That's how it is with racism.”  Neta, an 
Ashkenazi woman in her mid-60s living in West Jerusalem’s Katamon neighbourhood, 
relayed similar perceptions of religious ‘blackness’ and stigmatisation thus: 
I accept most people, religious too – I have no problem with religious people.  
I heard from the kibbutz people “How can you live in Jerusalem?  There are 
black people – in Mea She’arim [an ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood], in dress 
not skin colour – how do you live with them?”  To me, you know people with 
black clothes have different faces, different characters.  I see the person first, 
then whether they are religious, Arab, or whatever….  I have a friend in Eli, 
she went from being on the kibbutz to religious to a mitnachelet [settler].  Her 
                                                
12 As Jasbir Puar (2013: 336) writes, “In my 2007 monograph Terrorist Assemblages: 
Homonationalism in Queer Times . . . I develop the conceptual frame of ‘homonationalism’ for 
understanding the complexities of how ‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’ for gay and lesbian subjects have 
become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated.”  This 
concept is further discussed with respect to Israeli state and society in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
13 Due to security concerns Palestinian citizens of Israel are in effect deemed ineligible for service in 
the IDF; until 2012 ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Jewish Israeli men were able to claim legal exemption 
from mandatory conscription based on the Tal Law, which permitted deferral of service for students at 
yeshiva (an education institution focused on the study of religious texts).  See Shafir and Peled 2002: 
126-127, 143-144 and Harel 2012.  
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name is Danielle.  We’re still friends!  When I worked at the television station, 
they were looking for more researchers so I offered my friend – she had no 
experience, but she was very nice and intelligent.  I didn’t say she was 
religious because it wasn’t important, it had no connection to the work.  My 
boss, also a woman, said “Ok, invite her!  Where does she live?”  “Eli.”  
“What, she’s from a settlement?”  I said yes.  “Does she dress like a settler?”  
“Yes – what’s the problem?”  My boss was open enough to meet Danielle and 
loved her.  The dress question – they don’t ask me about how I dress.  I don’t 
think it’s a big issue.  Many people look at Danielle when she comes – she said 
that she feels like a Negro [sic] who comes to the wrong bus.  But because 
she’s so charming, a genius with relationships, many people love her in the 
end.  They see behind the dress.14 
In this instance a female body is symbolically inscribed and decoded, marking a 
woman not only as religious, but also gleaning from her the particular mode or degree 
of religiosity.  Perhaps dressed in long flowing skirts with her hair covered in a 
knotted scarf, vestment becomes the discernable marker of belonging as ‘settler’ 
status is read upon Danielle’s gendered body.  A shade of black apart from those 
living within Jerusalem’s municipal borders in Orthodox Mea She’arim, Danielle 
becomes further darkened by her visible identification with the religiosity of the 
‘ideological’ settlement movement.15  However, she rescues herself from this double 
blackness by charming her co-workers, though qualifying this ostensible inclusion by 
relating how she still “feels like a Negro who comes to the wrong bus” as she enters 
the workplace.  While both Yoni and Neta again substantiate the significance of space 
and sociality to practices of telling, racialisation additionally draws attention to the 
shifting contours of belonging.  Here exclusion might be navigated and inclusion 
differentially extended, as Jewish Israeli society not only attempts separation from 
Palestinian ‘others’ but also internally categorises and divides itself. 
 
 
                                                
14 Interview in Jerusalem, 4 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
15 Within Jewish Israeli society popular discourse reflects a perceived distinction between ‘ideological’ 
and ‘economic’ settlers, as the latter are seen to reside in occupied territory due to the lack of available 
housing within Israel’s borders.  As an acquaintance claimed of Har Adar, a de facto illegal settlement, 
“It isn’t really a settlement because it isn’t ideological – people go there to build houses, big houses!  
When people want to move out of the city, to have open space, this is where they go.”  Field notes, 2 
May 2011.  
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‘What They Do to Their Women’ 
While mapping, telling and racialisation actively divide and unfold while at the same 
time relying upon entanglement and enfolding, so too these acts of differentiation 
reveal the construction of moral codes believed to further separate ‘us’ from ‘them.’  
In this, specific individuals and groups become the markers of collectivity, guarding 
the boundaries of community.  As feminist scholars have convincingly demonstrated, 
in addition to biologically, culturally and even ideologically reproducing the nation, 
women are often ascribed this symbolic position (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; 
Kandiyoti 1991; Yuval-Davis 1997: 23; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002: 334).  
Indeed, Nira Yuval-Davis (1997: 46) makes this connection explicit, arguing that in 
their fraught position at the limits “[w]omen, in their ‘proper’ behaviour, their ‘proper’ 
clothing, embody the line which signifies the collectivity’s boundaries.”16  Yet at the 
same time as they become symbols of the national collective, women simultaneously 
embody its external ‘other(s),’ existing both within and without the polity (Kandiyoti 
1991: 433-435; Yuval-Davis 1997: 47; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002: 335).  
Familiar yet somehow foreign, specifically gendered bodies come to symbolically, 
discursively and materially represent that which makes us who we are, just as they 
suggest who we are not. 
With regard to Jewish Israeli society, particular women are positioned as boundary 
markers or border guards, indeed serving to identify, maintain and reproduce ‘us’ in 
accordance with existing social hierarchies.  Importantly, not all women represent the 
collectivity equally; rather these figures have been constructed as largely secular, 
Ashkenazi, middle-class, heterosexual women who represent both tradition and 
modernity, custom and progress.  However even as this boundary work appears 
largely internally focused, ‘their’ women are also read as symbolic texts, whether 
through corporeal semiotics or cultural practices, differentially reflecting the moral 
orders of both communities.  As with processes of mapping, telling and racialisation, 
the ‘othered’ collective may exist internal or external to Jewish Israeli society, with 
seemingly stark lines separating categories of religious from secular Jewish and 
                                                
16 While in his theorisation of ‘telling’ Feldman (1991: 69-70) briefly highlights gender – describing 
processes of discursive feminisation and posthumous masculinisation that accompanied violent 
encounter in Northern Ireland – Yuval-Davis importantly moves to centralise the role of gender in 
practices of boundary maintenance, drawing attention to the cultural, symbolic, biological and 
discursive modes of reproduction which consolidate and mark communities.  
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‘Israeli’ from ‘Arab.’  In keeping with the work of Yuval-Davis (1997: 42), though 
irreducible to one another, culture and religion often constitute the basis for these 
judgements read upon the bodies and comportment of ‘other’ women.  Popular 
perceptions of ‘what they do to their women’ thus identify ostensibly irreconcilable 
cultural and moral disparities, marking gendered bodies as objects of pity, as their 
symbolism as ‘border guard’ is now read ‘victim.’ 
Significantly, the construction of morality and depravity through the bodies and 
treatment of women bolsters wider political arguments, particularly those regarding 
the protracted peace process and the impossibility of political change.  Hila, a 68 year-
old artist and former archivist at the Knesset17 who lives in Jerusalem’s Arnona 
neighbourhood, collapsed perceptions of Bedouin and Palestinian women as she 
related the intractability of conflict: 
What if there is peace for us?  Is it possible?  I’m pessimistic.  Two nations 
want the same country – there can’t be peace.  I think there can be if there 
wasn’t the extreme political Right in Israel and not the Hamas extreme on the 
other side.  Also if they [Palestinians] give their women equal rights.  It’s 
culture, it will take time for them to want to be a democratic country and give 
human rights to their people.  The Bedouin in Israel, if a woman wants to go to 
visit places in Israel, they prepare her journey.  In the morning the woman 
goes to the bus and all the men came with rifles and shoot her – they don’t 
allow her to go on the journey!  Or if a Bedouin woman wants to work, they 
make a place for [selling] carpets and the men burn it.  Why?  The women earn 
money, they help the family – why burn it?  They don’t want her to earn 
money, they don’t want an independent woman in any way.  With a mentality 
like that how can there be peace between us and them?   
Projecting her understanding of the gendered power relations specific to Bedouin 
communities inside Israel onto the aggregate category of ‘them’ (read: Palestinians), 
what Hila identifies as the ‘typical’ treatment of any Arab woman suffices to 
legitimate the continuation of the tense political status quo.  Through gendered terms, 
Hila situates the ideals of democracy, human rights, independence and the capacity to 
accumulate capital opposite “their mentality,” as the treatment of women comes to 
constitute a major political obstacle alongside claims land and the problematics of 
growing extremism.  Later in our exchange Hila raised the issue of honour killings, 
                                                
17 The Israeli Parliament. 
  
 89 
linking this phenomenon to both her parents’ experiences in nascent Israel and 
Palestinian statelessness: 
My parents made a revolution, against their own parents they came to  
build a country.  The Palestinians were asleep, very primitive.  There wasn’t a 
nation or country of Palestine, there were people who sat here under the 
Turkish and the English.  Then they wake up and want to be a nation?  I 
understand, but it was too late.  The state of Israel already was.  You can see 
until today that they work in the field with very primitive [instruments].  It will 
take time until they are more educated, liberal and democratic – they still 
murder their daughters.  So many murders.  Because they think she looks at 
another man, because she doesn’t listen to her brother or father, they kill her.  
For ‘honour.’  It’s not ‘honour,’ it’s murder – it’s awful to kill your daughter.  
When they change the mentality there will be peace.  Until then I don’t think 
so.18   
Raising the spectre of differential “mentality,” Hila ascribes moralistic labels of 
civilised and primitive, active and passive, assessing the prevalence of justice and 
murder through the figures of women.  Peace remains at a far distance as ‘we’ wait for 
‘them’ to become more like us, while simultaneously initiating the very policies and 
practices which pre-empt the possibility of greater similarity.  Rather than solely an 
issue of development or ‘culture,’ the use of “primitive” tools of the field in large part 
arises through the immense social, political and economic constraints imposed by 
Israel through continuing control and oppression (Roy 1995, 1999; Hever 2010, 2012).  
Yet more readily instrumentalised are the female border guards, whose seemingly 
rampant violent deaths symbolise a collective dearth of morality, law and civilisation.   
Deemed neither country nor granted nation, in this narrative the space populated by 
Palestinians exists in both historical and contemporary times as ‘backward’ and 
‘primitive,’ infused with and constructed through gender relations which serve to 
illustrate the extent to which Israel – imbued with state and nation – remains distant 
and progressively ‘other.’  Possessing the education, liberalism, democracy and 
mentality which ostensibly elude Palestinians and preclude the possibility of peace, 
Israel as a space and Jewish Israelis in their social relations gain positive substance 
through what they are not.  Again, this process of differentiation reflects not only 
outward, but also inward as related by Rachel, a 28 year-old secular Ashkenazi 
                                                
18 Interview in Jerusalem, 5 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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filmmaker in Tel Aviv: “In terms of women, I think of the other side and what they 
have to live with – they have no rights, they have to have children, their husbands 
treat them badly….  Really, Palestinian women and Hasidic women are in similar 
situations.”19  In collapsing the experiences of Palestinian and Jewish religious women, 
Rachel’s community takes shape through two ‘others’ marked as aberrant by the 
treatment of ‘their women,’ providing narrower contours of ‘us’ and ‘them’ while 
validating our superior morality. 
Collectively, the gendered techniques and processes of identification recounted here – 
mapping, telling, racialisation and what they do to their women – constitute a 
‘common sense’ system of classification through which strangers are individually and 
collectively ‘othered,’ separated from the community in terms both spatial and social.  
Then the reciprocal relation between space and society advanced by Massey (1994) 
and Portugali (1993) importantly extends beyond a given location and its internal 
relations or society; rather, here the convergence of multiple spaces and social 
relations grants discursive shape and material substance to community and place.  
Drawing upon topographic space, race, culture and religion, gendered bodies are 
decoded for various degrees of belonging, with women coming to signify the 
perceived irreconcilability of moral orders which maintain ‘us’ against the tide of 
‘them.’  
 
 
The Tangled Webs We Weave  
Across the geographies of seemingly divided space traverse identifiably raced and 
gendered subjects, generating the valuations of safety and harm, ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘us’ 
and ‘them,’ as detailed above.  However, separation is clearly incomplete as the 
production of space and social relations relies upon the continuing presence of the 
ostensibly inverse or obverse; here, borders and boundaries emerge through processes 
of inclusion made possible by active exclusion.  Thus despite the pursuit of spatial and 
social division by the Israeli state and Jewish Israeli society, everyday life – its 
meanings and material conditions – remains contingent upon relations of 
entanglement, if rendered largely invisible.  In this, Jewish Israeli normalcy exists 
                                                
19 Interview in Tel Aviv, 25 November 2010; handwritten notes. 
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explicitly through the presence of ‘othered’ populations and territories; built neither 
‘around’ nor ‘in spite of’ occupation, conflict and domination, everyday life takes 
shape because of these very processes, policies and practices.  Marked by a history of 
permeability, the boundaries between ‘here’ and ‘there’ remain necessarily porous in 
order to sustain the material conditions of normality as imagined, pursued and 
constructed by Jewish Israelis.  Much like the role of ‘strangers’ as explored by Ronit 
Lentin (2000: 182-183) with respect to Holocaust survivors in Israel, here “a union of 
closeness and remoteness” defines an ‘inside’ through its outside, ‘normal’ through 
interaction with ‘strange.’  Again taking shape through experiences and 
understandings of gender, encounter and entanglement thus make possible Jewish 
Israeli everyday life while at the same time granting structure, texture and content to 
‘Israel’ as if distinct from ‘Palestine.’  
According to Lorenzo Veracini (2011a, 2011b: 5-6) and Patrick Wolfe (1991), ‘non-
encounter’ describes the infrequent moments of contact which characterise social 
relations between settlers and ‘others’ in contexts of settler colonialism.  In conditions 
of non-encounter, instances of social or interpersonal exchange are rendered nearly 
non-existent as a given settler colonial project attempts “[…] to supersede its own 
systems of operation… to cover its own tracks, to erase” (Veracini 2011a).  
Disavowing both founding violence and indigenous presence (Veracini 2010: 84), 
colonial ‘contact’ is imagined to occur solely between “man and land,” effectively 
erasing the history and presence of those ‘others’ sharing in space and residing in 
place.  As a settler colonial project indeed proceeds in Israel-Palestine (Rodinson 
1973; Abdo and Yuval-Davis 1995; Shafir 1999; Lentin 2000, 2008; Abu El-Haj 
2001; Veracini 2011a; Pappe 2012; Wolfe 2012), these logics and practices of ‘non-
encounter’ at first appear to resonate – from social segregation to material walls, 
fences and checkpoints, as on the explicate level contact between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians can be understood as limited at best.  Yet here too division remains 
underwritten by entanglement, as narratives of encounter complicate principles of 
separation (Weizman 2007; Gordon 2008) while at the same time reproducing their 
foundational claims to difference. 
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Who Builds Us?  Raising Israel 
As David Theo Goldberg (2008: 31) asserts, “Israel cannot live with the Palestinians, 
purging them persistently from green-line Israel, but cannot live without them, 
conceptually as much as materially, existentially as much as emotionally.”  Through 
building, maintaining and feeding (Jewish) Israel, Palestinians remain sewn into the 
fabric of everyday Jewish Israeli life, creating the material conditions for normalcy 
and binding the space of Israel-Palestine. 
Dating to the first formalised waves of Jewish settlement in Palestine,20 Palestinian 
labour has in part realised the task of building Israel with construction trades filled by 
men from within and without Israel’s internationally recognised borders (Shafir 1999; 
see also Shafir and Peled 2002: 325; Gordon 2008: 65; Hever 2012: 15, 127).  In the 
years following the economic restructuring and violence of the 1980s and early 90s, 
the number of permits drastically declined for labourers seeking entry from the 
occupied Palestinian Territories, ceasing entirely for those living in the Gaza Strip 
(Shafir and Peled 2002: 324-328; Hever 2012: 125-126).21  Yet construction-based 
narratives of encounter between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians within Israel extend 
from historical memories through present day practices, as ‘they’ cross the border 
from ‘there’ helping to raise ‘us’ ‘here.’  Neta, the Jerusalemite woman whose settler 
friend remains subject to racialisation in the workplace, contextualised and recounted 
an early experience of Palestinian labour thus: 
I have two memories from my childhood about Arabs – they really affected me.  
The first was when I was between three and five years old.  The village where 
I lived, before ’48 it was an Arab village and for some reason some of the 
houses were left.  When the Arabs ran away, the soldiers occupied [the houses], 
but sometimes people didn’t run away or they came back.  It went to the court 
to see which they did – if it’s proven that they ran away, they lost the house.  
                                                
20 In his work Gershon Shafir (1999: 83-90) outlines Israel’s transition from pure settlement colony to 
ethnic plantation colony, problematising analyses of Israeli society which divide its history into pre- 
and post-1967 eras.  While Shafir (1999: 83) explicitly states that “no preconceived notions but trial 
and error led the Zionist institutions to develop their method of colonization [sic]” prior to the First 
World War, he critically traces colonialism to the earliest Zionist immigrants who arrived to Palestine 
in the First Aliya beginning in 1882. 
 
21 As Shir Hever (2012: 126) notes, “Prior to the outbreak of the first Intifada, 32% of the West Bank 
workforce and 57% of the Gaza workforce were employed by Israeli employers, and work in Israel was 
the biggest source of income in the Palestinian economy. Currently 0% of the Gaza workforce is 
employed by Israeli employers, and 12.6% of the West Bank workforce is employed by Israeli 
employers (3.2% in the colonies).” 
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In the village one Arab family stayed forever, the court found that they didn’t 
run.  Another [family] was waiting for the court, so they lived in the middle of 
the village, in two or three houses, until the court decided that they had to 
leave because they left and returned.  I was there at the time when the soldiers 
or police took them from the house.  The women cried.  On one side they took 
them out, and on one side the bulldozer….  I think the whole village came to 
see.  This really affected me.   
The second time I was older, between eight and nine years old – it was in the 
‘50s during mimshal tsvai [military government].22  During that time the Arabs 
in Israel couldn’t move…. Before they could move, but they needed a permit – 
like now.  My parents were putting more rooms in the house and there were 
Arabs working for us.  Suddenly the police came to check if they have 
permission – some ran or some had permission.  One of them hid in the 
bathroom of our house, it wasn’t being used.  He was hiding and the police 
didn’t find him, and my parents didn’t tell.  I remember when the police left he 
was shaking, he was so frightened.  My parents had to explain why this old 
man – he wasn’t old, but I was young – why he has to hide.23   
Recalled here at length, Neta’s account is significant not only for highlighting the 
presence of Palestinian labourers within a Jewish Israeli home during the 1950s, but 
also for the arc from dispossession and destruction to active construction.  Her 
narrative is suffused with tension – the police, courts and military appear in her 
memories as entities which act against the interests of Palestinians and Jewish Israelis 
alike – yet it additionally demonstrates the extent to which gender is integral to 
understanding encounter.  In what was formerly a Palestinian village, Neta clearly 
remembers the tears of the Palestinian women as families were pulled from their 
homes, with bulldozers simultaneously beginning demolition.  The gender of soldiers, 
police and demolition crew – those de-constructing Palestinian homes and presence – 
can be assumed (Jewish Israeli) male, yet it is the (Palestinian) women and their 
emotionality which enters the weave of Neta’s memory.  She recounts a similarly 
feminised vulnerability in the subsequent narrative, though this time embodied by a 
Palestinian man in the face of near-certain persecution.  He enters Neta’s Jewish 
Israeli home with other (male) Palestinian builders, helping to raise the space of the 
                                                
22 From 1948 through 1966 Palestinian citizens of Israel were subject to rule by ‘military government,’ 
during which time their rights were largely suspended through the imposition of restrictions on freedom 
of movement, blocked entry to the Jewish labour market, and placement under surveillance and military 
law (Shafir and Peled 2002: 89, 111-112). 
 
23 Interview in Jerusalem, 4 May 2010; handwritten notes. 
 
  
 94 
family in a role which corresponds to gendered and racialised norms in the context of 
Israel-Palestine: building is cast as a ‘man’s job,’ in practice often a Palestinian or 
lower class man’s job.  Importantly, Neta recalls the physicality of the builder’s fear, 
requiring explication as a child unaware of the power relations which could produce in 
a man – importantly, an older man – the seemingly feminine need to flee and quake.   
In building the spaces of Jewish Israeli families, the coupling of security concerns 
with the entry of male Palestinian labourers is not unique to Neta’s childhood 
memories, nor is it specific to the era of 1950s Israel.  During the same exchange, 
Neta recalled more recent instances in which encounter occurred through gendered 
and racialised relations of construction:   
One of the times we built this house some of the workers were Arab.  My 
daughter asked me, “You aren’t afraid alone with the Arab workers?”  I’m not, 
but my daughter is.  Maybe for her, if you’re born into an intifada, the first 
thing you know about Arabs is something bad.  I lived in the Galilee, I knew a 
lot of Arabs, Israeli Arabs, when I was young.  It wasn’t a war and I didn’t 
think about them as enemies – so I stayed inside the house even when the Arab 
workers were there with me.  At the time of the intifada people were telling 
me, “Don’t put them [Palestinians] in your house!”  Now I think that maybe I 
was stupid, but I don’t think that Arab people are more dangerous than others.  
But my daughter is scared.24   
A capable woman, Neta has rebuilt her Jerusalem home by hand a number of times – 
sometimes alone, often with her husband and occasionally relying upon outside 
assistance.  In this second narrative, she recounts her continuing willingness to 
employ Palestinian builders and her ease in their presence, juxtaposing this with the 
palpable fear expressed by her daughter.  Though bound by close relation as mother 
and daughter, these women matured in different locations during specific historico-
political moments; these contexts then shape their experiences of encounter.  
Importantly, beneath the anxiety of Neta’s daughter lies a recurring theme, that of 
(en)gendered danger.  Drawing upon themes familiar from narratives of threat and 
protection in other colonial contexts (McClintock 1995; Stoler 2002), race again 
informs the terms of encounter in Israel-Palestine.  Here, the sexualised male 
Palestinians present a danger to the young (Ashkenazi) Jewish Israeli woman, as 
gendered bodies symbolically replace nations.   
                                                
24 Interview in Jerusalem, 4 May 2010; handwritten notes. 
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Yet in the space of a Jewish Israeli settlement proximal to Palestinian villages, 
gendered, sexualised and racialised fear becomes supplanted by ‘knowledge’ gleaned 
from more frequent interaction and exchange; again here encounter arises through 
labour practices, with the male Palestinian worker central as catalyst.  Located just 
above Abu Gosh, a Palestinian town inside Israel’s 1949 Armistice Agreement 
borders, the village of Har Adar sits on a hilltop east of the Green Line.  “It’s 
technically over the Green Line – I guess we’re ‘settlers!’” 45 year-old Keren said 
laughingly during our interview at her workplace in Jerusalem.  She continued, “But 
the fence goes around us and keeps us on the Israeli side, it cuts across the [Green] 
Line and encircles us.”  During our interview, Keren narrated this liminality as a 
preface to recounting her experiences of Palestinian labour: 
In this country you’re always ‘in’ or ‘next to!’  This isn’t really freedom, 
you’re not really ‘out there.’  You have to watch your kids all the time, even 
when they’re watching television.  I see a lot of new couples with kids living 
in either small apartments in the city or in a bigger place between villages.  
There is a lot of fear… but also there is no fear because people need to live, 
they want something better – so they go [to live in the settlements].   
I should tell you that I know a lot of the Arab side of all this.  We built our Har 
Adar house ourselves….  In Har Adar you sign up on a list and they bring 
[Palestinian] workers from the next village with permits to work only for you – 
they can’t be anywhere else.  
Keren paused to laugh, continuing: 
By law, [Palestinian] workers aren’t allowed into Israel, but they are allowed 
into Har Adar!  You can end up being friends, like we were friends with the 
electrical man.  If he wasn’t living in Qatane I’m sure he would be an artist, 
he’s soft and gentle.  But he needs work, so he’s an electrician.  He has five 
kids, which is little for them – most of them have 10 kids and more than one 
wife!  It’s so different where we live and where they live.  I don’t know any 
Arab women because only the men are allowed in [to Har Adar].  The roof guy 
became a friend of my husband – when my husband was in Tel Aviv he would 
buy materials for this guy for his other projects.  One day he told my husband 
that he was thinking about taking another wife.  What do you say to that?  
KN: What was your husband’s reaction?   
Keren: Well, he’s American so his reaction was different – I can only imagine 
what it would have been if he was an Israeli man!  But this is a conversation at 
our house!  [The roofer] never calls first, he’s always just stopping by and 
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coming for coffee.  It’s not like when I was growing up and people would stop 
over - there’s an ‘Arab’ knock at the door.  It’s a different kind of knock.  If I 
open the door he stays out of the house even if my husband is home.  I know 
that if he wants coffee I have to go upstairs or into my room, otherwise they’ll 
have to take coffee outside.  Politically it’s very difficult.25   
 
Related at length, Keren’s account initially moves from a consideration of family 
safety to an acknowledgement of fear, terminating with a statement of necessity and 
felt frustration.  Strikingly, Keren proclaims familiarity with the “Arab side,” a 
familiarity enabled by the relaxed labour codes which facilitate the construction and 
growth of her settlement community.  Keren cites the exceptionality of Har Adar in 
this regard and articulates how Palestinian workers permitted entry to the settlement 
from villages in the West Bank are overwhelmingly male.  Yet rather than recounting 
gendered or sexualised physical threat, she details her feelings of political discomfort 
as she senses the imposition of what she perceives to be Palestinian (read: Muslim) 
moral codes and gender norms upon the space of her home and private life.  
Harkening back to ‘what they do to their women,’ Keren feels herself in an awkward 
position as she tries to relate to the Palestinians with whom she comes in contact, 
ultimately supporting her husband’s friendship, while at the same time finding the 
prospect of multiple wives and gender segregation a personal affront.  Warned by the 
tell-tale “Arab knock,” Keren chooses her degree of engagement with the anxiety 
accompanying the Palestinian roofer’s appearance in the space of her Jewish Israeli 
home.  Yet rather than ending on the precarious note of fear, security and necessity 
borne of labour practices and government policies, Keren’s account importantly 
replaces this tension with larger questions of morality and custom. 
In these narratives of labour-based encounter, recurring themes centre around the 
entrance of male Palestinian workers into the space of the Jewish Israeli family.  
Whether perceived as threatening to sexual, personal and communal security or the 
bearers of repressive gender norms and moral codes, these Palestinian labourers 
remain nameless and largely faceless, with details related in absence.  At the same 
time, their low-cost labour remains essential to the construction and growth of Jewish 
Israel, its territorial expansion and even its claims to moral supremacy.  Importantly, 
                                                
25 Interview in Jerusalem, 2 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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here families become the locus of insecurity, as they comprise the frames in which 
scenes of encounter unfold.   
Who Maintains Us?  Keeping Israel Tidy  
In the realm of maintenance, Palestinian workers again enter the spaces of Jewish 
Israel in ways consistent with the perceived gender norms of both ‘here’ and ‘there.’  
Whereas Palestinian men appear at construction sites largely separated from their 
Russian, African, Asian and Jewish Israeli counterparts, Palestinian women labourers 
often clean private homes in the stead of ‘other’ women, namely Eastern European 
and Asian.  Rather than strictly predicated upon the ostensible division between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ – where men maintain the former and women the latter – 
labourers tasked with cleaning and tidying Israel often blur the margins of these 
spheres.  
As recounted during interview exchanges, normative patterns of gender often prevail 
even within the blurring of boundaries – here Palestinian men enter the private domain 
of the Jewish Israeli family via maintenance in positions as gardeners, plumbers, 
mechanics and day-labourers, while Palestinian women appear largely as domestic 
cleaners.  As in instances of encounter enabled by construction, with the arrival of 
male Palestinian workers security concerns rise to the fore.  Sonya, an elderly activist 
living near to Tel Aviv in Jaffa, related how the onset of military occupation in 1967 
intersected with labour practices in the family domain: 
Our farm was the last on the road before the moshav’s collective orange grove. 
The Palestinians were brought in every morning to work in the communal 
orange groves, and at 2 or 4pm they would come back from the groves and 
gather on our lawn.  They would wash up using our spigot for watering our 
lawn, they would spread out their prayer mats, pray and eat lunch.  They never 
left any dirt.  They took everything with them and left the lawn as clean as 
they found it.  They never made any problems.  My youngest daughter would 
even come home from school and let herself into the house alone and there 
were no problems.  I had no fear.  We felt that everything was alright – I really 
thought that the occupation was ok, it was alright.26 
Though Sonya protests that she experienced “no fear,” her sentiments clearly 
highlight the extent to which, as a Jewish Israeli mother of a school-aged girl, she was 
                                                
26 Interview in Tel Aviv, 31 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
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expected to feel a sense of danger as the day-labourers sat literally on the edge of the 
private sphere constituted by her family home.  Sonya’s delineation of positive 
qualities demonstrated by the Palestinian workers – clean, tidy and well behaved – 
points to the un-articulated characteristics commonly attributed to these men: filth, 
chaos and trouble.  With their presence further regularised through good comportment, 
not only did the Palestinian day-labourers maintain the village’s orange groves at a 
low cost, but also their conduct granted legitimacy to early Israeli claims that the 
occupation was in part a mission civilisatrice.27  Perched on the boundary between 
public and private, here the innocuous presence of Palestinian workers signals the 
degree to which labour practices normalised disparate relations of power in the years 
immediately following 1967, as the dangerous ‘other’ (man) was rendered impotent 
through his capacity for maintenance. 
In the present day, labouring Palestinian women differentially maintain Jewish Israel 
and enter deeply into the private realm of the family.  As noted by Keren in her 
narrative above, Jewish Israeli contact with Palestinian women from the Occupied 
Territories is often less frequent than with men from the same areas.  Here, hegemonic 
gender norms collude with the policies and practices of occupation to further limit the 
mobility and opportunities afforded to women living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
East Jerusalem (Abdo 2011).  Yet even as restrictions prevail, Palestinian women 
living within and without Israel’s internationally recognised borders contribute to the 
informal economy through the provision of domestic labour, further normalising the 
relations of occupation.28  In the instances in which Palestinian women enter the 
spaces of Jewish Israeli families encounter occurs largely between women, at times 
highlighting perceived commonalities.  Keren, whose home in Har Adar was 
constructed in large part through (male) Palestinian labour, additionally spoke of her 
house cleaner: 
I have a lady who helps to clean the house, an Arab woman, once a month.  
She lives inside the border in a village near Abu Gosh.  Recently she was 
                                                
27 As Sonya recalled during our interview, “[After 1967] we heard that they were earning more money 
than before, that it was good for them.  It was called ‘the enlightened occupation,’ as I’m sure you’ve 
heard it called.  Everyone talked about ‘the enlightened occupation.’  We were perfectly satisfied with 
it – it seemed like a good thing.”  Interview in Tel Aviv, 31 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
28 Importantly, Palestinian women living in the West Bank may steal the border and separation wall in 
order to work illegally as cleaners inside Israel; a 2012 documentary entitled White Night (directed by 
Irit Gal) portrays these acts of border crossing, along with their attendant rewards and risks. 
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asking me “Are the matzas29 in the stores now?”  They love matzot!  Her kids 
love it and she was anxious to have it.  She tells me that her kids buy dresses 
for Purim too – her daughter loves Purim.30  She said that this year she bought 
so many masks for them!  They don’t have a holiday for kids to dress up, for 
Muslims.  It’s too bad.  So she waits for Purim and Pesach each year!  Her 
family visits sometimes from Jordan – they’re originally from Jordan, I think.  
They come to stay and tell her that she has become ‘too Jewish.’  They don’t 
see it with a good eye that she is close to this country.  She’s big in body, but 
she has big fear.  I feel that she needs it more, the money – she needs the 
money more than I need her help.  I guess it’s a contract by heart between us.31   
While the cleaner she employs lives within Israel’s recognised borders – deemed 
‘Arab’ rather than ‘Palestinian’ – Keren’s narrative situates this woman clearly in the 
realm of the ‘other,’ deserving of pity as she appears repressed by religion and 
castigated by family.  Here ‘what they do to their women’ enters the realm of ‘our’ 
women as Keren responds emotionally and materially to the perceived privation and 
fear of her employee, to the extent that she concedes an indulgence in domestic labour 
rather than its necessity.  As Keren enters into a “contract by heart” with the 
Palestinian cleaner within the space of her home, the encounter indeed occurs between 
women and appears to engender solidarity, though the relationship remains suffused 
by power and paternalism.  Living in a Jewish Israeli settlement east of the Green 
Line, Keren employs a Muslim Palestinian woman from inside Israel – though for the 
sake of conscience the woman’s family may be “originally from Jordan” – and 
maintains the relation of domestic labour largely in an act of sympathy; yet the 
ostensibly pitiable conditions of the cleaner’s life and labour in part make Keren’s 
existence both liveable and normal.   
Yet the entry of Palestinian women labourers into the space of Jewish Israeli families 
cannot be typified as an always sympathetic encounter, particularly as exchanges 
between women remain framed by relations of power which extend beyond shared 
gender.  Upon entering the home, female Palestinian domestic workers are not 
automatically deemed ‘neutral’ based on biological sex; rather national, race and class 
                                                
29 Matza (plural: matzot) is an unleavened bread traditionally eaten by Jews during the holiday period of 
Passover, or Pesach.  
 
30 Celebrated with costumes and parties in a manner similar to Halloween, Purim is a Jewish holiday 
commemorating the deliverance of the Jews in ancient Persia. 
 
31 Interview in Jerusalem, 2 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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belonging additionally inform the judgement of threat.  In the instance of domestic 
labour, appraisals of danger and safety are importantly not limited to the physical, but 
extend into other aspects of personal and communal security.  After a long afternoon 
of shopping together outside Tel Aviv, my friend Ilana mentioned her house cleaners 
in passing.  We had just removed our bags of goods and locked the car doors in the 
parking garage, running back to the vehicle in order to double-check the locks.  
Ascending to her flat in the lift, Ilana told me that recently quite a few cars had been 
stolen from this new development where her family now lived; in fact, on the previous 
Saturday a car was stolen from the lot, replaced by the company hours later, and then 
stolen again!  I asked whether she knew whom the thieves might be and she replied 
with eyebrows raised, “They come from Qalqilya, Taybeh – these are our neighbours.”  
I responded that perhaps her neighbourhood should hire a roving security guard if 
theft is such a frequent occurrence, but Ilana said that, no, this would be expensive; 
though prized, security can be cost-prohibitive.  As we unpacked our bags and boxes 
in the flat upstairs, I asked Ilana whether she had the next day ‘off’ from work, which 
garnered a sharp look as Ilana does the majority of the housework in addition to caring 
for her children and working full time.  Rather than having free time, one of the items 
on the next day’s list was the arrival of two cleaners recommended by a friend – Ilana 
told me that she had hired both as “two can do the work of one in half the time for the 
same price.”  Yet despite this savings, Ilana relayed how she felt compelled to stay 
with the women while they cleaned, claiming, “You can’t trust anyone.”  I then 
inquired as to where the cleaners were from and Ilana replied, “Tira or Taybeh – I 
can’t remember which.”32  In this instance, the theft of the cars becomes bound with 
the presence of the domestic workers in Ilana’s house, as the individuals in question – 
thieves and cleaners – share a point of geographical origin in the West Bank.  In 
making this association, Ilana explicitly calculates the value of her time against that of 
the items potentially stolen in her absence, as security here relates to the sanctity of 
home and the objects within.  As with the entry of male Palestinian workers into the 
home through construction, this encounter is one of seeming necessity coupled with 
vulnerability, now a question of material property rather than physical or sexual threat 
– gender is no guarantee of solidarity.   
                                                
32 Field notes, 6 April 2011. 
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Thus through the enmeshment of gender roles and norms with racialised relations of 
power, cheap Palestinian domestic labour consistently enters into the Jewish Israeli 
home, maintaining the material conditions of normalcy.  Yet clearly this normality 
retains aspects of insecurity, reflecting the larger political realities in which 
experiences and understandings of encounter remain embedded.  As with building and 
construction, here gender structures modes of contact, determining entry to space and 
shaping the conduct of relations therein.  While at times opening sites of imagined 
solidarity – as shared space may indeed impact social relations – these ostensibly 
neutral exchanges ultimately entrench the sense of threat fostered by hegemonic 
discourses.  Whether resting on the margins of an orange grove in historical memory 
or entering deeply into the private realm in the present day, the presence of Palestinian 
men and women reproduces not only the material conditions of normality – bountiful 
harvests and clean homes – but also the normative precarity central to Jewish Israeli 
society. 
Who Feeds Us?  Nourishing Israel 
While the Jewish Israeli family frames encounters made possible through construction 
and maintenance, these experiences of exchange and understandings of contact clearly 
blur the constructed division between public and private spheres.  So too narratives of 
nourishment and sustenance span this porous boundary, further illustrating the extent 
to which ostensible separation remains underwritten by entanglement, the explicate 
made possible through the implicate.  Here the reciprocity between space and social 
relations shapes not only patterns of gender, but also gives rise to dynamics of 
resistance and complicity, building upon the complexity of imagined solidarity as 
recounted above. 
Importantly, the family remains central to those narratives of nourishment which 
unfold both within and without the space of homes and domesticity.  Whether 
experienced or desired, within Jewish Israeli society nourishment remains bound with 
norms of intimacy and reproduction, recreating the conditions for sustenance, life, 
community and survival pursued against a backdrop of trauma and privation; indeed, 
Ronit Lentin (2000: 17) retrospectively observes this dynamic in childhood 
experiences with her own grandmother, noting “[t]he compulsive attitudes to food, 
feeding us too much, worrying when we did not eat enough.”  Nourishment thus 
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emerges entangled with security – this time in the form of full bellies – as food 
practices differentially recreate the precarity underwriting Jewish Israeli society.  
Speaking once more of her position atop the hill in Har Adar outside Jerusalem, Keren 
conveyed this intimate relation through the figure of her daughter: 
KN: How do your children react to the conflict?  To living so close to the 
fence?   
Keren: Well, each kid reacts differently.  My daughter is really into fantasy – 
it’s a kind of running away.  I was like this too growing up.  “We live here 
now, but not forever” – maybe it’s a Holocaust thing or a Jewish soul.  I 
always thought I would live somewhere else, in a better place.  But I’ve 
travelled around and now I think there isn’t a better place.  I try to tell her that, 
but….  For her bat mitzvah we’re taking her to Ireland.  She said that she 
wants to go to the land where all her dream writers write… she wants to fly 
away.  Har Adar is like that, it’s an in-between place, especially for her.  It’s 
like being on the border of the sea, but you can’t go there.  We look over the 
fence and I know there are great hummus places there, I just know it!  But we 
can’t go.33   
This passage is notable for Keren’s admission of her daughter’s dream of escape, 
along with the extension of that desire to wider society – not only are national 
narratives shaped by historical experiences of the Holocaust, but so too are collective 
emotions and imaginaries.  Significantly, the account is brought ‘down to earth’ or 
‘back to reality’ by recognition that escape is necessarily ephemeral, as tomorrow’s 
trip to Ireland remains embedded in the political reality which separates ‘here’ from 
‘there’ and explicitly divides ‘us’ from nourishment.  In her account, Keren clearly 
relays familiarity with the cuisine attributed to her Palestinian neighbours, desiring the 
quality and authenticity of their hummus, absolutely certain of its presence ‘there’ 
beyond the fence.  Importantly, although her stated desire is to consume – craving 
hummus, the object of consumption – encounter is implied by the wish to “go,” even if 
absent or denied.  Speaking in the ‘we’ of family, this nourishment just beyond reach 
comes to stand for security on two levels: a political promise denied and a state of 
being pursued.  Were Israel-Palestine ‘safe’ we could go there, a Jewish Israeli 
woman and her daughter; in the meantime, we remain here, safe behind the fence. 
                                                
33 Interview in Jerusalem, 2 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Yet at the same time as desires for nourishment entrench the primacy of security – and 
with it hegemonic gender norms – so too modes of encounter might generate 
resistance, differentially structuring space and social relations.  Through a narrative 
which again invokes ‘their food, there’ Ron, a 36 year-old musician and journalist 
from Tel Aviv, associates contact with Palestinians with his own position as an 
‘outsider’ among Jewish Israelis.  Often picking up odd jobs in order to support his 
artistic pursuits, Ron related the ways in which actualised encounters may produce 
resistance: 
For a while I was working in Roche Ha’Ayn – actually it was Kfar Qasem [a 
Palestinian town in Israel] – in the orange industry.  It’s on the land of Kfar 
Qasem, but the area belongs to Roche Ha’Ayn, which is a Jewish town.  The 
area in Roche Ha’Ayn looks like a shopping mall, it’s very Israeli.  It’s 
amazing – it’s on the Green Line, but it’s like a cliff.  On the other side is the 
Occupied Territories…. it’s like being in Ariel [a Jewish Israeli settlement in 
the West Bank] looking out.  But there isn’t any cliff, that’s the point.  The 
Israeli side looks like a mall, but the industrial area of Kfar Qasem is all 
garages, it’s very poor.  There are hummus places in Kfar Qasem, so I would 
eat there at lunch – it’s literally just down the road.  It was such a difference 
going from this mall, corporate environment to the hummus place!  It was very 
interesting, very exciting.  
KN: How did the people you work with react to you going for hummus down 
the road? 
Ron: People already thought I was a weirdo, so….  This was during the 
Lebanon operation [in 2006] and for some stupid reason I got involved in 
talking about it with someone at work.  It was totally useless.  The guy almost 
hit me!  There were young people who would come to work with us and they’d 
work for a day, a couple of weeks, and leave.  There was one guy, Amir, who 
was really quiet.  He was sitting near the computer with his head down, not 
showing his face.  One day I said hello to him and I realized that he was an 
Arab.  So this violent guy said in the room, standing next to this guy, that he 
hates Arabs.  I tried to….  The guy was trying to piss me off.34   
Recalling Keren’s imagery of a fence forcibly instating social division, Ron relays the 
construction of a metaphorical ‘cliff’ dividing Jewish Israel from Palestine, this time 
through scenes of industrial materiality.  Positioning his body as catalyst, Ron 
actualises encounter through his pursuit and consumption of hummus, creating 
                                                
34 Interview in Tel Aviv, 28 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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moments of contact which prompt exchange; notably, as opposed to Keren’s 
ostensibly feminised passivity and longing, Ron acts.  In this, like Keren, Ron 
performs his normative gender role, resisting one set of power relations while 
reaffirming another.  Yet in keeping with the complexity of gender norms and 
constructs in Jewish Israeli society, Ron’s actions fail to fit the parameters of 
hegemonic masculinity.  Labelling himself “already a weirdo,” Ron’s border crossing 
“just down the road” is framed by his apparent strangeness vis-à-vis the Jewish Israeli 
men with whom he works.  Ron belongs to ‘us’ – Jewish Israeli society, national 
identity and space – but remains an ‘other’ within, even as an altercation with a macho 
Jewish Israeli co-worker allows him to perform protective and aggressive masculinity.  
Again, despite the resistance implied and performed in his pursuit of nourishment and 
exchange, in some ways Ron’s actions are profoundly normative.  Here political 
encounter is reaffirmed as the domain of men and conflict; Kfar Qasem remains 
located ‘there’ beyond a cliff, ‘poor’ and ‘other’; and Amir – the lone Palestinian 
present in this narrative – is constructed as feminised and in need of protection, 
catalysing Ron’s performance of masculinity.  
In the narratives recounted above, nourishment yields encounters typically removed 
from intimate personal contact, more remote than the accounts of builders, cleaners, 
gardeners and plumbers who enter into Jewish Israeli homes.  Indeed, within Israel’s 
borders food-based contact occurs most visibly in city streets and restaurants, where 
Palestinian labour makes possible a thriving Jewish Israeli culinary culture in part 
associated with Arab cuisine assimilated into the category of “Israeli food.”35  As 
hummus, falafel and chopped salad remain prime sites of (national) contest (Stein 
2008: 97-127; Kamin 2013; see also Dean 2013a, 2013b), Palestinian men continue to 
staff Jewish Israeli kitchens in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, whether in pizza 
parlours or establishments known for ‘Arab’ cuisine.  While the fusion of cultural 
practices and products might be seen as a potential road to ‘peace’ (BBC 2011), 
labour, exchange and encounter remain embedded with the relations of power and 
privilege specific to Israel-Palestine.  Gender again emerges as a central element of 
structure, as while those labouring in the kitchens of the Jewish Israeli public realm 
                                                
35 Importantly, while some ‘Arab’ or ‘Middle Eastern’ cuisine may have arrived to Israel through 
emigration from diverse Jewish communities in the region, the incorporation of distinctly Palestinian 
dishes into ‘Israeli’ cuisine constitutes an act of colonial appropriation.  Thanks to Ronit Lentin for 
emphasising this. 
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are largely Palestinian men – presumably with security clearance – while within the 
private space of the domestic Jewish Israeli women often reproduce this fare and craft. 
In these private practices and spaces, the reproduction of Palestinian cuisine may 
become a mode of opposition, an expression of desire and a performance of precarity, 
simultaneously resisting, reflecting and shaping hegemonic narratives and relations.  
On 10 May 2011, Jewish Israelis marked ‘Independence Day’ [Yom HaAtzmaut] as 
many Palestinians prepared to commemorate the ‘Nakba’ [Arabic: catastrophe] five 
days later, bringing to a close the intense two-week cluster of holidays which includes 
Yom HaShoah [Holocaust Remembrance Day] and Yom HaZikaron [Memorial Day]. 
Observed annually with fireworks, parties and barbeques, on Israeli Independence 
Day I was invited to attend a themed gathering at the home of a wealthy older couple 
outside of Tel Aviv.  Themed ‘What Made Us Laugh in the First Ten Years, 1948-
1958,’ guests were asked to bring stories, art work, recipes, poems, songs and letters 
to share with those assembled, actively (re)creating historical and collective memory.  
Between landscaped gardens, yellowing propaganda posters and tables laden with a 
bounty of dishes, I engaged with the aging upper crust of (Ashkenazi) Tel Aviv Leftist 
intelligentsia, meeting artists, academics and collectors.  “Do you see her?” I was 
asked as my eyes followed a finger extended toward a particularly elderly attendant, 
her face strikingly stern beneath a floppy hat.  “She was in the Palmach36 – she even 
killed an Englishman!”  It seemed time for a glass of wine. 
At lunch, amidst the many platters of salads and sauces there appeared a heaping dish 
of rice and chicken, shaped like a massive upside down pot.  “Oooh!  What’s that?” a 
woman behind me asked our smiling hostess.  “Something Arabic,” came the answer 
– this was makloubeh, a Palestinian dish now served at an Israeli Independence Day 
celebration.  How was the symbolism lost on those around me?  Throughout the 
presentations of ‘what made us laugh,’ gestures had been made toward (absent) 
Palestinians and Palestine, as many speakers demonstrated their Leftist politics 
through the particular photographs, narratives and letters chosen.  “Oh wow,” the first 
woman continued, clearly delighted by the dish, “I haven’t had this since the time 
                                                
36 The Palmach was the elite fighting unit of the Haganah, the Zionist pre-state paramilitary 
organisation which would later become the Israel Defense Force (Shlaim 2000: 22, 34). 
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when I was in Neve Shalom!”37  Aghast, I too filled my plate with the delicious dish, 
aware that I was consuming Palestine with those around me.38 
Though notable for the apparent hypocrisy in eating makloubeh among a group of 
Jewish Israelis on Israeli Independence Day – a contradiction which, like many, sits 
all too easily – this narrative highlights a differential way in which Palestinians and 
Palestine nourish Jewish Israelis and Israel.  Here encounter is again distanced or 
displaced, as no Palestinians ate with us at the celebration; rather the preparation and 
presentation of this dish within the space of a home nourished the political identity of 
our hostess and her assembled guests.  As Palestine gave rise to Israel – celebrated on 
Independence Day – so too the presence of and continuing conflict with Palestinians 
makes possible a Jewish Israeli political ‘Left.’  The collective consumption of 
makloubeh becomes a way of speaking about and illustrating personal politics, 
wherein modes of prior encounter are animated and demonstrated through familiarity 
with Palestinian cuisine.  Also known as ‘Wahat al-Salam’ or ‘Oasis of Peace,’ Neve 
Shalom is significant to the narrative and its political work.  In highlighting her 
knowledge of both cuisine and village, this guest signalled the general contours of her 
politics, as did the hostess when choosing to serve the dish.  Yet more significant than 
the positions conveyed and encounters implied is the exact phrasing of the guest’s 
recognition – her surprise and delight relate a sense of temporal distance.  Not having 
eaten makloubeh since her last trip to Neve Shalom, the intensity of this reaction 
makes clear that prior consumption and contact are happy memories.  Why has she not 
gone back?  As we all sat chewing and gushing over the deliciousness of this prized 
dish, the assembled guests participated in a kind of remembrance made possible 
through infrequent encounter – many recalled and again desired both cuisine and 
contact, yet knew the limits seemingly imposed by ‘conflict’ and the distance of 
‘peace.’  In this, Palestinian food reaffirmed precarity among these Jewish Israeli 
leftists, brought into the sanctity of home and literally to the table by a Jewish Israeli 
woman.  Unable to freely meet and eat due to a wider political reality, makloubeh 
ultimately nourishes a longing for normalcy. 
 
                                                
37 Often the site of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue initiatives, Neve Shalom is a bi-national village in Israel. 
 
38 Field notes, 10 May 2011. 
  
 107 
Conclusion 
Through nourishment, cleaning and building, by moral codes, racialisation, telling and 
mapping, space and social relations emerge as mutually constitutive in the context of 
Israel-Palestine.  On the explicate level divisions and separation prevail in both social 
and spatial terms – cities are carved into folds and zones; belonging is read upon 
bodies as physical texts, assuming meanings of blackness and whiteness; and morality, 
progress and readiness for ‘peace’ are marked by perceived cultural codes and custom.  
In this, a society divides itself, creating and reflecting hierarchies of power and 
privilege; here a particular kind of biopolitics takes shape.  Making visible the ways in 
which “relations of subjugation manufacture subjects” (Foucault 1997: 265), the 
modes of division and differentiation cited within this chapter actively create an ‘us’ 
and along with it a ‘here,’ spatially bordered and symbolically guarded.   
Yet so too the reciprocity between space and social relations reveals how ‘we’ remain 
dependent upon ‘them,’ ‘here’ upon ‘there,’ as power and norms require maintenance 
and repetition.  In keeping with Foucault (1997: 246), within a given society 
biopolitical mechanisms of social regularisation “ […] establish an equilibrium, 
maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis”; in this, ‘regular’ must be 
continually recast against the ostensibly irregular, an inside made possible through its 
outside.  Thus Israel takes shape through Palestine, as we are fed, tidied and built 
through the physical, emotional and symbolic labour of ‘others.’  On the implicate 
level entanglement prevails, catalysing processes and practices of boundary making as 
division emerges underwritten by relation. 
As the explicate thus both fashions and relies upon the implicate, gender comprises a 
key aspect of subjectivity and society, structuring those experiences and 
understandings which regularise and massify, divide and connect.  Gender not only 
provides the central valuation of public/private which ostensibly separates politics 
from intimacy, but also frames the normative narratives of (in)security which give rise 
to collectivity.  Read on bodies, in space and through encounter, hegemonic patterns 
of gender directly maintain ‘us’ as separate from ‘them’ and ‘here’ as divided from 
‘there,’ while at the same time providing discursive and material threads which bind 
seeming opposites together.  In following Massey (1994), as gender actively shapes 
space and social relations within Jewish Israeli society, so too norms, codes and roles 
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emerge; in this, the meanings of spaces and places in Israel-Palestine indeed “reflect 
and affect the ways in which gender is constructed and understood” (Massey 1994: 
179).  Through space and social relations public and private are actively encoded as 
masculine/feminine, rendering politics a sphere of male influence and intimacy a 
feminised domain in need of protection.  Thus the spatial and social construction of 
gender reaffirms the normative precarity so central to Jewish Israeli society, appealing 
to security and casting normalcy just beyond reach.  
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Chapter Three 
Gardens of Perhaps – Chaim Normalim  [Normal Life] 
 
Fresh flowers of perhaps once grew 
in a landscape dewy and warm, 
and I the best of gardeners knew 
how to foster and keep them from harm. 
 
Night after night, a sentinel 
I kept watch tirelessly 
to protect my buds from the cold wind, 
the wind of certainty. 
 
But finding out my secret, the wind 
coldly outwitting me, 
turned my garden of perhaps 
into a cemetery. 
 
- Ra’hel, ‘Flowers of Perhaps’1 
 
Standing in Ronit’s garden, I looked out over the rolling hillsides of brown, grey and 
green that compose the pastoral scenery of Mevasseret-Zion, a suburb outside West 
Jerusalem.  Upon arrival to the day’s interview I had been ushered warmly through a 
locked glass gate into a bright and spacious home, a welcome contrast to the blocky 
homogeneous stone exteriors which together rose like a fortress above the valley 
below.  Led through the home and into the garden space beyond, I was struck first not 
by the stunning view but by the massive fence which enclosed the yard completely – 
standing nine feet tall, the mesh fence was topped by a ‘y’-shaped frame from which a 
fanned extension projected toward the valley.  Definitely a security fence of sorts, the 
first association that sprang to mind was a prison compound, minus the concertina 
wire and with the addition of an incredible view.  “I built this for the cats, to keep 
them inside,” Ronit explained with a laugh as she began our tour of the garden.  “I 
have five cats at home who I want to keep in – and I want to keep the weasels out!”  I 
smiled and we walked toward the flora, as house cats’ wary eyes shined from behind a 
thicket of leaves and stems. 
                                                
1 Ra’hel 2008: 49 
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Moving around the garden, Ronit introduced me to trees of cherry, almond, lemon and 
clementine – 300 oranges harvested in the previous year! – then on to graceful stems 
of white calla lilies, cheery pentas whose pink and red flowers attract butterflies, and 
fading purple and white anemones which mark the arrival of spring.  The garden was 
bursting with flowers and trees, providing an ornate display against the ascetic nudity 
of the brown hills and their lines of stone.  Together we stooped to inspect a small 
door cut into the fence through which Ronit fed the street cats, along with the 
occasional weasel.  Though banned from the garden sanctuary, Ronit felt compelled to 
care for these creatures at a comfortable distance.  Gazing across the hills once more I 
was moved to comment on their beauty: “Gosh, the West Bank is just so striking – it’s 
unreal.”  Ronit smiled and gestured to the valley as she replied, “No, the Green Line is 
quite far from here.  This is Israel.”  Stepping back into the house past the buds, 
blooms and branches I felt confused, certain that Mevasseret-Zion was located on or 
near the 1949 Armistice Agreements border line – later I would learn that ‘near’ and 
‘far’ possessed relative meaning: “The Green Line is not close to here,” Ronit 
reiterated, “But it’s not like it is in another country…”  Indeed, it bisected the valley 
below.2 
In the calm and cool of Ronit’s garden, the reality of conflict is held ‘far’ while the 
sanctuary of home and the realm of beauty are kept ‘near,’ though each possesses a 
window to the other.  Here buds indeed grow safely, fostered and kept from harm 
under the protective watch of a sentinel – a gardener of flowers, a cultivator of 
security and a protector of a world unto its own.  Yet ever visible beyond the fenced 
perimeter exists a wider world looming on the horizon, seemingly empty yet posing 
threat and promising danger metaphorically dressed in weasel’s clothing.  Entwined 
discursively, materially and emotionally, these worlds cannot decouple as the garden 
sanctuary – a site of desire and imagination, ‘perhaps’ what life might be – relies upon 
precarity, with lush abundance appearing in stark contrast to hills of scrub and rock.  
Thus even in the warmth of May the cold wind slips long fingers between the mesh of 
Ronit’s fence, prying at her garden while creating the conditions of its possibility. 
Following critical scholarship of power in the everyday (Mitchell 1990; Abu-Lughod 
1990; Navaro-Yashin 2003; Chalfin 2008; Hoffman 2011; Ochs 2011; Richter-Devroe 
                                                
2 Field notes, 20 May 2011. 
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2011), this chapter explores the sites and practices of normalisation which make 
Jewish Israeli everyday life possible in a context of sustained conflict and political 
violence.  In doing so, the wider relations shaping Israel-Palestine emerge as most 
effectively produced and maintained precisely where they seem barred, absent or least 
visible.  Here, everyday moments and sites of least resistance demonstrate exactly 
how normalisation works, how in becoming hegemonic specific boundaries blur to 
bind normalcy with on-going conflict and create a relationship of mutual dependency.  
Importantly, gender roles and relations emerge as the primary thread weaving the 
personal with the political, the intimate with the public and the everyday with 
domination, facilitating the production of normalcy explicitly through the continuing 
presence of violence.  Looking to the level of family and the construction of ‘small 
worlds’ or ‘elsewheres,’ this chapter uncovers gendered mechanisms which reproduce 
the normative precarity of Zionism and in doing so ensure stasis.  As gender shapes 
mechanisms of normalisation along with sites of action and investment, intimacy 
emerges central to a sense of normality desired, pursued and performed, providing 
relational ties which bind communities of varying size and composition.   
 
All in the Family 
Israelis are descendants of a long longing to normality, to live your personal 
life.  Not who is wrong or right, what I do that defines me as a person…  Just 
living a quiet life is a longing.  It’s why they established the state of the Jews.  
So you don’t have to think about what to do to make things better. It’s a way 
to analyse collectively – longing for a normal life is thousands of years old.   
It’s tiring.  If you are a person with a consciousness for the collective there are 
so many wrong things – on all levels and on all sides – that you just can’t deal 
with.  If you give a little contribution, no one will notice.  So what’s it for?  I 
can go to the park with my kid and at least my kid will be a good person.3 
Summarily binding normality, stasis and power in a familiar site of the everyday, 
Dalia spoke these incisive words late at night in her Tel Aviv flat alongside her 
partner, Avi, as their daughter slept in an adjacent room.  Rich with commentary about 
shared history, state building and community, Dalia’s account of desired normalcy 
                                                
3 Interview in Tel Aviv, 7 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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reflects the process of negotiation and compromise set into motion as the pursuit of 
political ideals seemingly meets with little or no substantive return.  A 35 year-old 
self-proclaimed Leftist “couch activist” of Russian origin, Dalia actively invests in 
‘the collective’ primarily through online activism, committing her time and energies 
in a manner which best suits her estimation of personal efficacy.  Here, even as 
belonging ideally yields freedom from “think[ing] about what to do to make things 
better,” Dalia’s collective simultaneously demands continued attention and individual 
contribution, remaining subject to “so many wrong things” in need of redress.  Caught 
between a longing for inaction and the necessity of participation, Dalia chooses the 
path of seemingly less resistance and greater benefit: everyday investment in her 
family.   
The position of the family in literature around Israel-Palestine remains contested, 
often cited as central to state-building and nationalist projects (Sharoni 1995; Yuval-
Davis 1997; Herzog 2005 [1998]; Johnson and Kuttab 2001; Kanaaneh 2002; 
Halperin-Kaddari 2004; Jacoby 2005), and at the same time yielding accusations of 
overemphasis turned cultural reductionism (Abdo 2011: 3).  Within Jewish Israeli 
society, the family exists a significant institution particularly due to its location at the 
nexus of multiple borders, facilitating the transmission of ideology while comprising a 
central unit of support and belonging.  In this, the family emerges as a point of 
confluence, a central location of boundary collapse wherein individuals come to 
understand and negotiate the intersection of everyday life with wider political realities, 
as depicted in Chapters One and Two.  As a site and institution wherein tensions 
intersect, this conceptualisation of the family seemingly counters the image of 
‘domestic’ or ‘private’ as bounded and characterised by depoliticisation and 
feminisation.  Yet the Jewish Israeli family additionally constitutes a primary locus of 
normalisation – understood here as the process through which “[…] an undesirable 
situation (event, condition, phenomenon) is unrecognized, ignored or made to seem 
normal” (Cohen 2001: 51) – importantly producing modes of ostensibly depoliticised 
normality seemingly in contrast to the politics and violence of reality.4 
                                                
4 Relatedly, Juliana Ochs (2011: 122) demonstrates how among Jewish Israelis during the second 
intifada “[…] fantasies of the home as a retreat reinforced a politics of normalization and the belief that 
conflict is sustainable.” 
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As described in Chapter One, in accordance with the nationalist family-oriented 
gender norms which privilege heterosexuality, Jewish Israeli women continue to bear 
the expectation of reproduction in biological and cultural terms (Sharoni 1995; Yuval-
Davis 1997; Herzog 2005 [1998]; Cockburn 1998; Halperin-Kaddari 2004; Jacoby 
2005; Segal 2008) while simultaneously marking the borders of both tradition and 
modernity (Kandiyoti 1991; Lentin 2004),5 producing the national community 
materially, ideologically and symbolically.  Due to their embeddedness at the 
intersection of family and nation, Jewish Israeli women become deeply implicated in 
the production of normalcy, actively tending and shielding buds against the cold wind.  
Here, women-as-mothers shoulder the responsibility of creating normalcy in situations 
of seeming abnormality, perhaps seen most clearly in relation to militarism – it is 
often mothers who wash dirty military fatigues with loads of regular family laundry, 
deliver home-cooked meals to military bases when conscripted sons and daughters are 
denied leave, and perform ‘home’ in the form of favourite meals and family 
gatherings when their children-soldiers are granted time off-base.6 
Thus Jewish Israeli women are uniquely situated to reflect upon the production and 
maintenance of normality, as they provide the sense of constancy and familiarity 
imagined to underwrite ‘ordinary life,’ albeit a particular vision.  Seen pushing the 
latest European pram down Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, the image of the 
‘modern’ Jewish Israeli woman-as-mother combines with that of feminists protesting 
against sexual harassment outside the art museum, revellers marching through the 
city’s rainbow-clad streets during the annual Pride Parade, and young female recruits 
training for deployment in military combat units.  Together these gendered norms, 
roles and relations bolster state and societal claims to ‘liberalism,’ ‘modernity’ and 
‘democracy,’ producing a sense of normalcy ‘as if’ elsewhere European or American.  
Yet even as the Pride Parade’s celebration of identities and sexualities seemingly 
destabilizes the normativity of heterosexuality,7 this specific imagination and 
                                                
5 While not specific to Israel-Palestine, Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1991) reflections on the contradictory 
implications of nationalist projects shed critical light on the complex position of Jewish Israeli women 
within Israeli society as markers of both ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity,’ ‘authenticity’ and ‘progress.’  
 
6 As there exist legal exemptions from mandatory military service in the IDF based on religious belief 
and practice, these observations of militarism extend primarily to secular Jewish Israeli families. 
 
7 Much critical scholarship details the extent to which the inclusion of non-normative sexualities by 
Israeli state and society acts to mask practices and policies of occupation, discrimination and 
colonisation.  In a manner similar to “homonationalist” projects (Puar 2007, 2008), ‘pinkwashing’ in 
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performance of normalcy implicates race (white), class (middle or upper) and 
geopolitical location (Europe, the United States).  Thus while purporting to engage 
primarily with ‘Jewish Israeli women’ and the ‘Jewish Israeli family,’ the cases 
related in this chapter necessarily reflect hierarchies of privilege operating within 
relations of domination – clearly not all women and families equally mirror, access or 
shape prevailing visions of normality.8  Rather, some dominate even within 
domination. 
 
Ruptures and Repairs 
In the context of Jewish Israeli society, processes of normalisation function to their 
remarkable degrees of efficacy due precisely to their intimate dimensions, the ways in 
which they join the personal with the political and in doing so generate tension.  In a 
society stratified across and fragmented by complex divisions,9 the perpetuation of 
normalcy entails seemingly passive assent to bargains with power, such as ‘knowingly 
not knowing’ (Cohen 2001: 24) so that one might lead an ‘ordinary life’ in a context 
of conflict.  Yet just as both active and passive consent secure hegemony (Gramsci 
1971: 333), so too normalcy arises as the product of actions taken and withheld.  Here 
specific mechanisms emerge which ostensibly prevent the rupture of order and 
                                                                                                                                       
Israel produces and solidifies national consensus through the selective extension of belonging to non-
normative sexual identities; see Kuntsman 2009, Hochberg 2010 and Puar 2011.  Importantly, Jasbir 
Puar (2013: 337) differentiates between homonationalism and pinkwashing:  
 
Homonationalism and pinkwashing should not be seen as parallel phenomena.  Rather, 
pinkwashing is one manifestation and practice made possible within and because of 
homonationalism.  Unlike pinkwashing, homonationalism is not a state practice per se.  It is 
instead the historical convergence of state practices, transnational circuits of queer commodity 
culture and human rights paradigms, and broader global phenomena such as the increasing 
entrenchment of Islamophobia. 
 
8 Based on interviews with largely secular, middle-class, heterosexual Ashkenazi Jewish Israelis living 
in Israel’s two main urban centres, these accounts reflect a particular range of social locations within 
existing hierarchies of power and privilege in Jewish Israeli society. 
 
9 Assessed primarily in terms of ethnicity, class and gender, studies of social stratification in Israel 
locate Ashkenazi Jews at the highest social level, Mizrahi Jews at a secondary level, followed by 
Palestinians living in Israel, and finally labour migrants – many non-Jewish – at the lowest social 
position (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2004: 4).  Oren Yiftachel (2006) complicates this prevailing 
model by looking to the total area of Israel’s effective sovereign rule, including Palestinian residents of 
the Occupied Territories. 
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facilitate the repair of normalcy when breached, yielding gendered modes of 
normalisation and social self-regulation. 
Set not against but constituted through wider political realities, the production, 
performance and maintenance of Jewish Israeli normalcy depends upon that violence 
which it ultimately seeks to erase.  Indeed, as Natalie Konopinski (2009: 92) 
demonstrates in her ethnography of security perspectives and practices in Tel Aviv, 
within scenes of normality “violence always threatens, always the possibility, always 
the potentiality, to break through the surface of security.”  Here ‘security’ may 
actually reproduce and amplify the fears and suspicions it claims to anticipate and 
thwart (Ochs 2011: 5), sewing conflict deeply into everyday life.10  Among Jewish 
Israelis, appraisals of both normality and reality remain largely framed by the 
continuing threat of violence, whether absent or present.  Deemed constitutive of 
reality, as reflected in the prevailing sentiment that life in Tel Aviv is “unreal” due to 
its relative insularity from attack,11 violence presents the greatest obstacle to the 
attainment of normalcy.  “I spent all my life between wars, terror attacks,” 57 year-old 
Ronit recounted as we sat in her living room in Mevasseret-Zion looking out to the 
garden and its surrounding hills.  “In the Yom Kippur War two of my best friends died.  
But after all these terrible conditions I don’t know how people grow up normal.  It is 
abnormal, exhausting, depressing.”12  In her statement, Ronit clearly demonstrates 
how violence seemingly dissociates normalcy from reality while at the same time 
binding them together, as her life experience is framed by the wars which produce a 
desire for and imagination of normality.  Importantly, this violence necessarily evades 
complete normalisation or even “routinisation” (Konopinski 2009; Ochs 2011; 
compare Allen 2008),13 not by virtue of its simultaneous constancy and 
unpredictability – the ways in which lives are interrupted – but through social 
                                                
10 This observation owes much to Charles Tilly’s (1982) conceptualisation of “protection rackets,” 
through which a state directly or indirectly manufactures the very threats from which it purports to 
protect its citizenry; see also Peterson 1992. 
 
11 Characterised as a ‘bubble’ or medinat Tel Aviv [‘the state of Tel Aviv’] in various interviews, this 
prevailing discourse is also echoed in scholarship and popular media; see Konopinski 2009, Mendel 
2009, Vick 2010, Simon 2012 and Deger 2012. 
 
12 Interview in Mevasseret-Zion, 20 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
13 Importantly, normalisation and routinisation are distinct phenomena.  While normalisation avoids the 
abnormal or absorbs and renders it seemingly ordinary, routinisation implies the production of habit 
without the guise of normality – through the latter process an abnormal event or situation remains so 
even as it becomes marked as quotidian; see Allen 2008.   
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imperatives.  Rather, as violence serves to actively reinforce and stabilize the relations 
which underwrite the construction of Jewish Israeli normalcy, particular worlds and 
communities are maintained. 
This process of world-maintenance critically unfolds through ruptures and repairs 
occurring within the intimate relations of the family, a (hetero)normative unit granted 
primacy in Jewish Israeli society (Halperin-Kaddari 2004: 229) and associated with 
stability and belonging at the most basic level.  Now 80 years old and living outside 
Tel Aviv in Jaffa with her husband, Sonya spoke at length about the ways in which 
her political identity as a feminist anti-occupation activist creates ruptures and repairs 
within family relations: 
 K: Are your daughters politically engaged like you? 
Sonya:  One shies away from politics completely.  Her now ex-husband is 
Right-wing… we never talked about politics together, not the occupation or 
anything like that.  They have four sons: 18 and-a-half, 17 and-a-half, 15, and 
12.  They never wanted these arguments in front of the children, they wanted 
to keep it as far away as possible.  My daughter knows what I think and I’m 
sure she agrees that the occupation is not a good thing.  But she’s not in any 
way radical – she won’t stand in the street with a sign saying ‘Down with the 
occupation!’  Because she won’t let us discuss it, the boys know 
approximately what I think….  Like at last Pesach [Passover], the oldest asked 
a question about the occupation.  Their family likes to do the whole thing 
[Passover ritual], to read the whole reading with a break for dinner in the 
middle.  So I answered, my husband answered, and it became a big discussion.  
It lasted about 45 minutes.  And my daughter got upset and said, “We have to 
finish [the reading]!”  So we had to leave the discussion, but we said [to the 
grandson] “When you want to ask again, do so.”  The opportunity doesn’t 
come often, as the boys are older.  They’re busy and it isn’t like we get them 
on Saturday afternoons to go to the park anymore.  They have their own lives.  
But they’re very much aware of my way of thinking and that where I stand is 
very different from where their father stands.   
Our other daughter and our son-in-law actually met in Peace Now14 at the 
university.  But she doesn’t want any political discussion when we’re visiting 
– she hates arguments!  Her husband would disagree pleasantly with me all the 
time if he were allowed.  For instance, there was one discussion and their son 
was 12 years old at the time.  He started asking “Why are they angry?  Why is 
                                                
14 Peace Now or ‘Shalom Achshav’ is a long-time Jewish Israeli activist organisation which promotes 
the creation of two-states in Israel-Palestine; see http://www.britsforpeacenow.com; accessed 26 
February 2012. 
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Aba [Dad] yelling at Savta [Grandma]?” and that was it – she doesn’t want 
him to see this.  Her in-laws are very far Right.  We have to be careful when 
we visit with them.  But she understands where I am.  My daughter is running 
away, but I can’t force her.   
Our oldest daughter is in Los Angeles and she is totally with my way of 
thinking, she agrees.  But what can she do?  She lives in LA!  Our youngest 
who is at home with us agrees with me about the occupation, but she is very 
sensitive.  She won’t do Machsom [Checkpoint] Watch15 because she doesn’t 
want to see.  She will sign a petition, but she won’t be active.  She actually 
laughs at me – she says “Who are you going to make peace with tonight?” 
when I go out the door.  I told her that “Tonight I’m going to make peace with 
Katie!”16  
Illustrating a range of political subjectivities from her own identification as a radical 
Leftist feminist activist to her former son-in-law’s Right-wing orientation, Sonya 
articulates the ways in which the family remains a repository of politics.17  Here, 
various mechanisms of repair emerge through episodes of rupture, as each daughter 
differentially attempts to fend off and mitigate the ostensible intrusion of the political 
into the familial and intimate.  Through mechanisms of joking, bypassing and 
unseeing, the politics framing and facilitating Jewish Israeli normalcy are seemingly 
displaced, rendering the ‘impossible,’ ‘discomfiting’ and ‘unknowable’ manageable or 
digestible.  As Sonya’s youngest daughter jokes about her mother leaving the house to 
“make peace,” she summarily hyper-politicises her mother’s actions and renders them 
surreal or ridiculous, despite shared political views.  The first daughter to appear in 
Sonya’s narrative also shares her politics, but effectively bypasses the resolution of a 
conversation about the occupation with an appeal to the completion of ritual or 
tradition.  As the middle daughter met her husband at Peace Now a common politics is 
again demonstrated, yet this daughter blocks the sight of familial disagreement from 
her son, not only precluding future conversations but also likely helping the child to 
                                                
15 Machsom Watch is a Jewish Israeli feminist anti-occupation organisation, whose work aims at 
influencing public opinion through conducting and documenting “[…] daily observations of IDF 
checkpoints in the West Bank, along the separation fence and in the seamline zone, on the main roads 
and on out-of-the-way dirt roads, as well as in the offices of the Civil Administration (DCOs) and in 
military courts.”  See http://www.machsomwatch.org/en, accessed 26 February 2012. 
 
16 Interview in Tel Aviv, 31 January 2010; handwritten notes. 
 
17 Throughout the course of interviews and fieldwork, a wide spectrum of political orientation and 
religious belief emerged characteristic of many Jewish Israeli families.  Bound by blood relation and 
value systems that at some level remain shared, family units often bring together a tense amalgamation 
of politics and perspectives.   
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un-see the dispute.  And not without a touch of sad irony does Sonya relate the 
absence of her most politically like-minded daughter, as the one who would do 
something cannot by virtue of geographic distance.   
Joking, Bypassing and Unseeing 
This trio of reparative mechanisms – joking, bypassing and unseeing – frequently 
recurred throughout the period of my fieldwork, experienced personally and conveyed 
in exchanges when political realities ruptured the carefully constructed fabric of 
normalcy.  Though moments of tension and interruption remain central to the 
production and preservation of normality – as an ostensible ‘inside’ is made possible 
through the continued presence of its ‘outside’ – this necessity in no way diminishes 
the sensation of intense discomfort which accompanies the transgression of limits and 
destabilisation of order.  Indeed, this very visceral tension remains requisite for the 
activation of normalisation mechanisms; here, gender operates on subtle levels, 
providing both frame and texture to the instances of rupture and processes of repair 
which together produce normality.   
Though articulated in interviews and observed in public settings, the gendered 
dimensions of joking, bypassing and unseeing are perhaps best appraised through 
experiences within my own family, as I pushed ‘the limits of the possible’ through 
various acts of border crossing.  Possessing an American passport and a desire to 
travel the entirety of Israel-Palestine, I understood physical borders as passable and 
political boundaries as open to traversal, experiencing mobility in a manner markedly 
different from my Jewish Israeli family and friends.  Importantly, this border crossing 
and testing of limits was framed and enabled by my positionality as a white, middle-
class, non-Jewish American woman, a social location which informed imagination, 
mobility and the reception of my perceived transgression.  In June 2011, I planned a 
three-day trip to Ramallah and Nablus to visit friends, join a hiking group and travel 
to the origin of knafeh, my favourite dessert in the region.  A previous trip to 
Ramallah and Birzeit had been a matter of secrecy to all but a small number of close 
friends, as at the time Guy was working in London and responsibility for me 
seemingly fell to his family.  Not wanting to worry them with my border crossing, I 
had decided against telling the family my intentions and effectively bypassed the issue 
and its wider political context.  This time, however, Guy was in Tel Aviv and I felt 
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more confident in defying limits, emboldened the day before by an interview 
participant who spoke about the importance of destabilising perceptions.  Framed by 
my impending absence at a family birthday party and the reassurance that, no, Guy 
would not be going with me to Ramallah, I looked forward to this trip both for the 
new experiences it would offer and the satisfaction of my transgression made public – 
I would knowingly rupture the guise of normalcy within my own family.  Surprisingly, 
there was no concern that I would be going into the occupied West Bank as a woman 
travelling alone; it was preferable that I should venture solo into the impossible and 
unknowable, a territory popularly associated with violence and insecurity, rather than 
taking my male (Jewish Israeli) partner with me.  Clearly, ethnicity and nationality 
trumped gender in this appraisal of safety, though I was often mistaken for being 
Jewish, if not Jewish Israeli, inside Israel.  Was there some intangible aspect of 
Jewishness that Palestinians could read, some way of ‘telling’ unknown to me?  
Would my ‘rupture’ interrupt anything at all? 
During my absence that weekend, Guy kept record of responses prompted by his 
answer to the question “Where is Katie?” as it arose in various contexts, from a 
gathering at the beach to the family birthday celebration and an art exhibition in 
Jerusalem.  Acting as both partner and research assistant, Guy responded openly when 
asked about my location and conveyed the subsequent reactions as we spoke over the 
phone each evening, revealing diverse modes of repair.  “Why does she have to go 
there?  Isn’t there enough to do here?” was a sentiment repeated among female friends 
and relatives, whose rhetorical queries bypassed my location and the politics 
surrounding my absence through an act of dismissal.  Similarly, a male relative asked, 
“Why would she go there?” this time expecting a response.  Guy replied with 
questions in kind: “Why wouldn’t she go there?  If it was Paris would you ask why 
she’s there?”  Guy’s interlocutor considered this for a moment before declaring that he 
would like to visit Ramallah himself, were he not concerned for personal safety.  At a 
beach gathering among childhood friends a male friend responded to my absence with 
another sort of query: “What?  She has an Arab boyfriend now?”  Simultaneously a 
joke and an accusation, this response to my location not only diminished the politics 
of my absence but also called into question my morality through invoking sexuality, if 
in jest.  Perhaps feeling badly about his reaction, this friend continued by telling Guy 
that he would actually like to visit cities in the West Bank and Jordan as he feels 
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“more comfortable in Arab cultures.”  Though desires are again stymied by fears for 
safety, in reality this friend lives in a Jewish Israeli settlement in the West Bank with 
his wife and children; he is surrounded by a desired ‘Arab culture,’ though unable to 
access its ‘comfort’ by virtue of the political realities which make possible his life 
within the settlement.  Interestingly, these reactions recorded and recounted by Guy 
emerge in specifically gendered terms which reaffirm hegemonic norms, codes and 
relations.   As practiced primarily by female relatives, bypassing remains rooted ‘here’ 
– why can I not stay put? – while joking by male relatives and friends morphs into 
admitted desires to go ‘there,’ to act and move.  In this, prevailing dualisms of stasis-
as-feminine and action-as-masculine are (re)confirmed through expressions of 
incomprehension and desire, though admittedly bypassing and joking are not strictly 
limited to women and men respectively.  With respect to “military-masculine 
hegemony” and the masculinised construction of normality in Israel (Lentin 2000), 
together joking and bypassing effectively serve to avoid, reduce and constitute an 
‘other,’ as abnormal actions are dismissed or rendered absurd through expressions 
which summarily feminise, diminish and invalidate. 
While mechanisms of joking and bypassing clearly emerge among family and friends 
when faced with acts of assumed transgression, unseeing was activated upon the 
introduction of materiality as I sought to share gifts, photographs and experiences 
from my trip to the West Bank.  In these instances, physical presence necessitated a 
different strategy of normalisation, as the material evidence brought from Palestine 
forced recipients to acknowledge what lies beyond the ostensible limits of possibility 
– in order to stabilise normalcy once more, this rupture required a differential mode of 
repair.  Carried through the Old City of Nablus, ferried to the top of Ibn Tulkarm’s 
palace, stashed under dusty bus seats, x-rayed and crushed in the machines at 
Qalandia checkpoint, and finally driven tiredly to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, a plate of 
sticky sweets and bars of olive oil soap from Nablus met with unexpected reactions.  
“We don’t like Arabic sweets – they’re too sweet.  You can take them with you when 
you go,” I was told as I presented the first gift, summarily being asked to remove the 
Palestinian treats from sight.  My photographs of the hiking trip – images of fog and 
breaking sunlight, terraced hills and exquisite flora – precipitated a request to see 
pictures of Ramallah, though these ultimately disappointed as they revealed a bustling 
and crowded city no more exotic than areas outlying Jerusalem.  The olive oil soap 
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was received first with appreciation and then a joke: “Wow… So if I wash with this 
will I become…”  The speaker left her sentence hanging in mid-air.  “Clean?”  I 
offered.  “Pro-Palestinian?” came the end of the query with a quick laugh.18  In these 
ways, gifts and images from my time in Palestine were actively un-seen by their 
intended recipients, as they were rejected or reduced in their materiality and 
symbolism.  Clearly operating in tandem with joking and bypassing, here acts of 
unseeing acknowledge a discomfiting object or truth while barring it from entering too 
deeply into home or psyche – before being set aside in a sink for use, soap is first 
cleansed of its politics.  Importantly, these exchanges occurred among women within 
domestic spaces, pointing to the ways in which mothers and wives might regulate the 
presence of politics in family life.  Though overwhelmingly associated with men, 
conflict and security, here women meet with politics head-on and set the terms of 
subsequent visibility and engagement.  In this, the porosity of the boundary between 
homefront and battlefield again becomes visible, creating not only the conditions for 
militarisation, but also determining exposure to alternative narratives, realities and 
possibilities.  
Silencing  
While joking, bypassing and unseeing take shape within intimate settings and 
interactions, resoundingly clear is the silence which prevails after incidences of 
rupture.  As a mode of repair, silence emerges not only through the absence of 
articulation, but also the ways in which particular issues are spoken about or rather 
around; silence may thus include speech, albeit that which “[…] has had no political 
‘voice’ or impact” (Berlant 2011: 232).  Yet the dependency of normalcy upon 
politics and conflict signals that repair can only ever be partial – whether rendered 
insignificant or silent, the political cannot be fully erased in its necessity to everyday 
life.  Then what is preserved by acts of silencing and for whom in these situations?  
Returning to Sonya’s narrative recounted above, through forbidden to speak about 
politics in order to protect her grandchildren from the emotional upset caused by 
conflict among relatives, the silencing of Sonya and her husband does not preserve a 
sense of ‘everything is alright’ for their adult children; despite altruistic intentions it is 
not likely to do so for the children in question either.  Rather, a knowing 
                                                
18 Field notes, 23-25 June 2011. 
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approximation of childhood normalcy becomes reconstituted and enshrined, where 
reality – in Sonya’s case political disagreement among adults – becomes displaced by 
a desired sense of normality.  As such, this resulting normalcy necessarily remains 
aspirational, reflecting “[…] the desire to feel normal and to feel normalcy as a ground 
of dependable life, a life that does not have to keep being reinvented” (Berlant 2007: 
281).  So too the silence which prevails within my own family after episodes of 
rejection or diminishment does not sit easily, yet it sits nonetheless – we wish it could 
be otherwise, like that somewhere else ‘normal’ which we try to recreate in our ginger 
steps around obvious hurts and disappointments. 
Importantly, though Sonya, her husband and myself appear victims of silencing 
enacted and normalcy pursued, those silent and silenced often play an active role in 
their apparent imposed muteness.  As illustrated by critical scholarship around 
political violence, silence indeed may become a matter of active consent in response 
to violent acts witnessed or watched (Last 2000: 324; Cohen 2001: 145, 166), just as it 
may constitute a protective mechanism for victimised individuals and communities 
(Das 2007: 54, 87; Lawrence 2000: 178; Lentin 2000) or a sign of protest and 
reassertion of commitment among the politically depressed (Eliasoph 1998; Berlant 
2011: 231).  As there exist many kinds of silences (Lawrence 2000: 178), some retain 
aspects of agency despite their seemingly forced imposition by external actors.  Not 
one to shy from confrontation, Sonya frequently marches in anti-occupation, anti-
racism and pro-democracy demonstrations, in addition to participating actively in 
multiple feminist anti-occupation organisations from Machsom Watch and Women in 
Black to the Coalition of Women for Peace.19  Her consent to silence among family, 
then, is quite significant.  Indeed, my own silence after the reception of sweets and 
soaps must be read in conjunction with my academic research and frequent 
participation in demonstrations and protests – holding politics and family in tension, I 
actively recreated the subject of my own study.  Rather than indicating denial as 
                                                
19 Employing differential strategies for mobilisation and action, Machsom Watch, Women in Black and 
the Coalition of Women for Peace are among the most visible feminist anti-occupation organisations in 
Israel.  While Machsom Watch focuses on reporting human rights violations at Israeli military 
checkpoints, as an international anti-militarist network Women in Black raises consciousness through 
weekly vigils.  The Coalition of Women for Peace “initiates public campaigns and education and 
outreach programs” and is responsible for the ‘Who Profits?’ campaign, which exposes corporate 
involvement in Israel’s occupation.  For further information see http://www.machsomwatch.org/en, 
http://www.womeninblack.org/es/history and 
http://www.coalitionofwomen.org/?page_id=340&lang=en, accessed 26 February 2012. 
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commonly associated with silence (Cohen 2001: 9), our muteness appears an 
affirmation, a subscription to the sense of normalcy seemingly requisite for familial 
accord.  While silence indeed interrupts the transmission of meaning upon which 
communities rely (Daniel 2000: 351), our reticence actively stabilises a most intimate 
constellation of collectivity. 
Within this family unit from whence silence emanates, gender functions as an element 
of structure, a vector of normativity and a relation of power, though perhaps 
unpredictably so.  The behaviours and attitudes produced through the entanglement of 
private with public, intimate with political, resist generalisation as an individual’s 
location, experience and perspective as ‘woman’ or ‘man’ exists embedded in 
multiple relations, at once personal and familial, social and political, material and 
emotional (Brah 1996).  In Sonya’s account, as the narrator of these episodes her 
voice trumps that of her husband and she appears an authoritative matriarch.  Yet in 
moments of silencing, political clashes occur explicitly with her daughters’ more 
conservative male partners, initiating closure – in Sonya’s opinion, her daughters all 
agree with her on matters relating to the occupation, while the men around her express 
opposition.  However, in each of the final moments of judgment, these very daughters 
are the actors who forbid the intrusion of politics into the intimacy of family life; they 
emerge the keepers of normality.  “She won’t let us discuss it [with] the boys…”, “She 
doesn’t want any political discussion when we’re visiting…”, “She doesn’t want to 
see…” – Sonya’s daughters guard the gates of normalcy and family harmony, 
ultimately exercising power over political debate and engagement in a manner 
strikingly similar to my own family.  Though acting differently within the ostensibly 
apolitical, feminised domestic sphere, political passivity cannot be ascribed to any of 
these women.  Rather, despite their male partners’ clear exercise of political voice, 
Sonya’s daughters appear de facto heads of household invested in the preservation of 
familial sanctity against their mother’s tide of politics.  Thus while existing literature 
highlights the connections between political speech and ‘knowledge of security’ in 
Israel – primarily available to men through participation in combat (Mazali 2003; 
Lentin 2004; Jacoby 2005; Rimalt 2008; Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 
2011)20 – these accounts reveal more subtle gendered relations in operation at the 
                                                
20 Interestingly, Orna Sasson-Levy, Yagil Levy and Edna Lomsky-Feder (2011) look to the exercise of 
women’s political voice within and subsequent to military service via the activist initiative ‘Women 
  
 124 
level of the family, where women regulate the terms of visibility, discussion and 
engagement in the interest of normality. 
The Ties that Bind Us  
Significantly, as gender structures processes of normalisation at the level of the Jewish 
Israeli family, militarism, violence, intimacy and duty converge in a situation unique 
to Israel wherein both men and women face mandatory conscription to the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) after completion of high school.  As militarism relies upon the 
blurring of military and civil boundaries in order to facilitate the production of 
violence (Geyer 1989 in Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008: 353; Jacoby 2005: 42-43), it 
permeates and shapes the family while drawing from this unit both human-power and 
ideological support.  From sites of active transmission such as school trips and holiday 
commemoration (Gor 2007) to more passive instances of shopping excursions marked 
by the routine inspection of bags at malls and supermarkets (Konopinski 2009; Ochs 
2011), the demands and values of militarism enter deeply into Jewish Israeli family 
relations, imbuing silence with the weight of both intimate relations and national 
security.  Yael, a 56 year-old Jerusalemite with four children above conscription age, 
reflected upon this enmeshment of military and family: 
[…] The minute a child – a child! A child! – goes to the army it becomes all-
encompassing for that person who goes to the army.  And also for the parents.  
It’s very different to send a daughter versus a son – it depends on what the 
daughter is doing, of course.  When you’re a mother, even living in Tel Aviv, 
and you send a child to a combat unit your life isn’t the same.  You live on a 
different level.  If Tel Aviv kids aren’t going to the army, then they [the 
parents] are excluded from worrying about the security of their children and 
the nation.21 
Embedded in a discussion of how she experiences the occupation in daily life as a 
“modern religious” Jerusalemite with friends and family living in West Bank Jewish 
Israeli settlements, Yael frames her observations as a difference between Jerusalem 
                                                                                                                                       
Breaking the Silence’ (WBS).  In this, the authors highlight the ways in which military service 
potentially grants legitimacy to women’s anti-war discourses, though not without tension: “The case of 
WBS reveals that military service can be a new source for women’s symbolic power in the political 
field. Hence, the same legitimating system that was hitherto deployed to marginalize women can also 
be leveraged to justify a political voice. However, employing military service as leverage to justify a 
political voice is also the source of its weakness” (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011: 757).  
 
21 Interview in Jerusalem, 12 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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and Tel Aviv.  While this again situates Tel Aviv in the realm of the fantasy due to a 
lack of violence experienced and now duty fulfilled, Yael raises the possibility that 
continued detachment from reality is not the highest price paid by parents of service 
evaders and conscientious objectors in Tel Aviv.  Rather, these parents ‘miss out’ on 
the worry which binds a collectivity, particularly during times of conflict and war; in 
this, their disentanglement from the needs of military and nation becomes a basis of 
non-belonging.  For Yael, social and national belonging is not a given as, unlike her 
Israel-born children, she emigrated from Australia at age 18 in search of a “legitimate 
way to escape from family.”  The inclusion of Yael’s children within the fabric of 
military, nation and society then signals a further entrenchment of her own belonging.  
As Nira Yuval-Davis (2011: 18) writes, “Belonging… is not just about social 
locations and constructions of individual and collective identities and attachments, it 
is also concerned with the ways these are assessed and valued by the self and others.”  
Highlighting the differential levels of anxiety that accompany the deployment of 
daughters and sons – young women must volunteer for combat positions while young 
men may be openly conscripted – Yael makes a further distinction between the 
degrees of investment and perhaps prestige that accompany participation in and 
belonging to the national worry.  Yet, in the space of the home these distinctions carry 
little import when the symbolism of the military appears upon the body of her child; 
as Yael said of her youngest daughter with obvious concern trailing into silence: 
“When my baby comes home with a big rifle and puts it in her clothes closet…” 
Importantly spoken from her position as a mother, Yael’s earlier narrative elucidates 
the depth of bonds between military and family as normalisation occurs through both 
the disruption of stability and instantiations of belonging – when sons go to combat 
and lives collectively fail to remain the same.  Here, an experience of explicitly 
masculinised rupture grants not only social capital but also political voice, as in 
forums more public those families whose children refuse or evade military service 
may be actively silenced due to their lack of participation in both national security and 
worry.  Corroborating this claim, Daphna, a research participant in Tel Aviv, spoke of 
an explosive conversation with her brother-in-law involving the accusation that she 
and her fellow Leftist activist husband were ‘ochrei Israel’ [haters of Israel].  “‘You 
hate your country, you hate your people – send your daughter to the army and then 
you can talk to me!’” the brother-in-law reportedly yelled before marching to the car 
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to await his wife’s departure from the ruined family meeting.  Already in an 
agreement of silence with a female cousin in Jerusalem who “[…] refuses to talk 
about politics with anyone in the family because of the huge damage it can do,” 
Daphna and her partner now entered into a similarly tense voluntary truce with this 
relative.22  Clearly, here military service denotes not only full social belonging for the 
family, but also the right to political speech.  Significantly, the gender of the should-
be soldier seems to matter little, as Daphna’s daughter’s enlistment remains the source 
of contention despite her lack of access to the social and political capital ascribed to 
male combat soldiers (see Sasson-Levy 2003; Sasson-Levy and Amram-Katz 2007; 
Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008).  However, while Daphna’s narrative disrupts the 
relationship between militarised masculinity and political voice, wider gender 
relations of “masculine normality” (Lentin 2000: 159, 217) remain intact – Daphna 
and her husband emerge the silent, feminised ‘losers’ of the family quarrel, while the 
indignant brother-in-law commands the terms of discussion. 
As these ruptures emerge within family units, normality continues to gain traction.  
Speaking again from the position of a woman whose child, this time a son, opted 
against serving in the military, 61 year-old Aviva illuminated a differential means 
through which belonging becomes bound with bargaining and silence: 
I can say that because my son didn’t go to the army, in that way it [the 
occupation] didn’t touch me.  But when your son is in the army I think it 
touches you very badly, again in a paradoxical way.  I have friends who came 
from the Left, who were activists in their young ages.  I cannot say that they 
rationally changed their minds – it doesn’t mean that they didn’t, maybe they 
did.  But the fact that their sons serve in the army, in the [Occupied] Territories, 
makes them blind.  Maybe this is normal, I can’t tell you.   
KN: This isn’t something you experience with a daughter in the army?   
Aviva: You don’t experience it with a daughter because she doesn’t go to 
combat.  I don’t think I would experience it anyway, I can’t change my mind.  
But I can’t say.  My daughter challenged my limits, she said “Maybe I will be 
a combatant.”  I said, “No way.  No way.”  We had great discussions about the 
army in our family.  First with our son – my partner didn’t go to the army and 
he didn’t want our son to go, but he let everyone make his own decision.  He 
said that I didn’t allow our son to go to the army.  It’s true, he’s right, but I 
                                                
22 Field notes, 31 August 2011. 
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think that we shouldn’t allow our son to go to the army!  Here is the discussion.  
With our daughter we were more permissive because she’s a girl, but she was 
more rebellious also.  It was clear that I didn’t want her to go.  But I supported 
her, I took food, I went to the ceremonies.  Here is where you have… the army 
gets into your house.  The main way the occupation gets into your house is 
through the army.   
Now it’s less, but I was very busy with one issue when my daughter was 18 
years old and her boy friends came to the house.  We’d have dinner together, 
chat, the usual thing.  These boys are in the army.  And you don’t ask 
questions, you try not to.  I knew that if I asked questions I would be in a 
situation where I have to decide if I let them into the house.  On the other side, 
they are responsible, but they are 18 years old… 18 years old.  They are kids.  
There also you close your eyes to the occupation.23 
Gender clearly pervades Aviva’s account as she raises issues of sight, speech and 
silencing in response to a question as to whether she encounters the occupation in 
Jerusalem.  Again daughters appear to constitute ‘less worry’ in their relative safety 
from assignment to combat positions, but these very ‘safe’ beings usher the military 
into the domain of family, dispelling the notion of sanctity from occupation and 
violence.  Like a rifle in the clothes closet, daughters may bring the army “into your 
house” even as mothers actively bring ‘home’ to the base.  Yet according to Aviva’s 
narrative, normalisation operates on two differential levels which remain associated 
with sons: the shift toward conservative politics or ‘blindness’ among parents of male 
soldiers and the self-censorship that accompanies certain knowledge of what those 
soldiers do.  Interestingly, in contrast to Yael’s earlier assumptions about belonging, 
for Aviva her son’s decision against military service provides escape from the ‘touch’ 
of the occupation – a respite from violence – rather than instilling in her a sense of 
non-belonging to the collective.  Like Yael, Aviva migrated to Israel as a teenager, 
though from Argentina rather than Australia; however unlike Yael, her feelings of 
belonging to Israeli society somehow resist the destabilisation of a son avoiding 
mandatory service.  Yet with her daughter’s enlistment, Aviva actively performs 
national belonging on multiple levels despite her acute sense of political and personal 
discomfort, bringing food to the military base, attending ceremonies, acquiescing to 
silence and approximating normalcy as conscripted male friends join the family for 
dinner.  Here, the destabilising yet normalised entry of military into domestic is again 
                                                
23 Interview in Jerusalem, 14 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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borne by daughters, as they differentially introduce violence to ‘private’ and ‘home’ in 
ways which simultaneously complicate and reinforce hegemonic norms. 
What, then, does Aviva’s mealtime silence preserve?  A sense or approximation of 
normalcy similar to that seemingly at stake with Sonya’s teenaged grandchildren?  
Whereas Sonya brings with her ‘abnormal’ politics which must be quelled, at Aviva’s 
dinner table the catalyst appears external, with internal angst activated by the 
destabilising yet normalised entry of military into domestic.  Indeed, militarisation 
explicitly creates constant destabilisation through collapsing boundaries between 
public and private, ushering violence directly into the home in part through the 
domestication of security (see Ochs 2011: 17, 117-37).  Significantly, in each of the 
accounts related above, the agential individual silent or silenced feels tension, anxiety 
and frustration rather than overwhelming normalcy – there exists no false sense that 
everything is truly ‘alright.’  However, in a context of aspirational normality perhaps 
this is the very belonging in question, underwritten by the constant precariousness of 
everyday life, the insecurity of the moment’s calm, the mantra of ‘live for today 
because you can’t count on tomorrow.’  Again, roots may be traced to the normative 
narrative of Zionism, which historically found “‘moral’ justification” in experiences 
of the Holocaust even as Jewish Israeli society remains in tense relation to its 
survivors (Lentin 2000: 203).  Indeed, as specific emotions become experienced as 
‘the national’ and particular sensations are deemed politically meaningful, the 
affective regimes of nation-states may cohere community in ways which justify 
domination (Berlant 1993, 1998b).  Israel’s relationship to the Holocaust is suffused 
with sensation and emotion, indeed generating collectivity through a particular cluster 
of “national emotions”; as Idith Zertal (2005: 5) notes, “[…] historical defeats were 
transmuted into paragons of triumph and models of identification for a mobilised and 
combative nation.”  Here, the experiences and emotions associated with ‘victim’ and 
‘victor’ overlap, as violence endured, imagined and pursued makes possible particular 
constellations of belonging (Zertal 2005; Kuntsman 2009).  
Then to belong to this continual trauma and the quest to ‘rise above’ is to be part of 
the nation, to constantly recast normalcy and perseverance as if ‘against’ and ‘despite’ 
but in so many ways through conflict – in order to suffuse the ordinary, to instil social 
cohesion, that tension must be replicated in the family, the foundational unit of 
community in Jewish Israeli society.  Within Jewish Israeli families processes of 
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rupture and repair take root, setting the stage for a vision of normality which allows 
living as if – as if all is ‘normal,’ while the everyday remains held in tension between 
reality and desire without need for their reconciliation.  As conceptualised by Lisa 
Wedeen (1999), Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Lori Allen (2013), a politics of ‘as if’ 
serves to entrench the gap between awareness and action, as here fantasy does not 
replace material reality but rather ensures its continuation.24  Through producing and 
maintaining this precarious relation, modes of normalisation among Jewish Israelis 
ultimately make us belong even as they close down the avenues of trust and 
understanding assumed guaranteed, opening fissures of anger, disappointment and 
resentment in their stead.  Indeed, in the silence following a particularly upsetting 
exchange among my own family in Tel Aviv, this very claim rang true: “Now we’re a 
real Israeli family, having an argument about politics in front of the television on a 
Friday night.”25 
 
Small Worlds, Simple Lives 
In many ways, the preceding sections of this chapter have demonstrated mechanisms 
of normalisation enacted in moments of rupture or interruption, a tool kit for repair 
shared by those invested in the preservation of normalcy.  Joking, bypassing, unseeing 
and silencing each emerge as modes of stabilisation in the necessarily precarious 
conditions which produce both normality and belonging, finding function through 
intimate political relations.  Yet after repair, what does normalcy look like?  How does 
it feel and for whom?  As seen above, rupture and repair can be profoundly tiring 
enterprises for all involved, particularly as they involve intimate realms and relations 
(Berlant 2011: 27, 48).26  Thus for many Jewish Israelis, personal energy is best 
invested on levels in which life can be made to feel most immediately normal, 
                                                
24 Despite ultimately arguing that through fantasy Israel “has completely lost any connection with 
reality,” Yonathan Mendel (2009) demonstrates the ways in which fantasy actually shapes material 
realities in Israel-Palestine: “The way of fantasizing [sic] another Israel – peaceful and moral, Jewish 
and democratic, not perfect but not harmful – has brought into being a virtual reality in which historical 
and contemporary events are blurred by wishful deceitful and blinkered thinking.” 
 
25 Field notes, 4 February 2011. 
 
26 Lauren Berlant’s chapter entitled ‘Cruel Optimism’ gives an excellent account of the fatigue 
produced by world-maintenance; see Berlant 2011, pages 23-49. 
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respective to the enormity and seeming intractability of surrounding political realities.  
Just as mechanisms of normalisation render the politics of occupation and 
discrimination palatable, so too does the creation of small worlds make life more 
liveable. 
Though varied in size and composition, these small worlds signal a “becoming-private” 
(Berlant 2011: 259) which suggests that the guise of normalcy cannot be adequately 
maintained on larger scales.  Here it is important to distinguish between modes and 
layers of normalcy, as throughout this thesis I argue that relations of occupation and 
discrimination have become so normalised as to constitute the basis for the function of 
everyday life for many Jewish Israelis.  Indeed, concertina wire and security checks 
may be cast as routine along with Palestinian workers employed in particular trades; 
to the extent to which these material and corporeal reminders remain visible they 
become ostensibly ‘normal.’  Yet at the same time, the performance of ‘normal’ 
liberal, Western, modern, capitalist life in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem creates a 
stage or set for the enactment of ‘just like you, like anywhere (else) in Europe,’ where 
this visibility is seemingly rescinded.  Thus while domination, subordination and 
oppression consistently underwrite and maintain the everyday in its differential 
appearances, these relations themselves remain unevenly normalised.   
In assessing the function of co-existent worlds, sociologists Stanley Cohen and Laurie 
Taylor (1992: 113) write, “We simultaneously occupy several worlds and move into 
different activities each of which may be distinguished by the degree of individuality, 
at-homeness, freedom from constraints which can be experienced.”  Yet in the context 
of Israel-Palestine, these worlds may additionally provide familiarity, away-ness and 
connectivity, as experiences of sustained conflict are compounded by social 
fragmentation and privatisation produced through rapid liberalisation (see Shafir and 
Peled 2000, 2002; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2004; Yiftachel 2006; Abdo 2011).  
Into this complex tension feminist and queer theorists insert a provocative claim: the 
normative and aspirational dimensions which constitute the basis of worlds apart may 
produce an economy in sync with existing relations of power and privilege.  Couched 
in affective terms by Sara Ahmed (2004) and Lauren Berlant (2007, 2011), worlds 
large and small are built and maintained through attachments – to others, to objects, to 
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scenes, practices and desires.27  Here, intimate relations and reciprocity yield the 
experiences of “unconflictedness, belonging, and worth” (Berlant 2007: 282) 
imagined to underwrite normality and ‘ordinary life,’ scenes where existence ceases to 
be a project and is instead exercised as fact (Berlant 2007: 291).  Constructed 
differentially by Jewish Israeli women and men, these small worlds of intimacy arise 
through the intersection of gender with hierarchies of class, race, religiosity and 
geopolitical location, producing approximations of normalcy bound with the 
preservation of power and privilege. 
Elsewheres, Here and There 
The mentality is Hobbesian here.  Fuck Hobbes!  You can’t build a society 
based on Hobbes unless you want no equality, depression, aggression.  Like 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer said, “I say my power should be our power!” – 
that’s the fandom I come from.  In sci-fi and fantasy Henry Jenkins did 
research and studied the link between involvement in sci-fi or fantasy fandoms 
and political action.  There’s a strong link, like how Donna Haraway writes 
about the creation of ‘elsewhere.’  The problem is that most people think “We 
have to do this,” to be ‘x’ is the only solution.  Well no, we live it and we can 
live it differently if we choose.  I believe in small steps, very small steps, not 
symbolic steps which are huge.  Of course it’s complicated and huge, but if we 
don’t start who will?28   
Meirav, a 25 year-old feminist blogger and political activist, first raised the possibility 
of ‘elsewhere’ as we sat together in Jerusalem’s Machane Yehuda market, watching 
evening shoppers from our position at a popular café.  The founder of an online 
initiative aimed at ending street harassment, Meirav invoked Donna Haraway’s (1992) 
conceptualisation of “elsewhere” multiple times during our interview, citing it as a 
positive space of possibility and meaning.  Of debates around the differing plights of 
Palestinian and Jewish Israeli women in Israel Meirav claimed, “The argument [of 
who has it worse] usually gets stuck at a dead end, but there’s always an 
‘elsewhere.’ . . .   Real change can come from women on each side.”  Similarly, in 
                                                
27 Importantly, Clare Hemmings (2005: 550, 557-558) critiques the recent “affective turn” in cultural 
theory, as its purported epistemological freedom and “capacity to transform” largely overlooks both 
postcolonial and feminist theory, which “value continuity of difference over time” in questions of social 
meaning.  Critically, this “myopia” allows affect theory to posit itself as “the way forward” in 
contemporary cultural theory. 
 
28 Interview in Jerusalem, 5 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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discussing Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian Territories and annexed East 
Jerusalem she concluded, “It is what it is, you get angry and frustrated.  You break 
down and then you see the options… if you’re lucky enough to have an ‘elsewhere.’”   
For Meirav ‘elsewhere’ exists a realm of political action as suggested by Haraway 
(1992: 295), a site of imagination which leads to transformation, an ability to access 
fantasy and in doing so change reality.   
Contesting claims to biological determinism, ‘naturalisation’ and postmodern “hyper-
productionism,”29 Haraway proposes the existence of “elsewhere,” a space of 
difference and diffraction, a site of interruption and interference that creates the 
possibility of change (1992: 299-300).  Home to “inappropriate/d others” (Trinh 
Minh-ha 1986, 1989 cited in Haraway 1992: 299) – those multi-cultural, ethnic, racial, 
national and sexual subjects excluded from hegemonic (Western) narratives of 
biology, nature and social construction – the third space of ‘elsewhere’ promises 
combination, interface, implosion, collapse, hope and action, a place where “my 
power” may indeed be “our power.”  What binds this realm of possibility and 
engagement with Ronit’s securitised garden depicted at the opening of this chapter, a 
site of seeming haven and passivity arising in reaction to those very conditions which 
inspire Meirav to act?  In a context of sustained conflict, rather than ushering in novel 
forms of resistance ‘elsewheres’ may additionally provide escape or respite, becoming 
small worlds of normalcy and immediate influence amidst a sea of uncertainty, fear, 
powerlessness and despair.  Sheltered behind mesh fences and carefully adorned with 
beauty, these worlds may constitute enclaves or ‘free areas’ in which “[…] we don’t 
experience any massive tension or disruption between fantasy and script” (Cohen and 
Taylor 1992: 113); so too they may be linked with denial, or “[…] the maintenance of 
social worlds in which an undesirable situation (event, condition, phenomenon) is 
unrecognized, ignored or made to seem normal” (Cohen 2001: 51).  As highlighted by 
Meirav above, while ‘elsewheres’ importantly expand the scope of thought and deed, 
                                                
29 In her work on transnational technoscience and cultural studies, Haraway (1992: 297) writes, “[…] 
[N]ature for us is made, as both fiction and fact.  If organisms are natural objects, it is crucial to 
remember that organisms are not born; they are made in world-changing techno-scientific practices by 
particular collective actors in particular times and places.”  Through these claims Haraway argues that 
worlds, realities, identities and even individuals are produced and manufactured – importantly by 
specific communities whose interests remain informed by particular historical moments and locations.  
Yet Haraway remains wary of broadly deterministic constructivist theories and posits an alternative to 
what she deems “hyper-productionism,” or the postmodern narrative that “[…] ‘man makes everything, 
including himself, out of the world that can only be resource and potency to his project and active 
agency’” (1992: 297).   
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the “very small steps” taken within these realms may replace large and symbolic 
actions, fostering not transformation but stasis. 
Rather than transcendental politicised realms evolved beyond prevailing conditions or 
conventions, the small worlds of Jewish Israelis emerge as liminal spaces, “gardens of 
perhaps” held in tension between the dewy warmth of promised blooms and the cold 
wind of certainty, sites of rupture and repair.  In a manner similar to the ways in which 
processes of othering and exclusion produce ‘elsewheres’ as conceptualised by 
Haraway (1992), these small worlds take shape through the surrounding environment, 
resonating between extremes as they offer both escape and action.  As Meirav acts to 
thwart street harassment, so too she escapes the violence of occupation and conflict; 
as Ronit escapes the Green Line and the threat of weasels, so too she acts to secure her 
garden and the lives within.  Bound to both ‘here’ and ‘elsewhere,’ small worlds 
necessarily remain rooted in material reality, dependant upon the latter for content and 
intelligibility – in part what a small world is not and in part what it seeks to transform.  
Yet in a context of political violence, equally significant is the inverse relationship: 
how existing conditions might rely upon the production and maintenance of small 
worlds, both escapist and oriented toward political hope.  
A Theory of Systemics 
What’s keeping me sane is the micro environment – family and friends.  I see 
families and I think “Where is this going?  What will we leave to our kids?”  I 
feel things are getting worse.  Neighbourhoods are a micro-cosmos.  At [age] 
11, I saw that my daughter couldn’t be free.  They built a student dormitory – 
four-story-high buildings that were fancy and new.  Many students live there.  
Then the Arabs in the neighbourhood became aggressive, they started 
attacking girls.  The students built their own security groups and patrolled, 
they were the ‘mishmar ezrachi’ [civilian guard].  The neighbourhood had 
groups on patrol too.  I decided that if I was alone I would stay, I have no 
energy to make the changes!  But because of Maya, not only was she growing 
up in this crazy country, but her development as an independent child [was at 
risk], the ability to go to her friend’s safely and come back safely.  So we left 
the neighbourhood because of Maya.  And I’m so glad we did!  Maya is 
independent, she goes to school and returns on her own, safely.  It’s not only 
being in an Arab environment, there are many people around who make life 
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impossible.  I still have the feeling that I need to protect her – Maya calls me 
when she gets to school, when she gets home.  But I’m not hysterical.30  
 
Sipping tea and eating cakes in the cool of Ronit’s apartment, the garden and its 
formidable fence remained visible through the sliding glass doors as my host outlined 
the contours of her small world, presented as a “micro environment.”  Here, Ronit 
constructs a multi-layered scene of threat and intimacy: a once-safe neighbourhood 
“micro-cosmos” whose changing dynamics jeopardised the core of her small world: 
her young daughter Maya.  From neighbours to friends and ultimately family – here a 
unit of two as Ronit raises her single child alone – the narrowing rings of Ronit’s 
micro environment indeed reveal sites of both action and stasis, clearly constructed 
through and bound by intimacy.  While Ronit admits to having felt “no energy” to 
move from her first neighbourhood in Jerusalem’s French Hill area, de jure a 
settlement across the Green Line in the Occupied West Bank, she feels impelled to 
action when her daughter’s development and security appear at risk.  By moving to 
escape conflict, violence and harm – acting to secure her small world – Ronit 
preserves a sense of stability: the apparent safety of a new neighbourhood and the 
‘normalcy’ of childhood freedom.   
In this, action becomes a vehicle for seeming passivity, ensuring a mode of ‘coasting’ 
which allows Ronit to invest in her micro environment and avoid feelings of constant 
struggle, danger and survival.  Indeed, as our conversation ended Ronit mused, “If one 
is happy in one’s micro environment, one will be used to the macro – this is keeping 
me sane.  In science, if the micro takes hold it becomes systemic.”  Yet to read Ronit’s 
words carefully, the happiness, security and stability of her micro environment 
remains tenuous, in need of continual maintenance and reaffirmation.  Despite moving 
from French Hill to Mevasseret-Zion where Maya can walk through the 
neighbourhood without fear, Ronit still requires her daughter to phone upon reaching 
the nearby school.  During the course of our interview Maya called to say that she was 
leaving school, arriving to the house some time later to a warm reception from her 
mother.  Rather than a performance of acute relief, an indicator of the extraordinary, 
Ronit and Maya’s interaction conveyed routinisation – this call and response 
constitute a daily interaction.  Instead of creating accord with the wider environment, 
                                                
30 Interview in Mevasseret-Zion, 20 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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the ‘systemics’ of Ronit’s small world clearly operate within particular boundaries to 
produce normalisation: one grows accustomed to the macro rather than including it 
within the scope of action and everyday life.   
Then even as her micro environment promises stasis and offers respite from wider 
cycles of violence, trauma and conflict, the stability of Ronit’s small world requires 
constant repetition, a forcible reiteration of particular norms (Butler 1993: 2).  As 
demonstrated by feminist and queer scholars including Judith Butler (1993, 1997b), 
Lauren Berlant (1997, 1998a, 2007, 2011) and Sara Ahmed (2000, 2004), normativity 
is central to world-building and maintenance as ‘matter’ gains “boundary, fixity, and 
surface” through processes of  (re)materialisation (Butler 1993: 9).  Then which 
repeated norms give rise to Ronit’s small world, linking her ‘elsewhere’ to material 
reality in its provision of “at-homeness” and away-ness?  Most clearly, Ronit’s micro 
environment underlines the primacy of protection, importantly challenging hegemonic 
gender norms while simultaneously reinforcing sexualised racial norms.  Produced 
through militarised patriarchal nationalism in combination with an ongoing settler 
colonial project (Abdo and Yuval-Davis 1995; Lentin 2000), the normative relations 
of Jewish Israeli man-as-protector and woman-as-reproducer are undermined by 
Ronit’s account of lived experience: as a single mother and sole income earner, Ronit 
assumes the dual responsibility of security and nourishment/care.  Here the (gendered) 
divisions between ‘homefront’ and ‘battlefield’ (Sharoni 2005 [1994]; Herzog 2005 
[1998]; Jacoby 2005) collapse even as Ronit seeks to maintain division, physically 
moving home to a locale beyond – yet near to – the Green Line through a mobility 
enabled by her membership in Israel’s middle class.  Yet in pursuing a sense and site 
of security on behalf of her young daughter, Ronit reaffirms a racialised and 
sexualised category of ‘other’ within the settler colonial project: the ‘Arab’ imagined 
to lurk menacingly at the physical and metaphorical borders of her micro-cosmos.  In 
a manner strikingly similar to discourses of colonial projects past (see Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis 1992; McClintock 1995; Stoler 2002), Ronit’s narrative (re)produces an 
image of the ‘other’ as an aggressive (brown or black) native-man-turned-invader 
preying upon innocent (white) daughters, salient symbols of the nation.   
Thus as Ronit performs protection and in doing so subverts hegemonic gender roles, 
the repetition of this racial norm confirms the position of the “abject being” (Butler 
1993: 3) whose continued presence materialises the border of her small world, a site 
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simultaneously secure and precarious in its proximity to ‘other’ bodies and violence.  
Then systemics transmit not happiness and security, but rather a sense of danger and 
fear, recreating the impetus for protection.  Indeed, after describing the contours of her 
small world, Ronit related the following: 
Katie, you can’t imagine how they hate Arabs. . .  Maya grew up – you can’t 
imagine how she hates Arabs.  In this house, in this family, you won’t hear 
these words.  She has so much hate, fear.  I say, “Maya, you can’t generalise!  
We have [friends] Amal and Khalid, we’re invited to their house!”  She tells 
me, “They are exceptional!  You can’t trust [Arabs].”  
KN: How old is she? 
Ronit: She’ll be 13 in October.31  
 
Spiritual Escapes: Of Self and Circles 
As valuations and hierarchies of race emerged stabilised by the repetition of norms 
associated with protection, Ronit’s family unit provides a small world in which norms 
are simultaneously subverted through acts of necessity; although a daughter remains 
the object of protection, her mother assumes the (masculine) roles of defender and 
provider along with (feminine) caretaker.  Yet family institutions provide no 
predictable patterns with regard to the construction and maintenance of small worlds 
and the normative relations therein; rather, specific factors intersect to give rise to 
diverse realms of escape and action.  In Ronit’s case, residence as a single mother in 
the occupied territory of French Hill converged with valuations of (Palestinian) race 
and opportunities afforded by (middle) class to produce the contours of her “micro 
environment,” a site worthy of cultivation and action.  For others, the family 
constitutes a nexus of differential interests, producing small worlds of investment and 
action which diverge from yet reinforce the overarching norms framing Ronit’s 
narrative. 
For 30 years, Yael has lived in the same modest limestone home in West Jerusalem’s 
German Colony, separated from the tense environment of French Hill by the Old City, 
Hebrew University and what feels like a cultural chasm.  Now retired from work as 
                                                
31 Interview in Mevasseret-Zion, 20 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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the manager of her husband’s surgery and with four children grown and moved away, 
at 56 year-old Yael cultivates her interest in dance, pottery, yoga and meditation 
through courses offered at the Cultural Centre behind her house.  Prefacing our 
exchange with the claim that she is “not a political creature,” Yael outlined her 
position and practices thus:  
Let me paint you a picture: every morning the paper is delivered to our door, 
my husband picks it up and goes through it, clucking his tongue in 
disappointment.  Ido is very Left and he can’t believe what’s going on here.  I 
can’t get my head around it.  I have to put my head in the sand like an ostrich 
to live here, because I don’t believe there’s a solution.32   
As an immigrant from Australia, Yael chose to raise her own family in Israel, 
exchanging one reality for another which, for her, necessitates conscious 
disengagement.  Defining her family as “modern religious,” for Yael “what’s going on 
here” extends beyond the divisions of nation and ethnicity described in prevailing 
narratives.  “We are modern religious, so we’re very exposed,” Yael related as we sat 
in her bright kitchen.  “In Jerusalem as modern religious people we don’t have one 
group of friends, we have all kinds.  My husband has lots of family here from 
Denmark and Sweden, all of his cousins immigrated.  And they’re all religious.  We 
also have a lot of family living in hard-core settlements.  For us it’s not ‘them’ and 
‘us.’”  With family living in occupied territory, Yael’s experiences and valuations of 
‘otherness’ emerge along lines of religious practice, belief and affiliation as abject 
beings appear within her society, ‘others’ not along lines of race but ideology.  
This intimate relation to Israel’s illegal settlements then informs Yael’s perceptions of 
the world around her, as family ties and religious belief propel her and her loved ones 
across territorial boundaries.  Indeed, with two of her children wounded during a 
shooting in the West Bank as they drove along a ‘settler only’ road, Yael views macro 
and micro scales in distinctly political terms.  Here ‘macro’ emerges “the Arab 
countries,” settlements and her children’s military service – matters of “security and 
survival” which preoccupy the country – set against the ‘micro’ of friends and family.  
“Yes, my kids were shot at in the car, but it wasn’t a personal attack on me,” Yael 
explained.  “And my son had an army accident, but it wasn’t the Arabs.  I don’t take 
this on board – the way I divide life is that the problems, bad, negative is ‘out there’ 
                                                
32 Interview in Jerusalem, 12 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
  
 138 
and what is personal…”  Trailing into silence, this disjuncture between “out there” 
and those matters deemed “personal” creates the boundary of Yael’s small world, a 
site of escape, connection and action: 
I’m a person who connects things!  I always say to the kids “Hakol kashur” – 
everything is connected!  They don’t see how, but it is.  But I disconnect 
because I look for the spiritual life.  I feel how I can bring the spiritual to the 
ground, into the here and now.  I only believe that what I can do in the world is 
to do what I can, to do good within my small circle.  I begin with myself – 
when I’m depressed it’s not good for anyone.  Then I go to my relationship 
with my husband, build a wonderful family, reach out to friends.  I don’t do 
community work on an organisational level, going to organisations and 
demonstrations, but on a personal level.   All I can do is on that level, in my 
small circle.  I see Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] on the 
television and it’s embarrassing to see his body language – he’s sitting on a 
chair and there is a row of gangsters behind him.  It’s about money and 
religion – they hide behind the cloak of religion, religion which is so full of 
righteousness.  What can I do with all of that?  Except for run away if it gets 
too bad… 
Disengaging from the macro level despite feeling irrevocably connected, Yael outlines 
a small world constructed through a particular form of spirituality, importantly 
different from the righteous religiosity of (male) political leaders.  Again 
demonstrating a subscription to systemics – the ability of change, happiness and 
stability to transmit from small circles to those larger – Yael positions herself as 
central to her small world; from here “goodness” radiates outward, yet “all [she] can 
do” remains within the personal level delimited by the presence of “bad” beyond.  
Yael’s small world then becomes a multi-layered sphere of influence, intimacy and 
consistency, a space of simultaneous connection and disconnection which allows her 
to remain living in Israel.   
Yet which repeated norms form the basis of this world unique to Yael’s spirituality, 
social class, race, location and gender?  Here, the overtly racialised ‘othering’ of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ as Jews and Arabs becomes displaced by internal exclusion borne of 
religious belief and practice, as spirituality expands territorial boundaries – ‘we’ are 
meant to remain within state borders, while ‘they’ live illegally beyond.  However, 
while complicating conventional understandings of ‘otherness,’ Yael’s distinction 
between “out there” and “the personal” again mirrors the normativity of protection, in 
both racialised and gendered terms.  ‘Macro,’ ‘bad’ and ‘there’ emerge bound with 
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Arabs, conflict and politics while ‘micro,’ ‘personal’ and ‘here’ become a source of 
sameness, read in terms of intimacy, calm and the presumed whiteness of Australia, 
Denmark and Sweden.  Thus ‘here’ emerges in need of protection from ‘there,’ 
repeating the militarised, sexualised and racialised gendered norms in part resisted and 
reinforced by Ronit’s actions in the interest of her daughter’s safety.  Although Yael 
directly experienced political violence as visited upon the bodies of her children, she 
avoids politics in a manner reflective of the norms which link knowledge of security 
to political voice in Israel (Mazali 2003; Lentin 2004; Jacoby 2005; Rimalt 2008; 
Sasson-Levy, Levy, Lomsky-Feder 2011).  Through avoiding the bad there even as it 
intrudes on the good here, Yael actively constructs herself as “not a political being,” 
unqualified to speak about the world around her even as she demonstrates a nuanced 
understanding of its connections and machinations.  Yael’s spiritual small world of 
action and influence then reproduces ‘the political’ as a realm of men, those 
“gangsters” whose exercise of power produces in her the desire flee ever deeper into 
spirituality, a hybrid practice made possible through (middle) class belonging. 
“Together in Pain, Together in Hope” 
While the narratives above seemingly point to a phenomenon of depoliticised or 
apolitical small worlds produced by Jewish Israeli women as gender norms meet with 
geopolitical location, social class, race and religion, this is not to say that Jewish 
Israeli men collectively dwell in the wider world of politics.  While small worlds of 
family and spirituality take shape in forms bound with the feminine/masculine 
valuations of private/public, homefront/battlefield and domestic/political borne of 
militarised patriarchal nationalisms, so too Jewish Israeli men construct microcosms 
of belonging, influence, escape and action vis-à-vis wider realities of conflict and 
violence.  Emerging through the confluence of norms and intersecting hierarchies of 
power and privilege, these small worlds again centralise intimacy and connectivity; in 
this, diverse spheres ultimately draw together to form a particular type of collective. 
Both a practitioner and instructor of a movement-based meditation practice derived 
from Buddhism and martial arts, 40 year-old Yair’s small world resonates with the 
circles built by Yael in part through spiritual practice.  Now living near to the 
Knesset33 in Neve Sha’anan northwest of Yael’s home in the German Colony, Yair 
                                                
33 The Israeli Parliament. 
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credits his father’s extreme politics with the formation of his current beliefs and 
practices:  
My father was very right-wing politically – he was part of the original 
settlement movement ‘Gush Emunim’34 and part of the group that supported 
[former Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon when he ran for the first time to the 
Knesset.  He wasn’t religious or anything, but he had a hard-core Right-wing 
orientation.  This was also me through high school – I was involved in the 
ideological Right wing until the army. . . .  It is the outcome of my father’s 
education that I support the opposite.”35 
While military experience catalysed a period of questioning and personal 
transformation for Yair, a post-service trip to Japan and the eruption of the second 
intifada during a retreat in France radicalised his politics, bringing Yair to participate 
in what he terms “Dharma activism.”  “The basic tenet of Dharma is that there is 
suffering in the world and we should be involved in ending or finishing the suffering,” 
Yair explained.  “[…] [T]he goal is not to solve, but to understand the conflict.”  Part 
of a small community of practitioners in Israel, activism in this vein aims at self-
understanding as a foundation for wider processes of change: “‘What does the conflict 
do to me?’” Yair related as the central question posed by Jewish Israeli Dharma 
activists. “Not even to us, but to me.  We want to create a safe space and gently insist 
on exposing this pain.”  Thus the individual again emerges the core of a world of 
meaning, this time based on ‘universal’ suffering which must be “ended or finished” 
while at the same time violence makes possible the very “safe space” of action. 
Yet within this world of self-reflection, greater understanding and reduced suffering, 
how does political action become manifest?  Yair describes “advanced practice” as a 
time in which the work of Dharma activists “extends,” importantly mirroring the 
principle of systemics outlined by Ronit and internalised by Yael, as all view security, 
stability and happiness as radiating outward from a core.  However, Yair admits that 
the “immature practice” in Israel focuses on “inner work”; as such, burgeoning 
initiatives seek to integrate self-cultivation with the wider context of conflict, which 
                                                                                                                                       
 
34 Precipitated by the October 1973 or Yom Kippur War, Gush Emunim [‘Bloc of the Faithful’] was a 
political religious nationalist movement which encouraged Jewish Israeli settlement of the Gaza Strip, 
West Bank and Golan Heights; see Shafir and Peled 2002: 159-183 and Shlaim 2010: 25-36.   
 
35 Interview in Jerusalem, 15 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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many identify as the root of their suffering.  From workshops with teenagers nearing 
military service to consciousness-raising meditation walks and solidarity actions in 
Palestinian villages, Dharma activist leaders attempt to bridge self and society, ‘me’ 
and ‘us.’  Yair recounted one long-term initiative thus: 
The New Age community is a group that you could say doesn’t have any 
political awareness, but for the last eight years there has been a ceremony 
commemorating Memorial Day, Independence Day and Nakba Day together.36   
The reason you don’t know about it is because it is initiated by New Age 
people.  At the start it was a Jewish renewal group that celebrated all the 
holidays.  A friend who belonged said, “We’re celebrating everything that 
happened here, but not Nakba Day – there are people here to whom that is 
important.”  It was a two-day event and the theme was ‘Together in pain, 
together in hope.’  The first day is Memorial Day – it’s about pain: the 
Holocaust and the Nakba story.  The second day is Independence Day – it’s 
about hope: how do we see a joint state or a joint way of living together? . . . 
But the New Age group doesn’t understand the political implications of what 
they’re doing.  Very healing things happen: Jews listen to Palestinians tell their 
story, they sympathise, and then the same thing happens in the opposite 
direction. . . .  The New Age group, their minds don’t go there, they’re happy 
with their personal moment of deep catharsis.  But I support it, of course.37 
Bringing together divergent national narratives beneath the banner of a single event, 
Yair and his fellow Dharma activists centralise suffering as a means of fostering 
connectivity across borders, formulating a sense of shared history and common future.  
Yet those practitioners who take part fail to move beyond “personal catharsis” even as 
the event ostensibly impels them to action – here individual happiness again supplants 
transformation on wider scales.   
Repeated in this world are the prevailing intersecting norms of race, class and gender, 
as indeed ‘us’ and ‘them’ remain the racialised categories of ‘Jew’ and ‘Palestinian,’ 
social class facilitates access to a spiritual practice requiring time and mobility, and 
the “safe space” for reflection and understanding appears feminised vis-à-vis the 
                                                
36 As conveyed in Chapter One, while Memorial Day and Independence Day are Jewish Israeli holidays 
marking the deaths of citizens (military and civilian) in conflict and the 1948 establishment of the State 
of Israel, respectively, Nakba Day is observed by Palestinians as the day of ‘catastrophe’ on which the 
Israeli state gained international recognition.  Memorial Day and Independence Day follow the Hebrew 
calendar, while Nakba Day is commemorated annually on 15 May; Memorial Day, Independence Day 
and Nakba Day commonly fall within the same week, only one week after Israeli commemoration of 
the Holocaust. 
 
37 Interview in Jerusalem, 15 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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assumed masculinity of violence and conflict.  Yet significantly, the central repetition 
underwriting this small world is the normative narrative of Zionism.  As Idith Zertal 
(2005: 3) writes, “Through a dialectical process of appropriation and exclusion, 
remembering and forgetting, Israeli society has defined itself in relation to the 
Holocaust: it regarded itself as both the heir to the victims and their accuser, atoning 
for their sins and redeeming their death.”  The terms of threat, persecution and 
transcendence resonate deeply with the suffering, pain and hope centralised by Jewish 
Israeli Dharma activists, as Nakba Day converges with commemoration of the 
Holocaust and celebration of Israel’s ‘independence.’38  Enmeshed with gender, class, 
race and the geopolitical location of Jerusalem – a nexus of diverse faiths positioned 
on a fault-line of history and ideology – Yair’s small world repeats the very narrative 
at the core of Jewish Israeli state and society, linking ‘me’ with ‘us’ in ways which 
halt at the boundaries of self and nation.  Here sympathy engenders not movement 
beyond the borders of collectivity, but guarantees trauma its position of primacy in 
worlds small and large. 
From this central ideological narrative emerge the norms repeated in differential 
worlds, spaces of escape and action bound with power and privilege.  These safe, 
feminised realms ostensibly free from the violence of ‘politics’ emerge those same 
sites where ‘whiteness’ takes shape through the masculinised and sexualised threat of 
‘Arab others,’ where class and urban environment enable the accumulation of 
‘sameness’ in constant need of protection.  At stake in the loss of these worlds, then, is 
less their sense of normalcy knowingly suspended between fantasy and reality, but the 
very selves and intimate relations at their centre, the systemics imagined to bind in 
both pain and hope. 
                                                
38 Joseph Massad (2006: 19) notes that the official document marking the foundation of Israel is 
entitled the ‘Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’ and was renamed the ‘Declaration 
of Independence’ only within popular discourse.  Massad pointedly argues that as Zionist settlers 
achieved statehood with the backing of imperial powers, their declaration of ‘independence’ stands as 
an attempt to recast the colonial establishment of the Israeli state as an anti-colonial struggle, ostensibly 
heralding a post-colonial era in Israel-Palestine.  So too Ronit Lentin (2000: 6) casts critical light on the 
claim to post-coloniality, if differentially so; Lentin writes,  
Zionism can . . . be seen as both a de-colonisation process (Jews freeing themselves from the 
Euro-Aryan yoke) and a re-colonisation process (in relation to the land of Israel and the 
indigenous Palestinians).  However, this call on post-coloniality does not sit comfortably with 
theories of diaspora: we must ask, in relation to the negation of the Jewish diaspora implied in 
narratives of the newly constructed Israeli nation, where does homeland begin and diaspora 
end. 
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The Liveable Life of Stasis 
Through fostering self and connectivity within differential spheres of meaning, 
influence and respite, the inhabitants of Jewish Israeli small worlds practice 
membership within micro imaginings of community while simultaneously ensuring 
belonging to the larger collective – a public importantly built upon the normative 
precarity of Zionism.  Importantly, this lack of stability creates the possibility of a 
world’s rematerialisation, of each day living out renewal and redemption as if a 
normative ‘ordinary life.’  Herein lies seeming potential for transformation.  While 
detailing the constitutive and pervasive qualities of normativity Judith Butler (1993: 2) 
writes, “That this reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialisation is never quite 
complete, that bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their 
materialisation is impelled.”  Raising the possibility that within iteration lay the seeds 
of resistance or subversion, the incomplete materialisation of worlds and the non-
compliance of bodies offer the hopeful interference, diffraction and interruption 
promised in Donna Haraway’s ‘elsewheres’ (1992).  However, when the central 
normative narrative around which selves and worlds coalesce relies on rupture and 
instability, what are the implications for transformation?   
As made visible through the accounts above, small worlds, their ruptures and repairs 
arise through a dynamic relationship between norms, not only those repeated but also 
those subverted, upending any assumptions about a mono-dimensional role of 
normativity in projects of world-building and world-maintenance.  When Ronit 
challenges the hegemonic gender roles which link Jewish Israeli men to 
action/defence and women to passivity/care, her very resistance becomes normative at 
the level of larger structure.  As Israel presents itself a ‘modern,’ ‘liberal’ and 
‘democratic’ state, feminist agendas paradoxically converge with patriarchal gender 
norms, fashioning particular kinds of Jewish Israeli women into markers of both 
tradition and modernity.  Ashkenazi, middle class, urban, secular and heterosexual, 
Ronit’s agential securitising actions signal resistance while at the same time repeating 
the claim that Israeli is like ‘anywhere else’ European or American (Lentin 2000: 200; 
Mendel 2013).  So too while Yael expands the scope of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to include 
hierarchies of belonging internal to Jewish Israeli society – challenging the narrative 
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of a single cleavage between Jews and Palestinians – her rejection of politics reaffirms 
the gendered norms linking men with the political and women with the domestic.  As 
Yair seeks to expand the systemics of his small world beyond self-cultivation and into 
political action, the work of Dharma activism breaks against the boundaries of self 
and nation, reproducing the normative narrative of Zionism.  Here, actions which 
subvert and destabilise also reinforce, becoming normative within wider frames of 
reference – ruptures indeed catalyse repairs. 
Unable to completely decouple from political realities, categories and actors, the 
construction of small worlds then remains bound with the norms and relations which 
deem particular lives ‘liveable’ and ‘thinkable’ (Butler 1993: 8-9; Butler 2004) – the 
contours of ‘I’ and ‘we,’ of ‘me’ and ‘us.’  These realms importantly complicate the 
optimism shown by both Butler (1993) and Haraway (1992) as small worlds 
demonstrate how instability might stabilise, violence might securitise and subversion 
might normalise, all within the frame of the nation.  Thus ‘ordinary life’ emerges a 
practice bound within particular structural boundaries, as acts of ostensible freedom – 
escape and action – articulate within wider material and political realities.39  Change 
may indeed be pursued to ensure the sanctity, security and stability of always-insecure 
and unstable small worlds, their senses of normalcy and the liveable lives of their 
inhabitants.  However, these actions supplant steps to be taken on larger scales, as 
existing political realities and historical narratives together produce the conditions for 
cherished worlds of constancy.   
With its core tightly bound with conflict and violence, normalcy in these small worlds 
remains fantastic and aspirational, an object of desire which, though seemingly 
tangible and achievable, remains ultimately beyond reach.  Then normalcy as it is 
imagined and performed within these realms – intimate, dependable and fulfilling – 
reflects a desire for the condition of stasis, for shaking free of continual reinvention 
and reconstitution, its fantasy indeed “[…] a form of bargaining with what is 
overwhelming about the present” (Berlant 2007: 291-292).  Gender enters deeply into 
these bargains, impacting world-making and life-building in its normative capacities, 
simultaneously constituting an aspect of subjectivity and a relation of power which 
                                                
39 For a superb discussion of the relationship between practice and structure see Timothy Mitchell’s 
(1990) critique of James C. Scott’s (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant 
Resistance; see bibliography. 
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frames, structures and organises diverse sites of normalisation and regulation.  This 
very pervasive quality of gender – operating on levels micro, meso and macro – binds 
intimacy with politics, public with private, and sanctuary with violence in the 
formation of subjects and collectivities.  In this, explicitly gendered norms generated 
within Jewish Israeli society shape carefully built small worlds through dynamics of 
rupture and repair.  Constructed ‘against’ the fragmentation borne of liberalism, 
insecurity borne of conflict, and aggression borne of politics, hegemonic patterns of 
gender provide the very sense of constancy and stability imagined to underwrite 
normality; at the same time, gender roles, codes, norms and relations reaffirm the 
precarity of Zionism, ultimately making possible the continuation of conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
Occurring interpersonally on micro levels, ruptures and repairs appear to ensure 
smooth function or lack of disruption in larger scenes of normality.  We may all sit 
happily sipping cappuccinos here or there, aware of the surrounding tensions – even 
casting them as regrettably ordinary with resigned shaking of heads – and through the 
repetition of normalcy we become less likely to say or do anything which might 
puncture the bubble of our present world (Cohen 2001: 52); in this, we assent to 
domination.  Yet even as we sip tea beneath a clementine tree looking out to the hills 
from garden sanctuary, we experience how world-maintenance – seeming stasis – may 
be physically and emotionally ‘tiring’ in its guise of passivity. 
As this sense of normality socially produced and maintained by Jewish Israelis 
articulates clearly in the public domain, it importantly takes root within the private, 
bridging the ostensible gaps between nation, state and self through the institution of 
family.  Here gender emerges not only “a structure of social relations” (Connell 2002: 
10) but acts to structure those very relations and the resulting political realities in 
complex and at times contradictory ways.  As Jewish Israeli women mark the 
boundary between tradition and modernity, they become the primary producers and 
guardians of normality in sites of intimate politics; as daughters fulfil the duty of 
military service they may cause ‘less worry’ than sons, yet introduce occupation and 
violence into the home in ways perhaps more penetrating.  These shifting norms, 
codes, roles and relations ensure that the desired ‘normal’ necessarily remains 
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aspirational as, following Zionist narratives, Jewish Israeli normalcy requires constant 
hardship, pursuit and transcendence.  As mechanisms effectively mask this 
dependency upon rupture and violence, the family emerges as much a regime of 
regulation (Ong 1999) and source of domination as a site of felt security and intimacy, 
equally an indicator of power and a locus of belonging.  
Rooted in the primacy of belonging and the tension between reality and aspiration, 
small worlds and micro environments arise as modes of ‘escape from’ and ‘resistance 
to’ wider political realities.  Offering normativity, security and forums for action 
inclusive of resistance, small worlds come to constitute microcosms of normality, an 
‘inside’ of seeming dependability, security and belonging made possible through the 
perpetuation of conflict ‘outside.’  Structured through the interplay of gendered norms 
performed and subverted, small worlds constitute the fabric through which individual 
and collective ‘simple lives’ might materialise; critically, at stake in the loss of these 
worlds are the very selves and relational communities at their centre.  While joking, 
bypassing, unseeing and silencing function to maintain and repair normality within 
these worlds and family units, the necessarily interpersonal dimension of these 
mechanisms importantly reminds us of who we are and what binds us together.  More 
precious than the fostered sense of normalcy consciously acknowledged by many as 
fleeting and unreal, micro environments offer the moral consistency, meaningful 
participation and realms of optimism and hope through which individuals may 
recognise themselves as ‘good’ and just.  Investment in small worlds thus extends 
beyond the active cognitive and material work required to stage ‘everyday life’ 
against the backdrop of conflict; rather, here one belongs to a moral community, 
formed not reactively but pro-actively, reflective of ideal selves who together invest in 
the present moment.  These small words exist not as the choice between utopian and 
eupsychic visions of the world around us – the former centred on an ideal social order 
and the latter concerned with an internal psychic order (Cohen and Taylor 1992: 14) – 
but as an integration of self and community, micro and ostensibly macro, in which the 
site matters less than its sustaining bonds.   
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Chapter Four 
Embedded (In)Action – Ma La’asot? [What Can We Do?] 
Standing at the fence line, a landscape of browns and greys spreads out before me 
from my position atop the hill, the wind blowing through my hair just as I had 
imagined.  When first I decided to join in the olive harvest with Rabbis for Human 
Rights, I pictured myself in the hills near Nablus – then unseen by me – amidst a 
grove of olive trees, labouring with volunteers and villagers as the shadowy presence 
of settlers and soldiers haunted the slope below.  However, a call from the 
organisation on the day before the harvest set me straight, bringing into focus a 
different image as I heard that we would be going not to Nablus, but to the area of 
Jayyus; near to the Green Line, we would be harvesting in a ‘buffer zone’ of sorts, 
positioned between the village and the fence with its military patrols and promise of 
violence.  According to the woman on the end of the line, we would be helping a 
widow and her two young sons to bring in their harvest for processing, a feat 
impossible for them alone in their relative ages and small number.  Less romantic than 
the thought of myself among gnarled trees high above the valleys of the West Bank, I 
adjusted my expectations to a barren dust track, turnstile gates and patrolling soldiers 
whose latent violence threatened the widow and her children.  Slightly more nervous 
than before, I slept little that night particularly as a relative expressed her shock upon 
hearing my plans for the next day: “This is not an ordinary thing for people to do, you 
understand?”  Flushed with the excitement of transgression, on harvest day I was 
surprised to find that our ultimate destination would not be Jayyus but a site behind 
Qalqilya, technically across the Green Line yet on the ‘Israeli side’ of the fence.   
Bumping along dirt roads in a minibus peopled with retirement-aged Jewish Israelis 
and international activists, our leader – a female rabbi – briefed us on violence and 
how to position our bodies between Palestinian harvesters and the military or settlers – 
our task was explicitly to “act as a buffer,” not solely to harvest olives as I had 
imagined.  Previously unaware that this was part of the ‘job,’ I felt a creeping anxiety 
as we came to a stop seemingly in the middle of nowhere; the Palestinian driver 
kindly instructed us to disembark and wait for our contact who would lead us to the 
harvest site.  A quick look around revealed no Palestinian villages, inhabitants or olive 
trees.  I was confused.  The only recognisable sight meeting the eye was a Jewish 
Israeli settlement which seemingly oozed over the sloping hillside above us, red roofs 
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and orderly streets enclosed within a formidable perimeter fence.  After a time we 
were indeed met by our ‘contact,’ two Palestinian boys no more than ten years old, 
who turned and led us up the dirt track toward the settlement – could this be right?  
Along the path other harvesters worked in the valley: small groups of Palestinian 
women and children with sticks, mules and carts, some singing as they whacked the 
olive branches, others resting beneath shade in the growing heat of morning.  Coming 
to a stop at the fence – now it was certain that we would be harvesting inside the 
settlement – my sense of the surreal grew upon learning that we must wait for the 
armed settlement guards to allow us entry.  After more than twenty minutes and 
numerous phone calls to parties inside the settlement, two men appeared in a large 
truck with black guns slung over their shoulders, their bright white smiles shining 
with benevolence.  They bid us entry along with a group of university students and the 
small number of Palestinian harvesters who had joined our retinue, slowly making 
note of passport numbers on a pad of legal paper.  Amidst the activists in the queue, 
the Palestinian women remained silent as their children practiced English and the 
single Palestinian man present revealed that these were his trees we planned to harvest 
– not a widow with two small children, but a male filmmaker with property in 
Ramallah.  Things were not at all what they had seemed. 
The harvest proceeded with volunteers picking by hand and rake, while the Palestinian 
children and women used long sticks to reach the higher branches with force.  “The 
Palestinian methods are backward and primitive, but we are their guests so we do it 
like they do, even if we can think of a better way,” our rabbi leader told me as we 
moved slowly among the twenty trees which sat directly behind a row of red-roofed 
houses, the area littered with garbage thrown over private fences.  If I climbed even 
one meter into a tree I could see over the fences and into the lives of these settlers, 
their yards manicured and adorned with lawn chairs, children’s bicycles and brightly 
coloured slides and swingsets.  Turning my head 180 degrees my eyes met another 
fence, that of the perimeter behind the patrol road.  Slowly, slowly we worked, with 
many volunteers taking breaks to practice Arabic and commiserate – why weren’t we 
rushing?  As it was Shabbat, we needed to leave by early afternoon in order for those 
observing the Sabbath to be home by sunset.  I asked about our unhurried pace and 
received an answer that really this harvest allowed the Palestinians with us “to feel 
good,” that some measure of accomplishment came from merely tending the trees.  In 
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truth it seemed more symbolic: the filmmaker and his family had been denied access 
to the trees for at least three years and did not expect to make much of the actual 
olives, yet our presence and actions were a means of articulating a claim to the land.  
Perhaps this desire to “feel good” more accurately applied to the volunteers and 
settlement guards than it did to our fellow harvesters.  A short time later we broke for 
a lunch of hot tea, breads, dips, cheeses and vegetables prepared by the Palestinian 
women; many volunteers would not re-commence work that day.   
During the meal I sat on the periphery of the group, watching a competition of who-
knows-more-Arabic or who’s-the-most-familiar-with-Palestinians unfold among 
volunteers, feeling disappointed and perplexed though I understood the symbolic 
value of our presence among the trees in the settlement.  Eventually, we began to 
gather our belongings before returning to the waiting minibus and I decided to walk 
alone for a moment, following the patrol road uphill toward our entry and exit point.  
Here I found my ‘lookout’; the desired wind indeed moved my hair as the warm sun 
and dust slowed the day to a crawl.  I closed my eyes in an effort to just be, to imagine 
my original fantasy, and instead found myself becoming aware of a loud, rhythmic 
pounding.  Opening my eyes and turning my head, I matched sound with image as a 
nearby construction site promised a bloom of new red roofs, private yards and orderly 
streets atop the neighbouring hill.  Only days earlier the construction ban in the 
settlements had expired, and clearly no time would be wasted.  I turned back to the 
vista, this time with my eyes open, taking in exactly what I was doing, where it was 
being done and under which circumstances, feeling much less the resistance and 
resistor of my imagination.1 
Outside yet glaringly inside, my participation in the olive harvest with Rabbis for 
Human Rights brought multiple limits and layers of power into focus.  East of 
Qalqilya yet somehow still within Israel, inside a Palestinian olive grove yet enclosed 
by a settlement, transgressing the borders of what people do yet requiring permission 
from security guards – could my act honestly be framed as resistance?  In this context, 
the interplay between limits and transgression emerges a matter of complexity, as 
seemingly oppositional elements remain dependent upon one another for definition.  
As Michel Foucault (2003 [1963]: 446) writes:  
                                                
1 Field notes, 4-5 November 2010. 
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Transgression carries the limit right to the limit of its being; transgression 
forces the limit to face the fact of its immanent disappearance, to find itself in 
what it excludes (perhaps, to be more exact, to recognise itself for the first 
time), to experience its positive truth in its downward fall.  And yet, toward 
what is transgression unleashed in its movement of pure violence, if not that 
which imprisons it, toward the limit and those elements it contains? 
Following Foucault, limits and transgression contain one another, inseparable as their 
exercise in part becomes possible through the continued existence of purported 
antithesis.  As the realisation of that which is – or those who are – excluded makes 
possible the “positive truth” of limits, so too transgression relies upon a standard of 
ordinary things people do; ultimately, a given order arises through the presence of 
both.   
Just as I stood inside the settlement fence line considering its multiple boundaries as 
the hammering of renewed expansion rang out over my act of resistance, layers of 
power shape decisions around action and inaction in Israel-Palestine, binding the two 
together.  As transgression indeed makes visible the limits of a particular order 
(Foucault 2003 [1963] cited in Fadil 2009: 440), actions taken and withheld may be 
cast as indicators of embeddedness, revealing the overlayering and production of 
power within a given context (Abu-Lughod 1990).  In response to the query ‘Ma 
la’asot?’ [What can we do?], this chapter illustrates the multiple means through which 
individuals actually do, the ways they take action with regard to occupation and 
discrimination through modes of resistance and transgression.  In doing so, not only 
do limits informing oppositional political action in Israel-Palestine become visible, but 
also the ways in which the very boundaries produced by transgression generate 
inaction in explicitly gendered terms.  Moving from forms of ‘everyday resistance’ 
differentially practiced by Jewish Israeli women and men, to the consequences of 
normalised feminist and ‘feminised’ anti-occupation activism, to the ways in which 
radical protests meet the threat of routinisation with shifting rules and codes, this 
chapter reveals a continuum linking political action and inaction among Jewish 
Israelis. 
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Everyday Conflict, Everyday Resistance 
Framed by a ‘sense of’ normalcy, everyday actions taken by Jewish Israelis occur 
within an approximation of the ordinary which remains predicated on keeping out 
wider political realities while intimately constructed through their continued presence.  
The task of this chapter is not to judge or evaluate modes of action, to assign labels of 
‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘effective’ or ‘ineffective,’ but in part to think around the economy 
and effects of diverse forms of activism – what they do in frames wider than 
individual everyday lives in the context of Israel-Palestine.  No longer an ‘event’ in 
the sense of “a drama which shocks being into radically open situations” (Badiou 
1999 cited in Berlant 2011: 5), Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories has 
become a ‘situation,’ “a state of things in which something that will perhaps matter is 
unfolding amid the usual activity of life” (Berlant 2011: 5).  Overlapping with and 
sometimes productive of the event’s staccato punctuation – those necessary moments 
of rupture – the situation exists “a state of animated and animating suspension” 
(Berlant 2011: 5), at once resonant with the precarity of constructed normalcy 
explored in the preceding chapters.  Here, resistance becomes framed by routinisation 
– absorption of the extraordinary within the everyday or translation of rupture into 
habit (Allen 2008) – which permits of action, reinforcing the extant order in part 
through hegemonic patterns of gender. 
Even as resistance becomes routine, for many Jewish Israelis the everyday remains a 
site of meaningful action – “You have to consider people like my cousin who refuses 
to drive over the Green Line,” I was told by a friend as we sat discussing my project 
during the early days of fieldwork.  For months I too understood myself to be 
undertaking acts of “everyday resistance” in correspondence with scholarship by 
James C. Scott (1985), Diane Singerman (1995) and Asef Bayat (1997), as part of a 
“prosaic but constant struggle” often comprised of  “passive noncompliance, subtle 
sabotage, evasion, and deception” (Scott 1985: 29, 31).  In the name of resistance, I 
refused to travel Route 443 through the occupied West Bank – a ‘short cut’ from 
Jerusalem to Tel Aviv – but upon travelling the highway in a shared taxi I realised 
how my boycotting of this road actually melded with a rejection of sight, experience 
and knowledge, as the spaces and places of de jure and de facto occupation were 
obscured through my own design.  
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Far from uncommon among politically Leftist Jewish Israelis, everyday resistance 
unfolds across a diverse range of actions and positions, as “non-activists,” “would-be 
activists,” “should-be activists,” “couch activists,” “passive activists,” “one-eighth” or 
“one-quarter activists,” “office activists,” “radical activists” and “former activists” 
practice multiply innovative modes of everyday political action.2  Here, what we can 
do is constantly articulated and performed in the everyday, in terms both positive and 
negative – through doing and not doing.  Yet as each account of everyday political 
action and resistance takes shape through the limits of a given order, it also becomes 
implicated in the production of differential modes of power.  In a manner reflective of 
Lila Abu-Lughod’s (1990) work on power and resistance, here embeddedness 
importantly frames oppositional action, as an act of resistance against a particular 
relation of power potentially reconstitutes a differential or wider relation.  In her 
scholarship, Abu-Lughod (1990: 42) importantly urges anthropologists to invert 
Foucault’s (1998 [1978]: 95-96) dictum “Where there is power, there is resistance,” 
instead looking to “[…] signs of human freedom… to tell us more about forms of 
power and how people are caught up in them.”  In doing so, the many acts of everyday 
resistance practiced by Jewish Israelis emerge as underwritten by and reproductive of 
hegemonic patterns of gender, which importantly reflect the differential registers for 
action available to women and men.  Here resistance indeed diagnoses power as 
gender norms shape the sites and content of action, reaffirming dominant orders while 
simultaneously permitting of subversion.  Thus the multiplicity of domination – its 
constitution through overlapping and at times contradictory relations of power – 
becomes visible across diverse sites importantly including home and labour, those 
spaces and practices from Chapter Two so central to the division and entanglement of 
Israel-Palestine. 
Resistance at Home  
As seen in the preceding chapter, the intimate space of the domestic remains central to 
understandings and experiences of politics; in this, so too ‘home’ – with its security 
and belonging – might become a site of resistance.  For Boaz, a long-time 
Jerusalemite living in the Beit HaKerem neighbourhood, home is a physical space 
accompanied by relations of ownership and autonomy: 
                                                
2 The categories listed here emerged throughout the process of interviews in Tel Aviv and West 
Jerusalem, as participants offered self-assessed labels to describe their degrees of political action. 
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Living here, being part of the society, I feel that I cooperate with the 
occupation whether I like it or not.  I evade taxes for the most part.  Here it’s 
moral, in this situation.  I evade taxes by not working – I don’t bring a benefit 
to society and I don’t pay much tax.  It’s also because I’m lazy.  But it’s a 
resistance!  I don’t feel that I fit in with society.  Also I’m not married and I 
don’t have a family – also maybe this is resistance.   
Conveying awareness of his own embeddedness in wider political realities – “I 
cooperate with the occupation whether I like it or not” – Boaz describes a mode of 
oppositional everyday action which targets the economic foundations of the Israeli 
state: his refusal to pay taxes constitutes an explicit act of resistance.  Yet as Boaz 
articulates and practices opposition, he simultaneously declares a fondness for 
capitalism, ‘surviving’ on the rental income generated by the multi-unit building 
which he owns and lives in.  “Now let me tell you about the renter who was smoking 
on the bench over there,” Boaz said later as he motioned toward where an older man 
had been sitting quietly on the edge of the garden, a lush green space with chestnut 
trees transplanted from the Golan Heights.  “He’s a Palestinian from the north, from 
1948.  Being a Palestinian looking to live in West Jerusalem is not so fun.  He works 
as an economist in the budgeting department at Hebrew University – he’s been there 
for years.  To me, he has a regular paycheck.  That’s the only thing I look for.”3   
Here, resistance in the space of the home indeed diagnoses power, as Boaz protests 
Israel’s occupation and state policies in explicitly capitalist terms while reaffirming 
the logics of neoliberalism – individualism, profit, privatisation – which underwrite 
the status quo.  This layering of power ultimately produces in Boaz a sense of 
benevolence as he accepts ‘a regular paycheck’ from a Palestinian lodger, an act 
morally consistent with his participation in East Jerusalem protests even as it 
summarily elides its own politics of capital gain.  Not without significance is the way 
in which Boaz relates his act of protest and egalitarian ideals to marital status and 
(hetero)normativity – as a single Ashkenazi man these registers of resistance are 
available to Boaz, providing him with both an expression of political voice and a 
source of financial profit.  Indeed, after our interview Boaz admitted that he will need 
to amend his present lifestyle if he begins a family in the future: “There will be more 
money going out in expenses and I’ll have to expand the flat – this means less rental 
                                                
3 Interview in Jerusalem, 17 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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income coming in.  In the end, I will have to work.”  Thus Boaz acknowledges that his 
resistance through withholding tax and providing accommodation is necessarily 
ephemeral, as when he shifts to a normative lifestyle – moving to  “fit in with society” 
– both will cease. 
Yet as Boaz invokes the normativity of the family unit assumed to be heterosexual 
and nuclear, it should not be taken as given; rather, alternative formations reveal 
further ways in which everyday resistance becomes caught up in power.  Also single, 
Ashkenazi and a property owner near Jerusalem, Ronit’s practices of everyday 
resistance reflect further upon home as a site of resistance, here a space of intimacy 
whose garden gave rise to a description of normalcy imagined, pursued and protected 
in Chapter Three.  As a single mother, prior to moving to Mevasseret-Zion Ronit lived 
in French Hill, a settlement de jure though de facto a Jewish Israeli neighbourhood 
conveniently located adjacent to the nearby university.  For Ronit, living in French 
Hill was an explicitly political act: 
I looked in many Jerusalem neighbourhoods, but I liked so much French Hill.  
At the time I was very ideological about peace and living in a mixed 
neighbourhood attracted me.  So I decided to buy a small apartment with three 
bedrooms and I took a mortgage.  My living room and bedroom windows 
faced the desert and the Dead Sea, the hills of Jordan.  The road below my 
windows went to the Dead Sea and the desert – it was very pleasant.  I was 
very happy at that time period. . . .  After, in 2000, I had Maya …  We were 
very happy, we had cats.  
Then started the intifada.  It was so tough – it’s because of this that I’m telling 
you about Maya.  When there was no nanny… the nanny didn’t have a car so 
they would walk home, carrying a cell phone.  The kindergarten was a square 
building, facing the road with five classes – there were 150 kids in the 
kindergarten.  It was nice, there were different ages and classes.  When I went 
to pick up Maya [one day], everything was curtained, closed and dark.  There 
was no music.  Normally it was a loud place, open with lots of music.  The 
guard also wasn’t there – you must knock and then the guard walks toward the 
gate from inside the building.  He tells me that they heard from the army that 
there are terrorists moving around the neighbourhood, and one of their aims is 
to kidnap little children from the kindergarten…  I don’t know how I didn’t 
run away.4 
                                                
4 Interview in Mevasseret-Zion, 20 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Ending on a familiar note of perseverance, an ordinary act of resistance is again 
embedded in multiple layers of power as Ronit recounts living in a “mixed” 
neighbourhood, in fact a Jewish Israeli settlement beyond the Green Line.  Surveying 
the Dead Sea and the Occupied Palestinian Territory bisected by the road below, from 
her vantage point in French Hill Ronit experiences the satisfaction of resistance 
without explicitly acknowledging the politics engaged and elided by her actions.  With 
the arrival of her daughter, Maya, Ronit’s everyday oppositional act – living among 
‘others’ – is revealed to be fleeting, as her experiences and understandings of 
coexistence reaffirm racialised constructions of threat.  Here home becomes a site of 
both security and precarity, at once the safe space to which Maya returns and the 
seemingly sole place of stability amidst a sea of danger.  In this space Ronit acts to 
both nurture and protect, as recounted in the previous chapter, upending gender norms 
as a woman raising her daughter alone.  Yet as Ronit doubly resisted power in her 
daily life in French Hill – attempting to practice coexistence as a single mother – her 
experience reproduced hegemonic norms and narratives, as a daughter in need of 
protection is ultimately ferried to the heights of Mevasseret-Zion where violence 
seemingly cannot shatter the music of childhood and the sanctity of home. 
Thus home differentially provides a site of everyday resistance struck through by 
contradiction, even as it produces and reflects modes of normativity.  Through their 
narratives, both Boaz and Ronit make visible multiple forms of opposition which 
overlap while seemingly standing in tension.  To date, neither conforms to the 
gendered national norms which centralise family in its nuclear constellation as man, 
woman and (multiple) children; Boaz remains single and Ronit raises her daughter 
alone.  Yet in their non-normative lifestyles, both reproduce gendered hegemonic 
norms through their chosen registers of opposition – on a readily discernable level 
Boaz performs masculinised authority and wage earning, while Ronit affirms 
mothering and feminised vulnerability.  Importantly, this performance, affirmation 
and reproduction remain complex processes at the levels of subjectivity and sociality.  
Indeed, while Boaz might perform aspects of hegemonic masculinity, his non-
normative lifestyle and activism imply a kind of social marginality; so too Ronit might 
affirm hegemonic roles associated with Jewish Israeli women, while at the same time 
providing the sole income and protection for her family.  Thus as hegemonic patterns 
of gender shape everyday acts of resistance within the home, prevailing norms, roles, 
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codes and relations may be simultaneously contested and confirmed.  Ultimately, 
however, each narrative concludes on a note of normativity, signalling that here 
resistance in part reconstitutes power through gendered, classed and racialised social 
relations. 
Resistance through Labour 
Beyond the intimate spaces of home and family, Jewish Israeli resistance becomes 
sewn into the fabric of everyday life though labour as employment practices create 
opportunities for contact and exchange, as detailed in Chapter Two.  Again, here 
patterns of gender intersect with modes of everyday resistance to shape and reveal 
embeddedness in power.  Upon beginning our interview in a Tel Aviv restaurant, 
Dana, a 32 year-old occupational therapist, conveyed doubt that she would be able to 
assist with my research as she feels herself politically “avoidant.”  However, 
throughout the course of our exchange Dana demonstrated how political awareness 
and engagement extend beyond reading newspapers, watching television broadcasts or 
listening to radio programmes, facilitating modes of everyday resistance: 
I work with Palestinians, you know.  I work as an occupational therapist at the 
hospital in Tel Aviv, with children who have cancer and have to stay in the 
hospital.  There is a whole floor of Palestinian kids from Gaza – a whole floor.  
This is the only way that I can be a pacifist, the only way that I can think of 
myself as contributing to the conflict.  I’m learning Arabic, ‘shwaya, shwaya’ 
[Arabic: slowly, slowly].  But I don’t feel the conflict with them.  
KN: How do you mean?   
Dana: My boss has to do a presentation about this floor at a meeting now that 
more people are finding out about the Palestinian kids there – they want him to 
talk about what ‘dilemmas’ we face working with Palestinians, how we get 
along, etc.  But I don’t feel the conflict, although there are lots of other issues.  
There is no stress, no expression of it.  The other issues are medical, mostly – 
about treating the children.  Will they die if they are sent home to those 
conditions, we can’t get their medical histories, it’s difficult to communicate, 
cultural differences, their families have no means, no resources.  These are 
medical issues.  
KN: So is this a way that you feel you can be proactive about the conflict? 
Dana: No, it’s not proactive.  But treating them as equal, really trying to learn 
Arabic. . . .  This is the only thing I get being peaceful – I judge them as a 
person, no less.   
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I also learn things about their society, things that make me question their 
behaviour.  Before working with the children at the hospital I definitely would 
have said “It’s all our fault” or “What options do 18 year-old boys in Gaza 
have besides terrorism, becoming a terrorist?  I would probably do the same in 
that situation.”  But I had a Palestinian friend, he’s from the West Bank, and 
he would sometimes blame Israel for everything.  Everything!  Like family 
pressure, and they had means – they weren’t rich, but they had means – and 
narrowed options.  There is no argument about his position in life and the fact 
that Israel has something to do with it, but it’s not all Israel’s fault.  I have 
pressure from my mother to be responsible, to have a family and a job, and it’s 
not to do with the conflict.  He would transfer everything to the conflict.  But it 
also has to do with the conflicts you have in life – yes, you have fewer options 
than us but also you have to take responsibility for growing older.5   
Recounted at length here, Dana’s narrative is remarkable for its self-reflexivity, 
honesty and clarity as she articulates the multiple layers of power in which her work 
unfolds.  Framed by her pacifism and desire to act or “contribute to [ending] the 
conflict,” Dana’s account sheds light upon the ways in which considerations of social 
class, race, religiosity, physical ability and geopolitical location inform her provision 
of service to Palestinian patients from Gaza.  Here resistance emerges not only in 
terms of providing care and learning Arabic in order to overcome technical obstacles 
to her work, but also as learning to treat these patients as equal – “as a person, no less.”  
Yet as this egalitarian practice enables Dana to practice resistance, so too it grants an 
unexpected sort of clarity and a shift away from radical politics.  Through “learning 
about their society,” Dana arrives at a more politically centrist position which 
moderates her perception of how occupation, colonisation, blockade and domination 
impact the lives of her Palestinian patients and friends.  Thus her everyday resistance 
– practiced literally each working day – gives rise to a political sentiment aligned with 
the logics of the status quo. 
In recounting his experiences as a social worker in Jerusalem’s lower-income 
neighbourhoods, 35 year-old Gil echoed how a shift to political conservatism may be 
made possible through labour-based encounters, if differentially so.  In his work with 
‘at-risk’ Jewish Israeli adolescent boys, Gil spends increasing amounts of time in the 
neighbourhoods of south Jerusalem, an area in which he includes Gilo despite its 
status as an illegal settlement overlooking Bethlehem.  As Gil related:  
                                                
5 Interview in Tel Aviv, 17 January 2010; handwritten notes. 
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It was always because of this thing, of oppressed people and groups, that I was 
always very Left-wing, but in the process of the last few years of life… I’m 
getting to understand other opinions as well.  Right-wing politics – I’m not 
talking about economics here – I’m getting to understand their concerns.  The 
fears, the complex situation, the need for security.   
KN: How?  Because of the families you work with?  Are they more 
conservative? 
Gil: Not because of work and those communities.  Because I’m getting more 
involved in society – my opinions are getting more based on reality, not on a 
basic idea of oppressed and oppressors.  I feel it is happening with my friends 
too.  It also comes with age, you get to see a more complex view.  Specifically 
for me, because I felt in a way oppressed, in a way pushed away from society 
– how do you say ‘Leshatef peula’?  ‘Cooperate.’  I used to go with this, 
seclude myself from society.  In the last few years, especially since I started 
with social work, started working… I felt in a way that society was fucked up, 
I didn’t want to deal with it – society was fucked up and I didn’t want a 
connection with it, I didn’t want to deal with it.  In the last years I am involved 
more with society, I get to understand the complexity.  I understand that I have 
to influence in a limited way – I have to.  It’s not worth it to stand on the 
side… even though it’s not perfect and it isn’t going to be.  So it comes from 
more involvement in society.  I didn’t go to the army, I was doing my stuff, 
music.  Jobs were just things that interested me, jobs didn’t influence.  In a 
way they do [influence] because I always liked art – it’s a more abstract, free 
way of influencing, of being part.  I’m trying to be involved in more concrete 
ways.6 
This narrative appears internally contradictory, as Gil rejects work as the reason for 
his shift in political opinion while simultaneously detailing the ways in which his job 
as a social worker provides an avenue of awareness, resistance and importantly 
influence.  Here, experiences of encounter and subsequent understandings emerge not 
from exchanges with Palestinians, but from meeting Jewish Israelis who possess scant 
access to social, economic and political capital.  Like Dana, Gil sees his work as 
everyday resistance, this time providing a means of acting against the prevailing 
relations of power which shape privilege and belonging within Jewish Israeli society; 
yet so too these ordinary oppositional actions remain embedded in wider realties, 
including relations of domination.  Indeed, through resistance Gil comes to understand 
the complexity, fears and security which drive more conservative politics than his own, 
                                                
6 Interview in Jerusalem, 13 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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effectively moving to centre as he draws closer to the society from which he felt 
previously estranged. 
Within these narratives of resistance based in labour practices, patterns of gender 
again shape and reflect the differential registers available to women and men.  Both 
Dana and Gil work in trades associated with care-taking – an ostensibly feminine or 
feminised role – and articulate a shift from stances described as more radically 
political to “understanding”; in keeping with the gender norms which frame Jewish 
Israeli society, this might be perceived as process of feminisation even as it conveys a 
kind of gender equity.  However, the actions, resistance and seemingly paradoxical 
complicity of Dana and Gil must be read through the intersection of norms and 
hierarchies.  Here Dana relates her understanding of responsibility – something she 
admits to personally struggling with – to acceding to normative pressures including 
the drive for family and reproduction, which seemingly equalises the life experiences 
of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians.  For Dana, these imperatives are divorced from 
their wider context of conflict and occupation – all men and women are subject to 
family pressures, purely as a matter of “growing older.”  In Dana’s eyes, what she 
negotiates as a young Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli woman should be met similarly by a 
young Palestinian man from the West Bank, nothing more and nothing less.  For Gil, 
resistance enables proximity to a society from which he has felt rejected as both a 
Mizrahi Jew and an artist.  In terms of gendered normativity, Gil’s non-normative 
masculinity is implied by his avoidance of mandatory military service, that ‘man-
making’ process ostensibly experienced by all Jewish Israelis.  This vector of 
difference intersects with Gil’s Iranian ethnicity, producing in him the impulse to “go 
along” with his own marginalisation, which simultaneously yielded Gil’s formerly 
radical politics and disengagement.  Refusing to cooperate in his own oppression and 
resisting the hierarchies of power and privilege which shape Jewish Israeli society, Gil 
chooses a register of action in which he might have more influence as a non-
conformist in gendered, political and ethnic terms, ultimately coming closer to the 
hegemonic group.  As made visible by both Dana and Gil, through labour hegemonic 
patterns again shape action and everyday resistance in complex and at times 
contradictory ways, ultimately bolstering the status quo and entrenching multiple 
layers of domination. 
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Structures of Practice 
As considered here, accounts of everyday action and resistance demonstrate the extent 
to which acts occur not in isolation, but within the wider context of ‘living on’ in 
conditions of conflict; when appraised through intersecting relations of power, 
meanings become destabilised despite the actors’ original intentions.  Then how do 
these acts positive and negative – doing and not doing – add up?  This query does not 
imply that actions taken or withheld are collectively futile, nor that individuals are 
victims of false consciousness; rather it directs attention to economy, how these acts 
combine and what they do together.  Embedding resistance in capitalist accumulation, 
illegal settlements and conservative politics – here everyday oppositional action 
becomes implicated in wider matrices of power.  While individually these actions 
might resist the “lateral agency” involved in the creation of the small worlds – 
attempting to counter “a mode of coasting consciousness within the ordinary” (Berlant 
2011: 18) – they also provide those moments of interruption which remain integral to 
the stabilisation of normality, as argued in Chapter Three.  Thus oppositional action 
may actually fortify relations of power which lie beyond those targeted through 
resistance.  In this manner, actions against occupation, injustice and discrimination 
become enmeshed with neoliberal capitalism, nationalism and political conservatism, 
all integral aspects of contemporary Zionism which shape not only ‘conflict,’ but also 
hegemonic patterns of gender.   
As such, what first appears as contradictory or hypocritical within the narratives 
recounted above becomes an matter of consistency, linking exchanges and 
experiences through the wider practices, norms and ideologies shaping Jewish Israeli 
society.  Here those forms of political action often deemed most accessible and least 
incendiary – everyday acts of resistance – serve to diagnose power, as enlarging the 
frame of reference indeed reveals how “[…] resisting at one level may catch people 
up at other levels” (Abu-Lughod 1990: 53).  As depicted in the passages above, these 
specific actions not only provide necessary ruptures of normalcy on micro levels and 
recreate the precarity essential to a state of suspension, but also they bolster hegemony.  
As highlighted by Timothy Mitchell (1990: 553), “Hegemony, in Gramsci’s writings, 
refers to non-violent forms of control exercised through the whole range of dominant 
cultural institutions and social practices, from schooling, museums, and political 
parties to religious practice, architectural forms, and the mass media.”  Through the 
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accounts of Boaz, Ronit, Dana and Gil, gender emerges as central to those practices 
and processes which secure hegemony even through resistance, intersecting with 
vectors and relations of power in everyday life.  Here the roles respectively ascribed to 
women and men in Jewish Israeli society importantly shape modes of resistance and 
action, along with expressions of political voice.  However, hegemonic patterns of 
gender necessarily retain a degree of dynamism, adapting to changing relations of 
power.  In this, the role of (Ashkenazi) woman-as-mother sits easily with mother-as-
earner, as both differentially reproduce the prevailing national narrative.  So too a 
Mizrahi man who refused mandatory military service might increasingly identify with 
the role of man-as-protector, reaffirming the very construction of masculinity from 
which he felt excluded.  Together these textures point to a diverse range of gender 
roles, norms, codes and relations which in part determine registers for action.7  
Yet as everyday resistance makes visible complexity and contradiction, these actions 
are not a matter of ‘false consciousness’ or the ideological persuasion and 
misrecognition which implicates individuals and communities in relations of 
domination (Scott 1990: 72).  Indeed, the individuals narrating the passages above 
knowingly articulate their embeddedness: Gil acknowledges that refusing to cooperate 
in oppression paradoxically brings him closer to the mainstream and domination, just 
as Dana admits that treating Palestinians from Gaza as “equal” means passing 
judgement on individuals whose “position in life” is shaped through violence 
perpetuated by her own state and society.  Thus diverse actions intended to express 
resistance or solidarity implicate individual actors in multiple relations and layers of 
domination.  This entanglement and embeddedness necessarily binds meaning with 
materiality and practice with structure, if in unexpected ways; as Mitchell (1990: 561) 
well cautions:  
The distinction between particular practices and their structure or frame is 
problematic not simply because it may not be shared by non-western traditions, 
but because . . . the apparent existence of such unphysical frameworks of 
structures is precisely the effect introduced by modern mechanisms of power 
and it is through this elusive yet powerful effect that modern systems of 
domination are maintained. 
                                                
7 The dynamic patterns of gender outlined here importantly complicate those roles and relations 
outlined in existing literature around gender, nationalism and militarism within Jewish Israeli society 
(see Sharoni 1995; Katz 2003; Sasson-Levy 2003; Jacoby 2005; Segal 2008). 
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Hegemonic Entanglements 
As the above accounts indicate, in the context of Israel-Palestine acknowledgement of 
“catching up” in power becomes a means of expressing how one ‘lives on’ or ‘gets by’ 
in conditions of conflict and their constitutive relations of power.  In this, the 
admission that “I am part of it whether I like it or not” signals that practice and 
structure indeed remain entwined.  Here hegemony importantly arises not through the 
division of coercion from persuasion or the separation of the physical realm from 
behaviour and consciousness (Mitchell 1990: 545, 559), but in large part through 
social maintenance and production, simultaneously invoking both materiality and 
meaning.  Thus participation in domination cannot be appraised as imposed or 
enforced by state or military actors upon an unwilling or unknowing populace, but 
must be understood as rooted in interpersonal and intimate dimensions of sociality, 
inclusive of those who resist.  Importantly, while this creates a seemingly untenable 
position for oppositional actions and actors – by their own admission bound with 
power despite altruistic intentions and at times great personal cost – resistance 
remains significant in part due to its very embeddedness, as individuals and 
communities insist upon the possibility of a better future despite inevitable flaws and 
failures.   
Yet given this enmeshment with hegemony, resistance might create its own resistance 
or movement away from its promise of opposition.  What drives those who actively 
‘resist’ resistance in opting against participation in the political actions which seek to 
oppose occupation, discrimination and injustice?  In a manner similar to transgression, 
which “[…] allows the limits to arise, in their blank nakedness, while simultaneously 
being transgressed” (Fadil 2009: 440), opposition to resistance despite a shared 
politics betrays much about the workings of power, providing a differential adaptation 
of Abu-Lughod’s (1990) imperative.  As resistance becomes interwoven with 
hegemony, opposition to those actions and agendas might be cast as a “nonpositive 
affirmation,” a contestation which “[…] does not imply a generalised negation, but an 
affirmation that affirms nothing, a radical break of transitivity” (Foucault 2003 
[1963]: 446-447).  While these modes of ‘resistance to resistance’ appear to contest 
hegemony, (non-)actions and (non-)actors ultimately become implicated in 
domination through their apparent passivity, as practice again emerges tightly woven 
with structure. 
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The Banality of Activism 
On the most readily apparent level, those individuals resisting resistance respond to an 
overwhelming normalisation of organised activism within everyday Jewish Israeli life, 
particularly those initiatives specific to the political Left.  From municipality-
approved demonstrations in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to independent activist 
organisations, various forms of political protest are actively stitched into the fabric of 
ordinary life, many in specifically gendered terms.  As fieldwork progressed 
throughout the year, my participation in frequent Tel Aviv demonstrations began to 
feel routine and formulaic, if not oddly ‘normal’ – even as my bodily presence in the 
street ostensibly directed attention to opposition, my actions somehow contributed to a 
prevailing sense of anaemia.  Dana, the occupational therapist who characterised her 
degree of political engagement as “avoidant,” described this regularisation:  
Most demonstrations are in Tel Aviv, but you barely feel it.  Every Friday at 
Ben Zion there is a quiet demonstration. 
KN: Women in Black? 
D: Yes – no one notices it.  It’s on a major route for buyers and, okay, they 
[Women in Black] are there, but it’s the same with the puppies with SOS.8  
One Friday people were yelling at them, but there is indifference here. 
Grouped with the pitiable puppies leashed to a city fence in hopes of adoption, the 
weekly protest of Women in Black stands a marker of normalcy rather than a 
provocation, though presumably evocative of different emotions and reactions than 
the pets nearby.  While often ignored or unseen, these primarily elderly women 
protestors at times elicit aggressive responses, emotional reactions which stand in 
contrast to the women’s “quiet demonstration” and the overwhelming “indifference” 
to their acts of protest. Yet this very volatility of encounter itself remains subject to 
normalisation, as it occurs within a political and social environment characterised by 
conflict, aggression, confrontation and debate.  When asked later in our interview 
about the possibility of mass mobilisation, Dana remarked upon the comportment and 
emotion imagined to spur action:  
The problem is that the Left-wing is impotent – where the Right-wing has 
loads of people and shouting, the Left is civilised and singing.  They don’t get 
                                                
8 SOS is an animal rescue organisation; see http://www.sospets.co.il, accessed 30 April 2012. 
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noticed.  There is practically no Left-wing.  Sadly, when the people will rise 
for change it will be because of internal problems, not because of the conflict.  
Problems like the corrupt government, financial judgment, and criticism of 
education.  When [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin died he was supporting the 
peace initiative – if there will be any serious initiative there will be followers.  
But to rise against the situation as it is now?  No.  The activists, the Anarchists, 
the Women in Black – it will be the same actors and the same percentage.  
People won’t rage against it.9 
Within this reflection, the indifference facing oppositional actors becomes a product 
of their own doing, an apparent deficiency in critical mass, political voice and 
visibility in contrast to that garnered by the political Right.10  Critically, these “same 
actors” – explicitly listed among them the Friday protestors from Women in Black – 
are deemed lacking in rage, the same ingredient I increasingly felt missing from the 
organised protests of Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, save when met with Right-wing 
counter-protests.  Interestingly, this subscription to rage – also on my part – replicates 
the denigration of women’s and feminist protest groups in Israel, as it validates a 
belief in the transformative potential of masculinised anger infused with the threat of 
violence.  Numerous commentators note the prevalence of women’s anti-occupation 
and peace activism organisations in Israel from the 1980s through the early 2000s (see 
Mayer 1994; Sharoni 1995, 1996; Helman 1999a; Cockburn 1998, 2007; Freedman 
2002; Misra and Rich 2002; Svirsky 2002a, 2002b; Lentin 2004; Fuchs 2005; Jacoby 
2005; Powers 2006; Kaye-Kantrowitz 2008; Segal 2008; Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Feder 2011), detailing how women activists became associated with 
particular protest modes and agendas.  While this association of women with protest 
potentially serves to feminise Israeli peace organisations and initiatives, Dana’s 
narrative points to a sense that the wider culture of Leftist political protest has become 
feminised, extending beyond women’s and feminist groups.  Thus Dana’s political 
avoidance emerges in part a resistance to a normalised and pacified spectre of 
organised political protest, an ostensibly feminised mode of action deemed “impotent” 
in the face of a masculinised Right-wing fury.  Here, as anger seemingly constitutes 
the ultimate political motivator – an exception to the banality and passivity of ‘living 
                                                
9 Interview in Tel Aviv, 17 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
10 In numerous interviews individuals expressed their sense that the political Right-wing is able to 
mobilise more effectively than the Left, noting that these parties and organisations are better versed in 
the politics of protest and popular appeal. 
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on’ or ‘getting by’ – the assumed emotion of opposition effectively affirms the 
hegemonic gender order. 
However, in keeping with the complexity and contradiction of resistance as made 
visible in the preceding section, this belief in the transformative capacity of 
masculinised rage halts at the limits of the Jewish Israeli collectivity.  Intersecting 
with race, class and national belonging, here too the conduct of protest entrenches 
prevailing gender norms, codes, roles and relations, if differentially so.  As seen in 
reactions to demonstrations by Palestinian citizens of Israel, African refugees and 
asylum seekers, and domestic caretakers, the normalisation of specific forms of 
protest in turn creates ‘abnormal’ or ‘dangerous’ modes of action, coded along lines of 
race and gender.  With its protest site intentionally positioned in the centre of Tel 
Aviv, a Palestinian demonstration against Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and two 
marches involving the city’s African migrant population were characterised by a high 
level of male participation, relative visibility in the core of ‘white’ Tel Aviv and a 
striking degree of audibility.  As I attended the Palestinian-Egyptian solidarity 
demonstration in Basel Square,11 I was struck by the ways in which ‘Israeli Arabs’ – 
clearly differentiated from ‘Palestinians’ in nearly every interview I conducted – 
suddenly became Palestinian even to the “hard core” Jewish Israeli activists who 
stood watching the demonstration across the street.  “They don’t understand Arabic, 
they don’t know what they’re saying,” a fellow anthropologist explained to me after 
speaking with these activists, many of whom were participants in her research project.  
“People are scared – they see a big group of angry young Palestinian men, shouting in 
Arabic and waving Palestinian flags.”12  Though young Palestinian women were also 
in attendance, their voices were subsumed within the majority-male mass as the 
spectre of masculinised rage and ostensible threat of violence transformed not only the 
‘Israeli Arabs,’ but also the radical Jewish activists who in their trepidation became 
‘Israeli.’   
Likewise, playing drums, chanting in English and appearing in numbers previously 
unknown to the Jewish Israeli residents of central and north Tel Aviv, African 
                                                
11 For footage of the 1 February 2011 protest near the Egyptian embassy see 
http://vimeo.com/21132162, accessed 30 April 2012.   
 
12 Field notes, 1 February 2011. 
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refugees and asylum seekers elicited similar shock and anxiety in both the 2010 
Human Rights Day march and an independent demonstration against the construction 
of a planned African-only detention facility.13  As Dimi Reider (2010) of +972 
Magazine wrote of the former event, “ […] until yesterday, Israelis have never seen 
the refugees march together, as a coherent, unapologetic group, not merely speaking 
their claim not in the slums and the periphery where they have been pushed, but 
chanting it on one of Israel’s most affluent shopping streets.”  Viewed by participants 
and organisers as a welcome addition to the ordinarily predictable annual Tel Aviv 
march, the presence of the African migrants – primarily men – on Human Rights Day 
was more ambiguously received by onlookers; as Ilan, a 32 year-old Tel Aviv resident, 
recounted: “I was in Pilates on the day of the International Human Rights Day march 
and we watched out the window as hundreds of blacks walked past on Rothschild 
[Boulevard].  They just kept coming, and people found it really alarming.”14  In a 
similar manner, walking amidst the crowd in the later protest against the detention 
facility I wondered how the presence of large numbers of African demonstrators – 
many from Sudan, Eritrea and Congo – appearing in central Tel Aviv would 
ultimately impact their struggle, given the climate of virulent racism.15  While the 
African migrant community importantly became visible and articulated their demands, 
at the same time a perceived ‘threat’ materialised and became suddenly tangible to a 
wider Jewish Israeli society. 
                                                
13 For footage of the 10 December 2010 Human Rights Day march see http://democracy-
project.org.il/en/2010/12/highlights-from-the-march-part-2-the-refugees, accessed 30 April 2012. The 
solidarity demonstration against the detention centre was held on 24 December 2010; see Lior 2010.  
Importantly, though the article by Lior (2010) cites the presence of a large number of “Israeli activists,” 
the overwhelming majority of participants were from the African migrant community in south Tel Aviv.   
 
14 Interview in Tel Aviv, 5 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
15 Throughout the time of my fieldwork public racism and violence directed against African migrants – 
often refugees and asylum seekers – increased dramatically, reflecting the discrimination and prejudice 
directed toward Palestinians while at the same time supplanting this group on the lowest echelon of 
Israeli society; see Ettinger, Hasson and Lior 2010 and Sheen 2011a.  However, Jewish Israeli attitudes 
and behaviours toward this community often exposed significant tensions; while largely reviled and 
demonised within public discourse, within individual exchanges black African migrants were regarded 
with a degree of pity and empathy not extended toward Palestinians.  For example, during an ulpan 
lesson our instructor related her understanding that where many African migrants lived in (south) Tel 
Aviv tended to be “violent and dirty, with drugs and homelessness.”  Shaking her head sadly our 
instructor told the class, “These conditions bring out the worst in them and this brings out the worst in 
us [Israelis], and people then take advantage of them.”  Field notes, 28 December 2010.  
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Significantly, this masculinisation and racialisation of non-Jewish protest articulates 
through the sexualised discourse of threat, penetration and “infiltration” applied to 
both Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and African migrants (Ettinger, 
Hasson and Lior 2010; Khoury, Pfeffer and Ha’aretz 2011; Dana 2011; Sheen 2011a; 
Lis 2011b; Reuters 2013).  Thus the presence and expression of rage cannot be so 
easily associated with transformative potential in political protest; rather race, national 
belonging and gender intersect to shape perceptions and experiences of political action.  
Indeed, a protest against the institution of an immigration law binding health workers 
and domestic caregivers to a specific family – deemed the “slavery law” by activists – 
garnered far more public support and far less anxiety or fear, problematising an easy 
association of anger with political or social change.  Though the law was eventually 
passed on 16 May 2011 (ACRI 2011a), in March 2011 a relatively high proportion of 
(white) Jewish Israelis attended a quiet, orderly demonstration in order to support 
those individuals, primarily women of Asian origin, tasked with caring for their 
elderly relatives.  One interview participant explained the support for this 
demonstration as a testament to the successful “integration” of these female workers 
in Jewish Israeli society.  However, and perhaps more importantly, this demonstration 
also followed the template of ‘normalised’ political action, characterised by the same 
perceived feminisation and lack of rage as found in regular Leftist demonstrations.16  
Paradoxically, this same dearth or absence imbued the initiative with markedly greater 
legitimacy than protests by Palestinians or African migrants.  Indeed, Tamar Hermann 
(2009 cited in Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011: 746) makes a similar 
observation with regard to the Arba Emahot [Four Mothers] campaign, which resulted 
in the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon in 2000: “The movement gained 
legitimacy and public attention because of its framing as an apolitical group within the 
acceptable framework of motherhood.” 
Marked by the spectre of masculinised and racialised rage, the Palestinian and African 
migrant protests were cast as abnormal vis-à-vis the normalised and ostensibly 
feminised docility of regular Tel Aviv protests, which the care providers and their 
supporters invoked to a potential advantage.  Again pointing to the embeddedness of 
protest and resistance within wider relations of power, the political actions undertaken 
                                                
16 Field notes, 26 March 2011 and interview in Tel Aviv, 27 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
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by Palestinian citizens of Israel and African migrants living in Tel Aviv bolstered a 
sense of ‘threat’ while at the same time substantiating the Israeli state and society’s 
claims to democracy.  As minority populations publicly exercise freedom of speech 
and right to assembly, resistance becomes ‘caught up’ in layers of power and 
contributes to hegemony.  However, the significance of these accounts to perceptions 
of what we can do lies in their complication of and contribution to normalisation, as a 
mode of protest – seemingly feminised, pacified and impotent – becomes subject to 
active resistance, despite achieving legitimacy.  Here opposition to political action 
emerges as a move against the overwhelming sense of passivity, calm and balance 
which these actions are seen to project, those very attributes paradoxically strived for 
in the pursuit of normalcy.  In this, dominant forms of oppositional political action are 
read for their effect in the context of Jewish Israeli society, as a necessary rupture 
ultimately obeys the limits of structure and permits of everyday life.   
Yet this dynamic does not go unacknowledged by the activists whose initiatives and 
organisations become normalised and associated with the hegemonic quality of Leftist 
political action.  Yardena, a 75 year-old Jerusalemite formerly active with Bat Shalom 
and currently working with Machsom Watch, the Israeli Committee Against House 
Demolitions, Women in Black and Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity,17 became politically 
active in England during the anti-Vietnam war and anti-Apartheid movements, 
returning to Israel in 1970 in time to join the first demonstrations against the then-
nascent West Bank settlements.  As we spoke together on Naksa Day,18 Yardena 
recounted her experiences and perceptions thus:  
What was interesting was the sociology of things – I find that very interesting.  
The first time when I was arrested in 1970 [for protesting] against the 
settlement of Kiryat Arba, we were all stuck in a big cage of the Russian 
Compound prison, men and women together.  The guards brought us coffee… 
the environment was relaxed.  We were not taken seriously – the occupation 
had not settled in.  We weren’t the enemy.  But in ’73, we were the enemy.  I 
was not in a cage with other people, I was put with women.  Some women 
                                                
17 Each of the organisations listed may be considered part of a wider ‘anti-occupation movement’ in 
Israel; see bibliography for links to organisation websites. 
 
18 As related in Chapter One, Naksa Day marks the Palestinian commemoration of the 1967 War, which 
resulted in further dispossession and displacement of Palestinians along with the military occupation of 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula.  The 2011 anniversary 
was marked by protests and the killing of unarmed Palestinian civilians by the IDF as individuals 
attempted to cross the border fence from Syria into Israel; see Khoury, Ashkenazi and Harel 2011.  
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there didn’t like me because when you’re low down on the social scale you 
have to be ‘better than’ [someone else]. . . .  With Women in Black – I can’t 
remember the start date… it was the first intifada.  At the demonstrations it 
was built up in a circle with men on the bottom and women on the top in the 
centre. . . .  The drivers would go past and say, “Women go home!  You have a 
child waiting for you!  The Sabbath dinner is waiting!”  A few months later it 
was, “Arab lovers!  Prostitutes!”  And a few more months later it became, 
“Traitors!”  Women’s place as political beings, who don’t follow their men 
into the army, was very interesting…  Then there were a lot of women at the 
demonstrations, but now there are 15 with many women from abroad.  Then 
there were 40 to 50 – it’s 15 now.  On the Friday nearest the 6th of June [Naksa 
Day] we used to get more than 100 people, Israelis, men and women.  Last 
Friday we had 40, with many from abroad. 
Highlighting the gender tensions which suffuse her experiences of arrest and political 
protest, Yardena’s narrative recalls a transition from the social inclusion of the early 
1970s to the sexualised and nationalised exclusion caused by the imbrication of 
protest with episodes of violent conflict – the 1973 October or Yom Kippur War and 
the first intifada – culminating in the relative indifference and inaction of the present 
day.  Within her secondary discussion of Women in Black, the narrative arc is 
particularly significant as here Yardena traces a shift from dismissal – on gendered 
grounds as mothers – to labelling as “traitors” as women mounted an increasingly 
serious challenge to Israeli state and military policies.  Importantly, Yardena relates 
normalisation – the failure to be “taken seriously” – to declining participation, 
ultimately reflecting upon women’s position as “political beings” in the past tense.  
Here, normalisation can be read as silence, as the gap between vehement accusations 
and low participant numbers; in the interim, Yardena implies that women as political 
beings have been seemingly neutralised or eliminated as their protest becomes 
normalised.   
Yet similarly to the ways in which vectors of race, class and gender complicate the 
association of rage with transformative politics, an intersectional reading of Yardena’s 
narrative sheds further light upon normalisation at it meets with protest.  Throughout 
our exchange, Yardena made reference to the racial, ethnic and class composition of 
what she deemed Israel’s “social scale,” a spectrum invoked in her recollection of 
time spent in prison.  At one point, she related an experience of marching with the 
Israeli Black Panthers, a Mizrahi protest movement active in the 1970s:  
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They had a big march, several, in Jerusalem.  At this one I was separated from 
the main march and surrounded by North African Jews.  They said, “What are 
you doing?  You’re Ashkenazi!  You’re rich, you have an apartment!”  I 
wasn’t [rich], but the assumption was that because I’m Ashkenazi I’m rich and 
I have an apartment to go home to.  I said, “Okay, let’s assume I was [rich].  
Why wouldn’t I march with the Black Panthers?”  It was like a march with the 
blacks in the southern US when the whites came, except the blacks [in the US] 
accepted it.19  
In these combined accounts, Yardena’s actions aimed at social and political 
transformation are met with what she perceives to be class- and race-based antipathy, 
rather than solidarity – in both the Black Panthers march and the women-only prison 
cell, Yardena is not welcome.  Delineated precisely as Ashkenazi (white), affluent and 
female, in these narratives the hegemonic figure of the Jewish Israeli protestor is 
received with hostility and derision by fellow citizens who possess less privilege, 
influence and capital.  Strikingly, in both instances the “social scales” invoked by 
Yardena are inverted, as if in states of exception – explicitly as a white Jewish Israeli 
activist, she is treated as if positioned lower within social hierarchies than her 
respective interlocutors, understanding herself differentially perceived as “the enemy.”  
In this, Yardena remains a member of the hegemonic group despite her acts of 
resistance; in the spaces of both radical protest and incarceration her presence is 
equated with the privilege of normalcy. 
Resistance to the Game 
Within the passages above, the normalisation of activism within Jewish Israeli society 
begets not only its own resistance, but also new modes of political action, if judged 
‘abnormal’ or threatening.  Indeed, protests by Palestinian citizens of Israel, African 
migrants living in south Tel Aviv and the Mizrahi Black Panthers of the 1970s arise 
through and at the limits of hegemonic forms of protest, including those actions 
seemingly feminised, normalised and pacified.  In this, established forms of activism 
set ‘rules of the game’ to be contested and reformulated by subsequent initiatives and 
organisations.  Baruch Kimmerling (2001: 216) writes similarly of Israeli militarism: 
“Another fact of this situation of perpetual threat has been the development and 
adoption of a value system – that is, the rules of the game implied by culture, values, 
                                                
19 Interview in Jerusalem, 5 June 2011; handwritten notes 
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mores, folklore, and myths – that tends to support the real and artificial needs created 
by warfare and a perceived siege situation.”20  Beyond the codes and needs which 
underwrite the militarised value system explored in Chapter One, of interest here is 
“the game” whose explicit acknowledgement and entanglement with conflict makes 
visible further ways in which patterns of gender intersect with protest to produce 
political inaction.   
As ‘games’ of resistance unfold within more veteran protest vehicles – those now-
normalised modes of political action explored above including highly visible women’s 
initiatives and organisations – their diverse codes of conduct ultimately influence the 
perception and performance of new modes of activism; importantly, these games take 
place not only within the borders of Israel proper, but also in the spaces of the 
Occupied Territories.  Indeed, the normalisation of older forms of anti-occupation 
activism within Israel’s recognised borders has in part yielded groups such as Sheikh 
Jarrah Solidarity in East Jerusalem and popular resistance initiatives in West Bank 
villages including Na’alin, Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, which have recently shifted to the 
forefront of organised political action.  Ofek, a 26 year-old activist from Jerusalem, 
detailed the contours of one such game of activism which subsequently establishes 
new rules: 
In the south I was part of Machsom Watch – they’re a human rights group to 
watch entry.  Usually there aren’t young women, it’s more like old aunts 
because they can be easy, relaxed with the soldiers.  When they had enough 
[older] women to balance me, I took part.  It was becoming a practice at this 
point: three women arrive, the soldier closes the checkpoint, no Palestinians 
can go in or out because of Machsom Watch.  It’s like a game.  Then we’d go 
to the hill and they [the soldiers] would notice, they come back and close the 
checkpoint again… until we go, the Palestinians suffer.21   
Well-documented and researched similarly to the Israeli Women in Black, Machsom 
Watch was founded by Jewish Israeli women in 2001 at the onset of the second 
intifada, as the function and proliferation of checkpoints in the Occupied Territories 
became increasingly visible to Jewish Israelis (Kotef and Amir 2007: 974).  The 
organisation has been critiqued both internally and academically in terms of its gender, 
                                                
20 Emphasis added. 
 
21 Interview in Jerusalem, 11 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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ethnic, class and generational dimensions, as membership consists primarily of 
retirement-aged middle-class Ashkenazi Israeli women whose ‘de-sexualised’ 
femininity and maternal appearance is seen to grant a degree of protection from and 
influence over the young (male) soldiers stationed at military checkpoints in the West 
Bank.22  While an innovative mode of action relative to the sanctioned demonstrations 
occurring within Israel’s recognised borders, Ofek highlights the game-like qualities 
of the interaction between the Machsom Watch women and the soldiers, illustrating 
the extent to which both action and re-action have been regularised over time.  
Characterised as “a practice,” this game of political protest and intervention indeed 
possesses particular rules, values and codes.  While the declared intention of the 
organisation is to observe and document the operation of the checkpoints and the 
subsequent treatment of Palestinians at these sites,23 in Ofek’s narrative – and indeed 
the accounts of other research participants active with Machsom Watch – the 
exchange unfolds strictly between Jewish Israeli actors whose interactions remain 
framed by prevailing assumptions concerning the relationship between gender and 
violence; the Palestinians subject to this exercise of power are consigned to waiting 
and suffering.  Paradoxically, and in keeping with the embeddedness of resistance 
within wider relations of power, the actions of Machsom Watch have been explicitly 
criticised as ensuring the continued function of the very checkpoints these activists 
oppose.24  Potentially contributing to the extension of military control through 
sanitisation, the actions of Machsom Watch produce not only a differential mode of 
                                                
22 Interviews in Jerusalem, 11 May 2011 and 20 June 2011; handwritten notes.  While Kotef and Amir 
(2007) contest this claim with accounts of younger women’s sexualisation in Machsom Watch – both 
strategic and unsolicited – no corroborating narratives emerged during multiple interviews involving 
Machsom Watch volunteers across a range of ages. 
 
23 See http://www.machsomwatch.org/en, accessed 3 May 2012; also see Kotef and Amir (2007). 
 
24 As Professor Yagil Levy (2011) argues: 
Even if the leftist groups’ intention is to ensure upholding Palestinian rights, though, the 
unintentional result of their activity is preserving the occupation.  Moderating and restraining 
the army's activity gives it a more human and legal facade.  Reducing the pressure of 
international organizations, alongside moderating the Palestinian population's resistance 
potential, enables the army to continue to maintain this control model over a prolonged period 
of time. 
Importantly, many Machsom Watch volunteers are aware of this tension in their work.  See interviews 
in Tel Aviv, 31 January 2011 and Jerusalem, 17 April 2011 and 14 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
  
 173 
normalisation, but also depoliticisation which accompanies the shift to a language of 
human rights in this context.25  
More radical and marginal than the sanctioned demonstrations of Tel Aviv, specific 
oppositional political actions produce rules of the game as outlined above, providing a 
standard for future initiatives.  Here reactions and resistance to the established model 
produce differential modes of political action, as patterns of gender again meet with 
conflict and protest.  Significantly, positions adopted by the latest generation of 
activist initiatives which include Jewish Israelis – such as Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity and 
the Friday protests in Bil’in, Na’alin and Nabi Saleh – actively refute the perceived 
feminisation and regularisation of hegemonic political protest.26  Yet at the same time 
as innovation transgresses existing limits, new rules and value systems come into play, 
again shaping relations of inclusion and exclusion, participation and resistance.  
Intrigued by the demonstrations in Bil’in,27 presented to me as “hard core” political 
actions during numerous interviews, I decided to participate and observe a Friday 
protest in May 2011.  I was encouraged by the small number of interview participants 
who had attended the protests and was puzzled by comments made by Nadav, a 31 
year-old activist from Tel Aviv, in a recent exchange: 
You should go because if you’re a decent person you will get mad – about the 
activists, the army, all the ritual.  Of course there are reasons it is like this.  It’s 
hard to keep it in mind.  For an Israeli to go to Bil’in is something necessary.  
For the first time in your life you’re in the Palestinian Territories, surrounded 
by Palestinians, Arabic, Arabic music coming from speakers on a large 
truck… it’s like something from a Reuter’s photo.  You’re sure you will get 
killed.  The army is no longer an 18 year-old douche bag with a rifle – it’s the 
                                                
25 Many interview participants attested to the increasing appeal of ‘human rights’ work; at the same 
time, a small number of participants drew attention to the potentially neutralising or depoliticising 
aspects of this discourse and practice (see also Einhorn 2008: 171-190 and Allen 2013: 90).  
Importantly, this depoliticisation remains associated with feminisation, again bringing valuations of 
gender squarely into resistance. 
 
26 While Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity protests take place in East Jerusalem, organised actions in Bil’in, 
Na’alin, and Nabi Saleh are located within these respective Palestinian West Bank villages; the latter 
sites are associated with the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (see https://popularstruggle.org, 
accessed 4 May 2012). 
 
27 These demonstrations began in response to the annexation of Bil’in lands by the Jewish Israeli 
settlement Modi’in, made possible by the construction of the Wall through village territory; see 
http://www.bilin-village.org/english, accessed 4 May 2012.  After the Israeli High Court ordered the 
Wall to be re-routed in 2007, the structure was finally moved in 2011; however, 150,000 square metres 
of village land presently remain annexed (Ha’aretz 2010a) and protests continue. 
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enemy.  You try to remember that the army is an 18 year-old guy whose 
vacation is screwed up because of you.  But the Palestinians have more to lose.  
It doesn’t change your views, but it does change some of the elemental fear 
Israelis have of Palestinians.   
Most of it is like tourism.  Like I met four Italians in Ma’asra28 who were 
singing, shouting something at the soldiers.  I speak Italian so I understood 
what they were singing – it was children’s songs.  They were singing excitedly, 
furiously at the army… they were having a very nice time.  This is what 
happens.  Last time I was in Bil’in, I was surrounded by tear gas, shock 
grenades, people weeping… and you can hear ‘Jingle Bells’ coming from the 
ice cream truck on the road.  It’s a hot day and the truck is there, like usual, 
selling ice cream to people and playing ‘Jingle Bells.’  You sit and watch the 
truck with the driver… it’s something you have to see.  Some Israeli activists 
do it for adventure, for tourism… for righteousness.29   
 
On the day of my participation in the protest at Bil’in ‘Jingle Bells’ was not to be 
heard, nor was the mythical ice cream truck in sight, but Nadav was present along 
with fellow Jewish Israeli bloggers relaying the events real-time on Twitter.  The 
predicted sense of ritual and fantasy indeed began on the 45-minute drive from Tel 
Aviv to the village, wherein passengers in the vehicle played friendly ‘name games’ 
by means of introduction as we hurtled along Route 443 past Modi’in and across the 
Green Line.  As we drove and familiarised ourselves, Sean, a young Jewish American 
man studying at the Arava Institute,30 summarised his perception of the Bil’in protests 
with a reference to American popular culture: “It’s like ‘Fight Club’: ‘Once you’ve 
been in fight club the volume on everything else is turned down.’”31  Our driver, Nina, 
nodded in agreement and Sean continued excitedly with a declaration that, having 
been to Bil’in four times, the next week he planned to attend the demonstration in 
                                                
28 Weekly actions are also held on Fridays in the West Bank village of Ma’asra. 
 
29 Interview in Tel Aviv, 20 April 2011; handwritten notes.  For excellent analyses of the ways in which 
tourism intersects with conflict and security practices in Israel-Palestine see Stein 2008 and Ochs 2011: 
138-160. 
 
30 Located in the Negev Desert of south Israel, the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies “… 
prepar[es] future Arab and Jewish leaders to cooperatively solve the region's environmental 
challenges”; see http://www.arava.org, accessed 5 May 2012. 
 
31 The exact quotation from Chuck Palahniuk’s 1996 novel reads as follows: “After a night in fight club, 
everything in the real world gets the volume turned down.  Nothing can piss you off.  Your word is law, 
and if other people break that law or question you, even that doesn’t piss you off.”   
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nearby Nabi Saleh explicitly because these actions were more violent.  “The army 
goes into the city there!” he told us, highlighting the extent to which these West Bank 
demonstrations exist hierarchically arranged according to levels of danger, with 
participants therein appraised by their degrees of bravery.   
After crossing through the checkpoint – “Everybody look Zionist!” Nina commanded 
with a laugh as we passed the Israeli soldiers – the game of protest continued to 
unfold in the village, its rules becoming obvious as the event began.  Upon joining the 
main group, I was assigned a “babysitter,” a veteran (male) Jewish Israeli activist to 
guide me at the demonstration and ensure that I stayed within my personal comfort 
zone vis-à-vis the expected violence.  We chatted as I waited for a safety briefing to 
begin and the atmosphere was friendly even if I felt anxious; I noted with some 
surprise that I actually recognised the houses and a number of faces from the film 
Bil’in Habibti, a documentary viewed months earlier.32  Eventually, members of 
Anarchists Against the Wall33 called new participants to a shaded garden and the 
safety briefing commenced in serious tones.  Here we learned what to expect and how 
to act regarding military violence, as clearly there existed a customary order of events 
and escalation: first stun grenades, then skunk water and tear gas canisters, possibly 
followed by Ruger rifles and rubber-coated bullets or even live fire.  Next came 
instructions on what to do upon injury, arrest and finally – for women – sexual 
harassment by male protestors.  Replete with a separate set of instructions, alcohol 
wipes were passed around the group in order to quell the effects of the inevitable tear 
gas.  I felt increasingly unsure of this game.  Yet as the demonstration began, led by a 
cardboard coffin and Palestinian men dressed as [Palestinian National Authority 
President] Mahmoud Abbas and either [Hamas Political Bureau Chairman] Khaled 
Mashal or [disputed Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister] Ismail Haniyeh,34 
I fell in behind the line of yellow flags, youths with keffiyeh-wrapped faces and a 
                                                
32 Bil’in Habibti [Bil’in My Love] is a film made by Jewish Israeli activist and documentarist Shai 
Carmeli-Pollak in 2006, which focuses on the popular struggle in Bil’in. 
 
33 Anarchists Against the Wall is a Jewish Israeli group “supporting the popular Palestinian resistance 
to the Israeli separation wall”; see http://www.awalls.org, accessed 5 May 2012. 
 
34 The makeshift coffin signified the disunity and factionalism that were meant to end with the then-
recent Hamas-Fatah reconciliation; there was some disagreement among the Jewish Israeli and 
international activists as to whom the bearded man was supposed to be, Mashal or Haniyeh. 
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group of nearly fifty Jewish Israeli and international activists as we walked to a small 
peninsula of land ringed by fencing and Israeli soldiers.   
From here the real game began, as my babysitter explained that while the official non-
violent procession advanced toward the far end of the fence – where soldiers stood at 
the ready with guns and a skunk water truck behind the buffer zone – the keffiyeh-clad 
youths would break to the right and begin throwing rocks, though it was always 
unclear who acted first in violence, the soldiers or protestors.  As we followed the 
demonstration at a distance the first stun grenades were fired, directed at the young 
men who had indeed broken off from the group.  Then the tear gas began.  When the 
gas dissipated momentarily we retreated to a small rise, watching the game from a 
safer vantage point: youths stood inside the fence among low scrub grass and rocks as 
soldiers pelted them with tear gas canisters – both ‘sides’ baited and responded.  In the 
distance, the official demonstration had nearly reached the fence before being sprayed 
with skunk water and enshrouded in tear gas, trapped between concertina wire, 
soldiers and guns or a haze of noxious smoke.  Shouting, crying and vomiting, 
protestors retreated and lit small fires in their wake; only a man in a wheelchair 
wearing a gasmask was able to withstand the intensity.35  I stood watching and at 
times coughing or weeping due to the gas, realising that for many of the Jewish 
Israelis and international activists around me the demonstration was a ‘Choose Your 
Own Adventure’ affair, similar to a children’s story with multiple points of decision 
and conclusion.  These protestors were constantly testing their personal limits as they 
and their Palestinian counterparts challenged those of the Israeli military.  For many, 
the scene of conflict spread out below as if on television, though at times it 
surrounded all players.  Indeed “like a Reuter’s photograph,” the press in their brightly 
coloured vests stayed close to the young Palestinian men and boys near the fence with 
their slingshots, rocks and keffiyehs, engulfed in tear gas and “looking for blood,” 
according to my minder.  Beneath the popping sound of newly fired gas canisters, we 
turned back to the village close behind.  As we walked, I asked whether villagers 
protested on other days of the week; my babysitter shook his head in the negative and 
                                                
35 Rani, a young Palestinian man partially paralysed in 2000 during the start of the second or al-Aqsa 
intifada, appears in the film Bil’in Habibti and is now an iconic figure in the Bil’in protest.  
Interestingly, the mythology of the protest among Jewish Israelis contends that Rani was injured at 
Bil’in rather than in Jerusalem, as clearly presented in the film. 
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replied, “They have to work, live their lives, so no.  The game is on Friday and 
everyone knows it.”36 
Exhilarating and confusing, surreal and simultaneously hyper-real, my experience of 
Bil’in that day indeed unfolded in a game-like manner, one marked explicitly by 
violence expected and enacted.  In these few hours I began to understand first-hand 
the extent to which violence can be both shattering and unifying, terrifying and 
productive of intense solidarities; with tears running down my face, I gave my alcohol 
wipes to a father and his two daughters no older than six, feeling something which 
seemed deeper than outrage and more profound than empathy as we reeled from the 
effects of tear gas.  Yet this was all part of the game, very much in keeping with the 
values, codes and myths created by and defining our political action.  Something apart 
from the ostensibly feminised, regularised and normalised modes of protest associated 
with Jewish Israeli Leftist activism both mainstream and radical, participants in this 
generation of innovative activist initiatives construct rules of a game newly 
masculinised, with implications for wider political action.  Tali, a 30 year-old feminist 
gay rights activist from Tel Aviv whose anti-occupation activism has recently 
diminished, painted a complete picture thus:  
At the big demonstrations I can see that they are run by men.  Even when 
women are the organisers, the people on the stage are men – Ashkenazi Jewish 
men at that.  This is frustrating and annoying to me.  It makes me feel that 
even though these movements are against the occupation, they are also against 
me.  In the radical Left there is more discussion about gender, so there should 
be more awareness.  But there you can see subtle oppression, like in Sheikh 
Jarrah a few months ago when the women protestors were asked to wear 
‘decent clothes.’  You can also feel the physical aggression, the machoism.  
For example in Bil’in you can feel the machoism of the Palestinians – only 
Palestinian men are there – and also the machoism of the Jewish demonstrators 
too.  Women are pushed aside.   
KN: Does that change how you feel about participating? 
Tali: I don’t want to be part of it.  It makes me angry that in order to promote 
justice for Palestinians, we don’t want gender equality.  There is a song from 
the ‘80s by Pollyana Frank called ‘Dykes and the Holy War’ – the refrain says 
                                                
36 Field notes, 6 May 2011. 
  
 178 
“Revolutions are alike, none will enter my door / Guess what they’ll do with 
us dykes when they win that holy war?”  It’s true.37  
Indeed, the specifically gendered dimensions of these protests old and new constitute 
a significant element of structure, shaping sites of action, forms of expression and 
relations of inclusion and exclusion.  As articulated by Tali and other interview 
participants, the rules of the game cannot be read with a lens limited to the relations 
between ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’; rather, here too an intersectional approach makes 
visible the working of power within resistance.  For Tali, the routinised 
demonstrations of organised political protests – marked by stages, speakers and rallies 
– remain the bastion of (particular kinds of) men, in a manner similar to the ways in 
which politics and political voice are largely framed by direct experiences of conflict 
and knowledge of security; paradoxically, these are the same demonstrations 
perceived as “feminised” and “impotent” among many younger activists.  Yet rather 
than drawing a distinction between the new generation of protests which in part arises 
in reaction to these (white) men speaking on stages, Tali outlines terms of connection: 
both are “run by men” despite the participation of women.  Naming Bil’in and Sheikh 
Jarrah – two of the most popular Friday protest sites, often cited as responsible for the 
low numbers of participants at Women in Black demonstrations occurring at a similar 
time – Tali associates these actions with a kind of “machoism” which mitigates 
against gender equality and the realisation of gay and queer activist agendas.   
Thus Tali’s account may indeed be read for the ways in which gender and sexuality 
intersect with conflict-derived norms in the space of protest; yet so too it might be 
read for race, adding a further layer of complexity.  As Tali identifies forms of “subtle 
oppression” in operation at the Sheikh Jarrah events, race, religion and ethnicity go 
unspoken, however in practice the request that (Jewish Israeli and international) 
women wear “decent clothes” came at the behest of Muslim Palestinian participants 
(Issacharoff 2012).  Correspondingly, when Tali highlights “machoism” above, she 
does so in explicitly racialised terms, first citing it as a characteristic of “Palestinian 
men” at the Bil'in protests and later adding “Jewish demonstrators.”  As well, her 
emphasis on the absence of Palestinian women and the subordination of those other 
women present is significant.  Indeed, while the sexual harassment briefing in Bil’in 
was left free of racial markers, those providing and attending the training shared an 
                                                
37 Interview in Tel Aviv, 28 January 2011; handwritten notes. 
  
 179 
understanding that this phenomenon pertained to the targeting of Jewish Israeli and 
international women by Palestinian men (Issacharoff 2012).  While this creates a 
substantial tension for those feminist activists like Tali who remain invested in 
realising anti-occupation and gender equity platforms together, for many would-be 
participants sexual harassment constitutes a significant deterrent to action, particularly 
as it draws upon prevailing racial stereotypes.  Further demonstrating the 
embeddedness of these new forms of protest within multiple layers of power, Shin Bet 
– the Israeli internal intelligence agency – used the publicity surrounding instances of 
sexual harassment to pressure Jewish Israeli activists prior to a planned “fly in” 
demonstration in April 2012, adapting official methods of deterrence to meet with 
shifting rules of the game (Hass 2012). 
Soldiering   
Upon hearing my tale of the Bil’in demonstration hours later over ice cream in Tel 
Aviv, my boots still smeared with the red dirt of the village, Guy confessed, “I want to 
go even less now – it feels just like the army, with the security briefing, the 
strategising, the gas and the violence.  It’s a game, but also it’s the military.”38  Thus 
arises a differential mode of hegemonic entanglement which frames Jewish Israeli 
political action, as here experiences of military service become enmeshed with 
activism.  Not limited to matters of procedure such as briefings and strategies, 
resistance to ‘soldiering’ often becomes a way of talking about the assertion of 
individual identity in a context of conformity, a means of insisting upon the salience 
of subordinated interests, and a critique of existing hierarchies of power and privilege 
internal to the Jewish Israeli collective.  As militarism collapses the boundary between 
the military and civil society, soldiering extends into everyday life with its affective 
regime, modes of practice and value system, as detailed throughout this thesis.  Citing 
Israel as characterised by “total militarism” inclusive of both professional and civilian 
dimensions, Baruch Kimmerling (2001: 215) writes: 
This characterization [sic] is amply underscored by the overt and latent social 
significance that is attributed to military service, and by the way in which the 
society orients itself toward constant preparation for war, a kind of ‘militarism 
of the mind.’  In this case, the socio-political boundaries of the collectivity are 
                                                
38 Field notes, 6 May 2011. 
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determined and maintained by participation in military service and 
manipulation of the collectivity to sacrifice in order to support the spheres 
classified as belonging to national security. 
While much academic research substantiates these claims to the influence of 
militarism over collectivity boundaries, national belonging and social hierarchies in 
Israel (Sharoni 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997; Lentin 2000; Shafir and Peled 2002; Sasson-
Levy 2003; Jacoby 2005; Yiftachel 2006; Segal 2008),39 Kimmerling’s charge of 
explicit “manipulation” positions Jewish Israeli political actors as largely subject to 
rather than productive of the discourses and practices which grant primacy to national 
security.  Similarly, while Kimmerling (2001: 215, 227-228) asserts that Israel’s 
particular brand of militarism creates that situation in which war-making and peace-
making exist in dialectic relation, the actual behaviours and attitudes binding these 
collective pursuits remain obscured.  In the realms of subjectivity and interpersonal 
relations, both ideological and material dimensions provide the glue which melds war 
and soldiering with ostensible peace.  Yet rather than resulting from manipulation or 
coercion, this diffusion of militarisation provides an illustration of hegemony both 
passively and actively secured, bearing significant implications for resistance and 
opposition. 
Recounted previously as the primary conduit through which the occupation and army 
enter the intimacy of private life – rupturing the ostensible sanctity of family units and 
small worlds – experiences of soldiering continue to impact individuals, families and 
communities beyond the period of active duty.  Indeed, mandatory military service 
remains profoundly normative in Israel, immediately productive of subjectivities 
while its influence extends to political participation, national values and 
institutionalised privilege.  In speaking of the impetus for a recent project, Oded, a 33 
year-old filmmaker living Tel Aviv, articulated the extent to which this normativity 
importantly emerges through gender dimensions: 
[…]  I met an elite [unit] guy.  After the army he went to India to travel and 
when he returned he almost lost his mind.  I understood that this is a terrible 
thing: men are trained in combat to kill, kill, kill.  The Israeli army is moral – 
wait, I believe that the Israeli army is less immoral than the US army or 
                                                
39 The scholarship highlighted here pays particular attention to the ways in which Israeli militarism 
creates and emerges through particular valuations of gender, race, class and sexuality, contributing an 
important intersectional approach to the study of militarism. 
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European armies.  It’s always on the surface, morals.  [They say] “Don’t carry 
out orders blindly, you are not a tool.”  There is actually an ‘absolute illegal 
order,’ which is when your commander tells you to kill, but he doesn’t explain 
it in a way that you find logical – you can refuse.  On paper this is probably as 
good as an army can get.  The problem is that an 18 year-old learns “shoot and 
kill, shoot and kill, shoot and kill” – “oh, but wait until someone gives you a 
good reason.”  Most don’t wait.  They have terrible power in their hands and 
they’re kept ready for action.  I know it, I felt it.  I was too much a coward to 
get carried away with action – I’m happy that I wasn’t in a situation where I 
was about to kill.  I feel bad enough about the experiences I had.   
Anyhow, I started to think here’s a good guy: kind, sensitive, intelligent.  At 
18 he wants to do good.  Ok, so ‘good’ goes to the elite unit to become the 
‘man-est of men,’ to protect the country.  He went, he killed people, it screwed 
his mind.  He comes back to live life in society, to live as a civilian.  No one 
prosecutes him for what he has done – in society he did the ‘right’ thing. . . .  
At a fragile age they take your humanity and give you ‘manhood’ instead. . . .  
You go in a child and come out a man.40 
Notable for the extent to which it seemingly corroborates Kimmerling’s (2001: 215) 
assertion of manipulation, here Oded articulates an experience of ‘shooting and 
crying,’ in effect displacing blame for violence upon the entity educating and issuing 
orders (Kidron 2004; Helman 1999b: 67 fn19).  Importantly, this account clearly 
illustrates how collective morality emerges in tandem with the construction of 
hegemonic masculinity, underwritten by participation in violence.  “Good” not only 
dutifully fulfils his military service, but he does so at the highest level, exposed to the 
greatest degree of sacrifice, required to kill and deserving of prestige; ultimately 
“good” becomes the “man-est of men.”  Yet as Oded voices his opposition to the 
normativity of soldiering, a practice which he feels strips individuals of their 
childhood and humanity in pursuit of “right” and “good,” he judges himself by the 
very normative standards in question, casting himself as a “coward.”  Retrospectively 
pleased with his “inability to get carried away with action” as it shielded him from 
moral imperatives surrounding the decision to kill, in describing his actions as 
‘cowardice’ Oded continues to valuate himself according to normative militant 
manhood (see Sharoni 1995; Lentin 2000; Sasson-Levy 2003; Sasson-Levy, Levy and 
Lomsky-Feder 2011).  
                                                
40 Interview in Tel Aviv, 11 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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This is not to say, however, that individuals who incompletely or unsuccessfully resist 
the normativity of soldiering are subject to or victims of false consciousness, unaware 
that they remain ‘part of it’ even in their opposition; rather, active negotiations may 
constitute a path toward self-definition.  Earlier in our interview, Oded explicitly 
acknowledged the layers of his enmeshment and the constant manoeuvring this 
embeddedness entails, particularly as he now engages in activism:  
KN: You said that you are active in human rights activism – how did you 
become active? 
Oded: It started mostly after the second Lebanon War [in 2006] – it’s all part 
of the same process.  Coming out was part of the process too. . . . after that I 
was able to make choices, it all came together.  Ok, so this situation is fucked 
up and I know it is.  I might as well try to do something about it – if I don’t it 
won’t change.  And if I do maybe it still won’t change, but at least I tried! 
So I started with gay rights, human rights and circles of people who feel like 
myself about issues.  The Anarchists used to have the best parties!  I can’t 
stand lots of people there – they can be as militant and aggressive as the Right-
wing.  This is the thing about Israeli society: brutality.  The belief in power 
goes really deep.  This is how Israelis define themselves as Israeli, as men.  
It’s hard – I’ve only lived here half my life, I grew up in another place.  But 
still these things got deep in to me, through high school and the army.  I’m still 
trying to squeeze it out [of myself].  Like how can I struggle without becoming 
physical?  It’s harder for people who were born here and raised by parents who 
were also raised here.  It defines who you are – you can’t just throw it away.41   
Contextualised within the process of understanding his non-normative sexuality, 
Oded’s will to action remains explicitly framed by multiple dimensions of militarised 
normativity: the narrative ubiquity of war, the “brutality” permeating activism, the 
overriding subscription to power, the definition of ‘Israeli’ as masculine and the 
pedagogical influence of militarised institutions.  Collectively these factors shape 
Oded’s subjectivity, yet importantly he insists upon the availability of choice, marking 
his presence as an agential actor within these conditions of constraint.  Facilitated by 
the becoming-public of his sexual identity, that mentality which was cast as the result 
of manipulation or indoctrination is met with struggle or resistance, as “being part of it” 
becomes a state that might be changed.  Having grown up in Latvia and arriving alone 
to Israel at age 16, Oded importantly uses his lesser degree of belonging as a means of 
                                                
41 Interview in Tel Aviv, 11 April 2011; handwritten notes. 
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qualifying his ability to choose and act – though he relates ‘full Israeliness’ to the 
military service in which he partook, Oded deems his sense of self as bound less 
tightly with militarisation, soldiering and masculinised normativity than for those 
Jewish Israelis born and raised in Israel. 
Thus through Oded’s account the negotiation of identity and experiences of activism 
collapse into militarism, and soldiering emerges as a practice which produces further 
resistance to resistance.  Here, those saturating qualities of militarism which produce 
constructions of masculinity and create normative identities are rejected in the desire 
for individuation and self-definition.  Importantly, this resistance extends from 
experiences of military service to understandings of political action.  Dov, a 35 year-
old artist and DJ living in south Tel Aviv, explicitly traced this connection through his 
reflections: 
I never wanted to be a fighter [in the army]. . . .  I’m a good boy but I don’t 
like inclusive institutions – I don’t like institutions that strip you of your 
identity.  I thought from the beginning that I don’t buy their game, I don’t like 
to be the smallest piece on the chess board to a politician.  That’s what I 
felt. . . .  The army fucked me up big time.   
After serving in an intelligence capacity during the Oslo Years between intifadas – 
stationed at times in the West Bank – Dov clearly articulates his resistance to the 
perceived homogenisation and powerlessness which accompany the military ‘game,’ 
confronting the limits and costs of being a “good boy.”  Yet so too he projects this 
resistance onto activism, including those initiatives which resist the military policies 
and practices which he opposes.  In response to queries around his participation in 
actions against the occupation, Dov stated, “Yeah, I did something, but even in that 
I’m not an infantry soldier, you know what I mean?  I’m not a soldier….  I read 
Ghandi, Martin Luther King.  I don’t believe in war.”42   Not only does Dov connect 
military service and activism through the figure of the willing and dutiful soldier, but 
also he critically situates both within a shared frame of conflict, violence and war.  If 
mandatory conscription produces hegemonic constructions of masculinity as Oded 
and multiple scholars argue (see Sharoni 1995; Lentin 2000; Sasson-Levy 2003; 
Jacoby 2005; Levy and Lomsky-Feder 2011), within the shared frame of war so too 
                                                
42 Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
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dutiful activism produces patterns and hierarchies of gender – “good boys” whose 
loyalty might later be questioned and resisted. 
Importantly, Jewish Israeli men are not alone in expressing resistance toward 
soldiering and its homogenising capacities as they consider participation in 
oppositional action.  Subject to deployment in combat positions and longer terms of 
conscription, many men experience lengthier exposure to the normative pressures of 
military service than their female counterparts; however, Jewish Israeli women also 
pass through this normative institution, which in turn shapes their experiences and 
understandings of activism.  At 30 years old and currently working for a “violence 
reduction” NGO in Tel Aviv, Noa reflected upon her former service as an education 
officer in glowing terms, stating, “This was the first time I felt me, that this is what I 
want to do.”  Charged with the instruction of soldiers in Israeli history and morals – an 
assignment predominantly given to female soldiers – Noa’s position importantly 
exposed her to markedly different conditions from those of the infantry or combat 
units where Dov and Oded served.  Later in our interview Noa spoke about activism 
and the difficulties of finding an outlet for action which suited her, both personally 
and politically:  
In Israel the term ‘activist’ is an automatic label to the political sphere.  
Activists are people who spend their entire life at protests.  I feel my work is 
connected to social change, yes, but not to activism.  In a normal country this 
would be the same, but in Israel activism is peace activism….  I feel the whole 
country, the whole world, is concentrated on the conflict.  “God damn it!”  I 
said, “We need to do something also for ourselves.”  It’s related in a way to 
the occupation….  It’s difficult to find something that you’re not a ‘soldier’ in, 
something where you are yourself.  I don’t feel that something is really me 
except [the NGO] because something changed inside me.  I was looking at the 
Palestinians and their suffering, and also our suffering.  Now I’m looking 
inside society and doing the best I can with my tools.  It’s very tiring to focus 
on the conflict and the occupation.43 
Echoing Dov’s narrative, through her account of action withheld and pursued Noa 
describes her resistance to soldiering as she reacts to the hegemonic entanglement of 
activism with conflict and peace; importantly, however, Noa’s experience of military 
service remains favourably framed, providing her with a sense of self and burgeoning 
interests.  In their commonality, the narratives of Noa and Dov bridge the ostensible 
                                                
43 Interview in Tel Aviv, 31 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
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gap between war and peace in Israel-Palestine, situating these concepts and conditions 
as dialectical within a context of protracted conflict.  For Noa, activism in Israel has 
become defined through and by peace initiatives which emerge as the hegemonic 
frame of political action.  While the qualities associated with hegemonic forms of 
activism in Israel invoke both pacifism and ostensible feminisation as argued 
throughout this chapter, within Noa’s account the wider frame is significant – Noa 
does not stress the specific contours of peace activism, but rather its location within 
conflict.  In this, Noa turns away from activism by paradoxically looking back to the 
Jewish Israeli collective which produces the very figure she rejects: the soldier whose 
masculinised sacrifice in part sustains conflict.  Through identifying her niche for 
action as “work connected to social change,” Noa makes an active choice not only for 
herself, but importantly for Jewish Israeli society as well.  In doing so, she reaffirms 
the hegemonic patterns of gender which shape and reflect a presumed division 
between ‘social’ and ‘political’ realms, the former associated with women in their role 
as reproducers of culture, while the later remains the bastion of men. 
 
Conclusion 
Thus hegemonic patterns of gender emerge as a thread binding conflict with peace and 
problematising the too-neat division between political action and inaction within 
Jewish Israeli society.  Just as war and peace exist inseparable effects of power, so too 
actions taken and withheld – political activism and ostensible apathy – materialise not 
in opposition, but rather bound together as aspects of domination.  As Timothy 
Mitchell (1990: 559) reminds, “It is through the creation of what appears to us as the 
larger binary order of meaning versus reality that the effectiveness of domination is to 
be understood.”  Here, while action and inaction are intended as diverse modes of 
resistance, in reality both differentially reconstitute the status quo, preserving stasis on 
larger social scales.  In complex and sometimes contradictory ways, the initiatives and 
options which constitute what we can do – those actions available to Jewish Israelis 
who oppose Israel’s occupation – thus morph into the question underwriting this 
thesis: Ma la’asot?  What can we do?   
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, diverse modes of action and inaction 
comprise a spectrum which binds activism and apathy within the shared context of 
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conflict, as experiences and understandings indeed converge to secure hegemony 
through both active and passive assent (Gramsci 1971: 52-53).  Through a dynamic 
made visible by employing resistance as a diagnostic of power (Abu-Lughod 1990) 
and considering practice in relation to structure (Mitchell 1990), resistance begets 
resistance – action begets inaction – as it telescopes within an ever-widening frame.  
Embedded within multiple layers of power, everyday forms of resistance may reaffirm 
neoliberalism, conservative politics and prevailing relations of gender, race and class; 
radical feminist activism might produce not provocation, but normalisation and 
routinisation; shifting ‘rules of the game’ may lead to the re-framing of anti-
occupation activism as a bastion of male privilege; and practices of soldiering might 
generate opposition to both military service and political action.   
Within these trends and processes, hegemonic patterns of gender importantly serve to 
structure experiences and understandings, practices and beliefs, meanings and 
materiality, providing a baseline of constancy while permitting dynamism.  As actions 
taken and withheld by Jewish Israeli women and men largely reconfirm the gendered 
norms, relations, codes and roles prescribed by Zionist narratives, these patterns 
respond to changing values and conditions.  In this, a “new breed” of radical activists 
might indeed be constructed as ‘gender sensitive’ – explicitly addressing sexual 
harassment at demonstrations – while at the same time disavowing the perceived prior 
feminisation of political protest, effectively bolstering the existing gender relations 
which subordinate ‘women’ to ‘men’ and ‘feminine’ to ‘masculine,’ in addition to 
entrenching racial stereotypes.  Thus as forms of resistance adapt to meet new rules 
and roles, they produce not only the terms of their own opposition, but also those 
hegemonic patterns underwriting the seeming binary orders which drive conflict and 
falsely divide action from inaction in a context of domination.  
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Chapter Five 
Protesting Politics – Ha’Am Doresh…  [The People Demand] 
 
‘Ha’am!  Doresh!  Tsedek chevrati!’  The people demand social justice!  The cry 
preceded its mass as we stood in shock along side Tel Aviv’s Ibn Gavirol Street in 
July 2011.  Sceptical, cynical and curious, Guy and I were attending the second 
‘official’ demonstration of Israel’s nascent housing protests as observers rather than 
participants, for the first time taking part in a political event with some degree of 
passivity.  Initiated by university students on 14 July 2011 in response to the rising 
cost of housing in Tel Aviv, the protests had electrified and magnetised Jewish Israeli 
society, bringing to action many of those interview participants and personal friends 
who had – until now – cast themselves as politically avoidant, reluctant or inactive.  
First watching the protests gather momentum from the distance of a short trip to 
London, we felt at turns frustrated and ambivalent, witnessing those who we would 
see moved to participate in anti-occupation, anti-racism and anti-discrimination 
activism join protests centred around the cost of living.  
Yet here we were in the humid Tel Aviv night air, standing on the shores of a living 
sea which would soon engulf us too, as the tide of humanity surged to forcibly blur the 
boundary between participants and observers.  Waiting for the protest to move from 
its start in Habima Square toward the Tel Aviv museum, the streets were filled with an 
energy, vitality and creativity unknown to me from previous protests.  Indeed, the 
sheer numbers of participants streaming uninterrupted toward the meeting point 
marked something decidedly different about this demonstration.  This flow continued 
unabated until suddenly the steady wave of foot-traffic doubled back on itself, 
reversing direction.  The demonstration had begun and it was impossible for 
latecomers to fall into line behind the banners; instead, they simply turned to walk in 
their great numbers before the organised front line.   
Generating deafening, raucous, unorganized noise, the body of the crowd bore down 
upon us.  The sound of drums banging, whistles shrieking, voices screaming not 
words but sheer anger, hands and feet colliding with whatever made sound nearby – 
this filled the air to a decibel I had yet to experience anywhere.  Homemade signs 
were in full effect with inspired banners and colourful posters waving high above the 
crowd, nearly one in every five participants carrying something original which voiced 
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her specific demand or message.  Absent were the prepared plastic signs of the 
political parties with their official slogans; present were tens of thousands of personal 
connections to this demonstration and the declared issues at hand.  People were fed up, 
needed a release, wanted social change and they were going be certain that their 
concerted voices were heard.  The chants began in earnest with thousands of voices in 
unison rising at top lung capacity – gone were the feeble, self-conscious declarations 
which typified even the recent Jewish Israeli-Palestinian solidarity march in Jerusalem.  
The night air was filled with cries: “An entire generation demands a future!  Hoo-haa, 
here comes the welfare state!  The people demand social justice!”  “Social justice – do 
they even know what that means?”  I later asked as we left the demonstration, walking 
through the remnants of what looked and felt like an enormous street party.  At the 
moment it mattered little – social justice was what together the people wanted.1 
However, as the protests hollered and crashed, laughed and sang, chanted and 
demanded in voices individual and collective in the humid Tel Aviv night air, the 
strident call for change simultaneously spelled the perpetuation of stasis.  Here 
political actors sought transformation as their actions targeted the policies, practices 
and relations of power deemed most significant to everyday life.  Seemingly more 
contestable and ‘solvable’ than the matters of conflict and occupation widely 
associated with politics in Israel-Palestine, in the summer of 2011 Jewish Israelis 
temporarily inverted the national prioritisation of security.  Ordinarily masked by a 
focus on impending or active threats of violence, domestic concerns gained centre 
stage during these summer months, ostensibly highlighting the social and economic 
divisions elided and maintained by previous deferment for issues of conflict.  Yet 
ultimately this inversion served to reproduce and bolster existing relations of power, 
entrenching the popular meaning and space of ‘politics’ while defining government as 
its sole arbiter. 
In looking to the 2011 summer of protests in Israel, the critical theorisations of Lila 
Abu-Lughod (1990) and Timothy Mitchell (1990) engaged in the preceding chapter 
offer tempting and applicable frames through which to consider the meaning and 
economy of political action.  Here resistance may indeed again become a diagnostic of 
                                                
 
1 Field notes, 30 July 2011. 
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power, as practice and structure emerge inseparable in the production and 
maintenance of domination.  Yet the 2011 protests merit specific attention in so far as 
they present a microcosm in which to judge how political protest may be 
depoliticising, revealing a critical distinction between acts which are world-making 
versus world changing (Berlant 2008: 269-270), as aspirational normality and political 
action converge.  Through gender analysis, a practice of ‘apolitical politics’ emerges 
as central to protestors’ targets and agendas, entrenching those presumed binary 
orders in which domination takes root.  Here, a carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1984 [1968]) 
suspension of national priorities ultimately reaffirmed private as separate from public, 
social as separate from political, ‘us’ as separate from ‘them’ and ‘here’ as separate 
from ‘there.’  Critically, the temporary inversion of gender norms and codes served to 
structure this renewed political action – its promises, practices and meanings – while 
at the same time providing a means through which ‘politics’ could become apolitical.  
In this shift and subsequent return to the status quo, protest participants and supporters 
effectively reified Israeli state sovereignty and with it the prevailing gender norms, 
codes, roles and relations which structure domination.  Drawing together the gendered 
constructs, mechanisms and dynamics detailed within the preceding four chapters, this 
chapter responds to a critical query posed by Maya Mikdashi (2009): “When we 
surrender politics to the politicians, what are we doing?” 
 
Rothschild pinat [corner of] Tahrir 
Days after the first tent was erected on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv (Sherwood 
2011) – a site symbolic of the city’s history and wealth (Mann 2001) – I departed 
Israel-Palestine with Guy for a short trip to London, leaving behind the nascent 
protests with a shrug of the shoulders and the assumption that, as is common to the 
cycle in Israel, before long those assembled would dissipate.  Following on the heels 
of a Facebook-led boycott of cottage cheese, which resulted in the lowering of prices 
for this staple Ashkenazi breakfast food (Zrahiya, Rozenberg, Lis and Cohen 2011; 
Connolly 2011),2 the protests relied heavily upon social media for the transmission of 
                                                
2 The ethno-national contours of this protest were explicitly made visible on a popular Israeli late night 
comedy programme, as when asked about his views regarding the cottage cheese protest Palestinian 
MK Ahmed Tibi shrugged and replied, “We don’t eat cottage [cheese] for breakfast – we eat labneh.”  
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grievances and agendas, mirroring the mobilisation strategies adopted by activists in 
uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa.  Indeed, in addition to the popular 
movement in Egypt from which the protests adopted their name and Twitter hashtag – 
‘the July 14 movement’ or #J14 – Israeli protestors were also influenced by the 
Indignants movement in Spain, anarchist and anti-capitalist protests in Greece and 
later the global ‘Occupy’ movements which emerged from Canada.  Together, these 
events and political actions directly inspired the main protest slogan, practices adopted 
by the protestors, and messages displayed on signs posted at tent encampments and 
carried during demonstrations, among them “Rothschild pinat [corner of] Tahrir,” 
“Walk Like an Egyptian,” and “Go! Egypt is here.”3 
As I regarded the events from the relative calm of Islington, London, the tent dwellers’ 
protest gathered momentum and produced its first organised demonstration on 23 July, 
attracting 20-40,000 participants who made their way from an encampment on 
Habima Square to the Tel Aviv museum (Gelbfish 2011; Lior 2011; Reider 2011).  
Unlike an earlier impromptu demonstration which corresponded with the appearance 
of the first tents, upon arriving at the final destination this time protestors followed 
routine protocol by completing their march with an organised rally, including speakers 
who addressed the crowd from a well-lit and amplified stage.  Yet in a move which 
would become characteristic of the housing protests, those ‘officially’ voicing the call 
for change importantly did not include politicians, though a number of Left-wing 
Knesset members (MKs) were present among the group assembled.  Rather, the 
primary voices and faces of the 2011 summer of protests in Israel were to be two 
young women: Daphne Leef, the Tel Aviv University film student whose actions 
catalysed the summer’s events, and Stav Shaffir, now an MK with the long-
established Labour Party (Lior 2011; Lis 2013).  Though leadership was shared more 
widely with other young Jewish Israelis (Schechter 2012), Leef and Shaffir became 
the unofficial spokeswomen for the protests, and their visibility and audibility – their 
political presence and voice – importantly signalled an inversion of (masculinised) 
‘politics as usual.’  
 
                                                
3 Field notes, 1 August 2011 and 6 August 2011. 
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Summarising ‘Social Justice’ 
Displaying a commitment to grass-roots leadership and creative protest while 
generating impressively high numbers of participation, the housing protests 
commanded national attention onward from the July 23 rally as participants 
articulated a collective demand for ‘social justice.’  As the protests quickly spread 
from Tel Aviv to cities and towns throughout Israel proper (Sheen 2011b), leaders and 
participants remained focused on two primary modes of action bolstered by social 
networks and growing mainstream media attention: tent encampments and regular 
demonstrations, both taking place in common public spaces.  However, this brief 
depiction of the protests’ expansion and mobilisation perhaps presents a too-tidy 
portrait of the summer’s events and their manners of generating individual and 
collective participation.4  Despite the overall framing of the protests as led by and 
largely representative of middle-class (Ashkenazi) youth, multiple meanings became 
ascribed to the housing protestors’ demand for ‘social justice,’ increasingly binding 
together a diverse body of participants.  Importantly, this inclusivity and appeal 
prompted some commentators to draw connections between the 2011 protests and the 
agenda advanced by the Mizrahi Black Panthers in the 1970s (Sheen 2011b; 
Ahronovitz 2011).  Founded by Jewish Israelis of Middle Eastern and North African 
ancestry who recognised and opposed their treatment as second class citizens in Israel 
(Massad 1996: 61-62), these political actors “[…] called for the destruction of the 
regime and for the legitimate rights of all the oppressed without regard to religion, 
origin or nationality” (Shohat 1988: 29).  The political, social and economic agenda of 
the Mizrahi Black Panthers – significantly expressed in solidarity with Palestinians 
(Shohat 1988: 31; Massad 1996: 63) – targeted not only state policies and practices, 
but also the relations underwriting power and privilege in Jewish Israeli society.  
Though more radical than the 2011 protests, the Mizrahi Black Panthers’ platform was 
similarly inclusive of diverse parties with multiple claims and interests within Israel; 
yet unlike the recent Ashkenazi-led demonstrations, the Panthers met with violent 
state repression, coercion and a government campaign aimed expressly at their 
delegitimisation (Shohat 1988; Massad 1996; Lavie 2011).  Ultimately, and again 
much like the trajectory of the 2011 protests, rather than forcibly denying all demands 
                                                
4 For an analysis of the protests’ relative disorder, particularly at the Rothschild Boulevard site, see 
Thom 2011.  
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articulated by the Panthers, the Israeli establishment selectively addressed and 
appropriated concerns, resulting in the eventual disbanding of the movement and the 
absorption of its leadership into existing political parties (Massad 1996: 64; Lavie 
2011: 67).5    
Significantly, despite a similarly inclusive platform the 2011 protests assumed a less 
threatening façade, as ‘social justice’ became a broad “summarising symbol” (Ortner 
1973) importantly articulated by members of the dominant social sector, in part 
recollecting the approach of Women in Black, a prominent Jewish Israeli feminist 
protest group (see Helman and Rapoport 1997; Sasson-Levy and Rapoport 2003).  As 
Sherry Ortner (1973: 1339) writes, summarising symbols are “[…] those symbols 
which are seen as summing up, expressing, representing for the participants in an 
emotionally powerful and relatively undifferentiated way, what the system means to 
them.”6  Operating under the pretext of generality, the inclusive framing of these 
symbols allows for and arises through the presence of a multiplicity of meanings.  
Here, rather than defining and locating a variety of precise targets for resistance, 
summarising symbols generate action through remaining relative open and permitting 
of membership.  As Orna Sasson-Levy and Tamar Rapoport (2003: 390-391) 
highlight with regard to Israel’s Women in Black, “The summarising nature of the 
homogenous message – ‘Stop the Occupation’ – enabled each woman to maintain 
zealously her individual political interpretation and position, while outwardly 
preserving a united front.”7  At the same time, the 2011 protests paired this context-
specific broad framing with recognisable regional uprisings, as Egyptian Tahrir 
Square’s “The people want to topple the regime” morphed into “The people demand 
social justice” (Kashua 2011a), a recognisably Israeli version of the demand for 
change.  Having witnessed the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt along with the reactions 
                                                
5 Following the 2011 protests against the cost of living in Israel, protest leaders Stav Shaffir and 
Daphne Leef became differentially involved with the Israeli government; while Shaffir was elected to 
the Knesset as a member of the Labour Party in 2013, Leef travelled to the UK in 2012 in conjunction 
with the government’s hasbara or ‘information’ programme to challenge ‘Israeli Apartheid Week’ (see 
Lis 2013 and Glaser 2012). 
 
6 Different from “elaborating symbols” which order experience (Ortner 1973: 1340), summarising 
symbols draw together a complex system of ideas under a unitary mode of representation, reducing 
differentiation in the interest of cohesion.  
 
7 In their research with Women in Black, Sara Helman and Tamar Rapoport (1997: 688-689) 
additionally cite the group’s lack of “ideological deliberation” as key to “maximis[ing] enlistment” and 
crystallising the “distinction between those within the demonstration and those outside it.” 
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of distrust and fear displayed by both the Israeli government and the majority of 
Jewish Israelis, many activists feared that the transformative potential of the 
neighbouring movements might bypass Israel altogether (Ravid 2011).  Thus what 
began as housing protests expanded to become social protests through employing and 
activating multiple sites of appeal, simultaneously linking to Israel’s history of 
political protest and contemporary political movements. 
However, beyond the appeal of summarising symbols and recent regional uprisings, 
Jewish Israeli protestors needed to generate participation, principally secured through 
fostering a sense of commitment and investment.  As importantly highlighted by 
Ortner (1973: 1342), summarising symbols bind systems of meaning with emotion, 
centralising the symbol’s “[…] focusing power, its drawing-together, intensifying, 
catalysing impact upon the respondent.”  Rather than organising thought or prompting 
action, these symbols crystallise commitment and catalyse feelings, speaking 
primarily to attitude (Ortner 1973: 1342-1343).  While in part capitalising on the 
enormous affective impact of regional events both ‘successful’ and violently repressed, 
participants in Israel’s social protests generated participation by creating an 
atmosphere unique to the Israeli setting yet reminiscent of differential places, times 
and struggles.   
Two days after my first experience of Israel’s social protest demonstrations, I stepped 
into Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard tent encampment in hopes of experiencing its 
energy more directly.  During a brief prior visit to the site, I had been impressed by 
the coexistence of organisation with chaotic revelry before the night’s protest, as 
groups excitedly readied colourful hand-made signs in a public space newly rendered 
quasi-private.  Now in daylight, I passed the Israeli flags which adorned the main 
organising tent at the head of Rothschild Boulevard near Habima Square, noting the 
small poster reading ‘Gilad adayn chai’ [Gilad (Shalit) is still alive’] with its blue and 
white Stars of David and images of a then-hostage soldier;8 together, these icons and 
symbols provided an immediate sense of the limits at and within which the protests 
might operate.  Beyond this logistical space – here a blackboard declared the day’s 
schedule of meetings – the encampment’s central infrastructure unfolded: the first aid 
                                                
8 In 2006, Jewish Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured on the border with the Gaza Strip and held 
captive for five years.  During this time a media campaign galvanised public support for efforts to 
pressure the government into securing his release and Shalit became a national symbol; see Cohen 2011. 
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tent staffed by Physicians for Human Rights, a broadcast and transmission station for 
the popular Army radio station ‘Galatz,’ and the massive kitchen area operated by the 
organised protestors.  From here orderly rows of tents covered the centre and edges of 
the boulevard, as the largely identical grey make of structures branded ‘Outdoor 
Revolution’ was interrupted by pedestrian aisles, communal living spaces and hand-
drawn expressions of motivation, discontent and desire. 
Importantly, while orderliness prevailed in the sections of the Rothschild encampment 
closest to the kitchen and organising areas, it gradually diminished as I walked the 
length of the boulevard toward Allenby Street away from Habima Square.  In large 
part a product of the protestors’ conviction that the encampment should be long-term, 
this degree of organisation conveyed a belief that orderliness generated both 
sustainability and appeal.  Yet the impression of tidiness was also produced through 
the municipality’s regular deployment of sanitation workers, many of whom are black 
African migrants – in this, the social protest encampment benefitted from and 
reinforced racialised patterns of labour.  Indeed, when the remaining encampments in 
Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were forcibly dismantled in September 2011, images 
circulating in the mainstream press depicted black African (male) contracted workers 
evicting Jewish Israeli protestors and demolishing their structures, potentially 
bolstering existing prejudices.  Interestingly, while also orderly, the tent encampment 
in Tel Aviv’s Levinsky Park– located in an area of south Tel Aviv now home to much 
of the city’s African migrant population and historically inhabited by working class 
Mizrahi Jews – was less maintained by the municipality and subject to frequent 
evacuation and demolition beginning in July (ACRI 2011b).  This disparity was 
likewise replicated between Jerusalem’s Horse and Independence parks, as more 
affluent protestors populated the former during the summer of 2011, while largely 
working class and impoverished or homeless protest participants inhabited the latter 
(Levy 2011a).  Here, the platform ostensibly shared with the Mizrahi Black Panthers 
of the 1970s dissolved, as the 2011 protests not only left key relations of power and 
privilege intact, but also in part depended upon their perpetuation. 
Back on Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard, with camera in hand I made my way 
through the rows of dwellings and interests, arriving to the corner of HaHashmona’im 
Street where the ‘Migdal Ha'Am’ [Tower of the People] adorned with Israeli flags 
faced an enormous heart-shaped arch erected by the ‘Love Revolution’ and the small 
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number of structures which constituted ‘Tent 1948,’ an attempt to bring together 
Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel.  Here, the multiplicity of messages and 
agendas seemed less a source of strength than an indicator of the extent to which 
‘social justice’ constituted an empty signifier, as the protests’ summarising symbol 
and rallying cry appeared in constant need of filling up.  As I recorded images, a man 
aged in his 60s approached me and asked, “Ma at choshevet al kol ze?” [What do you 
think of all this?].  Assuming that he had mistaken me for a reporter, I responded 
evasively that I found the encampment interesting and somehow beautiful with its 
creativity, hope and energy.  My interlocutor replied, “But there’s a problem here.  At 
night all these young people are drinking beer, dancing, singing, talking about love – I 
see it on television!  It’s starting to be a problem.”  He shook his head, “It’s becoming 
like Woodstock.”  “But it’s also supposed to be fun, isn’t it?” I asked.  This produced 
a snort of contempt:  
“It’s fun.”  This is no Woodstock, you understand?  Woodstock was a party 
yes… but it was around the Vietnam War, it had Jimi Hendrix, it had The Doors.  
I’ve seen The Doors!  These young people here don’t know what Woodstock 
was. 
A friend asked me a few years ago if I wanted to go with him to see The Doors 
play, but how is it The Doors without Jim Morrison?  That isn’t The Doors!  
You understand? And this isn’t Woodstock – they had Hendrix, Morrison…9 
 
In a matter of minutes, “It’s becoming like Woodstock” morphed into “This is no 
Woodstock,” as a statement of negatively judged similarity shifted to become one of 
inadequacy, appearing a reversal of the previous claim.  Yet rather than revealing 
contradiction, this commentary constitutes a significant statement about the deliberate 
act of distancing undertaken by the protestors: ‘politics’ would remain absent from 
their discourse and platform.  Situating the authenticity of Woodstock within the 
wider context of protests against the Vietnam War, this observer of Israel’s largest 
tent encampment found the site, actors and agenda lacking specifically in political 
terms, as symbols and practices were incompletely appropriated.  Here the drinking, 
dancing, singing and love which characterised and popularised the American protest 
are stripped of both meaning and transformative potential within the depoliticised 
                                                
9 Field notes, 1 August 2011. 
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context created by protestors in Tel Aviv, despite the presence of signs reading 
‘Mahapecha’ [Revolution].  Equivalent to The Doors without Jim Morrison and 
Woodstock without the Vietnam War, the social protests assumed a form more akin to 
carnivalesque, as a “pathos of change and renewal” (Bakhtin 1984 [1968]: 11) 
became the mask beneath which politics could be expunged. 
The Politics of Carnivalesque 
According to Mikhail Bakhtin (1984 [1968]: 7): 
Carnival… does not acknowledge any distinction between actors and 
spectators. . . .  Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, 
and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people.  While 
carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it.   
With boundaries indeed blurred between participants and observers as recounted in 
the opening of this chapter, Israel’s protests were “lived in” by the many Jewish 
Israelis who found space however small within social justice for their individual 
interests and claims, becoming absorbed by the life within.  More carefully 
constructed than was readily apparent during my first experience of the 
demonstrations, the inner life of the protests resonated with the qualities of energetic 
possibility ascribed to carnival by Bakhtin (1984 [1968]: 10), replete with new modes 
of communication and the ostensible suspension of hierarchies.  However, as 
formulated by Bakhtin (1984 [1968]: 10) carnivalesque explicitly exists as a 
“temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order.”10  
With an eventual return to the “old order” after the cessation of carnival, the very 
“change and renewal” made possible proves impermanent (Weichselbaumer 2010), as 
like Ortner’s (1973) summary symbols Bakhtin’s pathos targets emotion without 
necessary implications for sustained thought or action.  Thus the “feast of becoming” 
(Bakhtin 1984 [1968]: 10) arises and functions through concealment as much as 
potential, raising the question of how the carnivalesque might trivialise or elide 
relations of power while permitting of subversion (Weichselbaumer 2010).  
In the case of Israel’s 2011 summer of protest, this concealment or masking emerged 
not as an incidental by-product of the emotive atmosphere, but rather an integral 
                                                
10 Emphasis added. 
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aspect of the protestors’ strategies aimed at garnering appeal, strength and longevity.  
As Bakhtin’s (1984 [1968]) momentary carnivalesque can only be incompletely 
decoupled from the reality of the “old order,” so too the Israeli protests remained 
bound with their wider context through discourse and practice, though selectively so.  
Here the deliberate splitting off and avoidance of ‘politics’ – the erasure of Vietnam 
from Woodstock – created a platform from which to generate a critical mass, melding 
the economic concerns of the early housing protests with broader ‘social’ interests of a 
dissatisfied public. Importantly, this apparent division between politics and those 
interests deemed economic and social was underwritten by hegemonic patterns of 
gender in both their suspension and reproduction.  Throughout the protests, the 
separation of ‘the political’ from ‘the economic’ and ‘the social’ framed calls for 
social justice, as leaders and participants routinely renounced contextually defined 
politics in favour of those agendas they felt ordinarily obscured or subsumed.  In 
gendered terms, this reversal was paramount to prioritising issues constructed as 
feminine or feminised over those deemed masculine or masculinised; here, calls for 
domestic transformation – lower costs of housing, groceries and childcare coupled 
with increased budgets for education, social welfare and medical systems – trumped 
the primacy of inter-national concerns rooted in perceptions of threat and security.  
One protestor, a young man then dwelling on Rothschild Boulevard, made clear the 
terms of this apparent subversion:  
This isn’t about who loves Palestinians and who hates Palestinians. . . .  Yes, 
this is political.  It is political.  But it isn’t political in the way that we’re used to 
talking about politics in Israel.  The biggest criticism we face is the accusation 
that we are all ‘Leftists.’  Yes, we’re Leftists, but this is the social and economic 
Left, not the political Left.   
We’re very careful to not be Right or Left, but we are social and economic Left.  
In the end, however, it will have to become political because that’s where 
change happens.11 
As defined by this speaker, here politics relates tightly to one’s stance regarding 
Palestinians, raising the masculinised spectres of conflict and violence popularly 
associated with ‘the political’ among Jewish Israelis (Mendel 2013).  Yet as this 
understanding prevailed, the young man on Rothschild Boulevard demonstrates how 
                                                
11 Field notes, 1 August 2011. 
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political labels of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ may be detached and reaffixed, transferred from 
politics to economic and social realms in a move which apparently leaves little residue.  
Importantly, in creating the potential to realise oneself as politically conservative yet 
economically and socially ‘Leftist,’ protestors effectively widened their popular base 
by drawing ostensibly clear boundaries and stipulating that politics must be left at the 
door – here inclusion and exclusion operate together to increase appeal.  However, at 
the same time as the speaker reaffirms the prevailing meaning of politics-as-conflict, 
he ultimately evokes political process – read as governance or formal politics – as the 
site “where change happens” and the practice with which protestors must eventually 
engage.  Politics is thus splintered, conceptually detached from social and economic 
issues yet practically remaining the forum for transformation.   
As the social protests of 2011 developed throughout the summer months, this 
bifurcation came to characterise protestors’ discourses, practices, platforms and 
agendas, effectively affirming and re-inscribing the prevailing meaning and space of 
politics through resistance or opposition.  Yet in this, protestors not only bolstered 
existing valuations of political/social, but also they reinforced those ostensible binary 
orders and gendered codes which characterise divisions of masculine/feminine, 
international/domestic, conflict/peace and ‘Right/Left’ in Israel.  As made clear in the 
account above, ‘Leftist’ was openly wielded as a largely pejorative term during those 
summer months, even when distanced from popular understandings of politics 
(Mendel 2013).12  Here, the assumed feminisation implied by Leftist pro-peace 
platforms – “who loves Palestinians” – stands apart from the elevation of social or 
domestic matters, also considered ‘feminised’ within prevailing popular discourses.  
Thus in abjuring both ‘Left’ as a political label and ‘politics’ read as concerns around 
masculinised inter-national conflict, the protests produced a form of depoliticisation 
which maintained exiting hierarchies, patterns and meanings.  Here gender would 
become the mask of carnivalesque, as the temporary subversion of hegemonic norms, 
                                                
12 Importantly, as argued by Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder (2011: 749-750), the accusation of 
being politically “Leftist” in Jewish Israeli society produces a silencing effect, described by the authors 
in the context of military service:  
 
The women soldiers, combatants and noncombatants alike, stated that they did not speak up 
during their service because of the very real fear of being socially ostracized, labeled [sic], 
identified as one-sided, as well as due to a sense of weakness and being in the minority. . . .  
The few who dared raise even the most measured criticism were marked as leftists and 
informers, were socially ostracized, and had to pass more initiation rites than others to prove 
their loyalty to the army and the state. 
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codes, roles and relations allowed wider political realities to remain intact.  However, 
this de-coupling of ‘politics’ from popular protest in Israel is not unique to the 2011 
social protests.  Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of the Arba 
Emahot [Four Mothers] campaign against the deployment of Israeli troops in Lebanon, 
an explicit shift toward depoliticisation may increase legitimacy while simultaneously 
resonating with perceived feminisation within the Jewish Israeli public sphere, 
paradoxically generating an apolitical politics of protest.  So too the strategic 
employment of Women in Black’s summary symbol – ‘Dai laKibbush’ [End the 
Occupation] – produces a mode of depoliticised politics, if differentially so.  Framed 
less in terms of legitimacy than appeal, as Sasson-Levy and Rapoport (2003: 391) 
claim, “The relatively long-term duration of Women in Black may be attributed in 
large part to its deliberate avoidance of any collective ideological elaboration of the 
political message, protest practices, or the vigil in general. . . .  [T]he avoidance may 
be regarded as a protest practice that enabled the inclusion of as many women as 
possible in the vigil.”  Then through these complex dynamics arises the possibility 
that avoidance may become an integral aspect of mobilisation, a strategy which 
depoliticises while facilitating and strengthening commitment.  
Israel’s Intimate Public 
Importantly, during the summer of 2011 avoidance and depoliticisation explicitly 
combined with collective aspiration for “the good life,” those material conditions 
imagined to underwrite normalcy in contexts less subject to conflict and political 
violence.  In their ostensibly apolitical frame the social protests might thus be read as 
generative of an “intimate public,” a domain which thrives in proximity to the 
political yet ultimately remains ambivalent about politics (Berlant 2008: x).  In a 
manner similar to summarising symbols (Ortner 1973) and carnivalesque (Bakhtin 
1984 [1968]), intimate publics explicitly draw upon emotion as both catalyst and 
agent of cohesion, creating within or beside the dominant public sphere a differential 
space of belonging and action.  As Lauren Berlant (2008: 10) writes: 
A public is intimate when it foregrounds affective and emotional attachments 
located in fantasies of the common, the everyday, and a sense of ordinariness, a 
space where the social world is rich with anonymity and local recognitions, and 
where challenging and banal conditions of life take place in proximity to the 
attentions of power but also squarely in the radar of a recognition that can be 
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provided by other humans. 
Central to intimate publics are sociality and affirmation practiced next to larger 
matrices of power, constituted through these relations yet importantly not determined 
thereby.  Deemed “juxtapolitical” by Berlant (2008: 10), this proximate location of 
intimate publics provides “relief from the political” in contexts where “[…] the 
political sphere is more often seen as a field of threat, chaos, degradation, or 
retraumatisation than a condition of possibility” (Berlant 2008: 11), a description 
which mirrors many Jewish Israeli protestors’ assessment of political life in Israel.   
Providing more personal impetus for the avoidance highlighted above, intimate 
publics importantly straddle the porous boundary between public and private spheres.  
Again parallels to the Israeli context arise as Berlant (2008: 3) claims, “[…] generally 
intimate publics … [flourish] in proximity to the political because the political is 
deemed an elsewhere managed by elites who are interested in reproducing the 
conditions of their objective superiority, not in the well-being of ordinary people or 
life-worlds.”  Framed by the inclusion of Israel within the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010 (Ravid 2010), the resilience of the 
Israeli economy during the recent global economic downturn (Bassock 2011), and the 
continuing dominance of select Jewish Israeli business families (Ben-David and 
Wainer 2010), protest leaders and participants indeed foregrounded the concerns of 
‘ordinary people’ vis-à-vis the economic and political elite, those now-targeted 
‘tycoons’ and politicians.  Yet despite ostensibly instating division, intimate publics 
rely on boundary collapse and an ultimately incomplete separation from the political. 
As Berlant (2008: x) writes of juxtapolitical “women’s culture” in the United States, 
“[…] [it] thrives in proximity to the political, occasionally crossing over in political 
alliance, even more occasionally doing some politics, but most often not, acting as a 
critical chorus that sees the expression of emotional response and conceptual 
recalibration as achievement enough.”13  While this is not to claim that Israel’s social 
protests of 2011 and American “women’s culture” exist in analogous terms of relation, 
the contours of political ambivalence in one context may serve to demystify another.  
Productive of both emotional response and conceptual recalibration as seen in the 
accounts above, success or “achievement” in the context of the Israeli protests can 
                                                
13 Emphasis in original text. 
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thus be read not solely in goals outlined and subsequently attained, but in the creation 
of an intimate public. Indeed, it is possible “[…] to understand the flourishing of the 
social to one side of the political as something other than a failure to be politics” 
(Berlant 2008: 24-25) while at the same time as asking what those terms of thriving 
might do in political terms. 
Importantly, the intimate public specific to the social protests of 2011 emerges in 
specifically gendered terms, reflecting the norms, relations, roles and codes specific to 
the Israeli context and its national narrative.  As described above, despite a disavowal 
of contextually defined politics the protests indeed remained political in their 
articulation of collective interests, democratic procedure and interface with authority. 
However, these permitted politics were pursued and practiced in a manner markedly 
different from conventional experiences of the political in Israel. Writing in Ha’aretz 
during the summer of protests, journalist Bradley Burston (2011) confirms this claim: 
From an Israeli standpoint, the most radical act of this newborn revolution has 
already taken place. In a country where, whether on serious television 
roundtables or the Knesset floor, discourse is defined as everyone screaming 
simultaneously, the ‘Tent People’ have adopted a system that sanctifies listening 
and respect. When a speaker is addressing the group, crowd members respond 
not with interjection but with sign language – raised, fluttering hands signify 
agreement, crossed fists show disapproval, and a rolling of both hands means 
the speaker is going on and on without making a point. 
While seeking not to essentialise or reify either masculinity or femininity, these then-
formerly aggressive and confrontational modes of communication – “everyone 
screaming simultaneously” – arise in part from active processes of masculinisation 
and Israel’s “military-masculine hegemony” (Lentin 2000: 188, 217). Linked to 
Israel’s conditions of “total militarism” (Kimmerling 2001: 214) and evocative of the 
hegemonic ‘Sabra’ figure – the tough native-born Israeli constructed in response to 
the perceived feminisation of Jews in diaspora and during the Second World War  
(Sharoni 1995: 41; Lentin 2000: 198-201; Katz 2003: 21)14 – during the summer 
protests masculinised political practices were replaced by ones ostensibly more 
feminine, characterised by “listening and respect.”  Again signalling the significance 
                                                
14 Though concerned with Jewish masculinity more widely than Israeli ‘Sabra’ identity, Daniel 
Boyarin’s (1997) work is incredibly instructive here as it elucidates the foundation against and upon 
which hegemonic Jewish Israeli masculinity has been built. 
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of shared discourses and practices of protest, this reaction to the perceived machismo 
of politics was paralleled in the Occupy and anti-globalisation movements from which 
Israeli protestors borrowed. 
Yet simultaneously, this newly ‘feminised’ political practice in Israel was itself cast in 
opposition to that same diasporic figure which produced the Sabra and the 
masculinisation of politics.  Referred to in Yiddish as a ‘freier’ – a ‘sucker’ whose 
masculinity is called into question by his lack of wits15 – this figure was at times 
invoked by protestors as an illustration of what/who they were not, as they asserted for 
themselves a differential mode of resistant masculinity.  “Pit’om anachnu lo freierim 
yoter” [‘Suddenly we aren’t freiers anymore’] appeared on signs posted at the 
Rothschild Boulevard encampment and carried in protests, while at the final Tel Aviv 
demonstration the popular band HaDag Nachash performed a song containing the 
repeated refrain “Anachnu betach lo freierim” [‘We are definitely not freiers’].16  
Thus the reviled emasculated Jew of the diaspora was brought squarely into protest 
discourse and iconography.  Historically, this diasporic figure’s ostensible impotence, 
weakness and lawfulness have been situated as central to the construction of ‘native 
Israeliness,’ clearly discernable in both the militarised ‘Sabra’ motif and masculinised 
political practices (Sharoni 1995; Lentin 2000; Katz 2003).  However, as Simona 
Sharoni (2005 [1994]), Daniel Boyarin (1997) and Carol Bardenstein (1998) 
demonstrate in their analyses, the constitution and deployment of the supposedly 
oppositional anti-freier figure remains complex and contradictory.  Here gender roles 
constructed in correspondence with the masculinised ‘New Jew’ shift during wartime 
to support the national effort (Sharoni 2005 [1994]: 243); Jewish masculinity 
additionally arises in opposition to the perceived hyper-masculinity of goyim or non-
Jews (Boyarin 1997: 4-5); and the cactus from which the Jewish Israeli ‘Sabra’ takes 
its name (Opuntia ficus-Indica) is a symbol shared by Palestinians as a marker of 
resistant steadfastness and resilience (Bardenstein 1998: 11-14).  In keeping with this 
complexity, while Jewish Israeli protestors engaged in and advocated for more 
‘feminised’ political practices during the summer of 2011, they rejected ostensible 
feminisation by insisting upon shared purchase in the acceptably masculinised ‘Sabra’ 
                                                
15 For a discussion of the freier figure in Israeli politics see Ilan 2007. 
 
16 Field notes, 3 September 2011. 
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paradigm.  Though practiced in contradistinction to the screaming and interjection 
which characterise dominant modes of masculinised political practice, this new 
politics ultimately fed back into existing norms as the feminine remained subject to 
devaluation, leaving existing systems of meaning largely intact. 
As prevailing gender norms and political codes were reinforced, appropriated and 
selectively transgressed in pursuit of social justice, these negotiations and 
contestations largely obeyed the ‘non-political’ frame of the protests, raising the 
question of what it means to glorify ‘feminised’ political practices in the absence of 
contextually-defined politics.  Reaffirming the gender norms which relate men and 
masculinity to politics while associating women and femininity with depoliticisation 
and social realms, the 2011 social protests ultimately bolstered the status quo as they 
remained dependent upon existing hierarchies and relations of power even in 
temporary suspension (Bakhtin 1984 [1968]).  Returning to Timothy Mitchell’s (1990: 
561) charge that the evaluation of practice as separate from structure both masks and 
maintains domination, the embeddedness of the protests’ intimate public within its 
wider frame begs consideration of the work done by insisting on proximity to politics.  
What are the promises offered and realities (re-)produced by apolitical political 
action? 
 
Fashioning an Apolitical Politics 
Framed by the broad appeal of a summary symbol and the suspension of normative 
orders promised by carnivalesque, within the intimate public specific to the 2011 
social protests the multivalent reproduction of the status quo arises in part through the 
pursuit of aspirational normality as it intersects with belonging.  While protest leaders 
and participants prided themselves on the explicit blurring of boundaries and 
ostensible transcendence of hierarchies, the persistence of particular terms of inclusion 
and exclusion actively shaped collective contours and agendas.  Here shifting 
distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ again obtained both internally and externally, as 
prevailing relations of gender, class, ethnicity, race, religion, ideology and geopolitical 
location resurfaced, often to be negotiated in manners which entrenched the very 
categories purportedly blurred or transcended.  This mode of exclusive inclusion 
ultimately proved a basis for the protests’ relative longevity, garnering wide popular 
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appeal and participation while simultaneously obeying the limits of the existing 
political order.   
Whether ‘Leftist,’ Ethiopian, queer, working class or Palestinian, during the summer 
of 2011 individuals and communities from each sector of Israeli society could in 
theory place their hats into the box labelled ‘social justice,’ an object of desire not 
exclusively bound to Jewishness.  However, while the exact content and meaning of 
this collective demand intentionally resisted clarity in discussions of the protestors’ 
aims, through discourse and practice the image of a desired future emerged much in 
line with current realities, even if draped in new material trappings.  In early August 
after my first experience of the demonstrations and my visit to the Rothschild 
Boulevard encampment, I sat at a café near the namal – the recently-renovated north 
Tel Aviv port area, bustling with boutiques and restaurants – with Nili, a Jewish 
Israeli friend from Tel Aviv who is fiercely critical of Israeli state and society.  As the 
sun set and the heat slowly dissipated, she conveyed her impression of the protests in 
no uncertain terms: “The idea seems to be ‘I want the most for me over here and he 
wants the most for him over there’ – people don’t all want the same thing, but the 
most given their position.  Then, maybe once they’re comfortable, they’ll turn their 
attention to the occupation.”17  As a former activist who worked in Ramallah and East 
Jerusalem, Nili’s criticism of the protests stems from their explicit avoidance of 
politics in its contextually defined and popularly understood meaning.  While 
highlighting a clear way in which the protest both produced and inhibited participation, 
through her perception Nili importantly renders visible how the differential desires of 
participants rely upon relations of occupation and domination in order to make 
particular futures imaginable.  Coalescing in a collective demand for and pursuit of 
‘the good life’ – or at least a better life – these acts of imagination resonate with the 
small words and simple lives outlined in Chapter Three, those fantasies of normalcy 
                                                
17 Field notes, 2 August 2012.  Correspondingly, Yonathan Mendel (2013) writes of the connection 
between the protests’ politics of comfort in 2011 and the 2013 elections in Israel, which saw former 
television presenter Yair Lapid and his party Yesh Atid [There is a Future] gain a surprising 19 seats in 
the Knesset:  
 
I remembered the reaction of my friend Abigail, who lives in Oxford and who came to visit 
during the ‘social justice protests’ in the summer of 2011.  ‘Why do people here keep speaking 
about a social protest?’ she asked after a trip to Rothschild Avenue.  ‘This is a consumer 
protest.’ . . . The reason Lapid has been so successful is that he knows that in a consumerist 
society the candidate who promises to make the most of our money is the star; that it would be 
a waste of his time to talk about the Palestinians. 
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‘elsewhere’ approximated and rendered actual against and through the existence of 
conflict.   
As normalcy thus becomes bound with the vision of social justice advanced in the 
2011 summer of protests in Israel, specific mechanisms emerged to preserve its 
intimate public in a manner similar to the stabilisation of smaller spheres of action and 
influence.  While here joking, bypassing, unseeing and silencing may indeed be found 
in operation, instances of rupture and repair do not serve to reinforce or entrench the 
aspiration to normality.  Rather, something decidedly different lies at stake in the 
potential loss of an intimate public, jeopardised by the introduction of politics to 
protests deemed ‘social’ and ‘economic.’  As formerly reticent friends and family 
began to take action toward the end of my time in Israel-Palestine, challenges posed to 
the (re-)new(ed) consensus assumed a severity apart from the normalised ruptures 
within small worlds.  At stake in this intimate public was the possibility created 
through a collective will and move to action, underwritten by the investment of so 
many participants who cast their primary political emotions as “despair” and 
“disillusionment.”  Borne of disappointment from former days of activism and 
unrealised visions of ‘solutions’ or futures, the bitterness of past political action was 
overcome in a newly depoliticised mode of action, as a differential community – that 
elusive critical mass – arose beneath the banner of social justice.  Here the adopted 
summarising symbol held more than the promise of inclusive broad-based 
participation; rather social justice sutured the fragmentation which has come to typify 
Israeli society.  Indeed, as one former interview participant said of the protests in late 
August, “It’s really something for Israelis, who want so much always to divide.”18   
As the protestors’ central demand invited a multiplicity of claims and interests, so too 
it built investment and commitment precisely through refusing to define the contours 
of its possibility.  Instantiated in the spaces of encampments, demonstrations and 
rallies, this newly engendered solidarity stood as the potential price of failure, as the 
temporariness of the change, renewal and becoming promised by carnivalesque was 
imagined to be lasting.  Thus when forcibly introduced to this juxtapolitical intimate 
public, contextually defined ‘politics’ elicited responses aimed not at repair but 
foreclosure, with this rupture deemed world-destroying rather than world-making.  In 
                                                
18 Field notes, 31 August 2011. 
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this, appeals to gradualism and practices of self-exclusion came to act as guardians of 
community, maintaining its apolitical character within a context suffused by politics. 
Gradualism  
“Talking with you is different from talking to Israelis,” Nili said at our portside 
meeting, her voice registering surprise and a hint of sadness.  “I agree with everything 
you said about the tent protests, but if I was to say all of this to even my most activist 
Israeli friends they would become upset with me and tell me to ‘be patient’ with the 
protests.”19  Having become close friends during my fieldwork, the infrequent 
meetings between Nili and myself provided an opportunity to fully express our 
political views and contemplate the personal cost of these opinions when shared more 
widely.  Thus Nili openly articulated her reasons for scepticism and non-participation 
in the popular social protests, along with the prevailing response her hesitation 
garnered among her “most activist Israeli friends.”  Their reaction to her search for 
politics – “‘be patient’” – was echoed in various incarnations throughout the span of 
the protests, often by individuals who considered themselves activists, whether former, 
current or emergent.    
Couched as “long-term” and “new resistance,”20 the omission of contextually defined 
politics from protest discourses and agendas was cast by those participants critical of 
Israel’s occupation as a deliberately adopted strategy, producing appeals to gradualism 
with the intention of deflecting criticism.  Indicative of the sense of continuity and 
community at stake in the summer’s mass mobilisation, these reassurances that “We’ll 
get there, it just takes time” sought to preserve cohesion and generate participation 
through satisfying both critics and supporters of the protests’ apolitical framing.  
Interestingly, these appeals were often both issued by and constraining of women’s 
and feminist activist initiatives, groups which have historically been at the forefront of 
Jewish Israeli anti-occupation activism, as described in Chapter Four.  Daphna, an 
interview participant from Tel Aviv who remains active with Machsom Watch, 
clarified the tense relation framing the participation of women anti-occupation 
activists when we met casually in late August.  When I posed the question of whether 
                                                
19 Field notes, 2 August 2011. 
 
20 Field notes, 31 August 2011 and 30 July 2011, respectively. 
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the social protests had produced increased interest or participation in the activities of 
Machsom Watch – from routine checkpoint visits to occasional organised tours – 
Daphna replied that early in the protests the organisation had held a meeting to decide 
whether or not to “pitch their tent” alongside the others on Rothschild Boulevard.  As 
she related, in the end the group decided against “introducing their radical politics” in 
the interest of letting younger protestors determine the agenda, opting to support the 
protests as individuals rather than a feminist, human rights or anti-occupation 
organisation.21  
The appeasing phrases “It will get there” and “Let’s see where this goes”22 offered in 
the summer of 2011 by anti-occupation activists – many of them self-defined 
feminists – mirror the messages often directed at women and feminists participating in 
nationalist or liberation movements, including those specific to Israel-Palestine.  
Though as a category ‘women’s equality’ was enshrined in the 1948 Declaration of 
the Establishment of the State of Israel and the 1951 Law of Equal Rights for Women 
as outlined in Chapter One (Raday 1991: 18–20; Yuval-Davis 2005 [1980]: 122; 
Yishai 2005 [1997]: 203; Halperin-Kaddari 2004: 17, 20), in the name of 
‘independence’ or ‘nationhood’ Jewish Israeli feminist activists have historically been 
told that their agendas remain secondary to collective interests, often framed in terms 
of security.  During summer 2011, many women and feminist activists deferred their 
anti-occupation agendas to that of social justice, encouraging others to follow suit 
beneath a summarising symbol inclusive of multiple and often contradictory meanings.  
“It’s there, look in the subtext,” seemed to be the word on the street among those 
participants critical of the occupation yet hesitant to withhold their participation from 
an apparent social movement brewing among the largely quiescent public.  Indeed, 
another Tel Aviv activist at the late July demonstration deemed the lack of settlers 
“striking,” and cited their absence as the presence of the occupation at the event.  Her 
stated reasoning followed that, as the government adequately supports the settlers and 
meets their needs, not only did they have little material reason to join the protests, but 
also their absence could be read as a reaction to an implied anti-occupation (Leftist) 
platform underwriting the demonstrations – to her, the settlers’ non-participation 
                                                
21 Field notes, 30 August 2011. 
 
22 Field notes, 30 July 2011. 
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clearly reflected the ideological and political opposition of the protest participants.23  
Thus the insistence by these activists that politics were present at the level of subtext 
constituted a differential entreaty to gradualism, seeking to quell criticism in the 
interest of a broader agenda. 
Yet while this belief in the apparent presence of contextually defined politics – as 
subtext or awaiting an opportune moment – speaks to the persuasive influence of 
broadly engineered solidarity, it elides the desire for normality woven into the fabric 
of the protests.  As we walked together amidst the sea of humanity at the 30 July 
demonstration whose scene of raucous energy opened this chapter, Ilan – a close 
friend, interview participant and then newly re-engaged political actor – made explicit 
the links between conflict and normality, which not only underwrote appeals to 
gradualism, but also maintain the binary order of the protests and their wider political 
reality: 
People see that there’s no solution to the conflict and they’re tired of the issue.  
With these social issues there are solutions.  Maybe after the social problems 
are fixed this will spill into the political sphere, but people are tired of hearing 
that security concerns come first.  People just want some kind of normalcy.  
Once there is normalcy, after a few years maybe people will start to think 
about what that normalcy is, what it requires, and then they’ll think about the 
occupation.24 
 
‘Don’t Piss in the Well You Drink From’ 
As the protests extended from July into the heat of August and September, increasing 
wariness greeted queries about the absence or presence of the occupation and the links 
between conflict and normalcy.  “Don’t piss in the cornflakes,” Guy warned with a 
laugh as we met with friends and family whose newly reinvigorated political will 
meant that the social protests would be a prime topic of discussion.  While similar to 
the gendered mechanism of silencing described in Chapter Three, these warnings and 
their resulting silence were seemingly self-imposed as criticism risked souring 
individual experiences of collective action.  As voices which pushed conversation 
                                                
23 Field notes, 30 July 2011. 
 
24 Field notes, 30 July 2011. 
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beyond the accepted boundaries likewise produced confrontation and an eventual hush, 
here silence protected the protests’ intimate public not through reconstituting an 
approximation of normalcy, but through cementing solidarity.  Thus the achievement 
of belonging stood the prize of participation and the potential cost of dissent, with 
world-loss threatening a return to fragmentation and alienation. 
Rather than instituting a world-renewing cycle of repair, within the protests those 
conditions productive of silencing bring to the fore processes of exclusion in which 
the cost of rupture supplants potential benefit.  Though participants and supporters 
professed a shared desire for ‘the good life’ – a new normality aimed at “the most for 
me over here and the most for him over there” – the world of belonging and solidarity 
engineered through protests constituted its magnetising core.  While outwardly aimed 
at the European standard of living desired by the (Ashkenazi) middle-class whose 
children first catalysed the protests and the domestic focus imagined to characterise 
decidedly post-colonial realities (Massad 2006), those bonds suturing the critical mass 
came to constitute a social world made anew.  Formerly inconceivable to many 
despite the representation of (Jewish) Israeli society as largely unified beneath the 
banner of state and nation, the broad solidarities built by the protests necessitated an 
ostensibly non-exclusive mode of protection, an insurance of security from threat 
which would preserve the protests’ central ability to mobilise through inclusivity.  
Thus much like entreaties to gradualism, which importantly ensured the possibility of 
future participation by quelling criticism without compromising appeal or inclusion, 
this differential response to potentially politicising dissent additionally played upon 
mechanisms of self-selection. 
Taken alone, the expectation that criticism would spoil or dirty the experience of 
committed solidarity seemingly reflects an experience in which ordinarily avoidant 
individuals faced attack from those regularly politically active, this time paradoxically 
for assent to participation.  However, throughout the summer of 2011 the protests and 
protestors enjoyed near-hegemonic status, as levels of support reached over 80 per 
cent among the Israeli public (Ha’aretz 2011; Sheizaf 2011).  With overwhelming 
support indeed registered among members and parties of the political Left despite a 
declared ‘non-political’ orientation, the dominance of the protests necessarily 
generated marginal categories, among them actors ordinarily considered ‘radical’ in 
their opposition to Israeli political practices and policies.  “What is it you said earlier, 
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Guy?  That maybe we’re ‘pissing in the cornflakes?’” I asked as we discussed the 
reception of our criticism among friends at a casual gathering.  This elicited an 
eruption of laughter; “The original [phrase] is ‘Don’t piss in the well you drink from,’” 
a friend corrected.  I considered this for a moment before replying, “But it’s okay to 
piss in someone else’s well?”  All present nodded in agreement.  The well of the 
protests – that solidarity, belonging and sense of community from which many of the 
protestors formerly felt themselves excluded or imagined an impossibility – had 
achieved a sacred status, ostensibly beyond contempt or reproach.   
As engagement with and participation in the summer protests assumed normative 
status, belonging emerged in part a matter of individual reflections – one’s politics 
and world view – recognised or found missing among collective discourses and 
practices.  Recounting a radio interview with the popular Ashkenazi Jewish Israeli 
singer Aviv Geffen, Nili reflected on the influence both exerted and experienced 
through the impetus to preserve consensus and define agendas as apolitical.  
Previously, on a radio programme aired by the army station ‘Galatz,’ Margalit 
Tzan’ani – a well known Mizrahi Jewish Israeli singer – had voiced opposition to the 
protests on the grounds that they focused on the interests of Israel’s Ashkenazi 
citizens and thus intentionally avoided politics (Lev 2011; Izikovitch 2011).  
According to Nili, Geffen responded to Tzan’ani’s criticism by stating, “‘That’s so 
2010!’” and summarily dismissing the question proffered by the interviewing 
journalist.  Nili expressed her amazement at Geffen’s suggestion, telling me, “How 
incredible is it that the agenda and consensus – the community building around these 
protests – can make all of those issues ‘passé!’”25  In response to public outcry, 
Tzan’ani was quick to declare solidarity with the protestors and disavowed her earlier 
criticism, going so far as to perform at a later protest rally in Be’er Sheva.  Appraised 
as a full narrative arc, Tzan’ani’s actions are notable for demonstrating how positions 
‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the protests – its relations of belonging – were cast as a matter of 
individual choice rather than external imposition.  Like the members of Machsom 
Watch who decided against introducing their radical politics to the Rothschild 
Boulevard encampment, these positions were self-selected. 
                                                
25 Field notes, 6 August 2011. 
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Importantly, while self-exclusion or self-selection reveals a marked distinction from 
the production of silencing outlined in Chapter Three, these mechanisms converge in 
their entrenchment of hegemonic patterns of gender, if arriving to this shared point by 
different means.  Through the silencing described earlier, a collective subscription to 
masculinised practices of communication and constructions of politics renders critics 
silent and seemingly feminised; conversely, within the space of the protests dissenting 
voices spoke against a politics ostensibly more feminine in both discourse and practice.  
Thus criticism of this ‘new politics’ assumed the overtly masculinised tones of attack 
with intention to defeat, as the values of “listening and respect” were potentially 
jeopardised by the forcible introduction of conflict, occupation and violence.  Yet 
rather than signalling a seeming reversal or inversion of hegemonic gender norms and 
relations, as the feminine gained purchase above the masculine during the 2011 
protests, the active silencing of criticism among protest participants and observers 
importantly reinforced the hegemonic gender regime, as the protests became 
understood as in need of protection.  Ultimately reflective of the militarised gender 
relations which equate vulnerability with femininity, the well of the protests required 
(masculinised) defence against the threat of (old) politics, with security retaining 
primacy anew. 
 
The Politics of Belonging 
As processes of inclusion and exclusion unfolded during the summer of protests, 
individual or private decisions around participation necessarily intersected with the 
broader public negotiation of its collective boundaries, ushering in an explicit ‘politics 
of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis 2011).  According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2011: 20), “The 
boundaries [that] the politics of belonging are concerned with are the boundaries of 
the political community of belonging, the boundaries which, sometimes physically, 
but always symbolically, separate the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them.’”  Though 
framed as inclusive of differential social positions, material realities and political 
orientations, the protests required the continuing presence of prevailing social 
divisions and hierarchies, reflecting the dynamics central to everyday Jewish Israeli 
life as detailed in Chapter Two.  Here, Tzan’ani’s charge that the protests reflected the 
concerns of particular citizens indeed rings true, as the processes of inclusion and 
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exclusion recounted above reproduced the wider political categories, communities and 
meanings shaped by conflict in Israel-Palestine. 
In sentiments mirroring the admission that “[…] it will have to become political 
because that’s where change happens,” as expressed by the protestor interviewed on 
Rothschild Boulevard,26 various participants and observers acknowledged a gap in 
need of bridging as the protests developed.  “You can’t solve this without solving the 
political problems – the internal can’t be solved without looking at the external,” a 
friend explained as we walked together during a late July protest.  “In the next 
election who ever wins, he will need to represent this and declare it.  It just isn’t 
possible that someone will be elected who doesn’t engage with the political when 
talking about solving these social issues.”27  While in part lending support to calls for 
gradualism, this speaker conveys his perception that the necessary connection between 
social and political realms will determine the protests’ resolution.  Relating a similar 
belief through a somewhat differential position, weeks later another friend and protest 
participant took interest in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s declared desire to enter into 
negotiations regarding the protestors’ demands.  Rather than exploring alternative 
routes to resolution through the formation of councils or joint panels, Yael felt that 
Netanyahu’s vision followed in the form of prevailing political processes centred in 
the “‘You’re on that side, I’m on this side’” conflict model (see also Lis and Bassock 
2011; Verter 2011).28  For Yael, translation and realisation of the protestors’ diffuse 
demands needed to resist packaging within the (masculinised) conflict-driven 
approach, even while clearly relying upon an interface with authority for its ultimate 
success.  This political necessity was also emphasised later by Dov, the Tel Aviv artist 
and DJ who articulated resistance to resistance by “not being a good soldier”; Dov 
agreed that the protests had opened important new spaces of political discourse and 
practice, while falling short of addressing Left/Right divisions and their basis in 
conflict, violence and occupation.  “They have to [address politics] ultimately, 
                                                
26 Field notes, 1 August 2011. 
 
27 Field notes, 30 July 2011. 
 
28 Field notes, 12 August 2011.  
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because it is all about Left-Right issues!” Dov claimed as frustration with the 
ambiguity of protestors’ apolitical platform mounted during the passing months.29  
As indicated by these commentaries, protest agendas, discourses and practices needed 
to retain political intelligibility and currency while working toward the realisation of 
demands and goals deemed ‘social’ and ‘economic.’  While many focused primarily 
upon cultivating the community of solidarity engendered through the protests, for 
those in positions of leadership the targets remained material and ostensibly 
achievable through interaction with government.  Yet when coupled with the 
enmeshment of this very authority with contextually specific and popularly 
understood meanings of politics, this need for intelligibility wielded certain influence 
over the limits of protest.  In order to be heard or recognised on the level “where 
change happens,” the protests ultimately operated within prevailing political 
boundaries while seeking the very transformation of their meaning.  Significantly, the 
collective agreement around the necessity of a reversion to politics – if only in 
procedure and practice – signals the extent to which the prioritisation of the protests’ 
more ‘feminine’ politics would indeed be temporary, as the promise of “becoming, 
change and renewal” was made thoroughly carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1984 [1968]: 10) 
with the eventual return of prevailing norms, relations and hierarchies. 
Who are ‘Ha’Am?’ 
Most clearly negotiated through the shifting divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which 
cut across and framed the protests even in their inclusivity, collective boundaries 
followed the contours of the national ‘we’ bound with the politics of conflict, 
occupation and domination.  Yet as Yuval-Davis (2011: 20) importantly argues, “The 
politics of belonging involve not only the maintenance and reproduction of the 
boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political power (within 
and outside the community), but also their contestation, challenge and resistance by 
other political agents.”  Once more, practices of active exclusion remained seemingly 
absent while groups and communities attempted to locate their interests within the 
well of belonging, now shaped by the constraints of political intelligibility.  Here 
marginal groups were re-assured of their subordination within a movement ostensibly 
                                                
29 Field notes, 30 August 2011.  
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aimed at equitable transformation, again mirroring the struggles of women and 
feminists within nationalist and liberation movements of times past and present.  
During our portside conversation after the late July protest, Nili spoke of a friend who 
had attended the same demonstration as part of a group who assembled in Tel Aviv’s 
Levinsky Park – this was a self-professed “radical bloc” who sought to engage with 
politics in its fullest sense, including contextual definition in relation to conflict while 
joining the larger protests.  Nili said that, like myself, this friend had been astounded 
by the energy and anger of the protestors, finding himself amazed rather than 
experiencing the alienation which had initially spurred the formation of the radical 
bloc in which he participated.  According to Nili, her friend tended to be critical of the 
protests, feeling the vagueness of demanded social justice more problematic than its 
dissociation from the occupation – he was frustrated that participants wielded the term 
without considering its meaning.  “But personally I’m more bothered by the first part 
of that phrase: ‘Ha’am,’ the people,” Nili told me.  For Nili,‘ha’am’ remained 
inseparable from the ethnic and religious nation which explicitly underwrites the 
constitution of ‘the people’ in Israel.  “This goes back to racism,” she said heatedly, 
“social, economic and political racism. . . .  If it isn’t Right, or Left or Centre then 
what do we have in common?  We are Jews.  ‘The people’ are Jewish people.”30  
Substantiated by the displays of Israeli flags at the tent encampments, the singing of 
nationalist songs from bygone eras at demonstrations and the images and sentiments 
gracing hand-made signs, the (Jewish) nation indeed circumscribed the protests. 
With ‘ha’am’ thus clearly bound to ‘the Jewish people,’ contestations around 
belonging took on decidedly political tones in their intersection with shifting 
processes of inclusion and exclusion.  In particular, the participation of Palestinian 
and Jewish settler communities brought to the fore the differential ways in which the 
political boundaries of the nation actively crosscut the protest collective.  Among 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, the nationalised contours of ‘the people’ were 
immediately recognised; as Palestinian journalist Sayed Kashua (2011a) wrote in his 
weekly Ha’aretz column in early August: 
“The people want social justice.”  What exactly is the definition of ‘the 
people’?  Will I feel comfortable shouting those words out along with the other 
                                                
30 Field notes, 2 August 2011. 
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protesters?  I know it was borrowed from Tahrir Square, where they shouted, 
“The people want to topple the regime.’  But in Egypt the word referred to the 
Egyptian people.  Meaning everyone who lives in Egypt.  And here?  Does the 
term ‘the people’ really include all of Israel's citizens? 
Echoing Nili’s concerns, Kashua’s hesitancy reflects not a wariness of ‘social justice,’ 
but knowledge gleaned from his experiences as a Palestinian citizen of Jewish Israeli 
‘democracy,’ where provision of and access to rights remains de facto dependent upon 
ethnic identity (Shafir and Peled 2002; Lowrance 2004; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 
2004; Yiftachel 2006; Abdo 2011).  Interestingly, one week after the publication of 
the article cited above, Kashua (2011b) spoke at the second demonstration in 
Jerusalem upon invitation and later described how his experience – understood as 
deeply political – reaffirmed the protests’ apolitical politics:  
“Talk about the place you come from,” the activist said to me on the phone, 
trying to help.  And just what is ‘this place that I come from,’ goddammit?  
What ... like, the Arabs?  That I come from the Arabs?  What can I say about 
that?  I'll get up on stage like an idiot and start talking about the housing 
problem in the Arab villages?  What do I know about that?  I come from a 
neighborhood [sic] in West Jerusalem.  If they really want someone to talk about 
that, why don't they invite some Arab council head, or someone who can cite 
statistics?  What, they want me to get up there and say that the Arabs in Israel 
support the protest?  I should say that we too want social justice?  Who gave me 
the mandate to speak on behalf of the place from which I supposedly come? 
Maybe I'll talk about the Likud, about Israel Beiteinu, about Kadima, about the 
National Home and the racist laws the Knesset is passing left and right.  No, no.  
I can't.  This protest is not political, and who knows what the protesters think 
about the occupation, if they even think about it at all.  This is a social protest 
that has an economic basis, I reminded myself.  I can't talk about the settlements, 
the racist laws, the occupation and all that kind of stuff: It's not relevant, it's 
insignificant. 
 
However, within the problematic and depoliticised inclusivity of social justice other 
Palestinian citizens of Israel found a site of resistance, if marginal.  Situated at the 
head of the large second block in Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard encampment, a 
small group of Palestinian citizens of Israel took up residence at ‘Tent 1948,’ as 
recounted briefly above.  According to Palestinian rights activist Abir Kopty (2011) 
from Nazareth, “Tent 1948’s main message is that social justice should be for all. It 
  
 216 
brings together Jewish and Palestinian citizens who believe in shared sovereignty in 
the state of all its citizens.”  Here sat a handful of dwellings adorned by signs written 
in Arabic, Hebrew and English, where Tent 1948’s Palestinian and Jewish inhabitants 
displayed large plywood placards detailing narratives of expulsion and dispossession, 
challenging the meaning and scope of ‘social justice.’  Appealing to the promises of 
equity held forth by both citizenship and social justice while insisting upon the ways 
in which these concepts acted to exclude rather than include, the participation of 
Palestinians in Tel Aviv, in Nazareth, Jaffa, Haifa and other sites more peripheral 
across Israel served to politicise the protests.  As politics again threatened the 
cherished foundation underwriting the protests’ collectivity, burgeoning solidarities 
met with the boundaries of nation.  Physically attacked in late July by Right-wing 
protest participants, the structures and residents of Tent 1948 signified an intrusion of 
the political into the sanctity of a unified world made anew, as they brought 
occupation, conflict and violence into the heart of an ostensibly apolitical protected 
space.  While subsequent confrontations remained limited, the mechanism of self-
selection ultimately operated effectively as the sea of Jewish Israeli demands and 
interests largely drowned discussions of Palestinian support or recognition.  Indeed, as 
Kopty (2011) wrote during her time at Tent 1948: 
For me, as Palestinian, I don’t feel part of the July 14 movement, and I’m not 
there because I feel part, almost every corner of this encampment reminds me 
that this place does not want me.  My first tour there was pretty depressing, I 
found lots of Israeli flags, a man giving a lecture to youth about his memories 
from ’48 war’ [sic] from a Zionist perspective, another group marching with 
signs calling for the release of Gilad Shalit, another singing Zionist songs.  
This is certainly not a place that the 20% of the population would feel belong 
to.  The second day I found Ronen Shuval, from Im Tirtzu, the extreme right 
wing organization giving a talk full of incitement and hatred to the left and 
human rights organizations.  Settlers already set a tent and were dancing with 
joy.31  
                                                
31 Max Blumenthal and Joseph Dana (2011) cite Kopty in their compelling article entitled ‘J14: The 
Exclusive Revolution,’ written for +972 Magazine during the protests:  
 
“The injustice will continue,” Kopty declared flatly. “And I don’t believe J14 will create 
changes that are socio-political. But our struggle is completely political. So when J14 finally 
explodes because the different internal groups have contradicting interests — and they can’t 
remain apolitical forever — our struggle will go on.” 
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Kopty’s depiction not only highlights the ways in which exclusion again emerges a 
matter of seemingly independent choice – importantly reinforced by the carnivalesque 
environment specific to the protests – but also her experience of non-belonging 
underscores the imbrication of national boundaries with the protest body.   
However, while here Kopty presents the ostensible embrace of Right-wing and ultra-
nationalist factions as largely uncontested, the arrival and presence of settler 
contingents generated controversy among protestors as these actors differentially 
ushered the politics of occupation, conflict, violence and borders into the heart of Tel 
Aviv.  On the same day as a coalition of dairy farmers joined the main protest, Right-
wing activists marched from the protests’ symbolic centre at Habima Square both in 
solidarity and as an insistence on inclusion beneath the banner of ‘social justice.’  
Including factions such as Im Tirtzu – a Jewish Israeli ultra-nationalist group named 
after Theodore Herzl’s famous dictum, “Im tirtzu, ein zo agada” [‘If you will it, it is 
no dream’] – and the Yesha Council – an umbrella organisation of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank – these new participants posed a new challenge to the limits of 
‘ha’am.’  Paradoxically linked to the tensions raised by Palestinian citizens of Israel, 
Jewish Israeli settler contingents again tested the inclusivity claimed by the protests’ 
Left-wing and ostensibly non-political leadership (Levinson and Lior 2011).  Along 
with public support expressed by Yesha Council leader Naftali Bennett and West 
Bank Kahanist32 Baruch Marzel during visits to the Rothschild encampment, the move 
for broad-based Right-wing inclusion generated a furore among those protest 
participants who had earlier responded to appeals for gradualism and set aside anti-
occupation politics in the interest of cohesion (Mandel 2011; Frenkel 2011).  
Bolstering the atmosphere productive of exclusion, Right-wing participants chanted 
“Tel Aviv is Jewish, Sudanese to go Sudan!” along with “No Left, no Right, cheap 
apartments are our right!” (Zonszein 2011; Mendel 2013) demonstrating the 
simultaneous rigidity and fluidity of the protests’ internal boundaries.  Refuting claims 
that the clarity of an absent-present Leftist orientation kept settler participation at bay, 
members of the Hilltop Youth – young ultra-nationalists often at the forefront of 
settlement expansion through their establishment of illegal outposts – pitched a tent on 
                                                
32 ‘Kahanists’ follow the teaching of Rabbi Meir Kahane, whose political party Kach “called for the 
‘transfer’ of all Palestinians, citizens and non-citizens alike, out of the Land of Israel”; in 1988 Kach 
was disqualified from participation in Knesset elections (Shafir and Peled 2002: 127). 
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Rothschild Boulevard and crucially pushed further the limits of ‘ha’am’ as these 
Jewish citizens of Israel insisted on belonging despite living (illegally) extra-
territorially (Levinson 2011).33  To this end, Marzel couched the demand for inclusion 
in the explicitly apolitical – yet political – terms adopted by the protestors, claiming, 
“[…] ‘when it comes to social issues, I'm more Left than the Left’” (Mandel 2011).  
Though ultimately expelled by inhabitants of Rothschild Boulevard after at times 
violent confrontations, Jewish settler factions continued to participate in the protests 
as encampments and demonstrations spread to the illegal settlements, with actions in 
Ariel receiving “official endorsement” from the protests’ central leadership 
(Blumenthal and Dana 2011).34  While the inclusion of these Right-wing factions 
resulted in the seemingly self-imposed exclusion of those participants who 
ideologically refused to stand in solidarity with settlers, their insistence on belonging 
held an important mirror to the Jewish Israeli mainstream.  Frequently scapegoated by 
the secular middle-class for social ills and occupation practices, during the protests 
these communities transgressed the boundaries between ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘us’ and 
‘them,’ serving to actualise the national meaning of ‘the people’ and render visible 
those social and political ties which bind beyond territorial boundaries. 
Differentially framed and realised, Palestinian and settler appeals to belonging within 
‘the people’ demanding social justice thus reveal the extent to which the ostensibly 
apolitical orientation of the protests remained underwritten by politics, as here 
division, convergence and power relations specific to the wider political context 
indeed shape the collective and its agenda.  While both Palestinians and settlers 
continued to participate in encampments and demonstrations throughout the summer, 
the national membership and social ties enjoyed by the latter group remained more 
                                                
33 Shortly after Marzel’s suggestion that the housing crisis could be solved by the expansion of building 
in Jerusalem, primarily possible in the city’s illegally occupied Eastern sector, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s government approved the construction of 227 new units in Ariel, a Jewish settlement in 
the West Bank; see Levinson and The Associated Press 2011.  
 
34 Also, the continuing presence of Ayalim – an organisation which advocates building expansion in the 
Negev and Galilee regions – remained largely uncontested despite their adoption of settlement rhetoric 
and clear designs on ‘Judaising’ these majority Bedouin and Palestinian areas.  During a later visit to 
the Rothschild encampment, a representative told me that the organisation aims to increase Jewish 
settlement “in all of the area given to the Jews” through the establishment of ‘youth villages.’  He then 
recounted how members had recently adopted a ‘new’ strategy to counter the bureaucratic delays which 
commonly slowed development: “[…] yesterday we did something amazing, really amazing.  For the 
first time we just went to a place and starting building!  We built an outpost an put an Israeli flag on it!”  
Field notes, 1 August 2011.  See also http://ayalim.org.il/en, accessed 2 August 2012.    
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readily recognised and accommodated than the explicitly political demands and 
appeals to citizenship issued by the former.  Yet as these marginal sectors of Israeli 
society inevitably ushered in the spectre of occupation, conflict and violence – 
whether passively or actively – both remained in tense relation to the protests’ 
intimate public.  In correspondence with the hegemonic patterns of gender framing the 
protests’ carnivalesque period of subversion, again a feminine core appeared in need 
of protection from masculinised politics, as here ‘threats’ to a body defined as 
apolitical and social materialised in appeals for inclusion by politicised communities.  
Thus similarly to appeals to gradualism and self-selected exclusion, negotiations 
around the constitution of ‘the people’ and the meaning of ‘social justice’ within the 
protests ultimately reinforced prevailing gendered valuations of threat and protection.  
As these militarised power relations continue to subordinate ‘feminine’ to ‘masculine’ 
and ‘social’ to ‘political,’ the temporary inversion and suspension offered by the 
protests served to further bolster an apolitical frame of action.   
Engaging (In)action  
The argument that Israel’s 2011 summer of protests reaffirmed politics as masculine, 
while temporarily exalting the feminine, makes visible how these mass actions 
ultimately reinforced the primacy of security and entrenched prevailing values, norms, 
codes and relations through appeals to ‘threat’ and ‘protection.’  Yet importantly, the 
effects of this framing rippled beyond the summer’s events and participants, bearing 
implications for both the content and arbiter of politics in Jewish Israeli society.  Here 
as negotiations around ‘ha’am’ produced a broad politics of belonging, which 
functioned to secure existing political codes, categories and communities, dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion activated more intimate meanings of ‘politics,’ reifying the 
state as separate from society and reproducing conditions of political stasis. 
As the summer of protests unfolded, conversations among friends and family 
increasingly focused on the collective will to action, which was for some a renewal of 
previous investment, for others a new-found site of identity and belonging, and for yet 
others an occasion for wariness – in all instances the promise of political action 
touched open ‘the personal.’  At a friend’s apartment in Baka, West Jerusalem the 
depth of these intimate ties became clear as four Jewish Israeli men engaged in a 
discussion of participation, individually considering whether they might take part in 
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that night’s protest rally in (West) Jerusalem.  Artists, filmmakers and musicians, they 
gathered in order to showcase their work, with my attendance made possible through 
Guy though I was acquainted with most of the men through prior interviews and 
friendship.  While waiting for the first film to load, conversation turned to how my 
research intersected with the summer’s events; understood as “about the occupation,” 
the combination of my work and the protests signalled an opening into ‘politics,’ a 
topic which before had largely remained an object of tension and avoidance.  As I 
began to recount my visit to the Rothschild Boulevard encampment that morning 
where I learned of Woodstock, Jim Morrison and The Doors, Zohar asked, “Did 
anyone say anything interesting to you?”  I replied by explaining how there had been a 
clear separation of politics from ‘social issues’ in the spoken words of the protestors 
and the signs adorning tent walls.  Rather than causing the anticipated awkward 
silence, these observations served to generate further discussion.  Sitting beside Guy 
on the couch, Zohar responded quickly as he drew on the first of many cigarettes: “It 
isn’t about politics I think, because to talk about politics brings in things like shame 
and family…”  His words trailed away as the smoke curled above his head.  Guy 
broke the silence by adding, “Politics brings up other things too, like responsibility – 
people don’t want to take responsibility. A socio-economic struggle is something that 
people can feel good about!”  There seemed to be a quiet agreement in the room as Gil 
offered a final thought: “The participants and leaders might be keeping separate from 
the Old Left because they [the Old Left] are seen as part of the elite – the Ashkenazi 
elite.”35 
Giving voice to speculation around strategies for inclusion, the ease of exchange 
within this conversation indeed attests to the opening of political discussion and 
practice actively produced through the protests.  Yet the specific terms through which 
these men relate the political – shame, family, responsibility and privilege – reveal 
intimate ties shaping what it means to engage with politics in its fullest sense.  
Suggesting an understanding which extends beyond sociality and into understandings 
of self, these terms give texture to that sense of relief additionally promised in the 
creation of intimate publics.  Indeed, as Berlant (2008: 150) writes of “juxtapolitical 
citizenship,” “The history of its flourishing reveals individuals en masse hoarding a 
                                                
35 Field notes, 1 August 2011. 
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sense of belonging against what politics as usual seems to offer – a space of aversive 
intensities, increased risk, shame, vulnerability, exploitation, and, paradoxically, 
irrelevance.”36  In offering relief from the political and a means of avoidance, the 
social protests explicitly drew upon these intimate dimensions as understandings of 
self and constructions of personhood intersected with decisions around engagement 
and participation.   
For Zohar politics emerges bound with family, as his mother helped to found Women 
in Black and his father practices various forms of “everyday resistance” in his 
capacity as a university professor.  At the same time, here politics becomes linked to 
shame; in an earlier interview Zohar related how he feels estranged from his family, 
no longer considering himself an activist as his “passion disintegrated because the 
hope disintegrated” – among this family of activists, Zohar’s relative inaction and 
hopelessness bring with them a sense of shame now enmeshed with politics.37  Guy 
raises the possibility that the nascent protests avoid politics due to its coupling with 
personal responsibility; having lived away from Israel-Palestine for twelve years and 
returning for the period of my fieldwork, this pairing of terms reflects feelings around 
his absence as a political actor in Israel.  Indeed, throughout the course of the year 
when friends suggestively asked what they, as Jewish Israelis, should do regarding the 
occupation, Guy’s answer increasingly became, “Take responsibility.”  Moving into a 
position of understanding himself as an occupier by virtue of nationality, Guy 
connects responsibility to participation in political action.  As Gil provides the final 
point, he posits that popular understandings of politics relate closely to specific types 
of privilege: ethnic and economic.  Here, his sense that the protest leaders and 
participants are actively attempting to distance themselves from the old guard invokes 
the primacy of Ashkenazim in Jewish Israeli society.  Raised near Tel Aviv as the 
child of Iranian parents, Gil often found himself between ethnic identities due in part 
to his Ashkenazi physical appearance; yet while assumed to be a member of the elite, 
maximally enfranchised and possessing full belonging, Gil continues to understand 
                                                
36 Emphasis in original text. 
 
37 Interview in Jerusalem, 2 July 2011; handwritten notes. 
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himself as ‘other.’  For Gil, then, ‘politics’ brings with it narratives of privilege, 
perhaps linked to assumptions made falsely about himself by others. 
Importantly, the differential meanings ascribed to politics by these men – shame, 
family, responsibility and privilege – again span the boundary between private and 
public spheres, with their respective feminine/masculine valuations.  Shaped by yet 
not limited to its wider context, this enmeshment of politics with subjectivity provides 
many with reasons to avoid particular modes of political action, while in this instance 
augmenting the appeal of participation in ostensibly apolitical mass mobilisation.  Yet 
as Jewish Israeli protestors took action while attempting to disentangle themselves 
from politics and its purchase on intimate dimensions, their ascription to apolitical 
framing bolstered power relations on levels more macro.  In a manner similar to the 
ultimate entrenchment of those hegemonic patterns of gender temporarily suspended, 
during the summer of 2011 protest participants and supporters effectively reconfirmed 
the position of the state as the legitimate arbiter of politics in its contextually specific 
meaning.  Though framed in opposition to government policies and practices in social 
and economic realms, here resistance melds with sanction in political realms, again 
evoking Mitchell’s (1990: 561) entreaty that practice and structure must be appraised 
together.  Indeed, while the summer’s social protests were cast as a ‘conflict’ between 
a constitutive populace and its constituted sovereign, the former ultimately shored up 
the latter.  In this, the effective parcelling off of politics to the state directly implicates 
Jewish Israelis in domination, as ‘that there’ unfolds seemingly irrespective of ‘us 
here,’ beyond influence or control.  Shaped by, yet again not limited to, the 
masculinised discourses and practices which fuse the political in Israel-Palestine with 
violence, power and conflict, this binding of politics with subjectivity provides an 
impetus for disengagement.  Thus arises a possibility articulated by Hannah Arendt 
(1998 [1958]), which touches open these tensions between individual and collective.  
As Arendt (1998 [1958]: 233-234) argues, for many freedom to invest in ‘the realm of 
human affairs’ – the public sphere of politics – is believed to spell the forfeit of that 
liberty, as action taken necessitates seemingly endless repetition.  If so, Arendt (1998 
[1958]: 234) cautions, “The only salvation from this kind of freedom seems to lie in 
non-acting, in abstention from the whole realm of human affairs as the only means to 
safeguard one’s sovereignty and integrity as a person.” 
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Conclusion 
Through the body, framing and agenda of the 2011 summer of protests in Israel, 
oppositional political action paradoxically reaffirmed state sovereignty under the 
pretext of subverting the hegemonic relations of power which subordinate domestic to 
international, social to political and feminine to masculine.  In practicing political 
disengagement Jewish Israeli protestors not only confirmed the meaning of politics as 
bound with conflict and violence, but also they produced and maintained the specific 
system of meaning which underwrites the centralisation of political power and 
authority in the state.  Here state sovereignty arises through social production, 
including those acts deemed resistant – rather than destabilising sovereignty through 
targeting government practices and policies, these mass protests actually reinforced 
beliefs in and experiences of the state as the central, exclusive power.  This happens 
precisely because of the ways in which an intimate understanding of politics blurs the 
boundaries between public and private, state and society, while at the same time 
affirming their ostensible separation.  Underwritten by constructions of masculinity 
and femininity, framed by gendered norms and codes of practice, and bound with 
shame, family, responsibility and privilege, politics remains within the exclusive 
purview of the Israeli state-as-sovereign through individual and collective action. 
Here sovereignty emerges through practices, discourses and beliefs, challenging the 
notion of pre-existing power or positive truth and destabilising the rigid distinctions 
between structure and practice, meaning and material reality, to reflect more precisely 
how domination operates.  In this, state sovereignty emerges at the micro level as 
much the product of omissions as commissions, problematising the constructed 
divisions of private/public, intimate/political and inside/outside which ostensibly 
define political space.  At the same time, in keeping with these assumed binary orders 
the social production of sovereignty in Israel during the summer of 2011 ultimately 
brought with it the absolution of collective and individual responsibility for conflict, 
occupation, violence and domination, those very practices and relations which give 
shape to the contextual definition of ‘politics’ as an interest apart from matters 
deemed social and economic.  As this chapter has demonstrated, Jewish Israeli 
protestors bolstered domination through resistance and produced apparent apathy 
through action explicitly by fashioning an apolitical politics, a seeming paradox which 
ensures the status quo.  Yet this accord of contradiction prevailed throughout the 
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summer of protests, structuring logics, agendas, collectivities and individual 
experiences as the protests operated through both the collapse and reification of 
borders, subverting and reflecting the hegemonic patterns of gender which structure 
subjectivities, society and state.   
Thus, this chapter provides an answer to Maya Mikdashi’s (2009) earlier query: when 
we surrender politics to the politicians, we participate in domination.  Indeed, as 
Jewish Israelis ultimately reaffirmed the political space of sovereignty during the 
social protests of 2011, they simultaneously freed themselves from responsibility for 
those practices and policies of occupation, domination and colonisation which define 
the contours of politics in Israel-Palestine.  Yet here the route is as significant as its 
terminus, as dynamics of inversion, suspension and resistance function to elide, 
entrench and reify in ways which bridge seeming the seeming divisions structuring 
lived realities.  Through political disengagement, Jewish Israeli protestors pursued a 
course of action which sought transformation without endangering the wider status 
quo which makes life liveable.  Thus ‘freedom from’ colludes with ‘freedom to’ as 
individuals and communities seek to perpetuate their absolution of responsibility 
through participation in political action.  Mirroring the historical tensions which 
underwrite Jewish Israeli society, here liberalism and collectivism operate in tandem, 
as individual aspirations for flourishing – “the most for me over here” – coalesce to 
create a world of belonging made anew, an intimate public whose binding ties might 
usurp agendas and intentions.  Sustained by the “becoming, change and renewal” 
promised in carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1984 [1968]: 10), the suspension of hierarchies 
and norms is imagined as permanent even as their continuation provides the basis for 
a world made possible.  Yet while separation from and avoidance of ‘the political’ 
seemingly ensured the appeal and efficacy of the protests in Israel, this very act of 
division guaranteed temporariness as political realities remain central to constructions 
of the Jewish Israeli everyday life regardless of the cost of apartments, cheese or 
childcare.  
Indeed, this necessarily incomplete dissociation became increasingly evident as 
(masculinised) politics-as-conflict forcibly interrupted the protests in September 
through instances of violence near Eilat, the impending Palestinian bid for statehood 
at the United Nations, and the spectre of a future war with Iran.  Slowly but surely 
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energy waned, as friends and family returned unimpressed from visits to the once-
robust Rothschild Boulevard encampment and voiced growing criticism along with 
concerns that the initiative was “losing steam.”38  As a critic of the protests’ apolitical 
politics I felt conflicted about what this decline might mean, though I began to 
understand the cost of this world-loss, feeling an urgency for something to be 
achieved so that these solidarities might fulfil the gradualist promise of “getting there 
eventually.”  On the day of the final march – the proclaimed “March of Millions,” 
which would number 450,000 participants in total – I walked among what felt like 
drips, dribbles and thin streams of protestors from Habima Square, this time to Kikar 
HaMedina [State Square] where massive scaffolding was set for a now regularised, 
normalised and professionalised final rally.  Making our way through the streets of 
Tel Aviv with friends once more, I remarked on the comparatively low energy and 
numbers, expressing my desire for some kind of actualisation to buoy those 
participants who had surmounted despair in order to (re)invest in political action.  It 
seemed that ‘politics’ had again supplanted the social issues, economic concerns and 
engendered solidarities made possible through the protests’ ostensible elevation of the 
feminine and domestic, resulting in an apparent dissolution of the collective.  Upon 
passing Kikar Rabin [Rabin Square] we paused on a nearby ledge, scanning the 
procession in an attempt to appraise the mass ahead, alongside and behind our small 
group.  A friend’s mood changed in an instant and his face lit with happy surprise as – 
though in streams and trickles – the mass of protestors stretched far into the distance 
in either direction.  He proclaimed excitedly, “This is amazing, it has never happened 
like this in Israel before!”  Yet while the dribbles had indeed now amassed into a 
larger body, there remained a feeling of routine and finality, a shadow of the former 
energy and conviction which electrified earlier protests.   
And “this” had happened in Israel before, though in a historical moment profoundly 
political and politicised: the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres of the first Lebanon 
War.  Then over 400,000 Israelis had protested against Israel’s role in the massacre of 
Palestinian refugees at the camps in Beirut (Davidi 2000; Kidron 2004), participating 
in what had been the largest demonstration in the history of Israel until that night in 
September 2011.  Now we arrived calmly to the Gucci and Burberry storefronts of 
                                                
38 Field notes, 19 August 2011.  
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Kikar HaMedina, departing before the emotive strains of the national anthem 
‘HaTikva’ [The Hope] could confirm how politics also underwrote this protest and its 
boundaries, even if elided.  On that night we marched not only toward new promises 
recognised as fleeting, but also quietly past Sabra and Shatila, signalling a return to 
politics as usual. 
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Conclusion 
Sof HaDerech? [Best of the Best or End of the Road] 
 
Tall ship on the horizon.  It is nearly one year to the day since I departed Tel Aviv for 
the familiarity of London, trading sandals and sunscreen for an umbrella and wool hat.  
Striking how life comes full circle.  We sit at ‘Gilly’s,’ the restaurant on the old port 
promenade which has somehow marked my experiences of Israel-Palestine – a first 
visit with the splendour of sea and savoury ‘Israeli breakfast’; meetings and meals 
shared with family and friends; the memory of a goat cheese omelette and cappuccino 
paired with the presence of a gunship, my first encounter with the banality of violence.  
Today we sit at the restaurant’s wicker tables beneath taut shades, readying to leave 
once more.  This trip has been five days in total, the first since my year of fieldwork.   
So little has changed, disappointingly and sadly reassuringly.  The sun still scorches, 
the sea still sparkles, the air neglects to stir even as helicopters fly invariably south.  
Families parade the length of the wooden sea-front deck, cafes and restaurants bustle 
into the early morning hours, cleaners, stockers, attendants and cooks attest to the 
social divisions which shape lives and cityscapes.  Road signs direct traffic to Jewish 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank as if legal, talk of ‘social justice’ lingers though 
fading with time, families sit in tense silence or talk about everything but politics (in 
the most political way).  A city and its people continue to actively ‘get by’ conflict, 
violence and occupation, reaffirming the depth of normalcy’s promise and with it the 
relevance of my thesis.  These images and thoughts cross my mind as I contemplate 
yet another omelette, ordered in a Hebrew which has not escaped me after these 
months away – this is my personal cycle within a larger national cycle, my 
performance of normalcy while everything inside is buzzing and whirring, ready to 
escape.  We sit three – Guy, his mother and me – passing the time before a flight away 
from the dull lure of everydayness in Tel Aviv, its predictability, stability and 
constancy.  Glasses which minutes earlier held champagne drinks stand empty.  We 
wait.   
With fork to mouth, I stop – what is that on the horizon at sea?  Feeling impending 
déjà vu I cannot make sense of the shape in the distance.  I turn to Guy and find words 
for a question: “Is that a pirate ship?”  Squinting, peering and speculating ensue, 
though still we cannot decipher the form.  We decide that it must be part of a new jetty 
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at the marina, just far enough away to appear abstractly vessel-shaped.  Back to eating 
and small talk.  “No,” I say after a few minutes’ time, “It’s moving.  That is a pirate 
ship!”  Slowly, the form has pulled away from what seemed its mooring at the marina, 
becoming distinguishable as an unattached vessel.  Now diners around us are starting 
to take notice, while before all were engrossed in their respective omelettes, cocktails 
and conversations.  Murmurs, pointing, the scraping of chairs across deck boards – 
signs of astonishment grow as smartphones with inadequate zoom functions attempt to 
capture what is most certainly a tall four-masted ship sailing north along the coast.  
Strange and enchantingly anachronistic, the ship dazzles with its white sails billowing 
against blue skies and waters.  “Oohs” and “aahs” rise from the promenade, as life 
grinds momentarily to a halt.1   
In its simplicity, this scene reminds me of both the beauty of an unexpected moment 
and what fails to be remarkable in Israel-Palestine.  I cannot help but contrast the 
shrugs and nods which met my announcement of the gunship almost two years ago 
with the curiosity and attention now greeting this sea-borne relic.  Polished and 
smooth, this vessel sails into hearts and dreams, interrupting everyday life with its 
timeless beauty; grey and unmistakably utile, the blocky form of the gunship melded 
seamlessly with the tapestry of the familiar, reaffirming threat and insecurity for those 
who took note.  Yet if one peered hard enough into the bright horizon of September 
2012, today’s beautiful old ship travelled with company, escorted by a retinue of 
delicate sailboats and one small blocky gunship. 
This thesis has attempted to make visible how the scene above is made possible, how 
normalcy happens, what kinds of bargains it entails and at what cost.  Admittedly, this 
tale of omelettes, tall ships and impending departure extracts a small toll relative to its 
wider context.  Yet through the narrative above, we might better understand the ways 
in which ‘events’ are assessed value and experienced as impactful or not, demarcating 
the commonplace and the extraordinary (Highmore 2002; Allen 2008; Berlant 2011).  
So too we might see how emotions and reactions are not only subjective, but also 
interpersonal and relational – how a single (re)action becomes multiplied and gains 
meaning through collective repetition (Butler 1993; Ahmed 2004; Berlant 2008).  As 
well the pervasive quality of militarisation becomes clear, illustrating how objects 
                                                
1 Personal diary, 24 September 2012. 
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take on or repel charges relative to physical space and lived experience (Enloe 1989; 
Gonzalez 2007).  So too this scene reveals how aspiration shapes awareness, 
demonstrating the ways in which desire may simultaneously displace and entrench 
material realities (Berlant 2008; Wiegman 2012).  At its widest scope, this tale of 
pirate ship and horizon implicates those present in the active production and 
maintenance of stasis – through what we choose to see and what is left invisible, what 
we choose to say and what remains in silence, what we know and what we knowingly 
do not know, as the textures of conflict resonate with comfort.  
 
Revisiting Normalcy 
As the everyday becomes implicated in power, violence, conflict and politics, it is 
imperative that we evaluate the mundane, banal, ordinary and ‘common sense’ 
explicitly for their effects (Mohanty 1988).  With this guiding politics – a focus on 
costs and implications borne of postcolonial and transnational feminist critiques – a 
diagnostic of apathy has become an investigation into how everyday life produces and 
maintains domination.  This research project began with a single question: what can 
gender tell us about ‘Ma la’asot?’ [What can we do?], about what lies beneath this 
phrase and sustains its relevance in discussions of Israel’s occupation?  Through a 
process of unstitching and re-weaving the threads of everyday Jewish Israeli life in 
Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, this thesis has attempted in part to unpick the problem 
of normalcy in Israel-Palestine, what it conceals, relies upon and makes possible.  To 
grapple with normalcy among Jewish Israelis in the context of Israel-Palestine is to 
highlight a significant aspect of protracted conflict, one often elided through a focus 
on physical violence and spectacular events.  Yet ultimately this research does not 
situate violence opposite normalcy.  Here normalcy arises as if against or in spite of 
violence, yet very much through its continuing presence – in this thesis I have argued 
that normality for many if not most Jewish Israelis remains dependent upon conflict.   
In the context of Israel-Palestine, existing critical scholarship deftly makes visible the 
ideological foundations, historical trajectory, political economy, material 
infrastructure and macro-structural logics of Israel’s occupation (see Shafir 1989, 
1999; Shlaim 2000, 2010; Lentin 2000, 2008; Abu El-Haj 2001; Shafir and Peled 
2002; Masalha 2003; Ron 2003; Zertal 2005; Khalidi 2006; Massad 2006; Pappe 
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2006; Yiftachel 2006; Weizman 2007; Gordon 2008; Hever 2010; Pappe and Hilal 
2010; Abdo 2011; Weizman 2013).  Together these approaches draw attention to the 
ways in which ‘the conflict,’ practices and policies of occupation, and existing 
relations of power are anything but temporary.  Yet even as this body of scholarship 
reveals the roots from which current political realities arise and the routes they 
continue to shape and travel, these accounts lack a fine-tuned analysis of the micro-
political relations which produce and maintain the status quo.  While we might better 
understand the mechanics of why and how things stay the same on macro-political 
scales, we know little of how stasis takes shape on levels more intimate.  If we 
appraise power as a solely a top-down affair imposed by states and governments upon 
citizens and subjects we miss what has rendered the term ‘conflict’ empty to the point 
of euphemism, what makes its material reality comfortable and particular lives 
liveable, how it provides the foundation for normality and draws strength from its own 
resistance.  In neglecting micro politics we miss the complex and contradictory 
tensions which sustain domination, as related at length by Mira, a 30 year-old 
Jerusalemite activist: 
KN: Can you tell me more about what you meant when you said that it is easy 
to ‘disengage or detach’ here?  How so? 
Mira: At the most basic sense, there’s “Listen, I have to live my life.”  People 
get up, go to work in the morning, come home at night, veg in front of the 
television or meet friends.  This happens in a very socially specific area – for 
example, in Rehavia.  It was built by old rich Germans and now rich 
Americans and students live there, along with some of the Germans.  They 
don’t see it, what’s going in the East of the city.   
At the second level, it’s easy to disengage… it’s a mess.  It’s difficult because 
the whole situation is difficult.  There may be a dialogue between individuals 
on the Palestinian side and on the Israeli side, but there are very few real 
relationships being formed.  Because what you have in fact is the Israeli Left 
radical activists driven by what are basically liberal ideals or a sense of 
altruism.  That’s the Israeli side.  On the Palestinian side of the interaction they 
have concrete, practical, particular problems – it’s not ideologically driven, 
they just want their lives back!  For example, the wells they dig up because 
they want their houses back.  They’re tired of being treated like shit.  So you 
have two kinds of… it’s an interesting thing to see it coming together.  They’re 
[the Israelis are] coming from a place of being guilt-driven, they think they’re 
not really coming to interact with a peer.  They don’t consider him [the 
Palestinian] equal if only because they don’t know how to communicate in his 
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own language, linguistically and culturally.  This is awkward and it’s easy to 
slip out of.  I feel like it’s like an Iggy Pop song: they [the Israelis] are 
passengers, not really living their [the Palestinians’] lives.2  I can go to the 
Sheikh Jarrah tent, sleep next to their homes – their former homes – and watch 
for the settlers to do something.  But I’m still not living their reality.  I can 
afford to go home and sleep in my bed at night.  There’s something not real 
about it, it’s very artificial.  So you can do one of two things: you can go like 
the Sheikh Jarrah group to all the trials – you can get Hoovered into all the 
places, go to all the trials, get arrested three times a week.  Or you can try to 
find balance.3   
 
Normalcy in Israel takes work to produce, whether through the pursuit of balance, the 
material labour of ‘others’ or in the acts of unseeing, “knowingly not knowing” 
(Cohen 2001) and rationalisation that allow us to bargain with what underwrites the 
everyday – what is unpleasant or overwhelming about the world we live in (Berlant 
2007, 2008).  The words “Ma la’asot?” – What can we do? – expressed by Jewish 
Israeli Leftists when grappling with the seeming intractability of conflict then point to 
an ambivalence about what underpins normalcy, what sustains and produces it.  
Conveying political emotions of despair, helplessness and disappointment while 
posing a practical question of power, this phrase signals a subscription to ‘getting by’ 
or living out everyday life through particular types of compromise (Allen 2008; Kelly 
2008; Richter-Devroe 2011).  As stated in the introduction of this thesis, here ‘getting 
by’ does not imply equivalency between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis invested in 
living out everyday life in relation to ongoing occupation, conflict and violence.  
Rather, while mechanisms might be shared or mirrored, among Jewish Israelis these 
practices, processes, ideals and aspirations unfold in differential relation to 
domination – not as ‘subject to’ but rather ‘productive of.’  Indeed, as Michel de 
Certeau (1984) warns, power is at play not only among structures of practice, but also 
within them.  While drawing this distinction seemingly estranges ‘Israel’ from 
‘Palestine’ and Jewish Israelis from Palestinians, it trains focus on power and the 
wider effects of normalcy produced and maintained.  Framed not only by violent 
events, an interminably stalled peace process and increasing social and political 
                                                
2 Reference to ‘The Passenger’ by Iggy and the Stooges, 1977. 
 
3 Interview in Jerusalem, 30 May 2011; handwritten notes. 
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conservatism, the horizon of what we can do additionally takes shape through 
investment in everyday life.  By revealing the logics which make occupation and 
domination possible at the levels of subjectivity and sociality, this thesis offers a 
critical point of intervention. 
In looking to normalcy in a context of conflict, this thesis has deliberately 
defamiliarised the everyday, estranging the ordinary for purposes of drawing attention 
to the inconspicuous (Highmore 2002: 22).  Framed by a historical legacy of and 
continuing commitment to “telling stories differently” (Hemmings 2011), feminist 
gender analysis presents an “interruptive strategy” particularly suited to the everyday 
(Brecht 1964 cited in Highmore 2002: 23).  As an aspect of subjectivity, relation of 
power, and structure of states and societies, gender is integral to the practices of 
everyday life, if often elided.  Gender shapes spaces and encounters, impacts our 
understandings of selves and others, brings militaries into homes, informs experiences 
of political action, structures degrees of belonging, and influences our relationship to 
the politics framing narratives, aspirations and material realties.  Indeed, following 
Cynthia Cockburn (1999 cited in Al-Ali and Pratt 2009: 8) gender “is seen to shape 
the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the 
international arena.”  To foreground gender as a political and analytical category, then, 
is potentially to make strange the ordinary from its micro-political base to its macro-
political logics, particularly in studies of conflict and domination whose histories of 
gender-blindness limit the scope of both understanding and possibility.  
Through this critical lens, normalcy emerges as a desire for the condition of stasis – in 
the words of Lauren Berlant (2007: 291) “[…] of being able to be somewhere and 
make a life, exercising existence as a fact, not a project” – not merely surviving, but 
living.  So too the pursuit of “ordinary life” among Jewish Israelis reflects a gap 
between experiences of what ‘is’ and estimations of what ‘ought to be’ (Kelly 2008), a 
tension between reality and ideals.  Framed aspirationally, here the dependability, 
stability and constancy of normalcy remain always out of reach, a destination made 
possible by failure to arrive.  Across diverse contexts, many of us settle for living as if 
(Wedeen 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Allen 2013), for proximity to normalcy 
provided through narratives, relations and desires – these bargains are made and 
settled for.  Yet within the context of Israel-Palestine, these negotiations and pursuits 
entrench violent conflict, maintain occupation, advance colonisation and bolster the 
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seeming divisions separating ‘us’ from ‘them’ and ‘here’ from ‘there’ in ways which 
spell erasure, oppression and dispossession.   
By engaging with these tensions, this thesis has revealed how gender constitutes a 
central vector of normativity and normalisation within Jewish Israeli society, 
providing structure to and rendering manageable lives which necessarily fail to attain 
an ideal.  From the formation of subjectivities to the construction of family units and 
larger collectivities, hegemonic patterns of gender formed by prevailing relations, 
norms, codes and roles lend familiarity and stability to a context shaped by narratives 
and experiences of constant precarity.  Constructed in terms of masculinised defence 
and feminised vulnerability, dominant roles and codes ensure the perceived sanctity of 
home and domestic seen to underwrite the small worlds and simple lives built 
ostensibly against conflict and violence.  Here women-as-mothers and men-as-
soldiers shed significant light on the ties binding intimacy with politics, domestic with 
military and fantasy with reality, as purported dualisms collapse to create 
approximations of normality.  So too prevailing norms and relations maintain the 
hierarchies of power and privilege which demarcate politics as the realm of men and 
masculinity, providing enclaves of seeming escape within ‘the (feminised) social’ 
whether framed as sites of stasis or transformative potential.  Intersecting with vectors 
of race, class, sexuality, religion and geopolitical location, this thesis has 
demonstrated how hegemonic patterns of gender provide a thread of stability and 
familiarity within the everyday, buffering bargains made and reproducing wider 
relations of power.  As the privileges of whiteness, middle-class standing, 
heterosexuality and secularism intersect with constructions and social meanings of 
masculinity and femininity in urban Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, a particular 
material reality emerges: one which confers belonging while simultaneously 
perpetuating occupation, colonisation and domination.  
Of Threads and Tapestries  
In the context of Jewish Israeli society, gender assumes its normative form and 
function largely through the hegemonic narrative of Zionism, whose arc recalls threat, 
persecution and transcendence (Zertal 2005: 2; Lentin 2000: 188).  From historical 
roots to its current incarnation, the framework of Zionism provides templates for 
practice and belief which both shape and arise from the relationship between state, 
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society and subject.  Rooted in the historical experiences of European Jewry, Zionist 
ideology and practice have yielded the patriarchal gender relations which situate men 
– largely heterosexual, middle or upper-class and Ashkenazi – in public and political 
spheres, while relegating women to the ostensibly depoliticised private and domestic.  
While complicated by looking to the relative positions of women and men as they 
intersect with race, ethnicity and projects of modernisation, the logics and norms of 
Zionism-as-patriarchal-nationalism continue to entrench male privilege.  Shaping the 
political realm in terms of access to political voice and power, these hegemonic 
narratives also inform the domestic, tracing a thread which connects public and 
private while at the same time constructing them as separate and unequal.   
Through this connective thread, nationalism, militarism and increasingly 
neoliberalism – ideologies underwriting the pillars of ‘fraternity,’ ‘security’ and 
‘modernity’ – gain purchase in everyday lives.  Here, gender possesses the capacity to 
both regularise and normalise as dominant roles, norms, codes and relations produce a 
hegemonic “gender order,” a significant social structure (Connell 1987: 134-139; 
Connell 2002: 3).  In the context of Jewish Israeli society, this gender order privileges 
heterosexuality, reinforces the role of women as biological and cultural reproducers, 
and divides ‘us’ from ‘them’ as modern subjects, as a militarised patriarchal 
nationalism becomes infused with the logics of neoliberalism.  Critically, this given 
gender order creates a seemingly predictable and dependable foundation upon which 
everyday life might unfold, while remaining dependent upon the evolution of norms, 
codes, roles and relations. 
As this hegemonic gender order differently positions women and men within shared 
ideological and political frames, so too it impacts spatio-social dimensions, 
constructing further borders while simultaneously relying upon their collapse.  Here, a 
society divides itself through gendered spatial and social relations, creating and 
reflecting the hierarchies of power and privilege which demarcate ‘us’ and ‘here’ as 
separate from ‘them’ and ‘there.’  Read upon bodies, in space and through encounter, 
hegemonic patterns of gender maintain the relations of belonging and exclusion so 
central to the formation of collectivity.  Yet at the same time, ‘we’ remain dependent 
upon ‘them,’ necessarily entangled through gendered patterns of labour which raise, 
feed and nourish in material and symbolic terms.  Through processes of unfolding and 
enfolding, social space is encoded as public/private, masculine/feminine and 
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political/intimate, “reflecting and affecting the ways in which gender is constructed 
and understood” (Massey 1994: 179) while affirming normative precarity. 
Paradoxically emerging through the constancy of changeable conditions, this precarity 
draws conflict deeply into the everyday as threat, persecution and transcendence are 
replayed and reaffirmed on scales more micro.  While ultimately granting normalcy its 
very stability, this precarity requires disavowal or concealment of the terms which 
create its possibility.  Indeed, as Michel Foucault (1998 [1978]) and scholars of the 
everyday have convincingly demonstrated, power operates best when concealed 
(Mitchell 1990; Abu-Lughod 1990; Weedon 1997; Navaro-Yashin 2003; Gonzalez 
2007; Chalfin 2008; Hoffman 2011; Ochs 2011; Richter-Devroe 2011).  In this, 
patterns of gender not only provide the means of rupture – facilitating the passage of 
conflict between public and private realms coded as separate – but also produce 
mechanisms of repair, the tools through which seeming order is restored.  In this, 
joking, bypassing, unseeing and silencing give rise to “small worlds,” “elsewheres” 
and “simple lives,” which hold the promise of security, influence and moral 
consistency. 
However even as gender facilitates the repair of ruptured order, it does so 
incompletely as, again, instability paradoxically serves to stabilise.  This precarity 
extends to resistance and oppositional political action, which risk incorporation into 
hegemonic narratives, relations and practices by virtue of their very challenge to the 
dominant order.  Here gender informs the organisation and experience of resistance, 
shaping “rules of the game” and horizons of possibility.  While feminist activists have 
historically led anti-occupation and anti-militarist activism in Israel – through groups 
such as Women in Black and Machsom Watch – their long-time work increasingly 
becomes normalised and routinised, part of the scenery and practice of normality.  
While no less meaningful for its familiarity, these actions are often appraised by 
young activists as ‘depoliticised’ and stand as the template against which new 
initiatives are envisioned.  More ‘muscular’ forms of action may then replace 
ostensibly feminised modes of protest, reproducing patriarchal relations and 
valuations of politics even as they offer important new avenues of resistance. 
As practices of resistance continually adapt to meet these shifting forms of power – 
creating new limits and rules of the game – the depth of normativity ensures a 
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presumed division between ‘political’ and ‘social’ which relates the former to 
masculinity and conflict, while associating the latter with femininity and the domestic.  
Even in periods of temporary suspension or inversion catalysed by mass-mobilisation, 
such as the 2011 summer of ‘social protests’ against the cost of living, hegemonic 
patterns of gender serve to structure discourses, practices, agendas and collectivities, 
bolstering beliefs in and experiences of the state as sovereign – the sole arbiter of 
politics, defined in masculine terms of conflict, occupation and violence.  While 
reducing risk of fragmentation within the movement by absolving participants of the 
need to articulate a position on Israel’s occupation and its Palestinian citizens, the 
pursuit of apolitical politics reaffirms politics as the realm of state and government, 
ultimately entrenching ‘normalcy’ and relations of domination beneath a mask of 
transformation. 
 
Rethinking Apathy and Domination  
Thus gender emerges as a thread structuring the tapestry of Jewish Israeli normality, 
at the same time as its hegemonic patterns arise through the interweaving of multiple 
layers of power which constitute ‘ordinary life.’  Yet as argued and demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, analyses cannot stop at the production and maintenance of the 
everyday or normality.  Rather, through the lens of gender analysis we might see more 
clearly the micro politics of domination in Israel-Palestine, the ways in which consent 
is socially manufactured through both passivity and action (Gramsci 1971).  Not 
solely a matter of coercion or the imposition of power, domination takes shape and 
gains purchase through the mundane, the ordinary, the everyday – through our 
investments, pursuits and desires.  Regularised and normalised through the familiarity 
of gendered roles, codes, norms and relations, power becomes not just “tolerable only 
on the condition that it mask a substantial part of itself,” as suggested by Michel 
Foucault (1998 [1978]: 86), but makes particular lives liveable, as this thesis has 
illustrated. 
Thus a gendered analysis of political stasis among Jewish Israelis must go beyond the 
construction of normalcy to consider the ways in which power might implicate even 
those who oppose and resist in the practices, policies and material realities which 
underwrite the occupation of the Palestinian Territories and annexed East Jerusalem. 
  
 237 
Admittedly, a thesis which details how the textures, complexities and contradictions 
of normality presented here come to constitute the ultimate success of the Zionist 
project might offer a stronger political tool than an analysis that grapples with the 
theoretical terrain of political disengagement and inaction.  Yet the active constitution 
of Jewish Israeli normality is but half the puzzle.  Rather, this thesis has argued that 
some Jewish Israelis see normality for what it is – they experience and understand the 
dependency of everyday life upon conflict and their implication within prevailing 
norms, relations, roles and codes.  The query posed here is what the disillusionment, 
despair, hopelessness, silence, disengagement and inaction of this group of Jewish 
Israelis might tell us about a wider society.  What can resistance and action desired yet 
not pursued tell us about power in Israel-Palestine?   
In looking to stasis and the work required for its production and maintenance, this 
research makes visible the multiple textures of apathy – degrees of division and 
entanglement, modes of avoidance and action, sites of investment and withdrawal, and 
instantiations of rupture and repair – while foregrounding the gendered subjectivities 
and sociality central to domination in Israel-Palestine.  Normalcy then becomes a 
meeting point, the site in which everyday life becomes directly implicated in 
domination.  Not only a tension (Kelly 2008) or desire (Berlant 2007, 2008), normalcy 
critically provides the fabric through which power circulates and gains purchase.  
Normalcy simultaneously arises from and yields systems of meaning, modes of 
relating and frames for understanding, which produce and maintain existing material 
realities.  Suffused with hierarchies of privilege and power, normalcy exists not a 
neutral state of passivity or a ‘default’ setting, but a practice of living politically 
charged by aspiration and action.   
Ultimately, the yes-no question of whether apathy exists among Jewish Israelis in Tel 
Aviv and West Jerusalem is not the subject of this research.  As related earlier, Jewish 
Israelis vote in high numbers, readily demonstrate their politics in streets and 
conversations, and care deeply about the worlds they live in; this is not the apathy of 
total disconnection even as individuals articulate despair, disenchantment and 
hopelessness.  What emerges through the tapestry of everyday life is active 
disengagement – a kind of hoping, trying, building, believing, knowing, relating, 
engaging and acting oriented toward self-preservation as the surrounding world 
threatens to shred the fabric of the familiar.  At the core of that familiarity is a 
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stabilising narrative of threat, persecution and transcendence – an ideology turned 
practice, politics and way of life.  In wanting intensely to hold fast to this constancy 
even as it requires insecurity, individuals and communities knowingly enter into 
bargains whose terms are increasingly costly, whose politics may grate against their 
own.  Apathy, then, is not solely a matter of political practice or participation (see 
Rosenberg 1954; Sevy 1983; Boyer 1984; Eliasoph 1997, 1998; Dolan and Holbrook 
2001; Hay 2007), but through gender analysis emerges from the accord between 
conflict and normalcy, politics and intimacy, action and inaction – as these assumed 
binaries and dualisms collapse, they produce and maintain domination.  Importantly, 
this apathy is active and problematises victimhood even as many claim paralysis, 
impotence and fatigue in the face of politics and conflict.  Like resistance and 
normalcy, apathy takes work to produce. 
Yet this active labour ultimately demands responsibility, a tension at the core of 
domination.  In work by Hannah Arendt (2006 [1963]), Frantz Fanon (1963), Max 
Weber (1978), Walter Benjamin (1978 [1921]), Antonio Gramsci (1971), Louis 
Althusser (1971), Michel Foucault (1997), Pierre Bourdieu (1977), James C. Scott 
(1990) Timothy Mitchell (1990, 1991), Carole Pateman and Charles Mills (2007), and 
the critical body of postcolonial and transnational feminist scholarship upon which 
this thesis draws, domination both begs and abjures responsibility.  What are the 
implications of domination when explicitly maintained through the practice of 
disengagement, through the will to absolution?  Often during interviews in Tel Aviv 
and West Jerusalem I heard the desire for normalcy expressed in plaintive or wistful 
tones, a wish identified by its speaker as fleeting at the moment of articulation.  It 
seemed to me then that this practice of normalcy – living in pursuit or as if – might be 
sof ha derech, “the best of the best” for Zionism and Jewish Israelis living in Israel.  
Resonant with hegemonic narratives, daily life lived as constant aspiration against the 
backdrop and through the continuation of conflict seemed the ultimate triumph of 
Zionist ideology – the Israeli state and its people must never arrive to their destination.  
Here striving assumes an eternal quality despite the creation of a ‘homeland’ and 
provision of security, the stated goals of early political Zionism.  Yet as argued above, 
this is but half the puzzle. 
Perhaps the normalcy outlined here can be conceived of as its own form of arrival, its 
own ‘promised land’ which upends the persistence of liminality.  In this, normality 
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becomes the site where individuals are freed from concerns, pressures, complexities, 
contradictions and tensions – here work is finally not required.  Seemingly void of 
politics, threat, persecution and conflict, ‘normalcy’ might exist a conceptual Zion as 
fatigue with perseverance results from the endless iteration of the hegemonic narrative.  
“I believe both sides are assholes,” Dov said at the end of our interview as he crushed 
a final cigarette and we finished our glasses of Coca-Cola on the dilapidated couch in 
his Tel Aviv living room.  “That’s why I want peace.  But what is peace?  I want my 
life to be good and theirs too.  I want to consider them like Sweden or New Zealand.  
There are so many countries that have problems that I don’t care or think about, I 
don’t stay awake at night over them.  Shitty things happen all the time.  But this is our 
life here.”4  As this thesis has illustrated, like Dov many Jewish Israelis have grown 
tired of ‘triumphing over difficulties’ as the hegemonic narrative prescribes – then 
perhaps their adherence to normalcy actually indicates the failure of Zionism rather 
than its apogee.  In order for Zionism to persist as an ideology, practice and politics it 
requires constant threat; yet the interviews and observations which form the basis of 
this research project point to the ways in which this relation has grown increasingly 
unsustainable, requiring ever more labour of maintenance and repair.  People are tired, 
exhausted from living life as a project rather than a fact, wearied by surviving rather 
than living (Berlant 2007: 291).  If so, the continuing ‘success’ of Zionism may be its 
very demise – if Zionism cannot be separated from its journey and cycles of repetition, 
fatigue and arrival might spell destruction.    
Then the phrase ‘Ma la’asot?’ [What can we do?] may indicate a growing fracture 
even as it makes visible the ways in which apathy takes shape through active 
disengagement.  Indeed, those who expressed this very sentiment did so precisely in 
an attempt to convey their lack of apathy, the ways in which they continue to care 
despite hopelessness and feel that they should act despite inefficacy, how they remain 
aware and opposed to what happens around them.  These individuals would be or 
could be moved to act, they want to act, used to act, feel the need to act, or claim scant 
knowledge of how to act – in its kinetic and potential energy, action lies at the heart of 
their tension.  I argue that this action might be catalysed by an admission of 
implication in domination, by the recognition and assumption of responsibility.  
                                                
4 Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
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Throughout interviews in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, the term “responsibility” 
arose explicitly in combination with politics, conflict and activism – who is or feels 
responsible for a given situation regardless of actions taken.  Messily entangled with 
victimhood rather than constituting its binary opposite, responsibility brings costs to 
bear on those whose privilege implies domination.  As an activist with Gisha, Zochrot 
and B’Tselem,5 Irit made this connection explicit during our exchange at a Tel Aviv 
café: 
[People are not interested in being involved] because there is a big personal 
price.  I felt that I paid a big price at the time of the [first] intifada.  
[Involvement] requires you to disconnect from society, you have to deal with 
things which are unpleasant, you have to take responsibility for things.  To 
sympathise and to do something – they are something else…  People live small 
lives.  It’s disturbing to get out of these lives and deal with things here – it’s all 
so loaded.6   
Indeed Asaf, a long-time activist filmmaker, similarly reflected on the relationship 
between privilege, action, responsibility and cost, stating, “When I think about the 
occupation I feel responsibility.  That’s the strongest thing I feel.  I feel responsible to 
do what is in my power to do.  Sometimes I do more, sometimes I do less…  Now I’m 
very tired from it.  It’s exhausting.”7  So too a Jerusalem participant active in queer, 
Mizrahi and anti-occupation initiatives invoked the “responsibility of privilege” when 
describing how the willingness to acknowledge and sacrifice this position divides 
“radical” activism from its “non-radical” cousin, potentially causing loss of common 
ground.8  In this way, intimate, collective and political costs emerge as individuals 
                                                
5 Gisha – Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement is a Jewish Israeli activist organisation which uses 
legal assistance and public advocacy “[…] to protect the freedom of movement of Palestinians, 
especially Gaza residents”; see http://www.gisha.org/content.asp?lang_id=en&p_id=5, accessed 26 
March 2013.  Zochrot carries out actions including organised tours, cinematic events, demonstrations 
and preservation initiatives with the stated goal of “challeng[ing] the Israeli Jewish public's 
preconceptions and promote awareness, political and cultural change within it to create the conditions 
for the Return of Palestinian Refugees”; see http://zochrot.org/en, accessed 26 March 2013.  B’Tselem 
– The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories focuses on 
documentation and aims to “[…] educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights 
violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli 
public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel”; see http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem, 
accessed 26 March 2013. 
 
6 Interview in Tel Aviv, 13 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
7 Interview in Tel Aviv, 30 March 2011; handwritten notes. 
 
8 Interview in Jerusalem, 7 June 2011; handwritten notes. 
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assume responsibility for their participation in domination, again drawing attention to 
effects. 
Despite these costs, responsibility continues to hold promise for political action as it 
breaks cycles of repetition in ways which might resist repair.  While I have indeed 
argued throughout this thesis that repairs to ruptured order are necessarily incomplete 
or partial – catalysing further processes of rupture – in a context of domination the 
assumption of responsibility potentially creates a platform for solidarity.  In keeping 
with the feminist politics, methodology and commitment driving this research project, 
mapping the mechanisms through which normality and domination are secured may 
produce critical points of intervention (Hemmings 2011: 20), opening doors to 
possibilities once deemed beyond the boundaries of imagination.  Indeed, the weft and 
warp comprising the fabric of this thesis in part illustrate how “[…] narratives are 
meaning-making structures,” which produce not only normality and sociopolitical 
reality, but also counter-narratives that allow us to envision the future differently 
(Lentin 2000: 2, 21, 24).  Through this radical potential, acknowledgement of one’s 
implication in occupation, discrimination, conflict and violence without reliance upon 
claims to victimhood, indoctrination or powerlessness opens doors to new political 
alliances, new movements and partners, even as it exacts potentially heavy tolls. 
These solidarities must defy the politics of nation, race, class, gender, ethnicity, 
generation, religion and sexuality by constantly engaging in self-critique and 
processes of opening and inclusion – they cannot operate within the confines of 
privilege even as they will incompletely transcend these limits.  From land-based 
rights movements by Palestinian citizens of Israel (Plonski 2014) to legal challenges 
brought by both Jewish Israelis and Palestinians (Weizman 2013), to international 
Boycott Divest and Sanction initiatives9 and the Palestinian Campaign for the 
Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel,10 a radical politics is beginning to hold not 
only the Israeli state to account, but also Jewish Israeli society.  Those willing to 
assume responsibility might join in this critical mass gaining shape and strength 
within and beyond the borders of Israel-Palestine, translating active disengagement 
into new forms of political relationality – while responsibility indeed requires a degree 
                                                
9 See http://www.bdsmovement.net, accessed 28 March 2013. 
 
10 See http://www.pacbi.org, accessed 28 March 2013. 
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of disconnection, as Irit stated above, it may open doors to other constellations of 
community.  Indeed, as this thesis has demonstrated how domination articulates with 
hegemonic patterns of gender, feminist struggles aimed at substantive political, 
economic and social change in Israel-Palestine emerge as necessarily bound up with 
movements against occupation, racism, colonialism and capitalism.  Ultimately, 
through the pursuit of a critical transnational anti-racist politics we might collectively 
know arrival; ‘Israel-Palestine’ might become a single secular multi-national 
democratic state, rather than a conceptual state of mind. 
 
The Road’s End 
As this radical possibility holds promise, this thesis has detailed precisely the deeply 
rooted obstacles to its realisation.  Even as active disengagement might produce the 
very platform upon which solidarities, alliances and new states may one day be built, 
the processes, practices and beliefs unfolding within these pages immediately present 
greater difficulty than potential.  In this thesis I have detailed the ways in which richly 
textured apathy materialises at the intersection of history, ideology and encounter, 
through the entanglement of self, family and community, in the assumed interstice 
between politics and society; so too I have illustrated how the material and political 
realities of domination arise through discursive, psycho-social and relational 
dimensions.  In doing so, this thesis has attempted to clarify the micro-political logics 
of occupation and colonisation which operate even in resistance, revealing how 
consensus is ‘won’ through hegemony as the action/apathy binary becomes blurred.11  
Yet the political and analytical lens of gender analysis has allowed the complex fabric 
of everyday life to be understood as a pattern of interwoven threads, stitched tightly 
but indeed capable of being re-woven through a politics of responsibility. 
Political apathy as active disengagement – as investment, caring, building, knowing 
and doing – is not unique to Jewish Israelis living in Tel Aviv and West Jerusalem, 
nor is it solely characteristic of Jewish Israeli society, albeit bearing particular costs in 
Israel-Palestine.  Increasingly, the term ‘apathy’ appears as a descriptor for individual 
                                                
11 Thanks to Adam Hanieh for his comments at the SOAS Centre for Palestine Studies research student 
seminar held on 12 March 2013. 
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and collective responses to what should move us across a range of contexts and issues, 
from OECD member states (Eliasoph 1998; Hay 2007) to the MENA region before 
the uprisings of 2010 and 2011 (Diab 2009; al-Werfalli 2011), from global climate 
change (Karpf 2012) to deepening civil war in Syria (Monajed 2012).12  These wider 
frames implicate each one of us in the production and maintenance of apathy and 
domination, in the systems, structures and relations which confer privilege and 
facilitate the circulation of power as status quo.  Yet beneath any seeming lack of 
interest, weakness of will and subscription to fatigue or helplessness, we never cease 
to act.  While we may do and strive in differential spheres of influence, the effects of 
our engagement ripple to broader frames and contexts – action in one site or form may 
indeed translate to inaction in others. 
Then this thesis concludes in a flurry of tensions old and new: the yes-no matter of 
whether apathy indeed exists among Jewish Israelis goes largely unanswered; the 
project creates its own moments of rupture, potentially at risk of reproducing the 
precarity so central to Jewish Israeli normalcy; a path to transformation emerges 
explicitly through the delineation of its impediments.  Yet with focus trained on the 
centrality of gender to normalcy, apathy and domination in a context of protracted 
conflict, new means, modes and logics become clear, even as new tensions emerge to 
confront us with shifting limits and contradictions.  As Michel Foucault (1998 [1978]: 
86) reminds, “[Power’s] success is proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms” – my hope is that in revealing these mechanisms this thesis offers a 
point of intervention, contributing to new avenues to transformation in Israel-Palestine.   
May one road’s end become a new beginning.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 My citation of the final source listed here – Monajed 2012 – is not to say that I support international 
intervention in Syria; rather it is to draw attention to the use of the term ‘apathy’ to describe 
international reactions to ongoing violence and conflict in this context. 
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